Of Zoogrammatology:A Derridean theory of textual animality by Da Silva, José Rodolfo
  
Of Zoogrammatology: 
A Derridean Theory of Textual Animality  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
José Rodolfo da Silva 
Doctor of Philosophy in Critical and Cultural Theory 
School of English, Communication and Philosophy 
Cardiff University 
Cardiff, 2017
  
 
  
Declaration 
 
This work has not been submitted in substance for any other degree or award at this or any 
other university or place of learning, nor is being submitted concurrently in candidature for any 
degree or other award. 
 
Signed: José Rodolfo da Silva Date: 29 September 2017 
 
 
Statement 1 
 
This thesis is being submitted in partial fulfilment of the requirements for the degree of PhD in 
Critical and Cultural Theory. 
 
Signed: José Rodolfo da Silva Date: 29 September 2017 
 
 
Statement 2 
 
This thesis is the result of my own independent work/investigation, except where otherwise 
stated, and the thesis has not been edited by a third party beyond what is permitted by Cardiff 
University’s Policy on the Use of Third Party Editors by Research Degree Students. Other 
sources are acknowledged by explicit references. The views expressed are my own. 
 
Signed: José Rodolfo da Silva Date: 29 September 2017 
  
  
 
  
  
Summary 
 
Of Zoogrammatology: A Derridean Theory of Textual Animality  
 
This thesis aims to ‘apply’, as it were, some of Jacques Derrida’s conclusions 
regarding the age-old distinction between ideal and material to an 
understanding of animality and how it emerges in texts. I propose the 
paleonym “arche-animality” to understand the workings of animality in texts. In 
the field of Literary Animal Studies, some challenging questions concerning 
animals in texts seem to mirror Derrida’s topics in his early works. On the one 
hand, we can conceptualise animals as radically different from humans due to 
their embodiment, but, on the other hand, we can take them to be only 
differently embodied subjectivities, not unlike the human’s as it is thought to 
be housed in the body. Both positions are fraught with problems and are, in 
fact, entangled with the relationship between materiality and ideality. These 
challenging questions – especially concerning animal embodiment – must be 
approached with an eye towards paleonymy, the procedure by means of which 
Derrida was able to propose arche-writing as the origin of both vulgar writing 
and speech. To demonstrate the appropriateness of paleonymy, I uncover the 
arche-animal in different texts of different genres and varying degrees of 
‘animal presence’: a ‘theoretical’ text (Sigmund Freud’s Totem and Taboo), a film 
(Darren Arofnosky’s Black Swan), a novel (Clarice Lispector’s The Apple in the 
Dark), and a poem (Ted Hughes’ ‘The Thought-Fox’).
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The alleged derivativeness of writing, however real and massive, was 
possible only on one condition: that the “original,” “natural,” etc. 
language had never existed, never been intact and untouched by 
writing, that it had itself always been a writing. An arche-writing 
whose necessity and new concept I wish to indicate and outline here; 
and which I continue to call writing only because it essentially 
communicates with the vulgar concept of writing. The latter could 
not have imposed itself historically except by the dissimulation of 
the arche-writing. 
Jacques Derrida, Of Grammatology 
 
 
Animal language—and animality in general—represents here the still 
living myth of fixity, of symbolic incapacity, of nonsupplementarity. If 
we consider the concept of animality not in its content of 
understanding or misunderstanding but in its specific function, we 
shall see that it must locate a moment of life which knows nothing of 
symbol, substitution, lack and supplementary addition, etc.—
everything, in fact, whose appearance and play I wish to describe 
here. A life that has not yet broached the play of supplementarity 
and which at the same time has not yet let itself be violated by it: a 
life without différance and without articulation. 
Jacques Derrida, Of Grammatology 
 
 
Ecce animot. Neither a species nor a gender nor an individual. 
Jacques Derrida, The Animal That Therefore I Am 
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Introduction 
This thesis aims to challenge a common practice in Animal Studies scholarship 
regarding literary representation so as to theorise more fully the nexus 
between animality and the literary. This common practice consists of an 
extreme materialism in framing the ‘animal question’ with respect to (literary) 
language, to the exclusion of other frameworks. In short, materialism is 
portrayed as the only channel for a literary theory of animality insofar as 
‘animals in literature’ are believed to be relevant (only) due to their supposed 
material embodiment. Kari Weil refers to this tendency as the ‘counter-
linguistic turn’, in which animals’ supposed lack of language is refashioned as an 
asset reliant on their bodiliness:  
Although many current projects are intent on proving that certain 
animals do have language capabilities like those of humans, other 
sectors of animal studies are concerned with forms of subjectivity that 
are not language-based. Instead, they are concerned with ways of 
knowing that appear to work outside those processes of logocentric, 
rational thinking that have defined what is proper to the human, as 
opposed to the nonhuman animal.1  
James Berger points out, in 2005, that  
with increasing influence over the past fifteen or twenty years we can 
see in the academic humanities, in some literary fiction, and in areas of 
popular culture varieties of what we might call a counter-linguistic turn. 
[…] Their central claim is that there is an other of language, whether or 
not this other can be conceptualized, and that language does not go “all 
the way down.”2 
                                                                
1 Kari Weil, ‘Killing Them Softly: Animal Death, Linguistic Disability, and the Struggle for 
Ethics’, Configurations, 14 (2006), 87-98 (p. 87). 
2 James Berger, ‘Falling Towers and Postmodern Wild Children: Oliver Sacks, Don DeLillo, and 
Turns against Language’, PMLA, 120 (2005), 341-361 (p. 344). 
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As one of the symptoms of this linguistic turn, Berger cites ‘studies 
across several fields that stress materiality or physicality. This work often 
focuses on the body, which serves as a crucial and contested boundary marker 
for the limits of language’.3 And in neurologist Oliver Sack’s popular writings, 
he argues that ‘the deepest experience of living as a human animal, the most 
basic form of consciousness, is not symbolic or linguistic. It is bodily, a sense of 
at-homeness in the body’.4 This focus on the animal side of the human, or on 
what we could call our uncanny proximity to animals, functions to stress their 
distinct type of embodiment, since the material existence we share with them 
encounters in our linguistically saturated nature a limit to this proximity. The 
emphasis on bodily matter engendered by such similarity would serve to posit 
matter once again as that which would ground ontology, as a way of writing it 
out of ‘theory’ and the constitutive powers of language. Such matter could 
easily be found in objects, or the mineral and vegetal kingdoms, but the fact 
that humans and animals are otherwise extremely similar works to underscore 
this materiality – and its push into language – in ways not available to other 
beings. Animals would represent, then, an exteriority to language, 
conceptuality, reason, and literature, exposing literary texts to their own 
limitations. I shall attempt, however, to expose the metaphysical foundation of 
such an analytical frame by revisiting Derrida’s critique of the simple evocation 
of matter. His complication of the material/ideal dichotomy will be shown to 
represent a more productive response to this duality and this will have crucial 
                                                                
3 Ibid. 
4 Ibid., p. 350. 
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consequences to a thinking of animality as grounded on bodily materiality. 
Crucially for literary studies, the materialism I shall be critiquing more often 
than not goes hand in hand with a methodological anti-formalism: literary texts 
are read as intricate forms of paraphrase of the real, material, embodied lives 
of animals, which means their textual form is secondary.5 
Interestingly, a radical formalist approach to texts could be attempted in 
the name of very focus on embodiment and materiality that guides the interest 
in animals within Literary Animal Studies. Hence, this formalism could be 
defended as a type of anti-speciesist literary criticism. If we read this in 
Cartesian terms, this sort of formalism would suggest an independence of the 
(animal) body (form as the body of the text) from the soul-or-mind, or even 
some kind of radical materialism that prioritises bodies before souls. However, 
as we saw, many literary scholars approach animals as objects in literary texts, 
as subject matters that can be and indeed are at stake at any other medium. At 
the level of object, this approach attempts to circle the specificity of animality 
as a different form of embodiment, while at the level of method, the text itself, 
as the form or embodiment of signification, is overlooked. 
For example, Robert McKay frames the emergence of Literary Animal 
Studies by stating that ‘[i]n the mid- to late-1990s, very few scholars were 
concerned with the near omnipresence of nonhuman animals in literary texts’, 
and he accuses those works which did try to address ‘the animal question’ 
                                                                
5 Cf. Kenneth Shapiro and Marion W. Copeland, ‘Toward a Critical Theory of Animal Issues in 
Fiction’, Society & Animals 13 (2005), 343-346. 
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before then of ‘coming nowhere near capturing the fullness of animals’ presence 
in literary and cultural history’.6 Similarly, Marion W. Copeland praises Literary 
Animal Studies which ‘approached canonical literature […] and found rich 
untapped sources of information on both human relations with and attitudes 
toward other animals’, sources whose ‘mining […] has become one goal of 
Literary Animal Studies’.7 McKay and Copeland defend seemingly disparate 
views on the relationship between animal ‘presence’ and textuality: whereas 
the former believes animals are present in texts (omnipresent, in fact), the 
latter seems to suggest that literary discourse is a medium capable of 
delivering us hard nuggets of important information about animals, who one 
assumes are therefore very present, albeit elsewhere. But McKay’s subtle shift 
from ‘omnipresence in texts’ to ‘presence in literary and cultural history’ points 
towards a belief in that material presence of animals despite and outside texts. If 
animals are ‘present’ in texts, they are apparently represented therein, à la 
Copeland, as pieces of information. She finally confirms hers and McKay’s 
similarity by asserting that some ‘poetry […] brings readers into the presence of 
other-than-human animals’.8 The ‘presence of non-human animals in works of 
fiction’ is also mentioned by Shaviro and Copeland, who also decry (the 
presence of?) animal ‘absent referent[s]’.9 
                                                                
6 Robert McKay, ‘What Kind of Literary Animal Studies Do We Want, or Need?’, Modern Fiction 
Studies 60 (2014), 636-644 (p. 637, my emphases). 
7 Marion W. Copeland, ‘Literary Animal Studies in 2012: Where We Are, Where We Are 
Going’, Anthrozoös 25 (2012), supplement, 91-105 (p. 99, my emphasis). 
8 Ibid. 
9 Shapiro and Copeland, p. 343. 
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Two interrelated gestures are performed in these position papers. On 
the one hand, we have the belief that animals can be made to be present in 
texts by means of appropriate writing or reading practices. On the other, there 
is a clear sense in which animals inhabit a completely separate realm against 
which the literary pushes. Both are joined in the assumption that some sort of 
presence may be evoked by means of textual networks of references, and, 
more importantly, that this evocation is the overarching work of textuality and 
literature. This formulation owes its logic to the very concept of form and how 
it has been understood in poetics.  
However, as I shall discuss in more detail, there are many reasons why a 
formalist textual approach that could rightfully be called anti-speciesist is 
ultimately untenable. Still, as we saw, the animalised meanings that underpin 
the very formulation of formalism would seem to invite us to strive to make 
formalism work in the name of a non-speciesist poetics and criticism that 
would liberate the body of form from subjugation to the soul of content. The 
whole problem seems to stem from the double pressure exercised on form – 
that it be the way texts appear but also that it always point to a what other than 
itself – and this connects to some of Derrida’s complications of the 
material/ideal duality in the concept of the signifier. 
Another contribution to the area of Literary Animal Studies is Pieter 
Vermeulen and Virginia Richter’s introduction to their edited volume of the 
European Journal of English Studies titled Modern Creatures, where they put 
forward the privileging of the concept of ‘creature’ and of ‘the creaturely’ as 
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key frameworks in the work of animal studies.10 Their main reference point is 
the work of Anat Pick, whose definition of the creaturely they cite: ‘[t]he 
creaturely is primarily the condition of exposure and finitude that affects all 
living bodies whatever they are’.11 And it is crucial to their project that Pick 
situates her emphasis on creatureliness as part of a resistance against the 
tendency to project human traits onto animals. Another important influence is 
the work of Eric Santner, whom they credit as also responsible for the scholarly 
relevance of the term ‘creaturely’. However, they underline some differences 
between Santner and Pick regarding creatureliness, especially the former’s 
understanding that human vulnerability and exposure is not only a product of 
its biological, animal nature. For him, human contingency is determined by only 
to its embodied vulnerability, but also by its exposure to ‘spiritual forces’ and 
‘social textures […] that uncannily animate the human body’.12 
In the area of Literary Animal Studies, Susan McHugh’s writings are 
among the most perceptive to this problem and to the perceived necessity of 
some kind of formalist poetics of animality. For her, animals ‘at once serv[e] as 
a metaphor for the poetic imagination and voic[e] the limits of human 
experience’. But, beyond that, their ‘peculiar operations of agency, these ways 
of inhabiting literature without somehow being represented therein, present 
tremendous opportunities for recovering and interrogating the material and 
                                                                
10 Pieter Vermeullen and Virginia Richter, ‘Introduction: Creaturely Constellations’, European 
Journal of English Studies 19 (2015), 1-9 (p. 2). 
11 Ibid., p. 3. 
12 Ibid., p. 5. 
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representational problems specific to animality’,13 but also to literature, since 
she entertains that ‘species being works in literary texts as a function of what 
we think of as their literariness’.14 She argues that ‘the problem of animals [is] 
written into the metaphysics of speech and subjectivity’.15 Despite her 
discussion of animal agency, she criticises the temptation of transferring 
subjectivity onto animals, suggesting that ‘sublimation of cross-species 
violence […] derives from the valorization of psychic interiority as the defining 
quality of the human in literary research’ and such ‘subjectivity entails a very 
specific and limiting story of agency’.16 She understands that  
the focus on embodiment, surfaces, and exteriority […] perhaps most 
clearly distinguishes animals as agents of an order different from that of 
human subjectivity—more precisely, as actors operating in accordance 
with a logic different from that of intentionality or psychological 
interiority.17 
However, she does not believe that privileging this beyond-human 
embodiment is the answer to the methodological problems posed by animals, 
since this reliance on animal transcendence misses the point of the enmeshing 
of animality and text. She holds that the argument for the irrelevance of 
literature and textuality for animals is groundless, since ‘messy entanglements 
of human and animal agents become sedimented even in cultural practices 
without immediate ties to animals’.18 Therefore, she defends the argument I am 
putting forth that one must find an answer to animal representation which is at 
                                                                
13 Susan McHugh, ‘Literary Animal Agents’, PMLA, 124 (2009), 487-495 (p. 487). 
14 Ibid., p. 488. 
15 Ibid., p. 489. 
16 Susan McHugh, ‘Modern Animals: From Subjects to Agents in Literary Studies’, Society & 
Animals, 17 (2009), 363-367 (p. 365). 
17 McHugh, ‘Literary Animal Agents’, p. 491. 
18 Ibid., p. 490. 
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the same time a methodological and theoretical position. She couples the issue 
of how to account for animal subjectivity (and/or animal embodiment) with the 
cultural practices that support and are supported by the very concepts of 
animal being. Thus, in literature, for example, McHugh would suggest both that 
one not privilege texts about animals being portrayed as transcendent to 
textuality or to the human world, and that one be attuned to how textuality 
itself as a cultural practice is suffused with the very issues it is trying to 
represent. As it is, her thinking is not only a call for a different thinking about 
animals, but also a qualified call for a formalist criticism attuned to the 
animality of textuality itself, to the ‘countless animal aspects of texts’.19 
However, McHugh arrives at a conundrum. Texts exhibit animal aspects 
and animal being is enmeshed into textuality, but that still does not tell us 
about the texture of animal agency. An animal subjectivity similar to a human’s 
threatens to efface any animal specificity, and misses the fact that even human 
subjectivity is constructed on the basis of a metaphysics of inside and outside 
wholly organised by concepts such as body and soul. On the other hand, 
ascribing to the animal a transcendence to language and text suggests wishful 
thinking, and ignores the extent to which this transcendence is prescribed by 
language itself. McHugh’s way out is openly guided by ‘the Deleuzian 
assumption […] that animality permeates language, literature, and everything 
as a line of flight or potential for becomings’,20 a position with which I not only 
agree but that I also explore to some extent in Chapter 3. I believe, however, 
                                                                
19 McHugh, ‘Modern Animals’, p. 363. 
20 McHugh, ‘Literary Animal Agents’, p. 493. 
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that there is a second, Derridean answer to the problem, which is more attuned 
to the issues raised by literary signification. 
Several other literary scholars have approached the issue of animality 
from a Derridean perspective. In their introduction to Seeing Animals after 
Derrida, Sarah Bezan and James Tink stress the importance of considering 
Derrida’s work on animals (and the wider ‘nonhuman turn’ in the humanities) 
against a backdrop of questions and challenges posed to Derrida and his 
overall thought.21 For example, they identify in readings of Derrida’s The 
Animal That Therefore I Am, even by those supportive of its general project, a 
disappointment with the text’s apparent refusal ‘to consider fully what the 
animal is as such’ and with the ‘lack of specificity’ of Derrida’s animal.22 A 
different approach underscored by them is reading the animal in Derrida as 
part of ‘the ongoing problem of the trace of the Other’: the argument goes that, 
even if the animal as a motif only emerged in his later texts, it came about as 
continuation of the issues of différance and the trace. As they put it, ‘in this case 
the condition of the living is far from being a state of the human being that 
could be simply attributed as animality, but instead an idea of arche-writing, as 
in an organization of traces and signs as a text that are the preconditions of 
understanding subjectivity and being’.23 However, the ‘restatement’ of the 
early Derrida of arche-writing in the animal lectures is not an uncontroversial 
observation, since literary studies, critical theory, and philosophy have seen a 
                                                                
21 Sarah Bezan and James Tink, ‘Introduction’, in Seeing Animals After Derrida, ed. by Sarah 
Bezan and James Tink (Lanham: Lexington, 2018), pp. ix-xxii (p. ix). 
22 Ibid, pp. x, xii. 
23 Ibid., p. xii. 
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turn towards ‘ideas of life, the bioethical and the affect, and indeed 
ecocriticism, which are sometimes leveled against deconstruction’, in the years 
after Derrida’s death.24 Bezan and Tink then identify Timothy Morton and 
Claire Colebrook as two examples of thinkers who are attempting to bridge 
deconstruction with the recent ‘non-textual turn’. Finally, Bezan and Tink’s 
own project is to explore the visual aspect in Derrida’s anecdote of being naked 
before the cat’s gaze in order to inquire ‘how the human comes to be exposed 
and made vulnerable in relation to the (in)visible animal’.25 For them, the 
ethical project before us involves acknowledging ‘the inherent meaning of 
nonhuman materiality’, and ‘the limitations of human perception’. This ethical 
call is similarly polarising, since it also separates the field of animal studies in 
two. They cite Giovanni Aloi’s diagnosis of two different views on the issue of 
animal visibility, with one group reliant on the posthumanist distrust for 
visibility as ‘truth-constructing’ and another counting on visibility as an 
epistemological strategy.26 
Sarah Bezan connects Derrida’s project in The Animal That Therefore I Am 
to some emerging areas such as new materialism, speculative realism, and 
object-oriented ontology.27 She sees those fields as allies to animal studies, as 
she argues that ‘a wide variety of scholars in the environmental humanities, 
ecocriticism, posthumanism, and animal studies more broadly’ are united in 
                                                                
24 Ibid., p. xiii. 
25 Ibid., p. xiv. 
26 Ibid., p. xv. 
27 Sarah Bezan, ‘The Anterior Animal: Derrida, Deep Time, and the Immersive Vision of 
Paleoartist Julius Csotonyi’, in Seeing Animals After Derrida, ed. by Sarah Bezan and James Tink 
(Lanham: Lexington, 2018), pp. 65-86 (p. 66). 
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‘dismantling transcendental humanism’ and criticising ‘the human’s strategies of 
mediation of the natural world, whether it be through consciousness, language, 
[or] spectrality’ by means of of a ‘combat’ against the ‘transcendental 
mediation of “Nature”‘.28 This is a very sweeping statement, as the fields she 
mentions clearly contain a wide range of different view of materiality. Timothy 
Morton, especially, whom she mentions in this context, writes against the 
belief in the possibility of simply doing away with the mediation of ‘Nature’. 
More serious, however, is the mischaracterisation of the Derridean position by 
his inclusion in this list (nominally, but also as an important thinker for many 
within those fields). The so-called linguistic turn with which Derrida is 
commonly associated actually emerges in his work as a rejection of 
transcendentalism that still constantly rejects any kind of simple material 
reality. Derrida addressed the pitfalls of materialism as a solution against 
transcendentalism several times in his writing, and answered questions 
directly on this issue in interviews. I shall discuss these positionings throughout 
the thesis and more specifically when I analyse Donna Haraway’s similar 
critiques of him. 
A crucial contribution to the field of Derridean Animal Studies is the 
edited collection The Animal Question in Deconstruction. In her introduction, 
editor Lynn Turner states clearly that the collection's remit is 'to take Jacques 
Derrida seriously when the says that he had always been thinking about the 
company of animals and that deconstruction has never limited itself to 
                                                                
28 Ibid., p. 69. 
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language, still less "human" language'.29 Apparently as a response to the title 
'The Autobiographical Animal' -- the conference in which the The Animal That 
Therefore I Am lectures were given -- Derrida provides a helpful overview of 
animal figures that populated his texts. However, Turner argues that 'these […] 
animals have largely escaped wider attention'. On the other hand, she points 
out that many scholars have emphasised that 'Derrida's work pointed to the 
deconstruction of the elevation of "man" above all others well before the 
pedagogical "tipping point" of The Animal That Therefore I Am'.30 
Thus formulated, the remit of the book seems two-pronged. On the one 
hand, it is concerned with the exploration of animal figures in Derrida's texts 
that have been overlooked in Derridean scholarship (the insect of 'Tympan'; 
the sponge in Signsponge; the wolves, elephants, and lions in The Beast and the 
Sovereign; the mole in 'Freud and the Scene of Writing'; the lion in his 
'Introduction' to Husserl's Origin of Geometry; not to the mention the more 
famous hedgehog from 'Che Cos'è La Poesia' and the cat from The Animal That 
Therefore I Am). On the other hand, the book strives to locate the importance of 
animality as a structural concept for the very project of deconstruction 
(embedded in a discussion of more-than-human language, for example) even 
when animal figures are not being directly discussed by Derrida. It is arguable that 
the book excels mostly in the former endeavour, but it is the latter venture that 
I am especially concerned with. Throughout the thesis, the decision to privilege 
                                                                
29 Lynn Turner, ‘Introduction: The Animal Question in Deconstruction’, in The Animal Question 
in Deconstruction, ed. by Lynn Turner (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2013), pp. 1-8 (p. 
2). 
30 Ibid., p. 3. 
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structural – rather than topical – animality will be continuously argued in 
theoretical, methodological, philosophical, and ethical terms. 
Therefore, I argue that it is symptomatic of the co-implication of 
animality and language as they are understood by philosophical tradition that 
this conundrum concerning the animal is the one Derrida faces when 
deconstructing the linguistic sign. More specifically, the question of how to 
approach the materiality of signs is the problem that opens the way for Derrida 
to propose most of his ideas. In his lengthy intervention in Husserl’s thought, 
Derrida attacked phenomenology’s disavowal, in the name of ideal 
transcendentality, of all that is bodily and material. This attack did not entail a 
triumphant materialism, since Derrida’s deconstructive reading, instead of 
simply refuting what Husserl proposes, identified in his formulation the 
unspoken possibility of both Husserlian idealism and of a naïve empirical 
materialism. Originary difference, its play and work, différance, the trace, 
iterability – these are all names for that which is enmeshed in its material 
support but which cannot be reduced to it. Literary Animal Studies can, 
therefore, find both the specific materiality of the animal and the bodily form of 
texts in the impure undecidable of that which is neither material nor 
immaterial. Similarly, it is well known that, in Of Grammatology, Derrida frees 
writing from its subordination to speech to show that all of language depends 
on a certain scriptural function derived from what he terms arche-writing. 
Just as arche-writing is situated ‘before’ the common differentiation 
between speech and writing, I argue that ‘before’ the distinction between 
human and animal as the metaphysical distinction between spirit and body, 
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there must be a sort of pure difference, a pure inscriptional space where the 
differentiation between body and soul might be possible. I call that the arche-
animal. Leonard Lawlor has discussed this Derridean recourse to old names as 
the ‘second phase’ of deconstruction, after the initial moment of overturning 
the classical hierarchy (e.g. speech/writing, human/animal). The second phase 
‘reinscribes the previously inferior term as the “origin” or “resource” of the 
hierarchy itself’, so that this term ‘becomes what Derrida calls an “old name” or 
a “paleonym”’.31 Lawlor sees these terms as ‘the experience of a process of 
differentiation that is also repetition’, or as ‘the experience of language where 
language is taken in a broad sense’.32 
In a Derridean Literary Animal Studies, animals cannot be regarded as 
simply matter, since it is clear that they are anima-ted matter, whose spark of 
life engenders auto-affection and movement. Their bodies cannot, however, be 
wished away in a repetition of speciesist, Cartesian conclusions that would 
consider these bodies to be simply cases for animal minds. As we saw, an 
animal subjectivity, constructed in the human mould, would make the animal 
itself vanish. And if this entire formulation is, as I argued, co-extensive with the 
structure and functioning of signification, it should be both possible and 
desirable to read the animated matter of texts, their play of form. The form of a 
text (its grammar) should be detachable from both its content (semantics) and 
its substance (phonology, graphematics, typography, etc.), in order for us to get 
                                                                
31 Leonard Lawlor, This Is Not Sufficient : An Essay on Animality and Human Nature in Derrida (New 
York: Columbia University Press, 2007), p. 30. 
32 Ibid. 
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at the animal aspects of texts. But is that even possible? Is form ever 
identifiable in texts in any way separable from its meaning and material 
support? 
The representation undertaken by signs is without a doubt essentially 
linked to animality. As I shall show, there could be no representation without 
animals, insofar as they provide us with the play of form. However, it is 
impossible for it to emerge phenomenally, in texts, as such, for that would 
require the process of signification to appear without actually signifying 
anything. Similarly, there is no signification which is not, in a way, trapped in the 
support of a substance, since there are no signs without a sensible face. It is 
therefore only possible to identify the moment when or the site where 
textuality reveals the scar of the impossibility of simply signifying. In a text, 
signification appears to collapse into either dumb marks on a page or abstract, 
conceptual meaning, both of which I believe to be counter-productive objects 
for Literary Animal Studies. But pinpointing signification as such – that which 
makes specific meanings possible – would be crucial for understanding the 
arche-animal as it works in literary texts and I shall explore whether 
signification as such can be an object of literary analysis. 
Other scholars have also stressed the enmeshing of animality and 
textuality. Kári Driscoll, discussing animal literature under the name 
‘zoopoetics’, advances that the latter is engaged with the ‘constitution’ of the 
animal in language but also with the constitution of language in relation to the 
animal. He entertains that zoopoetics might even ben ‘the most fundamental 
form of poetics’, since it involves the fundamental distinction between human 
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and animal as it is usually based on language.33 Driscoll includes an important 
historical aspect to his point, since he maps an explosion of zoopoetics around 
the time of early twentieth-century literary modernism and industrial 
modernity. The crisis of language, or Sprachkrise, explored by the animal texts 
of the early 1900s, represents, for Driscoll, a diminished faith on the 
representative powers of language, which he views as intrinsically intertwined 
with a crisis of anthropocentrism and a crisis of the animal. An acute awareness 
of the ‘prison-house of language’ and the desire to escape it led artists and 
writers to explore zoopoetics, since ‘any attempt to escape the boundaries of 
linguistic consciousness must proceed via the animal, which exists on the 
boundary of language and meaning, forever eluding conceptualisation, slipping 
toward the ineffable’.34 Ultimately, Driscoll defends that the question of 
language itself has always been (also) the question of the animal. In his view, 
literary animal studies approaches animals as ‘present[ing] a specific problem 
to and for language and representation’35 and he justifies this position with 
reference to the privileged position of animals in the mythical accounts of the 
origins of art, music, poetry, and language. 
Responding to the question of the ‘creaturely’, Sarah Bouttier starts 
from Anat Pick’s work in order to make the point that texts can be thought as 
creaturely as well. This textual creatureliness stems from a text’s ‘being 
embodied and finite at the same time, in a way that redefines their materiality 
                                                                
33 Kári Driscoll, ‘The Sticky Temptation of Poetry’, Journal of Literary Theory, 9 (2015), 212-229 
(p. 223). 
34 Ibid., p. 222. 
35 Ibid., p. 227. 
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and referentiality’. Their materiality as texts secures their bodiliness while 
their struggle to establish ‘their objects’ presence in the world’ opens them up 
to finitude - they are constantly being denied an embodiment which is other 
than their textual selves.36  
She suggests that not all texts can be considered to be creaturely, 
however, even if a creature textual object is not a ‘sine qua non fore creaturely 
textuality’.37 Rather, she views objects which are creatures as facilitators for 
the creatureliness of texts. Bouttier grounds her understanding of text on 
Derrida and ‘deconstructionist theory’, since they portray the text as 
constantly ‘navigat[ing] between self-referentiality and a gesturing towards 
the outside’ (113-4). Starting from Derrida’s description of a poem as a 
hedgehog, Bouttier entertains that ‘the poem is theorised as embodied 
because it binds together letter (itself) and meaning (a reference to what is 
outside itself)’, and is defined by this ‘double allegiance’.38 
 She suggests that the most successful a text can be in representing 
animal reality’s creaturely embodiment is by precisely offering up its own 
textuality – it is textuality itself and not its capacity for representation that is 
most productive for referencing the animal. ‘The text intimates a sense of the 
creaturely by gesturing towards a creaturely reality without trying to express 
it in a mimetic manner, but rather by being something itself and sharing that 
presence with the creaturely.’39 
                                                                
36 Sarah Boutier, ‘Creaturely Texts, Texts on Creatures’, European Journal of English Studies, 19 
(2015), 111-122 (p. 111). 
37 Ibid. 
38 Ibid., p. 114. 
39 Ibid., p. 115. 
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 She also addresses what I am going to call the issue of ‘corpus selection’, 
namely: how does one choose which text to analyse when the overarching 
argument being made is about the very character of textuality itself? Would a 
strategy of careful selection (choosing texts about animals, for example) 
undermine the argument for the important of textual materiality and the 
secondarity of referentiality? She concedes that ‘it remains that the 
representation of the creaturely impacts a text’s form to the point that it 
changes genres’ and she calls attention to the fact that Deleuze and Guattari, 
when writing about becoming-animal, ‘invariably choose texts and works of art 
dealing with animals’. For her, ‘this is consistent with their idea that the animal 
object plays an active part in the creative process of becoming animal - it is not 
only chosen by but actively alters the work of art and its producer’.40 In short, 
she proposes that the creatures referenced by creaturely texts, rather than 
simply furnish a target for linguistic representation, turn out to actively 
‘account for the [text’s] form’.41 
Thus, within that context, I call the study of the arche-animal in 
literature zoogrammatology, since it mirrors grammatology, the scientific study 
of arche-writing as proposed by Derrida. Of Grammatology initially appears to 
propose a scientific field that would study (arche-)writing, but Derrida 
denounces the impossibility of such a project from the start: ‘writing is not only 
an auxiliary means in the service of science—and eventually its object—but first 
                                                                
40 Ibid., p. 117. 
41 Ibid., pp. 117-8. 
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[…] the condition of possibility of ideal objects and therefore of scientific 
objectivity. Before being its object, writing is the condition of the epistémè’.42 
By a process of substitution already familiar to Of Grammatology, one could 
write: Animality is not only an auxiliary means in the service of literature—and 
eventually its object—but first the condition of possibility of signs and 
therefore of representation. Before being its object, animality is the condition 
of mimesis. 
Literary Animal Studies, or zoogrammatology, can work to reveal this 
condition. However, just as writing eludes the scrutiny of science since it turns 
out to be merely the effect of a repression of the ‘older’, more generalised 
arche-writing, it is likely that these animal conditions of signification are 
effaced by the very procedures that seem to offer readers the animal, the 
intended referent or meaning of an ‘animal’ text. How does one go about 
‘ignoring’ the animal meaning in order to read the animal conditions? For Judith 
Butler,  
this is no easy matter. For how can one read a text for what does not 
appear within its own terms, but which nevertheless constitutes the 
illegible conditions of its own legibility? Indeed, how can one read a text 
for the movement of that disappearing by which the textual ‘inside’ and 
‘outside’ are constituted?43 
Therefore, the thesis takes as its starting point that the practice of 
paleonymy is one of the main aspects of Derrida’s deconstructive readings, 
especially the ones which are concerned with the tension between the 
                                                                
42 Jacques Derrida, Of Grammatology, Fortieth Anniversary Edition, trans. by Gayatri 
Chakravorty Spivak (Baltimore: John Hopkins University, 2016), p. 29. 
43 Judith Butler, Bodies That Matter: On The Discursive Limits of “Sex” (London and New York: 
Routledge, 1993), p. 37. 
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materiality of bodies or signifiers and the ideality of subjectivity or signifieds. I 
propose paleonymy – by putting forth the arche-animal – as necessary both to 
properly approach animals as objects of study or of representation in literature 
and to devise an appropriate critical methodology. As I hope to show, the 
aporias regarding animal being feed into and are fed by similar aporias 
regarding the character of texts and the meaning-making they enact. Thus, the 
series of readings I offer below takes seriously the invitation for a more 
formalist approach to literary texts: they do not focus on texts about animals 
and, even if they do, they do not privilege the animal content of those texts. 
Rather, I strive for a third option, dissimilar from either formalism or 
paraphrase, which attempts to locate the conditions and consequences of the 
signification process: that which happens at the interface of form and content. 
These conditions and consequences, due to the co-implication of object of 
study and methodological approach that I have suggested, will ultimately be 
the arche-animality of the text. In other words, I attempt to read the arche-
animal because it represents a more productive object of study than the usual, 
heavily loaded concept of ‘the animal’, but, at the same time, this arche-animal 
is also the focus of a methodological approach that tries to skirt both formalism 
and idealism. 
Initially, in Chapter 1, I situate the analytical strategy mentioned above 
of foregrounding animal embodiment in J. M. Coetzee’s The Lives of Animals, 
and I underscore such a strategy’s inadvertent admission of the constitutive 
powers of language in literature’s attempt to grapple with embodiment. Next I 
discuss in more detail the co-implicated character of language and materiality 
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and offer a critique of some interventions in Animal Studies and their reliance 
on a thinking of the body. I then shift the discussion onto a Derridean ground 
by revisiting his early writings on Husserl where he exposes the similarities 
between language and animality, and I conclude by discussing how Derrida’s 
deconstruction of the linguistic sign and introduction of the trace opens a space 
for thinking the animal differently. 
Assuming that linguistics and animal embodiment share the same origin, 
in Chapter 2 I turn to a reading of Sigmund Freud’s Totem and Taboo as a way of 
providing a genealogy of the materialisation of both animal and linguistic 
bodies so as to map the extent to which they overlap. In my reading, I show that 
the totem animal discussed by Freud has to be thought as an arche-animal that 
is neither ideal as the notion of species it belongs to, nor material and singular 
as one specific member of that species. This is especially important because the 
totem animal, in Freud’s account, provides totemism with its symbolising 
capacity. The emergence of totemism is presented by Freud as the shift from 
nature to culture, so that this shift will be grounded on a totemic language 
dependent on the arche-animal. This semi-mythical shift, caught up as it is in 
Freud’s infamous notion of the ‘primal crime’, furnishes some of the same 
aporias as the passage from natural symbol to conventional signifier, whose 
discussion is central to Derrida’s deconstruction of the linguistic sign. The 
strange temporality of this passage is explained by Derrida by means of 
Nachträglichkeit, a concept from Freud himself. Finally, this chapter addresses 
the concept of the arche-animal in its relationship to materiality and ideation in 
more detail. 
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Chapter 3 continues some of the psychoanalytic focus but changes 
textual genres completely by analysing Darren Aronofsky’s 2010 film Black 
Swan. I start my discussion with a brief outline of the film’s plot as evidenced by 
my analysis of one crucial scene, along with what could be called a standard 
Lacanian interpretation. After that, I delve more deeply into some of the 
thematic strands that organise the textuality of the film and set up its 
investment in arche-animality. I move on to discuss animal representation 
more specifically, which leads me into its role in psychoanalysis in general, and 
especially in Freud’s case-study about the Wolf Man. I read Freud’s account for 
its disruptive arche-animality, before connecting it both to Deleuze and 
Guattari’s becoming-animal and the film’s becoming-swan. Rather than reading 
the swan referred to in the title as a metaphor, or the ballet plot both in the film 
and in the libretto as metaphors for the psychosexual madness suffered by the 
protagonist, I analyse the assumptions made by the film regarding 
representation and its relationship to material embodiment. I argue that the 
film presents a duality between (artistic) representation as grounded in formal 
technique – which I call dancity – and representation as occurring when these 
techniques are transcended, which I call transcendanse. Both options are 
shunned, however, by the becoming-swan depicted in the film, which I claim to 
be a figure of arche-animality. 
Chapter 4 analyses animality in Clarice Lispector’s novel The Apple in the 
Dark, as it is crucial to the novel’s concern with the human passage (or the re-
treading of the passage) from nature to culture. Rather than a stage in such a 
journey, the animal is revealed by the novel as an arche-animal, an articulating 
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supplement which precedes – and thus makes possible – the differentiation 
between stages in an evolutionary scale. I locate the paleonymy of arche-
animality primarily in the poetics of light and dark prefigured in the title, but 
also in the novel’s concern with temporality and (animal) mortality. This 
concern is channelled primarily through the figure of giving birth. ‘To give 
birth’, in Portuguese, is intrinsically connected to light, since one would say, to 
mean ‘to give birth to someone’, either dar a luz a alguém (‘to give the light to 
someone’) or dar à luz alguém (‘give someone to the light’). I read the flicker in 
the novel between the two variants of the expression as indicative of a 
paleonym that not only interprets the poetics of light and dark but also 
critiques common understandings of animal embodiment. 
Finally, in Chapter 5, I read Ted Hughes’s poem ‘The Thought-Fox’ for its 
zoogrammatological contribution to debates concerning the nature of poetic 
language. I start by discussing Derek Attridge’s presentation of Roman 
Jakobson’s ‘poetic function’ and the aporias it raises, which I argue are derived 
from the repression of arche-animality. I then review Gérard Genette’s 
account of theories of linguistic representation and how different strands of 
poetics dealt with them. This segues into a discussion of the benefits and traps 
of formalist criticism and the historical background of the concept of ‘form’. 
The apparent advantages of formalism is called into question by a revision of 
Derrida’s critique of the material and ideal aspects of the linguistic sign in Of 
Grammatology. Finally, I analyse how ‘The Thought-Fox’ responds to these 
concerns by means of its intertwining the very nature of poetic representation 
with animal representation. I argue that the poem acknowledges the arche-
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animality of the fox in its constitutive role in the functioning of linguistic 
meaning. By associating successful poetry-making with an animalistic visual 
onomatopoeia (the use of repetition of the letter w to represent fox 
pawprints), the poem identifies the work of poetry with accurate 
representation of reality, at the same time as it equates that accuracy to a 
certain reverie brought about by the arche-animal. 
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Chapter 1: Animal as Text 
Introduction 
Why do animals matter for literature? Would they constitute only another 
‘end’ to be then conveyed by any given ‘medium’ – literature, for example? On 
the one hand, animals have indeed been portrayed in literary texts for 
millennia, but so have other subject matters that similarly traverse human 
existence. Animal representations have been easily employed as just another 
component of the optical system of literature, seen as the humanistic, mediatic 
‘Mirror of Man’. On the other hand, the recent scholarly attention towards 
literary animals highlights a more radical relevance of animality beyond that of 
mere topic: it could be argued that in recent criticism illuminated by 
posthumanism and Animal Studies, animals matter precisely due to their 
matter. 
The material embodiment of animals is believed to offer a stark contrast 
to the linguistic constitution of textuality, to the extent that animals ‘in’ literary 
texts are said to illuminate – and sometimes challenge – the workings of 
literature. This view is easily encountered and widespread, and can be close-
read in an array of scholarly work dedicated to ‘the question of the animal’ in 
literature. As a privileged example, one can read J M Coetzee’s musings on 
animality in The Lives of Animals as both an instance of, and an incentive for, this 
kind of criticism. With it, Coetzee – by the means of his character Elizabeth 
Costello – has encouraged the privileging of embodiment as the tenor of 
literary research into animals. 
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In this lecture disguised as novel, the fictional novelist Elizabeth 
Costello is invited to give a talk at an American university on a topic of her 
choosing, and she decides to speak about animals both in philosophy and in 
literature. The novel is basically divided into two parts, each corresponding to 
one of the talks she gives at different university departments. Her contribution 
to the approach to animals mentioned above is based on her focus on the 
animal’s radically alien being-in-the-world as compared to human reason and 
abstract thought: 
To [human] thinking, cogitation, I oppose [the animal’s] fullness, 
embodiedness, the sensation of being – not a consciousness of yourself 
as a kind of ghostly reasoning machine thinking thoughts, but on the 
contrary the sensation – a heavily affective sensation – of being a body 
with limbs that have extension in space, of being alive to the world. This 
fullness contrasts starkly with Descartes’s key state [cogito ergo sum], 
which has an empty feel to it: the feel of a pea rattling around in a shell.1 
Coetzee has in fact become a sort of patron for literary research into 
animality, having been invited to contribute chapters to books on the topic and 
to give talks in Animal Studies conferences, as well as by being an author whose 
work is often the focus of said research.2 Accordingly, Costello offers later in 
the novel her take on good and bad uses of animals in literature. Comparing the 
poem ‘The Panther’ by Rilke with Ted Hughes’s ‘The Jaguar’ and ‘Second 
Glance at a Jaguar’, she argues: ‘In that kind of poetry, […] animals stand for 
                                                                
1 J. M. Coetzee, The Lives of Animals (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1999), p. 33. All 
further references are given parenthetically in the text. 
2 The interdisciplinary book on animal rights The Death of the Animal, edited by Paola Cavalieri, 
not only includes contributions by Coetzee but also seems to reference his Costello lecture in 
the title. The second Minding Animals conference of interdisciplinary Animal Studies, held in 
Utrecht in 2012, had Coetzee deliver the opening lecture (again a short piece of fiction 
featuring Costello) and also contained a series of Literary Animal Studies panels on his work. 
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human qualities: the lion for courage, the owl for wisdom, and so forth. Even in 
Rilke’s poem the panther is there as a stand-in for something else’ (p. 50). To 
this ancient fabular textual animality – widely criticised nowadays as 
anthropomorphic3 – Costello contrasts Hughes: 
Hughes is writing against Rilke. […] With Hughes it is a matter—I 
emphasize—not of inhabiting another mind but of inhabiting another 
body. That is the kind of poetry I bring to your attention today: poetry 
that does not try to find an idea in the animal, that is not about the 
animal, but is instead the record of an engagement with him. (p. 51) 
This approach has proved immensely popular with literary scholars, to 
the point that poetry (metonymically standing for all of literature) and 
animality are said to be aligned in challenging human linguistic and rational 
limitations.4 Even beyond that, it has been suggested that what we may call the 
literary branch of Animal Studies can contribute basically that: a 
representation – and a defence – of the otherness of animals. Again, Costello 
offers us the model: 
Writers teach us more than they are aware of. By bodying forth the jaguar, 
Hughes shows us that we too can embody animals—by the process 
called poetic invention that mingles breath and sense in a way that no 
                                                                
3 Tom Tyler has analysed in detail the symbolic work animals are required to do in philosophical 
and literary texts in his CIFERAE: A Bestiary in Five Fingers (Minneapolis: University of 
Minnesota Press, 2012). I shall return to his theses in my third chapter. 
4 Two famous quotes which are constantly cited in such context are one by Bataille and 
another by Derrida: ‘nothing […] is more closed to us than this animal life from which we are 
descended. […] In picturing the universe without man, a universe in which only the animal’s 
gaze would be opened to things, […] the correct way to speak of it can overtly only be poetic, in 
that poetry describes nothing that does not slip toward the unknowable. […] The animal opens 
before me a depth that attracts me and is familiar to me. […] It is also that which is farthest 
removed from me, that which deserves the name depth, which means precisely that which is 
unfathomable to me. But this too is poetry…’ (Georges Bataille, Theory of Religion, trans. by 
Robert Hurley [New York: Zone Books, 1989], pp. 20-2. Emphases in the original.) ‘Thinking 
concerning the animal, if there is such a thing, derives from poetry. There you have a 
hypothesis: it is what philosophy has, essentially, had to deprive itself of. That is the difference 
between philosophical knowledge and poetic thinking.’ (Jacques Derrida, The Animal That 
Therefore I Am, ed. by Marie-Louise Mallet, trans. by David Wills [New York: Fordham 
University Press, 2008], p. 7) 
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one has explained and no one ever will. He shows us how to bring the 
living body into being within ourselves.5 (p. 53, my emphasis) 
It is clear, therefore, that the argumentation depends wholly on the 
distinction between body and mind. Only insofar as animal being is taken to be 
saturated with embodiment can Costello argue that animalistic literary texts 
are able to account for a ‘bodily engagement’ with something other than 
language. In truth, it remains to be determined whether such animal 
embodiment is anything other than merely the Other of language. If the very 
concept of non-linguistic, non-rational animal life whose phenomenality would 
challenge the powers of referential language can be shown to be caught up 
with linguistic function, then Costello’s ‘poetic invention’ would in no way 
transpose the limits of textuality.  
As it is, Coetzee’s wording itself exposes the doubling effect that 
referentiality produces with respect to the matter of animal being: while the 
materiality of bodies (always first and foremost an animal body, even though 
Costello stresses the commonality of embodiment across the living) is taken to 
be that which lies outside of language marking its limitations, the same matter 
is also at work within language as that which makes representation possible – 
                                                                
5 It is curious, therefore, that literary scholars would defend a role for literature that differs 
very little from manifesto or awareness raising material. Philosopher Martha Nussbaum’s work 
on animal rights, for example, ‘insists that the power of “sympathetic imagining” of the lives of 
nonhuman animals of the sort made available by literature (but not only there) is important and 
relevant to questions of moral judgment.’ (Cary Wolfe, What Is Posthumanism? [Minneapolis: 
University of Minnesota Press, 2010], p. 78). Wolfe shows, however, that ‘for Nussbaum 
literature serves as a kind of kinder, gentler supplement to analytic philosophy’s project of 
“sentimental education” stirring in us identifications, empathetic responses, and projections 
that may then be readily formalized in analytical propositions’ (Ibid., pp. 78-9.). And he quotes 
Geoffrey Harpham’s contention that ‘in Nussbaum, the specificity of literature as a discourse, 
an object of professional study, is almost altogether erased and replaced by a conception that 
treats it bluntly as moral philosophy.’ (Harpham, quoted in Wolfe, Posthumanism, p. 79.) 
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as the phenomenal, signifying breath which must be articulated with (signified) 
sense in order for ‘poetic invention’ to be. Therefore, within language itself, a 
corporeality which is always animalistic can ‘already’ be found, even ‘before’ 
linguistic signs attempt to reach for the supposed extra-linguistic matter of 
animal embodiment: the signifier as the material face of the linguistic sign, the 
concrete breath which is articulated with sense in order to produce meaning 
and reference.  
 
Animals that matter 
Geoffrey Bennington has stressed the specularity which creates a double 
effect of materiality in two distinct sites in the network of elements associated 
with the linguistic sign – the referent as well as the signifier: 
This tripartite division [signifier, signified, and referent] gives us the 
appearance of a reign of ideality (signified, concept, the intelligible) 
which touches on both sides a realm of materiality. Upstream, in first 
position, things, the world, reality; downstream, in third position, the 
signifier, the phonic or graphic body that linguistics has always thought 
of […] as that of a word […]. Following a specular structure, we can 
valorize either the domain of ideality […] or the ‘hard’ materiality of 
things and, via a perilous extension, of the signifier. We can distribute as 
we wish the values of truth and illusion in these two realms without 
escaping the basic schema: the sign has always been thought of on the 
basis of this distinction between the sensible and the intelligible, and 
cannot be thought otherwise.6 
The accusation of radical linguistic relativism (in which referenced 
bodies would always already be only the result of the very act of referencing) 
can be staved off if ‘the phonic or graphic body’ of the linguistic sign be 
                                                                
6 Geoffrey Bennington, 'Derridabase', in Jacques Derrida, ed. by Geoffrey Bennington and 
Jacques Derrida (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1993), pp. 3-316 (pp. 26-7). 
30 | CHAPTER 1: ANIMAL AS TEXT 
 
 
considered in its irreducible affiliation to an entire metaphysics of the body as 
the animal component of human existence. To the extent that even the bodies 
of humans can only be thought in articulation with animal embodiment,7 the 
sensible/intelligible schema, so succinctly gathered under – or maybe even 
produced by – the body-and-soul structure, owes its intelligibility to the 
concept of animality. In other words, it is not that Costello is wrong because 
animals are always already language, she is wrong also because any language 
(even the Rilke poem she derides) appears to be haunted by the materiality 
which is made possible by the concept of animality – that of the signifier. 
However, the primordiality of either the animal body or the signifier – with 
respect to their matter – can never be sufficiently determined and one will 
continuously haunt the other, both as product and matrix. In other words, it is 
unclear – and perhaps even aporetically impossible to know – whether 
materiality flows from the signifier to the animal body, or vice-versa; whether 
the body is primordially an animal phenomenon that influences language, or an 
effect of the material aspects of language itself. It would be necessary to 
concede that the linguistic signifier and the animal are co-dependent.   
As Judith Butler has consistently argued, the body whose materiality is 
supposedly undisavowable is constituted by language and the sign as their 
                                                                
7 The formulation animal rationale which defines the human in the metaphysical tradition 
engenders the merging of an animal body with a heavenly spiritual supplement. This is 
responsible for the unstable self-image of humanity as trapped between base animality and 
sacred divinity, which is one source of the constant anxiety over and discursive policing of that 
internal border. Thus conceived, the human is therefore a hybrid and Cary Wolfe has indeed 
argued that in the confusion of pure essences at play in hybridism the very notion of purity is 
fabricated (Cary Wolfe, Animal Rites: American Culture, the Discourse of Species, and Posthumanist 
Theory [Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2003], pp. 201-2.). There is, therefore, no body 
which is not also an animal body. 
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constitutive outsides. Insofar as signs work to signal and reference ‘bodies’, the 
latter are marked by that operation of referentiality: 
The body posited as prior to the sign is always posited or signified as prior. 
The signification produces as an effect of its own procedure the very 
body that it nevertheless and simultaneously claims as that 
which precedes its own action. If the body signified as prior to 
signification is an effect of signification, then the mimetic or 
representational status of language, which claims that signs follow 
bodies as their necessary mirrors, is not mimetic at all. On the contrary, 
it is productive, constitutive, one might even argue performative, 
inasmuch as this signifying act delimits and contours the body that it 
then claims to find prior to any signification. This is not to say that the 
materiality of bodies is simply and only a linguistic effect which is 
reducible to a set of signifiers. Such a distinction overlooks the 
materiality of the signifier itself. To posit by way of language a 
materiality outside of language is still to posit that materiality, and the 
materiality so posited will retain that positing as its constitutive 
condition. […] Can language simply refer to materiality, or is language 
also the very condition under which materiality may be said to appear?8  
Cary Wolfe approaches the same issue as a frame to understand 
different attempts of overturning humanism. Insofar as ‘the human’ 
traditionally  
is achieved by escaping or repressing not just its animal origins in 
nature, the biological, and the evolutionary, but more generally by 
transcending the bonds of materiality and embodiment altogether,9 
trying to simply affirm the materiality of embodiment does not escape the 
realm of humanism, since embodiment’s status-as-material is co-extensive 
with its disavowal by humanism. Rather, Wolfe’s posthumanism  
names the embodiment and embeddedness of the human being in not 
just its biological but also its technological world, the prosthetic 
coevolution of the human animal with the technicity of tools and 
external archival mechanisms (such as language and culture) […]—and all 
                                                                
8 Judith Butler, Bodies That Matter: On the Discursive Limits of Sex (New York: Routledge, 1993), 
pp. 30-1. 
9 Wolfe, Posthumanism, p. xv. 
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of which comes before that historically specific thing called “the 
human”.10 
Wolfe’s Derridean approach enables him to indicate the conceptual 
contraband at play in posthumanisms which fail to skirt metaphysics: 
What Derrida helps us to see […] is that just because a particular 
discourse […] presents itself as a materialist rendering of the problem of 
consciousness in relation to embodiment, does not mean that the 
discourse is not metaphysical.11 
As suggested above, Costello intends to engender, by way of literary 
language, the possibility of engaging with extra-linguistic animal embodiment, 
but she is ‘positing by way of language a materiality outside of language’ when 
she reveals that poetic invention can only work by mingling ‘breath and sense’. 
Butler is writing against the strategy according to which the body is invoked as 
a reality whose ‘hard’ matter has to be conceded by the constitutive powers of 
language. Akin to such strategy is the invocation of animal reality as foreign to 
human conceptuality and language, a reality whose concession rests once again 
on the persuasive powers of the rhetoric of materiality. Therefore, a more 
refined analysis is needed of such common rhetorical moves and how they 
relate to the constructive character of language. 
 
The materiality of language and the signifying body 
Against Judith Butler’s suggestion that the very concept of materiality – 
thought to secure a space outside the grasp of language – can only be 
intelligible by means of language itself, one may object that the talk of 
                                                                
10 Ibid., emphasis added. 
11 Ibid., p. 43. 
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‘intelligibility’ and ‘rhetoric’ in no way leaves the realm of the linguist, and that 
the animal – as non-human – and its body (or bodies in general) represent (a 
word which might also be refused in the same gesture) the break and end of 
language as world-building. Accordingly, theorists of animality have 
consistently been criticised for dwelling on merely conceptual problems when 
real animals are supposed to clearly inhabit a different sphere. More radically, 
theoretical issues in Animal Studies are sometimes derided as totally unrelated 
to real animals, whose life (another term in the rhetorically powerful chain of 
materiality) is a power with which theory has to reckon as something 
absolutely exterior. Finally, there are those who, while conceding that language 
shapes the world in one way or another, would argue that the animal – 
precisely for being non-human – is the shape of existence beyond a 
linguistically saturated world.  
The issue of whether ‘reality’ or the ‘real world’ in fact exist indepen-
dently of their apprehension by language is too ambitious a topic to tackle 
here, but it should suffice to point out that animals-as-exterior-to-language is 
still a concept of such exteriority and, as such, in no way leaves the realm of 
language or avoids the burden of intelligibility. ‘Matter’ is supposed to mark a 
radical exteriority to conceptuality, but, as Butler puts it, ‘to have the concept 
of matter is to lose the exteriority that the concept is supposed to secure’.12 
Another related issue, even if only chiasmically, is the constitutive role of 
animal corporeality in the shaping of the linguistic signifier, which will then be 
                                                                
12 Butler, p. 31. 
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accused of always failing to represent that very corporeality. In other words, 
the invocation of (or call for) the reality of animals beyond the cultural and 
philosophical issue of access (as cultural, linguistic access to reality) makes 
recourse to the supposedly unavoidable materiality of animal being, but that is 
precisely the meaning and effect of the concept of animal as produced by or 
alongside textuality. As I suggested above, the material appearing of language 
(the efficacy of signifiers) cannot exist without the materiality it borrows from 
animals’ bodies, but the latter can only be intelligible by the means of the 
material linguistic signifier. That will mean that (the materiality of) language and 
(corporeal) animality are co-implicated.  Butler strongly supports my point when 
she argues that 
the materiality of language, indeed, of the very sign that attempts to 
denote “materiality,” suggests that it is not the case that everything, 
including materiality, is always already language. On the contrary, the 
materiality of the signifier (a “materiality” that comprises both signs and 
their significatory efficacy) implies that there can be no reference to a 
pure materiality except via materiality. Hence, it is not that one cannot 
get outside of language in order to grasp materiality in and of itself; 
rather, every effort to refer to materiality takes place through a sig-
nifying process which, in its phenomenality, is always already material. 
In this sense, then, language and materiality are not opposed, for 
language both is and refers to that which is material, and what is 
material never fully escapes from the process by which it is signified. […] 
Apart from and yet related to the materiality of the signifier is the 
materiality of the signified as well as the referent approached through 
the signified, but which remains irreducible to the signified. This radical 
difference between referent and signified is the site where the materiality 
of language and that of the world which it seeks to signify are 
perpetually negotiated. […] Language and materiality are fully 
embedded in each other, chiasmic in their interdependence but never 
fully collapsed into one another, i.e., reduced to one another, and yet 
neither fully ever exceeds the other. Always already implicated in each 
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other, always already exceeding one another, language and materiality are 
never fully identical nor fully different.13 
In a similar problematising vein, Jean-Luc Nancy, in his dense essay on 
the body, ‘Corpus’, delineates the constraints which traditionally limit thinking 
of the body: ‘properly speaking, we only know, conceive, and even imagine a 
signifying body [corps signifiant]’.14 Despite the fact that for the most part of the 
essay Nancy will attempt to propose new modes of thinking, he also describes 
the traditional metaphysical formulations that have shaped our concept of the 
body as always already a signifying body, caught up with the concept of sense: 
‘[the body] should operate as the place-holder and vicar of sense’.15 He 
describes the trappings of a concept of the body which always portrays it as the 
body of sense:  
We can only conceive of completely hysterical bodies, paralyzed by the 
representation of an other body—a body of sense. […] The signifying 
body—the whole corpus of philosophical, theological, psychoanalytic, 
and semiological bodies—incarnates one thing only: the absolute 
contradiction of not being able to be a body without being the body of a 
spirit, which disembodies it.16  
                                                                
13 Butler, pp. 68-9. Last emphasis added. On the difference between the materiality of language 
and that of bodies, Butler stresses that it is crucial that we attend to the ways in which bodies 
materialise, a process which she will read in Lacanian and Kristevan terms. In her reading, she 
suggests that the material relations in the ‘real world’ will shape the materiality of language as 
that which vicariously substitutes for the loss of those very relations. An account of the 
materialising process of bodies and language – with the respect to animal embodiment – 
follows in my next chapter in my reading of Totem and Taboo.  
14 Jean-Luc Nancy, ‘Corpus’, in Corpus (New York: Fordham University Press, 2008), pp. 2-121 
(p. 67). 
15 Ibid. It should be kept in mind that Nancy plays with the polysemy of the word sens in French, 
which can mean ‘sense’, both as signification and sensorial ability, or ‘direction’. Also, one must 
follow carefully in Nancy’s text the system composed of the words sign, sense, and signification. 
‘Sign’ would be, to a certain extent, synonymous with ‘signifier’, while ‘sense’ would be near the 
concept of the ‘signified’ – or, exploring Nancy’s two senses of the word – that which orients 
the signifier towards its referent, or such orientation itself. ‘Signification’ could best describe, 
for Nancy, the combined work of ‘sign’ and ‘sense’.  
16 Ibid.,  pp. 67, 69. 
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It is, therefore, often a failure to recognise the limitations of both 
idealism and naïve materialism that will result in the exteriority of animal-as-
embodiment to language. Such formulation has, at any rate, been adopted in 
Animal Studies circles as a philosophical strategy in the attempt to attack 
speciesism and anthropocentrism. Next, I shall attempt to briefly critique three 
such strategies for their reliance on a problematic understanding of the body of 
animals, as they can be found in the work of Carol J. Adams, Cora Diamond, and 
Donna Haraway. My textual engagement with them is limited, but I hope I have 
identified in the passages below a certain structural element of their argument. 
 
Rhetorics of the body 
Carol J. Adams, in her otherwise outstanding work in the intersections of 
misogyny and carnivorism, displays some problematic writing on the body 
when she introduces her concept of the ‘absent referent’ to refer to the 
slaughtered bodies of animals who get turned into meat: ‘through butchering, 
animals become absent referents. Animals in name and body are made absent 
as animals for meat to exist. […] Live animals are thus the absent referents in 
the concept of meat.’17  
In her formulation of the process of reference – or lack thereof – that 
obtains between meat and animal, it is not clear what ‘referent’ is taken to 
mean, if by ‘referent’ we understand that which is necessarily under erasure 
and absent in the formal process of meaning-making. As it is, all referents are 
                                                                
17 Carol J. Adams, The Sexual Politics of Meat : A Feminist-Vegetarian Critical Theory (Cambridge: 
Polity Press, 1990), p. 40.  
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absent in language and the productivity of the signifier (as when she argues 
that animalised language can be used to oppress or describe the oppression of 
humans) in no way describes the special structure of disappearance to which 
she believes animals are exposed.  When she argues that ‘within the symbolic 
order the fragmented referent no longer recalls itself but something else’,18 it is 
not clear whether she means ‘the symbolic order’ to be read in its full Lacanian 
overtones. If so, one can easily point out that there are no referents in the 
Symbolic, only signifiers, and they never recall themselves but always display a 
structure of substitution. In fact, it is not clear at all how a referent can be made 
to refer, if it is taken to mean that which is referred to by means of language. 
An even longer deconstruction of Adams’s argument could be 
attempted by proceeding to untangle the linguistic terms she employs almost 
interchangeably. The signifier ‘meat’, for example, refers obviously to the 
signified ‘meat’ and the referent to which we usually refer when we talk about 
‘meat’. The fact that dead animals are required in order to produce said meat 
reveals nothing special about the nature of the sign ‘meat’, since a myriad of 
material and logical relations haunt all signs and allow them to mean in a 
variety of ways and contexts, foregrounding and foreclosing different 
components in their syntagmatic chain.  
Actually, for the most part, her elaboration of the ‘absent referent’ could 
be more accurately read as the effects of an ‘absent signified’ which, while still 
working according to the same logic, would result in extremely less serious 
                                                                
18 Adams, pp. 45-6. 
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consequences. After all, an absent animal referent is a much more daunting 
notion than an absent animal signified. One could hastily conclude that her 
critique of the workings of the absent referent are in fact an attack on the 
catachrestic function of language: while she criticises the language that 
transforms ‘animal flesh’ into ‘meat’ and ‘cows’ into ‘beef’, it’s not at all clear 
how much more present animals as referents would be if meat were called by 
animal signifiers. Animals would still be dead and invisible in the meat made 
from their bodies and the only difference between calling meat ‘beef’ or ‘cow’ is 
the threat of catachresis in the former case and the illusory effect of proper 
naming in the latter. Catachresis is, after all, a possibility intrinsic to naming 
and it accounts for what Adams sometimes labels ‘metaphoric uses’ of 
language. She juxtaposes metaphor to referent when discussing proper and 
improper references to animals, arguing that metaphoric language erases 
animal referents, even if they sometimes have the power to overpower the 
workings of metaphor. I discuss such power in the third chapter, although in 
different terms from Adams’s.   
Interestingly, as I point out in the next chapter during my discussion of 
Totem and Taboo, it could be argued that the signifier ‘animal’ itself or even a 
signifier for a specific animal – ‘cow’, for example – similarly make absent the 
animal referent which they supposedly refer to. The crucial concept that 
carries out much of Adams’s argumentative work is the material singularity of 
the piece of meat. The piece of meat thus seems to be much more real in the 
structure of reference than the singular animal that had to die in order to be 
turned into meat – that is precisely the tragedy described by the concept of the 
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absent referent. But it is very likely that this is not a result of the signifying 
system of meat-eating or the signification of the signifier ‘meat’: for even if we 
make present (to mind) the animal which the signifier ‘meat’ makes absent, 
neither the signifier ‘animal’ nor its concept actually refer to the singular, 
specific animal that was turned into meat. Both ‘animal’ and ‘cow’ as signifiers 
signify generalities. That there is not a reference to singular, material animals is 
thus less a structure of meat-eating and more a result of the functioning of the 
dynamics of species, which I discuss in more detail further on. 
Nevertheless, the supposed realness of such animal life (foreclosed in 
the structure of the absent referent) is often interpreted as a challenge to 
human understanding, a challenge which philosopher Cora Diamond names a 
‘difficulty’.19 For her, difficulties come in two shapes: the difficulty of 
philosophy and the difficulty of reality, and, for Wolfe, Diamond argues that to 
conflate the two is to misunderstand and ignore the ‘impingement’ of reality as 
it ‘befalls’ us as something ‘unmasterable’.20 According to Diamond, the 
difficulty of reality, which cannot be ‘overcome by ever more ingenious or 
accomplished propositional arguments’21 that could philosophically account 
for it, reveals the ‘unspeakability of the limits of our own thinking in 
confronting […] reality’.22 Such difficulty would emerge in ‘experiences in which 
                                                                
19 Cora Diamond, ‘The Difficulty of Reality and the Difficulty of Philosophy’, Partial Answers: 
Journal of Literature and the History of Ideas, 1 (2003), 1-26 (p. 2). 
20 Wolfe, Posthumanism, p. 71. 
21 Ibid., p. 70. 
22 Ibid., p. 69. 
 
40 | CHAPTER 1: ANIMAL AS TEXT 
 
 
we take something in reality to be resistant to our thinking it, or possibly to be 
painful in its inexplicability’.23 
Diamond starts her argument by analysing a Ted Hughes poem in which 
the speaker feels unable to describe and explain a picture of some young men 
who went on to die shortly after being photographed. She suggests that the 
puzzlement triggered by the smiling image of a dead person is akin to a child’s 
who may not understand how a dead relative may be present in an image. For 
Diamond,  
the point of view from which [the child] sees a problem [of the 
photographic presence of a dead person] is not yet in the [language-
]game; while that from which the horrible contradiction impresses itself 
on [Ted Hughes’s] poet-speaker is that of someone who can no longer 
speak within the game.24  
It is this collapse of the language-game captured by Hughes that 
Diamond calls the difficulty of reality. It is significant that Diamond’s other 
privileged example of such a challenging encounter with difficult reality is 
Elizabeth Costello from Coetzee’s The Lives of Animals. Costello is challenged 
by an unmasterable reality that leaves her broken to the extent that she 
presents herself as a wounded animal, haunted and weakened by the brutal 
reality of what we do to animals.25 Diamond shows that, insofar as the 
‘question’ of animal rights is controversial and complex, Coetzee’s intervention 
in the debate – in the shape of Costello’s arguments – is often taken as an 
attempt to account for this complexity. However, she argues that this 
interpretation misses the fact that The Lives of Animals is not about the 
                                                                
23 Diamond, p. 2. 
24 Ibid. 
25 Ibid., p. 4. 
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difficulty of philosophy – the trickiness of offering good quality arguments in 
the animal rights debate – but about the difficulty of the reality of what is done 
to animals’ lives and what it is like for one to be oneself a living animal who has 
to live with that knowledge.26 The fact that Costello foregrounds her wounded 
state and barely attempts to engage in solid philosophical argumentation is, for 
Diamond, evidence that Coetzee’s text is grappling with this difficulty of 
reality. Diamond underscores that the commentary included in the published 
edition of The Lives of Animals all read Costello as a character as a sort of 
philosophical tool: 
For this kind of reading, the wounded woman, the woman with the 
haunted mind and the raw nerves, has no significance except as a device 
for putting forward (in an imaginatively stirring way) ideas about the 
resolution of a range of ethical issues, ideas which can then be 
abstracted and examined. For none of the commentators does the title 
of the story have any particular significance in relation to the wounded 
animal that the story has as its central character. […] In the life of the 
animal [Costello] is, argument does not have the weight we may take it 
to have in the life of the kind of animal we think of ourselves as being. 
She sees our reliance on argumentation as a way we may make 
unavailable to ourselves our own sense of what it is to be a living 
animal.27 
Diamond stresses that her article, among other things, is mainly about 
exposure.28 To the extent that our thinking and language is exposed to mortality 
and woundedness, the difficulty of reality impinges upon argumentation, giving 
rise to the difficulty of philosophy, which attempts to deflect the first difficulty. 
At this point it is crucial to identify that Diamond’s difficulty of reality appears 
to be commanded by the same rhetoric of animal matter. Reality impinges on 
                                                                
26 Ibid., p. 5-6. 
27 Ibid., pp. 5, 8 
28 Ibid., p. 21. 
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and by means of the materiality of (animal) bodies. Her deployment of 
Coetzee’s Costello and his politics of the body is especially relevant due to the 
fact that Diamond will be the starting point for Cary Wolfe to formulate the 
relationship between embodiment and language in his wider project of 
posthumanism. Since Wolfe is one of the leading figures in Posthumanist 
Animal Studies, his (heavily Derridean) reading of the nexus between language 
and the body becomes crucial to the project of zoogrammatology I am 
developing here. His sophisticated critique of Diamond emerges from a close 
engagement with Derridean philosophy, to which I shall attempt to do justice 
further on. 
To return to Diamond, she indeed glosses the difficulty of reality in the 
key of animal embodiment, equating the realness of reality with the hard 
materiality of animal(istic) bodies: 
The awareness we each have of being a living body, being “alive to the 
world,” carries with it exposure to the bodily sense of vulnerability to 
death, sheer animal vulnerability, the vulnerability we share with them. 
This vulnerability is capable of panicking us. To be able to acknowledge 
it at all, let alone as shared, is wounding; but acknowledging it as shared 
with other animals, in the presence of what we do to them, is capable 
not only of panicking one but also of isolating one, as Elizabeth Costello 
is isolated.29 
Diamond’s reality is co-extensive with animality in a two-fold sense: it 
emerges both from the animal nature of our bodies, and from the 
unspeakability of what we do to animals (or to their bodies, presumably). Once 
again, that which supposedly marks the limit to human conceptuality (her 
                                                                
29 Ibid., p. 22. 
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‘difficulty of philosophy’) – and has the burden of securing an outside to it – is 
the materiality of the (animal) body.  
Wolfe will counter Derrida to Diamond, however, to the extent that 
Derrida stresses, as Richard Beardsworth puts it, that ‘the experience of 
finitude is one of radical passivity’. In other words, ‘no relation to death can 
appear as such’.30 Wolfe is making the Derridean point that finitude itself (as 
mortality) is a form of finitude and passivity, so that there is a limit to one’s 
capacity for recognising one’s own mortality. Wolfe does not refuse the 
finitude of mortality, but sets it beside a second finitude (which is related to the 
impossibility of grasping one’s own death), defined as the exposure ‘to a certain 
estranging operation of language’.31 For him, living beings are exposed to a 
double finitude (to call it by the title of the section in question in his chapter): 
The first type [of finitude] (physical vulnerability, embodiment, and 
eventually mortality) is paradoxically made unavailable, inappropriable, 
to us by the very thing that makes it available—namely, a second type of 
“passivity” or “not being able,” which is the finitude we experience in our 
subjection to a radically ahuman technicity or mechanicity of language. 
[…] “We” are always radically other, already in- or ahuman in our very 
being—not just in the evolutionary, biological, and zoological fact of our 
physical vulnerability and mortality, our mammalian existence but also 
in our subjection to and constitution in the materiality and technicity of 
a language that is always on the scene before we are, as precondition of 
our subjectivity. […] This passivity and subjection are shared by humans 
and nonhumans the moment they begin to interact and communicate by 
means of any semiotic system.32 
Wolfe’s insistence on this technic, linguistic finitude stems from his 
attempt to inscribe ‘the question of the animal’ in the larger scope of 
posthumanism. This move seems to necessitate a move similar to my own 
                                                                
30 Richard Beardsworth, quoted in Wolfe, Posthumanism, pp. 83-4. 
31 Wolfe, Posthumanism, p. 84. 
32 Ibid., pp. 88-9. 
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which consists in taking the discussion on animality away from the facile 
immediatism of philosophies of the body and inserting it in a radically 
posthumanist paradigm, in which ‘language’ cannot be thought to stop where 
the body, materiality, and the animal begin. And contra Diamond’s literary 
capitalisation on embodied finitude, Wolfe defends that ‘the relationship 
between the human and the nonhuman animals is […] a wound, if you will, that 
can never be healed and is only further excavated and deepened by the very 
iterative technologies (thinking, writing, speech) that we use to try and suture 
it.’33 
Wolfe’s emphasis on the Derridean finitude engendered by the 
technicity of language seems in fact to suggest that his two finitudes cannot be 
kept as separate conditions. Put differently, he insinuates that one finitude is a 
regional account of the general law of the other, so that embodied vulnerability 
is only a consequence of one’s exposure to language: 
Human and […] nonhuman animal may be, in a phenomenological or 
ontological sense, more or less equally subjected to the exteriority and 
materiality of the trace in a way that only “the living” can be; that is what 
it means to be “mortal,” to be “fellow creatures,” to be subjected.34 
In other words, it is not that Diamond is wrong to insist on a difficulty of 
reality that challenges language, thinking, and philosophical argumentation. 
Rather, is it simply not clear that this difficulty is constituted solely or primarily 
in material terms. Reading her thesis by means of Wolfe’s ultimate collapse of 
                                                                
33 Ibid., p. 91. 
34 Ibid., p. 95, first emphasis mine. Wolfe is not denying the specificity of being-in-the-world of 
each animal (human or nonhuman). He is aware of the various degrees to which the trace 
encroaches upon different materialisations of the living and how such specific materialisations 
(that is, different beings) of the life/death relationship are indeed materialised differently. 
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his own two finitudes leads us to conclude the embodied difficulty of reality is 
the same – not as the difficulty of philosophy – but as a textual difficulty of 
reality. Ultimately, this difficulty refers to the experience of the collapse of the 
material/ideal divide. 
In her famous contribution to Animal Studies, When Species Meet, Donna 
Haraway employs similar bodily figures to Diamond’s in order to tackle what 
she believes are excessively abstract interpretations of animality. The 
embodiment she is arguing for emerges under the words ‘worldly’ and ‘mud’: ‘I 
think we learn to be worldly from grappling with, rather than generalising from, 
the ordinary. I am a creature of the mud, not the sky.’35 Accordingly, her project 
will defend the importance for being worldly of touching, skin, the flesh, and 
the singular: ‘Whom and what do we touch when we touch this dog? How does 
this touch make us more worldly […]?’36 She opposes, however, such 
experience of embodiment and of being-in-the-world to projects which 
attempt to engage animals in a general, abstract, or ‘sublime’ fashion, thereby 
setting up a material/ideal opposition.  
Her first target is Derrida, especially in his late text ‘The Animal That 
Therefore I Am (More To Follow)’, in which he narrates the abyssal encounter 
triggered by his cat’s gazing at his naked body one morning in the bathroom. As 
a reference to another of Derrida’s ‘animal lectures’ – ‘And Say the Animal 
Responded?’ – Haraway titles her encounter with him ‘And Say the Philosopher 
                                                                
35 Donna J. Haraway, When Species Meet (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2008), p. 
3. 
36 Ibid., p. 5. 
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Responded?’. Her annoyance with him is related to the fact that even though 
he, unlike other philosophers he criticises, considered the possibility of his cat’s 
responding to him and returning his gaze, Derrida completely overlooked the 
possibility that he might gaze back at his cat and respond to her, engaging her in 
communication. She recognises his attempt (in both mentioned lectures) of 
undoing the distinction between reaction and response, in which the latter 
would be present in humans alone, leaving both machines and animals to be 
only able to react. To Haraway, however, that was not enough: 
Derrida knew he was in the presence of someone, not of a machine 
reacting, […] but he was sidetracked by his textual canon of Western 
philosophy and literature and by his own linked worries about being 
naked in front of his cat. […] [He] failed a simple obligation of companion 
species; he did not become curious about what the cat might actually be 
doing, feeling, thinking, or perhaps making available to him in looking 
back at him that morning. […] [Although] Derrida gave us the 
provocation of a historically located look [instead of a primal scene of Man 
confronting Animal], […] the naked man’s shame quickly became a figure 
for the shame of philosophy before all of the animals.37 
Her critique relies mostly on the fact that one material, singular cat 
presented herself to Derrida, but he was unable to return that singular, 
material look – he was only able to theorise about animals in general, along 
philosophical, literary, textual lines. He did not grapple with the ordinary, the 
singular, or the mud. She levels a similar argument to her next target, Deleuze 
and Guattari’s concept of becoming-animal.38 In A Thousand Plateaus, they 
criticise Freud for his understanding of the symbolism of wolves in the dream 
recounted by the Wolf-Man, Freud’s famous patient, as well as his attempt at 
                                                                
37 Ibid., pp. 19, 20, 23, emphases added. 
38 I shall return to Deleuze and Guattari in the third chapter, in which the concept of becoming-
animal is further clarified, analysed, and discussed. 
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neutralising the pack of wolves (for them, a symbol of rhizomatic multiplicity) 
into one Oedipal wolf or father. As with Derrida, Haraway points out that they 
are too interested in an abstract, non-localisable concept of becoming-animal 
to the detriment of one-on-one relationships with animals (especially with 
pets): 
Mundane, prosaic, living wolves have no truck with that kind of wolf 
pack. […] Here I find little but the two writers’ scorn for all that is 
mundane and ordinary and the profound absence of curiosity about or 
respect for and with actual animals, even as innumerable references to 
diverse animals are invoked to figure the authors’ anti-Oedipal and 
anticapitalist project. […] This is a philosophy of the sublime, not the 
earthly, not the mud.39 
She seems especially offended by their controversial statements 
disregarding pets and the people who like them. She sees in their argument a 
system controlled by the dichotomy between the wild and the domestic, which 
seeps into the distinction wolf/dog and man/woman. In her own text, on the 
other hand, a similar structuring dichotomy reigns – that between the mud and 
the sky, the worldly and the sublime. As it is, her thought comes across as a 
hollow materialism that attempts to simply invert the hierarchy between 
spiritual and corporeal, without actually grappling with the structuring laws 
that engender it. A closer engagement with Derrida might have revealed the 
reason for his suspicions concerning the invocation of material singularities 
and their power to transgress metaphysics and ‘the sublime’:  
If I have not very often used the word “matter,” it is not […] because of 
some idealist or spiritualist kind of reservation. It is that in the logic of 
the phase of overturning [as when Haraway privileges the mud over the 
sublime,] this concept has been too often reinvested with those of thing, 
reality, presence in general, sensible presence, for example, substantial 
                                                                
39 Haraway, pp. 27, 28. 
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plenitude, content, referent, etc. Realism or sensualism—“empiricism”—are 
modifications of logocentrism. […] It is not only idealism in the narrow 
sense that falls back upon a transcendental signified. It can always come 
to reassure a metaphysical materialism. It then becomes an ultimate 
referent, […] or it becomes an “objective reality” absolutely “anterior” to 
any work of the mark.40 
And contrary to Haraway’s construal of him as a theoretical, abstract 
thinker inattentive to material singularities, Derrida values materialism (when 
certain precautions against the desire for metaphysical reassurance are taken) 
precisely for its rebuttal of a common misunderstanding of deconstruction: 
In a very determined field […], it seems to me that the materialist 
insistence can function as a means of having the necessary 
generalization of the concept of text […] not wind up […] as the definition 
of a new self-interiority, a new “idealism”, if you will, of the text.41 
For Claire Colebrook, materialism slips back into the problematic 
metaphysics it attempted to surpass when it writes matter out of the 
differential play of language:  
Any materialism that aimed to derive systems of difference from some 
grounding matter would be one more foundational metaphysic, 
especially if matter possessed a logic that would determine difference in 
advance. […] Derrida is not […] a textualist; he does not endorse a 
narrowly linguistic idealism. In fact it was precisely his expansion of the 
concept of trace and materiality beyond language in its narrow sense 
that now allows for a thoroughly naturalised deconstruction. 42 
                                                                
40 Jacques Derrida, ‘Positions: Interview with Jean-Loius Houdebine and Guy Scarpetta’, in 
Positions, trans. by Alan Bass (London: The Athlone Press, 1987), pp. 37-96 (pp. 64-5), my 
emphases. The full extent of Derrida’s critique of empiricism, the transcendental signified, and 
sensible presence should be clearer throughout the thesis, regarding his reading of Husserl and 
Saussure.   
41 Ibid., p. 66, emphasis on the original. 
42 Claire Colebrook, 'Matter without Bodies', Derrida Today, 4 (2011), 1-20. (p. 3). 
 
Rhetorics of the body | 49 
 
 
Derrida’s reworking of the very concept of language by means of the 
trace is what makes possible a naturalised deconstruction.43 This should not, 
however, mean that the differential working of the text is finally grounded on 
natural matter, but rather that one must ‘consider textual worlds materially and 
to consider materiality textually’44 and ultimately that 
textuality is not the nature of nature; it is not another way of saying that 
nature is complex. To posit textuality as first is to erase nature; it is to do 
away with a substance that is complex, differentiating or multiple. In 
fact, to approach materiality would be possible only with a radical 
destruction of figures and senses of nature.45 
Finally, she puts Derrida’s thinking of the entanglement of ‘abstract’ 
concept and its instantiations thus: 
Derrida’s approach to concepts [such as that of ‘the animal’ which 
Haraway believes is too theoretical] is primarily critical and entails two 
gestures. A concept must have some factical material support, and this 
marks its inscriptive or textual materiality. At the same time, a concept 
is only a concept if it is repeatable beyond any of its actual instances. 
Concepts therefore have the force of an essential impossibility, for their 
meaning or repeatability gestures to an ideality that exceeds any 
context, any actual material instance; and yet concepts – because of 
their materiality – are marked, scarred, deflected and contaminated by 
their singular conditions of emergence.46 
Vicky Kirby makes a similar point to Colebrook’s by demonstrating how 
a careful reading of the projection of deconstruction can dismantle the 
oppositions between the ‘two cultures’ (sciences versus humanities). She 
argues:  
If the question of the referent and its systemic entanglements arise just 
as powerfully through the grammatological “textile” as the quantum 
                                                                
43 A ‘naturalised deconstruction’ is how Colebrook names readings of Derrida’s trace that 
argue that it must be understood as something that precedes the anthropological advent of 
language and writing – hence, natural. 
44 Ibid., p. 18. 
45 Ibid., p. 6. 
46 Ibid., p. 15. 
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mechanical problematic such that the difference between the workings 
of form/ideation and the intricacies of substance/matter appear 
compromised, “both” already present in/as the other, then we cannot 
assume that modes of being are somehow separate from modes of knowing. It 
is possible that all those claims made by cultural analysts about the 
materiality of language and the constitutive efficacy of representations 
could be taken more seriously than even their authors envisaged, and 
enfolded into the question of science and objectivity more generally?47 
 Crucially, she frames this discussion as a question of the tension 
between Derrida and Lacan regarding animality. The ‘Subversion of the 
Subject’ brought about by psychoanalysis and the discovery of the 
unconscious, Kirby glosses Derrida as saying, does not go far enough by not 
acknowledging that human identity has to be even more alien than 
psychoanalysts such as Lacan are willing to accept. Instrumental to this 
argument is the Derridean argument posed by Kirby that language is not 
essentially ‘only’ a mediating technology that promotes forms of ‘knowing’, but 
is actually an ‘ontologising energy’ and, as such, cannot be possessed by either 
humans or animals.48 Up to a point, Lacan does accept that language is indeed 
an Other energy, but the Lacanian fracturing of human subjectivity by this 
Otherness occurs safely within ‘an enclosure’, from which the animal is so 
removed that it cannot even be granted the status of Other.49 But, according to 
Lacan’s own thought, ‘if the difference between sender, receiver, and message 
implodes, […] [if] I am spoken through -- then it is no longer clear why human 
                                                                
47 Vicki Kirby, ‘Original Science: Nature Deconstructing Itself’, Derrida Today, 3 (2010), 201-
220 (p. 205, my emphasis). 
48 Ibid., p. 208. 
49 Ibid., p. 210. 
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expression is any different to animal reaction as Lacan understands it, or even 
to the reaction of the machine’.50 What this entails for Kirby is that there is  
no simple division between subject and object nor mediation or one 
thing by another; no hermeneutic enclosure or culture or ideation over 
and against a more primordial system of physical matter. Importantly, 
the resulting “animation” is not ideation plus substance, but a profound 
radicalisation of these terms as wells as the very meaning of Life.51 
As for Deleuze and Guattari, I shall attempt to gauge the productiveness 
of their becoming-animal in chapter three, but for now one could point out to 
the problematic and facile distinction Haraway sets up between the general or 
conceptual on the one hand, and the singular and material on the other. 
Beyond the enmeshing of one in the other, the aporetic character of the 
relationship between general law and singular instance is never taken up by 
Haraway, even though it is precisely one of the main motifs in her book. Her 
title, for instance, foregrounds the encountering of different species, and even a 
historically located, singular instance of an encounter between two individuals 
of distinct species must still make recourse to the general law of what a species 
is so that ‘members’ of two species can meet. 
David Brooks presents a similarly resistant reading to Derrida, but is 
otherwise more attentive to the complexity of the latter’s strategies. Focusing 
on the wordplay present in je suis (‘I am’ and ‘I follow’), Brooks entertains that 
for Derrida the human’s relationship to following (and thus, being) is similar to 
its relationship to the trace: ‘there is, for humans, no being without text, […] in a 
                                                                
50 Ibid. I discuss this reading of Lacan by Derrida in more detail in my third chapter. 
51 Ibid., p. 211. 
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sense to be is to be text, that there is, for us, no being that is beyond or outside 
the text’.52 Thus, Derrida’s presumed indifference towards the cat as a real cat 
would be a product of the fact that ‘the human, because text is always 
preceded by text--because in this way there is no end to writing--is a creature 
divided, doubled, always itself but that self always a self that follow, that 
shadows, that is produced by prior writing’. That necessity of following means, 
for Brooks, that the human is ‘a being within being, held somehow apart from a 
greater being’ and that this distance is brought about by the very language that 
separates us -- or that we use to separate us -- from animals. ‘We are what we 
are because of the animot’.53 In that way, Brooks reads Derrida against the 
grain, but without the misreadings brought about by Haraway. He speculates 
that Derrida’s references to Through the Looking Glass, and What Alice Found 
There mean that his cat is a mirror-like Sphinx, always destined to reveal 
nothing but ‘Man’. He muses whether this amounts to an admission that ‘one 
should be able to pass through that mirror, […] that the texted/textual 
world/prison is like a dream, from which there might, just, somehow, be a 
waking’.54 Finally, Brooks comes to an admittedly abrupt conclusion with the 
suspicion that ‘Derrida has realized that, behind the mirror-cat, which he, and a 
long tradition behind him, has so loaded that he cannot see past her, there is 
another cat, another being, loaded with herself. […] An abyss, in short, which 
threatens to swallow him’.55 
                                                                
52 David Brooks, ‘The Loaded Cat’, in Seeing Animals After Derrida, ed. by Sarah Bezan and James 
Tink (Lanham: Lexington, 2018), pp. 21-35 (p. 27). 
53 Ibid., p. 28. 
54 Ibid., p. 32. 
55 Ibid., p. 33. 
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Actually, the kind of enmeshing of textuality and materiality that 
Derrida defends is not alien to Haraway’s thought. She, after all, coined the 
term naturecultures and her ‘A Cyborg Manifesto’ defended the 
interpenetration of nature, culture, information, language, etc.56 However, it is 
undeniable that Haraway does wield the distinction between material and 
ideal as a tool to confront Derrida and Deleuze and Guattari for their supposed 
failure to respond to singular animals. 
The question broached by Haraway seems precisely to be: to what 
extent can the singularity of a member of a species exceed the general logic of 
speciation as long as it is referred to by its species? And is not that precisely the 
issue that Derrida, Deleuze and Guattari are approaching? Derrida, after all, 
coined the term animot57 in order to convey such aporia: the concept of ‘the 
animal’ is always already plural and implies a multitude, so much so that even 
the singular ‘the animal’ still refers to a generality. Traditionally this multitude 
has been portrayed as the irreducible interchangeability of animals, so that 
each individual has no worth since its (still living) species is expected to stand 
behind it and outlive it. This logic is one of the underlying causes of the classical 
moral irrelevance of animals. Deleuze and Guatarri are, in fact, working 
through and revaluing the fact that animals always imply multitudes in order to 
                                                                
56 Donna J. Haraway, ‘A Cyborg Manifesto: Science, Technology, and Socialist Feminism in the 
Late Twentieth Century’, in Simians, Cyborgs, and Women: The Reinvention of Nature (New York: 
Routledge, 1991), pp. 149-182. 
57 Animot is a portmanteau of the plural noun animaux (‘animals’) and the noun mot (‘word’), 
stressing the linguistic violence in the very concept of the word animal that always generalises 
them. 
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show how and why they seduce humans, as lines of flight away from Oepidal 
configurations. 
The complex structure that organises instantiations of a generality (as 
repetitions of a model which, nevertheless, must still be different in order to be 
taken as separated entities) is what Derrida gathered under the name 
iterability. A fuller account of iterability shall be given during my reading of 
Totem and Taboo, where the tension between general ideality and specific 
materiality is demonstrated to be inseparable from the distinction between an 
individual animal and its species, to the point that Haraway cannot but 
encounter the problem of iterability when calling for animal specificity. 
However, the complicity between the law of iterability and animality can also 
be read in Derrida’s deconstruction of the concept of the sign in Husserl (but 
also in Saussure). To the extent that iterability produces localised, iterable 
units – just as a species contains specific, ‘interchangeable’ individuals – and to 
the extent that iterable units are figured as the materialisation or 
corporification of conceptual potentialities, Derrida’s critique of linguistics lays 
bare the co-implication of the concepts of body and sign. 
 
Husserl and the bodies of linguistics 
For Husserl's theory of signs, only expression (Ausdruck) can convey the 
essence of language, since it alone contains meaning (Bedeutung). The other 
kind of signs, endowed with signification but devoid of meaning, practices only 
Husserl and the bodies of linguistics | 55 
 
 
indication (Anzeichen).58 True language – that is, expression – cannot be 
reduced, however, to communication, for in it, the irreducibly spiritual 
character of Husserlian meaning has to reckon with a certain embodiment of 
language when it encounters the phenomenon of indication.59 What 
distinguishes expression and indication and justifies the subordination of the 
latter lies precisely in their relationship to a certain body. Derrida will uncover 
precisely the hesitation regarding whose and which body is at stake in the 
definition of the sign and in the privilege given to expression.  
For Husserl, that which is expressed must be transcendental both in 
terms of content and form.60 Derrida concludes, therefore, that in Husserl no 
remark about any empirical fact has a right to be called expression – otherwise 
it would be merely an indicative sign. Only transcendental idealities that reveal 
the essence lurking behind empirical reality are truly expressed.61 And because 
such idealities have to be presented to consciousness in such a way as to 
                                                                
58 ‘Every sign is a sign for something, but not every sign has “meaning”, a “sense” that the sign 
“expresses”. […] Signs in the sense of indications (notes, marks, etc.) do not express anything. […] 
From indicative signs we distinguish meaningful signs, i.e., expressions.’ (Edmund Husserl, 
‘Expression and Meaning’, trans. by J N Findlay, in The Essential Husserl: Basic Writings in 
Transcendental Phenomenology, ed. by Donn Welton [Bloomington and Indianapolis: Indiana 
University Press, 1999], pp. 26-51 [pp. 26, 28]) 
59 ‘Each instance or part of speech […] shall count as an expression, whether or not such speech 
is actually uttered. […] [In fact,] one sees at once that all expressions in communicative speech 
function as indications. They serve the hearer as signs of the “thoughts” of the speaker. […] 
Expressions as used in communication […] depend essentially on the fact that they operate 
indicatively. But expressions also play a great part in uncommunicative, interior mental life. […] 
Expressions continue to have meanings as they had before, and the same meanings as in 
dialogue. A word only ceases to be a word when our interest stops at its sensory contour, when 
it becomes a mere sound-pattern. […] If we reflect on the relation of expression to meaning, […] 
the word comes before us as intrinsically indifferent, whereas the sense seems the thing aimed 
at by the verbal sign. […] The expression is more than a merely sounded word.’ (Ibid., pp. 28, 29, 
30, 31) 
60 Ibid., pp. 33, 48. 
61 Jacques Derrida, Speech and Phenomena: And Other Essays on Husserl's Theory of Signs, ed. by 
John Wild, trans. by David B Allison (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1973), p. 34. 
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preserve their transcendentality, Derrida demonstrates that Husserl requires 
that they are given to the living present of a consciousness. The consequences 
are thus two-fold: two bodies – or two registers of the body – are bracketed off 
by Husserl. Husserl excludes both the body of the phenomenal sign, which 
would risk the expression of pure idealities, and the ‘real’ body that ‘houses’ the 
consciousness in question, whose embodiment introduces a perilous detour via 
the world that endangers absolute self-proximity and the living present. What 
is clear in Derrida’s reading of Husserl is the difficulty of determining which of 
the two types of bodies endangers Husserl’s thesis at each moment, and finally 
what precisely distinguishes them: 
What is excluded [from expression] is, for example, facial expressions, 
gestures, the whole of the body, and the mundane register, in a word, 
the whole of the visible and spatial as such. As such: that is, insofar as 
they are not worked over by Geist [spirit, mind], by the will, by the 
Geistigkeit [spirituality] which, in the word just as in the human body, 
transforms the Körper into Leib (into flesh). The opposition between 
body and soul is not only at the center of this doctrine of signification, it 
is confirmed by it; and, as has always been at bottom the case in 
philosophy, it depends upon an interpretation of language.62 
Husserl evidences the common root of the human body (as mark of its 
animal origin) and what one may term ‘the body of linguistics’ in his attempt to 
secure a purely transcendental, ideal language. In his effort to reduce 
contingency and materiality, he reveals the extent to which the (animalised) 
human body and the body of the phenomenal sign constitute each other. 
According to Derrida’s reading, the mundane (or the ‘worldly’, to return to 
Haraway’s term) and the bodily represent the disobedience to the authority of 
                                                                
62 Ibid., p. 35. Interpolations are mine. 
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spirituality, insofar as the latter has not yet neutralised them into Leib – they 
are mere Körper.63 Derrida argues that the mechanism which spiritualises a 
Körper into a Leib is the same both ‘in the word’ and ‘in the human body’: insofar 
as materiality is supervised and inhabited by the transcendental intention, its 
status as ‘mere’ matter is overcome. The same movement of spiritualisation 
both de-animalises the human body and makes possible the privilege of one 
substance of expression (the voice, or silent internal monologue) over others.64 
Just as Nancy argues that the classical philosophy of the body cannot think it 
except as a vehicle or obstacle to sense, Husserl (and here he represents an 
age-old tradition) considers all bodies to be always in a relationship with 
spirituality.65 
                                                                
63 The two words for ‘body’ in German could be translated as ‘the merely material body’ 
(Körper) and ‘lived flesh’ (Leib). This productive distinction – crucial for Husserl, Heidegger, and 
others – will be more fully discussed in the next chapter when read alongside Totem and Taboo. 
Since Husserl, in The Origin of Geometry, admits that writing is a Leib and not a Körper, we should 
be alert to the system organising the concepts of life and non-life with regard to the meaning-
giving spirituality of intention (before consulting The Origin of Geometry, one would rightly 
guess that Husserl should consider writing – as spatial, material language, unsupervised by a  
present consciousness – to display the mere materiality of a Körper). A certain living 
corporeality of writing should be considered alongside Freud’s account of animal totemism as a 
form of writing. 
64 Derrida analyses a similar gesture in Saussure, when the latter stresses that the signifier face 
of the linguistic sign is not in fact the sound spoken or heard, but the mental impression 
produced by the sound (Jacques Derrida, Of Grammatology, Fortieth Anniversary Edition, trans. 
by Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak [Baltimore: John Hopkins University, 2016], p. 57-8). For 
Derrida, Saussure is attempting to desubstantialise speech, even the spoken signifier, so that 
speech can be purely ideal. The written signifier alone would be, according to the Saussurean 
system, actually material. Employing the same terminology, we could say that Saussure wishes 
the spoken signifier to be a Leib, so that Körper can describe only a written signifier. It is safe to 
assume that the human being – as a rational, speaking animal – would also be characterised as 
having Leib, while the animal (just as material as writing) would have only a Körper. Just as in 
Husserl, the privilege of one substance of expression over another is an attempt of constituting 
the human body as essentially different from an animal’s, essentially de-animalising the body of 
the human. 
65 Whether they are in fact inhabited by a spirit (as in living flesh, Leib), or not (as in a corpse, 
Körper). 
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Furthermore, by rejecting the definition of expression as 
communication, Husserl reveals his reliance on the subordination of the body 
and his conflation between a ‘real’ body and the body of the sign: 
It is supposed [by Husserl] that in communication, […] a rigorous 
distinction can be drawn between […] the ideal and the real. It is 
supposed that effectiveness comes like an empirical and exterior cloak 
to expression, like a body to a soul. And these are indeed the notions 
Husserl uses, even when he stresses the unity of body and soul in 
intentional animation. This unity does not impair the essential 
distinction, for it always remains a unity of composition.66 
[In communication], sensible phenomena (audible, visible, etc.) are 
animated through the sense-giving acts of a subject, whose intention is 
to be simultaneously understood by another subject. But the “animation” 
cannot be pure and complete, for it must traverse, and to some degree 
lose itself in, the opaqueness of a body. […] Everything in my speech 
which is destined to manifest an experience to another must pass by the 
mediation of its physical side; this irreducible mediation involves every 
expression in an indicative operation. […] Here we find the core of 
indication: indication takes place whenever the sense-giving act, the 
animating intention, the living spirituality of the meaning-intention, is not 
fully present.67 
Derrida’s reading of Husserlian bodies is best glimpsed in his use of the 
word ‘animation’. A body is always that which is animated by a spirit (and the 
etymologies linking this metaphysical linguistics, animals, and souls should not 
be overlooked),68 but in such a way that this animation is never completely 
successful, so that spiritualisation actually becomes the spirit’s losing itself in 
                                                                
66 Derrida, Speech and Phenomena, p. 56. Emphases added. 
67 Ibid., p. 38. Emphases added. 
68 According to the OED, ‘animal’ comes ultimately from Latin anima (‘animal, n.’, in OED Online. 
Oxford University Press, 2016 [accessed 16 February 2017]), which meant ‘air, a current of 
air, a breeze, wind (mostly poetical), […] The vital principle, the breath of life […] (hence anima 
denotes the animal principle of life, in distinction from animus, the spiritual, reasoning, willing 
principle)’ (‘ănĭma’, in A Latin Dictionary, ed. by Charlton T. Lewis and Charles Short 
<http://www.perseus.tufts.edu/hopper/text?doc=Perseus:text:1999.04.0059:entry=anima> 
[accessed 14 February 2017]). Animus, thus, means, ‘in a general sense, the rational soul in 
man (in opp. to the body, corpus, and to the physical life, anima), […] the mind as thinking, feeling, 
willing, the intellect, the sensibility, and the will’ (‘ănĭmus’, A Latin Dictionary). 
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the wor(l)d. Such inherited metaphysical concepts of the body and of animality 
should limit the very possibility of our thinking the singular, localised body of 
an animal, as Haraway asks us to do, apart from a reference to spirituality. Put 
differently, a materialistic account of embodiment does not shake away the 
fact that embodiment is a process of corporification undertaken by a spirit. 
Not only that, but Husserl’s traditional account of the relationship 
between ideal spirituality and empirical, contingent bodies should illuminate 
Haraway’s criticism of Derrida (but also of Deleuze and Guattari). To the 
extent that we can identify Husserl’s traditional idealism as Haraway’s real 
target, and to the extent that Derrida actively deconstructs the former, we may 
conclude that Haraway and Derrida actually share their criticism of idealism,69 
so that Haraway’s dissatisfaction with Derrida’s supposedly abstract thinking 
of animals is due to her misinterpretation of the project of deconstruction. 
Derrida’s critique of Husserl relies mostly on a close exploration of the 
mechanism of repetition. Insofar as Husserl is concerned with idealities, 
Derrida concludes that such idealism is in fact necessitated by repeatability: 
only when an expression can emerge as the same, repeating itself, infinitely, do 
we have an ideality. Ideal repetition is, however, caught up in the empirical, 
sensible character of each instance, so that the possibility of indefinite 
repetition is in fact the possibility of indefinite alteration, or irreducible 
impurity and contingency. In sum, idealities can only come to be in their 
dependence on the material instances that ‘figure’ them. Derrida’s emphasis on 
                                                                
69 To be precise, Derrida mounts a challenge to idealism without refuting it outright: he 
deconstructs the ideal/material divide. 
60 | CHAPTER 1: ANIMAL AS TEXT 
 
 
the materiality of singularities emerges in his critique of Husserl so that his 
writing reads like Haraway’s criticism of himself: 
The relation with the presence of the present as the ultimate form of 
being and of ideality is the move by which I transgress empirical 
existence, factuality, contingency, worldliness, etc.—first of all, my own 
empirical existence, factuality, contingency, worldliness, etc. […] The 
relationship with my death (my disappearance in general) thus lurks in 
this determination of being as presence, ideality, the absolute possibility 
of repetition. The possibility of the sign is this relationship with death. 
The determination and elimination of the sign in metaphysics is the 
dissimulation of this relationship with death.70 
Husserl’s idealism is, for Derrida, a strategy to deflect a real worldliness 
or mortality which is ineluctably inscribed in the very thing that attempts to 
secure transcendentality: idealism’s absolute possibility of repetition.71 
Derrida’s project of establishing the nonderivative character of signs should 
underline his dedication to thinking outside of any pure idealism. As it is, 
Derrida’s thinking of animals (or specifically his cat) in The Animal That 
Therefore I Am escapes Haraway’s reservations for two reasons: it does not fail 
to engage with the discourse that links animals to the logic of species, and it 
implies that ideal concepts are themselves made possible by their inscription in 
the worldly, the contingent, the non-ideal. To use Haraway’s terms, the 
‘sublime sky’ is always already caught up in ‘the mud’. Similarly, even if all 
bodies are always waiting receptacles for a spirit, spirituality itself is in 
                                                                
70 Derrida, Speech and Phenomena, pp. 53-4. 
71 That ideal entities must be repeatable and that such repetitions incur alterations is what 
Derrida calls the law of iterability: ‘“Iterability” does not signify simply […] repeatability of the 
same, but rather alterability of this same idealized in the singularity of the event. […] There is 
no idealization without (identificatory) iterability; but for the same reason, for reasons of 
(altering) iterability, there is no idealization that keeps itself pure, safe from all contamination. 
The concept of iterability is this singular concept that render possible the silhouette of ideality. 
[…] But it is also the concept that, at the same time, with the same stroke marks the limit of 
idealization.’ (Jacques Derrida, ‘Afterword’, in Limited Inc [Evanston: Northwestern University 
Press, 1988], pp. 111-60 [p. 119]) 
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constant need of actualisation by means of embodiment or animation. The 
animalised structure of this logic – in which animals are precisely the paradigm 
of animation – should keep us alert to the part played in it by the concept of 
animality. This shall be further discussed in regard to Derridean iterability and 
the tension between animal species and individual animal in Totem and Taboo. A 
closer look at the trace in Of Grammatology should guide one to think of the 
animal in relation to iterability. Since the animal is analogous with the signifier, 
and if the signifier can be deconstructed to give rise to the trace, it follows that 
the animal can be similarly deconstructed. 
 
The trace 
The trace is presented as a deconstruction of the sign as the unity of a signifier 
and a signified; as it is, Derrida’s revision of the linguistic sign threatens to undo 
the correspondences I have drawn out between the linguistic signifier and the 
body of the animal. However, he replaces the Saussurean sign with the trace, 
which makes it possible for him to redescribe language as an a-human 
dimension that precedes the distinction between humanity and animality.72 If, 
                                                                
72 Derrida coined the term trace, according to Laurent Milesi, ‘as a more appropriate, more 
generalisable substitute for the sign since it can include its animal and technological nature’ 
(Laurent Milesi, ‘Sponge Inc’, in The Animal Question in Deconstruction, ed. by Lynn Turner 
[Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2013], pp. 70-88 (p. 70).  In his ambitious work 
Technics and Time, Bernard Stiegler explicates Derrida’s intervention in the field of linguistics, 
which Stiegler underscores as influenced by Leroi-Gourhan’s work on palaeontology and 
anthropology: ‘Leroi-Gourhan’s anthropology can be thought from within an essentially non-
anthropocentric concept that does not take for granted the usual divides between animality 
and humanity. Derrida bases his own thought of différance as a general history of life, that is, as 
a general history of the grammē, on the concept of program insofar as it can be found on both 
sides of such divides. Since the grammē is older than the specifically human written forms, and 
because the letter is nothing without it, the conceptual unity that différance is contests the 
opposition animal/human and, in the same move, the opposition nature/culture.’ (Bernard 
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as discussed above, the animal body cannot be thought apart from the signifier, 
and if the signifier should be critiqued as part of a larger project of 
grammatology, it should be possible to consider the very concept of animal 
being (and, consequently, of ‘the body’) as indissociable from a very specific 
legacy of metaphysical concepts, therefore opening a space for the 
deconstructive work of zoogrammatology.  
In Of Grammatology, Derrida is trying to chase the consequences of both 
the thesis of arbitrariness and that of differential value in Saussure’s theory of 
the linguistic sign. More essential to the functioning of writing than its 
definition as a signifier of a signifier, its unit – the graphie – is dependent on the 
structure Derrida calls the instituted trace, which would be at the base of 
signification in general. Such a primordial structure is exactly what Saussure 
saw in writing that made it so useful as a metaphor to explain the differential 
character of linguistic value.73 In a dense and famous passage, Derrida seems to 
‘define’ such a trace: 
One cannot think the instituted trace without thinking the retention of 
difference within a structure of reference where difference appears as 
such. […] The absence of an other here-now, of another transcendental 
present, of an other origin of the world appearing as such [comme telle], 
presenting itself as irreducible absence within the presence of the trace, 
that is not a metaphysical formula substituted for a scientific concept of 
writing. This formula […] describes the structure implied by the 
“arbitrariness of the sign”.74 
                                                                
Stiegler, Technics and Time, 1: The Fault of Epimetheus, trans. by Richard Beardsworth and 
George Collins [Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1998], p. 137) 
73 The fact that the variability of a phoneme does not threaten its difference-based identity, for 
example, is linked to the fact that one may draw a letter in slightly different ways without 
changing it to a different letter, as long as one draws it differently enough from the others 
(Ferdinand de Saussure, Course in General Linguistics, ed. by Charles Bally and Albert Sechehaye, 
trans. by Wade Baskin [London: Peter Owen, 1961], pp. 119-20). 
74 Ibid., p. 50-1, my interpolation. 
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His formula for a definition of the trace (as a more primordial attribute 
of writing) – which he substitutes for Saussure’s supposedly scientific 
definition of writing as technical representation – albeit sounding 
‘metaphysical’, is nothing but the conclusion of the thesis of arbitrariness. If the 
sign is arbitrary, that means its value cannot depend on the materiality of its 
sensible signifier (which is believed to be ‘accidental’) or on the (unmotivated) 
link between signifier and signified. Due to that, its functioning is dependent 
solely on the differences among itself and other signs. That difference, 
however, must appear as such, as difference itself, as the absence of other signs 
– it can never rely in fact on any trait of any one sign, either present or absent 
(as a modification of presence).75 In other words, absence must present itself as 
absence. That, in a nutshell, is all that is counter-intuitive and ‘nonsensical’ 
about deconstruction, since absence should not be able, by definition, to be 
present. The presentation of absence – or the relationship with absolute 
otherness – is another name for the structure of reference Derrida situates in 
place of traditional linguistic signification; or at least one of the names, since 
                                                                
75 That is the reason why the Derridean trace should not be confused with the metaphysical 
concept of the trace, according to which it would consist of the mark left in the present by 
something which is here-and-now absent. Such a mark would still be present and would not 
constitute the presentation of absence ‘as such’. That is why the trace is always the trace of a 
trace. Geoffrey Bennington clarifies that ‘these traces […] [are] nothing other than the traces of 
the absence of the other “element”, which is moreover not absent in the sense of “present 
elsewhere,” but itself made up of traces. Every trace is the trace of a trace. No element is 
anywhere present (nor simply absent), there are only traces. These traces are not, as the word 
might suggest, traces of a presence or the passage of a presence.  […] In every “element” all that 
is “present” is the other, “absent” element, which must, for language to be possible, present this 
alterity as alterity. This “presentation” of absence “as such” does not make it a presence, and at 
the same stroke overtakes the opposition presence/absence. […] The trace n’a arrive qu’à 
s’effacer […], arrives only by effacing itself, manages only to efface itself. “Trace” attempts to 
name this entwinement of the-other-in-the-same which is the condition of the same itself.’ 
(Bennington, ‘Derridabase’,  pp. 75-6). 
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trace, arche-writing, différance, grammē, and text are part of the chain of words 
Derrida employs to describe such structure of difference. His understanding of 
difference exceeds Saussure’s differential value, though, insofar as Derrida is 
concerned not with the constituted differences that obtain between elements 
of the linguistics system (and that are localisable by comparing the sensible 
traits of each element), but that which constitutes difference and makes them 
‘appear’ within the trace’s structure of non-presence: 
Without a trace retaining the other as other in the same, no difference 
would do its work and no meaning would appear. It is not the question of 
a constituted difference here, but rather, before all determination of the 
content, of the pure movement which produces difference. The (pure) 
trace is differance. It does not depend on any sensible plenitude, audible 
or visible, phonic or graphic. It is, on the contrary, its condition. […] Its 
possibility is by rights anterior to all that one calls sign 
(signified/signifier, content/expression, etc.), concept or operation, 
motor or sensory. This differance is therefore not more sensible than 
intelligible and it permits the articulation of signs among themselves 
within the same abstract order—of a phonic or graphic text for 
example—or between two orders of expression. It permits the 
articulation of speech and writing—in the colloquial sense—as it founds 
the metaphysical opposition between the sensible and the intelligible, 
then between signifier and signified, expression and content, etc.76 
Such a reworking of the ‘essence’ of ‘language’ – as the movement of 
différance –should illuminate a) the strategy according to which ‘language’ (now 
understood as the play of the trace) can cross the text/world boundary; b) the 
claim that there is no outside-text; and c) that ‘language’ should not be thought 
as strictly human. Accordingly, most scholarly work on animality and/or 
technics influenced by Derrida tends to confirm this more general 
understanding of language. Bernard Stiegler defends that différance is ‘nothing 
                                                                
76 Derrida, Grammatology, pp. 67-8. 
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else than the history of life’77 and that ‘the grammē structures all levels of the 
living and beyond, the pursuit of life by means other than life’,78 since it is not 
anthropological, and neither is arche-writing; the latter principally ‘means that 
what is alive cannot be sufficient unto itself’.79 Wolfe points out that Derrida 
revolutionises the concept of the signifier ‘in favour of the articulation of 
writing as fundamentally a structured dynamics of the trace’, whose 
communicative functioning ‘extends beyond the human to nonhuman animals 
and indeed exceeds […] the boundary between the living and the mechanical or 
the technical’. Ultimately, for Wolfe,   
[the human] is fundamentally a prosthetic creature that has coevolved 
with various forms of technicity and materiality, forms that are radically 
“not-human” and yet have nevertheless made the human what it is. (For 
Derrida, of course, this includes the most fundamental prostheticity of 
all: language in the broadest sense.)80 
If the trace in fact surpasses that which is traditionally linguistic, at this 
point one might ask why it is still so tied up with writing in Derrida, to the point 
that he proposes arche-writing as another name for it. To what extent can 
writing in the strict sense still be relevant for something which works across 
species lines, and even the life/death barrier? To be sure, only writing in the 
vulgar sense would remain strictly human, since arche-writing is not 
anthropological: 
Leroi-Gourhan […] describes the unity of man and the human adventure 
[…] as a stage or an articulation in the history of life—of what I we here 
                                                                
77 Stiegler, Technics and Time, p. 136. 
78 Ibid., p. 137. 
79 Bernard Stiegler, ‘Derrida and Technology: Fidelity at the Limits of Deconstruction and the 
Prosthesis of Faith’, in Jacques Derrida and the Humanities: A Critical Reader, ed. by Tom Cohen 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001), pp. 238-70 (pp. 250, 253-4). 
80 Wolfe, Posthumanism, p. xxv. 
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call differance—as the history of the grammè. Instead of having recourse 
to the concepts that habitually serve to distinguish man from other 
living beings (instinct and intelligence, absence or presence of speech, of 
society, of economy, etc. etc.), the notion of program is invoked [by Leroi-
Gourhan].81  
This notion of program is made possible by the history of the trace, as 
‘the emergence that makes the grammè appear as such (that is according to a 
new structure of nonpresence)’. The emergence of the grammè is the ground 
for the emergence of systems of writing in the narrow sense, ‘since “genetic 
inscription” and the “short programmatic chains” regulating the behavior of the 
amoeba or the annelid up to the passage beyond alphabetic writing to the 
orders of the logos and of a certain homo sapiens’.82 The trace – arche-writing – 
is therefore logically anterior to commonplace writing and cannot be confused 
with the human invention. As Wolfe and Stiegler have argued, it is the 
articulation of the living on the dead: 
If the trace, […] which must be thought before the opposition of nature 
and culture, animality and humanity, etc., belongs to the very movement 
of signification, then signification is a priori written, whether inscribed 
or not, in one form or another, in a “sensible” and “spatial” element that 
is called “exterior.” Arche-writing, at first the possibility of the spoken 
word, then of the “graphie” in the narrow sense, […] this trace is the 
opening of the first exteriority in general, the enigmatic relationship of 
the living to its other and of an inside to an outside: spacing. The outside, 
“spatial” and “objective” exteriority […] would not appear without the 
grammè, without differance as temporalization, without the 
nonpresence of the other inscribed within the sense of the present, 
without the relationship with death as the concrete structure of the 
living present. […] The presence-absence of the trace […] carries in itself 
the problems of the letter and the spirit, of body and soul.83 
                                                                
81 Derrida, Grammatology, p. 91. 
82 Ibid. 
83 Derrida, Grammatology, pp. 76-7. 
The trace | 67 
 
 
The question seems to be, thus, why arche-writing, if it precedes what 
one normally would understand by writing, still carries that name. In what 
sense is arche-writing still a writing at all? Derrida stresses that arche-writing 
still ‘essentially communicates with the vulgar concept of writing’ and the 
latter could not have emerged if not by a work of repression and dissimulation 
of arche-writing.84 Arche-writing is therefore still barely legible in the meaning 
of vulgar writing, so that writing’s philosophical elusiveness is symptomatic of 
the extra-metaphysical, grammatological character of arche-writing. The 
legibility of arche-writing lies precisely at the sites where writing is at stake, 
and that is why Derrida was able to wrench the non-metaphysical concept of 
arche-writing from within the texts of Saussure, Husserl, or Rousseau. 
Geoffrey Bennington puts it thus: 
This decision to retain the word ‘writing’, and to court the confusion of 
its ‘new’ sense (‘archi-writing’ [sic], a structure logically prior to the 
standard conceptual distinction of speech and writing) […] is justified by 
the thought that something of this ‘new’ sense is legible in the 
traditional discussions […] and the place of that legibility is 
systematically where writing (in its current or ‘vulgar’ sense) is at issue. 
Something about writing in the usual sense shows up something of the 
structure of archi-writing, even if only symptomatically, signalling an 
effort of repression.85 
Derrida’s reworking of language by means of the attention to its most 
irreducible possibilities and conditions (the trace, différance, iterability, arche-
writing, etc.) opens the possibility for a shift in the thinking of the animal body 
and its materiality as always already enmeshed in textuality. However, if on the 
one hand Derrida’s concept of the trace allows us to more fully comprehend 
                                                                
84 Ibid., p. 61. 
85 Geoffrey Bennington, ‘Saussure and Derrida’, in The Cambridge Companion to Saussure, ed. by 
Carol Sanders (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004), pp. 186-204 (p. 195). 
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the limitations of our thinking of the body, as well as the nature of mortality, on 
the other hand, we still need a thinking of the animal (and its body) that 
accounts for its literary power and philosophical elusiveness. After all, despite 
the fact that, as I have argued, animality-as-material-embodiment may be a 
result of the dissimulation of trace, and even though language as arche-writing 
is not strictly human, we must concede that the animal still appears to 
challenge and radically impact on language. What is needed is a history of the 
materialisation of animal bodies so as to understand the extent of their 
inscription within the logic of materialism. I turn to a reading of Sigmund 
Freud’s Totem and Taboo as a way of providing a genealogy of the 
materialisation of both animal and linguistic bodies so as to map the extent to 
which they mirror each other. Not only that, I shall try to show that Freud’s 
‘history’ of this embodiment also explains how it could give rise to a concept of 
the animal that both obeys and transgresses such genealogy, opening the path 
for a thinking of the trace – or, in Freud’s case, the totem – as the animal’s way 
out of the submission to the signifier. I shall try to show that Freud’s totem 
points to the possibility that animals in traditional discourse (literature, 
philosophy, science, etc.), just like writing in the vulgar sense with respect to 
arche-writing, permit a quasi-transcendental concept of animality to emerge, 
one which would precede the classical concept of ‘the animal’ – an arche-
animality. Freud’s text  will be shown to be a theoretical resource for 
formulating arche-animality, but its analysis will also furnish an example of a 
paleonymic textual reading that uncovers the arche-animal from/under the 
repression of vulgar animality.
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Chapter 2: Totem and Taboo 
Introduction 
Dominic Pettman opens his Look at the Bunny: Totem, Taboo, Technology by 
mentioning Claude Lévi-Strauss’s famous indictment against totemism as a 
conceptual category: ‘it has been over half a century since the doyen of 
structuralist anthropology, Claude Lévi-Strauss delivered his influential 
funeral oration for the notion of the totem.’1 According to Pettman, Lévi-
Strauss believed that totemism was ‘little more than an illusion: a trick of the 
light, produced by the disciplinary desire for origin myths of holistic social 
interaction’.2 In short, ‘totemism’ had been ‘asked to do too much work’ as a 
concept. Pettman, however, believes there is some sort of survival or 
persistence of the totem as a concept so as to dedicate to it an entire book. 
However, Lévi-Strauss, too, acknowledged at least some useful aspects 
of totemism as a concept. Wishing to dissociate it from the idea of the ‘guardian 
animal spirit’, he insisted that totemism cannot plot the whole of relations 
between humanity and the natural world and that, in fact, it only mapped 
relations between differences.3 In other words, there is a much more structural 
system of relationships in totemism between humans and animals than a 
mythopoetic one. He did not reduce totemism to a structural category, however 
– he eliminated it altogether: probably because the structural organisation of 
                                                                
1 Dominic Pettman, Look at the Bunny: Totem, Taboo, Technology (Alresford: Zero Books, 2013), 
Kindle location 43. 
2 Ibid., 141. 
3 Claude Lévi-Strauss, Totemism, trans. by Rodney Needham (London: Merlin Press, 1991), pp. 
86-9. 
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relations and differences that totemism came to signify under his pen was 
already carried out by the whole of his structural anthropology. Pettman 
seems to foreground such issue of structurality when he frames totemism as a 
technique of virtualisation:  
It is the virtual aspect of the totem which interests us in the present 
context: the way in which any actual existing crocodile is but a manifest 
avatar of “crocodileness” for those who live, think, and act within 
totemic protocols. A specific crocodile, sunning himself on a river bank, 
is sacred to the extent that he invokes the archetypal species with which 
the tribe is affiliated. (Just as the signifier is different from the referent – 
the former representing the abstract, collective meaning – the 
individualized reptile embodies something which cannot be accessed 
directly, but only circled.)4 
I suggest that Freud’s 1913 book Totem and Taboo: Resemblances 
Between the Mental Lives of Savages and Neurotics can, in fact, be seen as a virtual 
reading of totemism, at least due to, if nothing else, its psychoanalytic 
conclusions applicable to the minds of present individuals. Insofar as it narrates 
the emergence of a certain human psyche while also accounting for its 
functioning, Freud’s gesture is two-pronged. On the one hand, he produces a 
history of (the) virtualisation (of the unconscious), to the extent that the primal 
crime he speaks of is purported to mark the origin of human psychosociality. 
On the other hand, though, he also suggests a virtualisation of history, since the 
historical reality of the crime is at issue from the start, but in a way that its 
‘virtual’ taking-place is still demanded by the psychic structures supposed to 
emerge from it, even if its ‘historical’ taking-place can be rejected. 
                                                                
4 Pettman, 178. 
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Freud argued that both totemism and taboos emerged alongside each 
other, both sparked by Oedipal structures.5 Totemism was, for Freud, the 
shape of human social organisation before religion, and it would evolve (or 
perhaps one should say simply ‘change’) throughout time into various forms of 
beliefs, such as animism and polytheism, all the way to monotheism (pp. 90, 
116). Taboos would still be at work in present-day societies, although they 
would function more similarly to ‘original’ systems of taboos in the self-
prohibiting laws produced by the minds of neurotics (pp. 100-104). If, 
according to Lévi-Strauss, Freud does concede ‘that the act of parricide was 
[not] a historical event’, then Lévi-Strauss in his turn would concede that ‘[the 
primal crime] could be viewed as the simple expression of a recurrent 
virtuality, a generic and non-temporal model of psychological attitudes 
entailed by repetitive phenomena or institutions such as totemism and tabus’.6 
However, it remains elusive how the state of affairs, in this case, Oedipal psychic 
structures – if they depend on some form of performance of this crime – can 
come to produce their origin. In the uncanny temporality of Freud’s attempted 
explication of the shift from nature to culture, cause and effect would seem to 
change places. 
Derrida, too, seems to be caught up in a strange temporality when he 
attempts to account for the way in which Saussure’s arbitrary sign can take 
shape. If the arbitrary sign, in which ‘[the signifier] has no “natural attachment” 
                                                                
5 Sigmund Freud, Totem and Taboo: Some Points of Agreement between the Mental Lives of Savages 
and Neurotics, trans. by James Strachey (London: Routledge, 2001), p. 153. All further 
references to Totem and Taboo are from this edition and are given parenthetically in the text. 
6 Lévi-Strauss, p. 69. 
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to the signified within reality’,7 differs from a non-arbitrary symbol in that the 
latter would in fact resemble what it represents, that would mean that 
arbitrariness represents the shift from a ‘natural’ resemblance between 
symbols and things to a ‘cultural’ or ‘institutional’ relationship between 
signifiers and signifieds or referents. Unlike the symbol, which operates by 
means of the seemingly obvious similarity between itself and its referent, the 
arbitrary sign requires a system of relations and differences in which it 
functions. No arbitrary sign could do its work on its own, since it depends on 
other differences in the system. The system itself, in its turn, cannot exist 
without arbitrariness, since arbitrary relations constitute its very 
systematicity. A synchronic system is usually believed to owe its existence to a 
diachronic phenomenon, which, over time, gave rise to it. In other words, the 
system of arbitrary signs would have been constituted by the emergence of 
arbitrariness. Arbitrariness, however, cannot simply emerge, since it depends 
on a system already at work in order to function. The fact that we encounter 
the same problem both in Freud and in Derrida points to the fact that both 
structures – totemism and language – are related and can illuminate each 
other. 
 
                                                                
7 Jacques Derrida, Of Grammatology, Fortieth Anniversary Edition, trans. by Gayatri 
Chakravorty Spivak (Baltimore: John Hopkins University, 2016), p. 50. 
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Totem, taboo, and the primal crime 
Freud considered Totem and Taboo, especially the last of the four chapters (on 
totemism in childhood), as one of his best works.8 His controversial statements 
regarding the origin of society and morality encountered strong opposition 
from diverse fields of knowledge, from sociology to molecular biology. In fact, 
he refused to comment further on the biological impossibilities of his theory, 
and only in Moses and Monotheism, his last book, did he return to the topic, only 
to insist on his previous beliefs.9 According to Robert Paul, a list of 
anthropologists who have written (mostly negatively) on Totem and Taboo 
‘reads like a roll call of the immortals: Rivers, Marret, Boas, Westermarck, 
Schmidt, Goldenweiser, Kroeber, Radin, Malinowski, Fortes, Lévi-Strauss—not 
even to mention the obligatory back-of-the-hand rejection in every text and 
history of the discipline’.10 Even more illustrious scholars could be added if one 
were to include those who were sympathetic to some aspects of his theories, 
and an entire book was edited to mark its impact: Werner Muensterberger’s 
edited collection Man and His Culture: Psychoanalytic Anthropology after ‘Totem 
and Taboo’.11  
Freud indeed frames his project as an attempt to offer psychoanalytic 
contributions to then unanswered questions in the field of anthropology. 
Impressed by the similarities he could see between the mental life of those 
                                                                
8 Torberg Foss, ‘Freud 100 years ago. Totem and Taboo (1912–1913)’, The Scandinavian 
Psychoanalytic Review, 36 (2013), 1-4 (p. 1). The chapters were first published as separate 
essays in the journal Imago from 1912 to 1913. 
9 Sigmund Freud, Moses and Monotheism, trans. by Katherine Jones (London: Hogarth Press, 
1939), p. 94. 
10 Robert A. Paul, 'Did the Primal Crime Take Place?', Ethos, 4 (1976), 311-52 (p. 312). 
11 London: Rapp & Whiting, 1969. 
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deemed ‘neurotic’ and contemporary (to Freud) ‘primitive’ peoples as 
described by ethnographic reports, he suggests the possibility of drawing 
conclusions about the psyche of early humans – or even about the becoming-
human of this psyche – by means of psychoanalytic findings and methods. One 
of the most common traits of such so-called primitive people as studied by 
Freud was the absence of an organised religion, the place of which was taken 
by totemism. Freud defines a ‘totem’ thus: 
It is as a rule an animal (whether edible and harmless or dangerous and 
feared) and more rarely a plant or a natural phenomenon (such as rain or 
water),12 which stands in a peculiar relation to the whole clan. In the first 
place, the totem is the common ancestor of the clan; at the same time it 
is their guardian spirit and helper, which sends them oracles and, if 
dangerous to others, recognizes and spares its own children. 
Conversely, the clansmen are under the sacred obligation (subject to 
automatic sanctions) not to kill or destroy their totem and to avoid 
eating its flesh (or deriving benefit from it in other ways). The totemic 
character is inherent, not in some individual animal or entity, but in all 
the individuals of a given class. […] In almost every place where we find 
totems, we also find a law against persons of the same totem having sexual 
relations with one another and consequently against their marrying. This, 
then, is ‘exogamy’, an institution related to totemism.13 (pp. 3-5) 
In the first essay or section, ‘The Horror of Incest’, Freud stresses the 
unusualness of the totemic type of exogamy, since members of a clan were 
                                                                
12 Freud concedes in more than one place, however, that the totem is first and foremost an 
animal species. That is, if totemic systems can be encountered that operate around a non-
animal totem, they are nevertheless a later transformation of (animal) totemism as it emerged: 
‘The taboos on animals, which consist essentially of prohibitions against killing and eating 
them, constitute the nucleus of totemism.’ (p. 27). The last word in the passage, in the original 
German edition, is printed in spaced typed, which is Freud’s typographical mark for emphasis. 
Strachey’s translation does not follow that practice, but instead of adopting another 
typographical technique, simply remarks in footnotes that the given passage in German was in 
spaced type. The quoted sentence, however, does not do so: it brings the word ‘totemism’ with 
initial capital and italicized, running the risk of leading the reader into taking the word to be a 
title, possibly a shorthand for Frazer’s often cited Totemism and Exogamy, especially since the 
initial capital in the word, unremarkable in German due to its capitalized nouns, does not occur 
in other instances of the word ‘totemism’ in the book. 
13 Such relation is reflected in the title of Frazer’s Totemism and Exogamy. 
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forbidden to marry not only their blood relations (‘relatives’ in the present-day, 
Western sense) but any member of the same clan – that is, any person who 
shared their totem. Also, the taboo against intra-clan marriage or intercourse is 
extended to a system of taboo restrictions covering almost all everyday 
dealings with fellow clan members. Freud finishes by highlighting the relevance 
of the discovery of infantile sexuality by psychoanalysis to understanding clan 
taboos in totemic societies. Since psychoanalysis revealed that primary erotic 
investment in childhood is essentially incestuous, Freud suggests that totemic 
societies – unlike modern ones – ‘still’ believe, even in adult life, in the dangers 
of incestuous attachment or attraction, a psychic element shared by neurotics, 
so that clan life had to be deeply ruled by taboos to ward off any possibility of 
incest.14 The difference between the totemic horror of incest (directed 
towards one’s entire clan) and the contemporary incest avoidance – as well as 
the totemic belief in an animal ancestor – leads Freud to pose his overarching 
question: 
How did prehistoric men come to adopt totems? How, that is, did they 
come to make the fact of their being descended from one animal or 
another the basis of their social obligations and […] of their sexual 
restrictions? There are numerous theories on the subject […] but no 
agreement. It is my intention to devote a special study before long to the 
problem of totemism, in which I shall attempt to solve it by the help of a 
psychoanalytic line of approach. (p. 4) 
                                                                
14 For Freud, these mechanisms operated all unconsciously, of course. Even infantile (or 
infantilized) incestuous sexuality – in children or in adult neurotics – remains unconscious. 
Healthy adult individuals will have – unconsciously – substituted other, exogamous objects of 
desire for family members. Members of totemic societies, therefore, maintained their 
unconscious desire for incest into adult life, so that their conscious horror of it produced the 
systems of taboos to thwart the fulfilling of these unconscious desires.  
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And as he adds in brackets, the ‘special study’ he mentions refers to the 
last and fourth chapter, ‘The Return of Totemism in Childhood’. Before putting 
forward his overarching thesis and extracting full weight from his 
psychoanalytic premises, he discusses in more detail in the antecedent 
chapters taboo systems (chapter 2) and animism (chapter 3). They essentially 
do the work of laying the foundations for the bringing together of 
psychoanalytic and anthropological findings, especially by tracing parallels 
between the life of ‘savages’ and neurotics. Due to his belief that ontogenesis 
recapitulates phylogenesis, Freud maintained that human psychosexual 
development was bound to reflect earlier, ancient psychic procedures in the 
human mind. So much so that, in neurosis, hysteria or paranoia, one could read 
reflections and/or distortions of civilisational processes and institutions 
insofar as these are products of early human mental life (p. 85). In his chapter 
on animism and the omnipotence of thought, Freud draws on ethnographic 
accounts of early religious systems (such as animism) in his attempt to account 
for the origin of the power of mental unconscious processes. Since 
psychoanalysis knows that it is the apparent omnipotence of mere thoughts in 
the unconscious that propels the subject into virtually any psychic 
arrangement (Oedipal complexes and their resolutions, neuroses and 
psychoses, and even ‘normal’, sublimated mental life), Freud endeavours to 
locate in the complex systems of thought of early humans the phylogenetic 
explanation for such omnipotence. The concepts of magic, sorcery, and the soul 
are all traced back by Freud to the early human belief that internal mental life 
both corresponds to the external world and is able to influence its working. The 
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perceived relevance of mere thoughts to the understanding and mastering of 
reality is responsible both for the system of beliefs of early humans (magic, 
animism, taboos etc.) and for the operation of the psychic apparatus (in 
defence mechanisms, for instance).15 
In the last chapter, finally, Freud offers to elucidate why totemism and 
exogamy seem to necessitate each other. After quoting definitions of totemism 
by Wundt, Frazer, and Reinach, he summarises his view thus:  
If we seek to penetrate to the original nature of totemism, without 
regard to subsequent accretions or attenuations, we find that its 
essential characteristics are these: Originally, all totems were animals, and 
were regarded as the ancestors of the different clans. Totems were inherited 
only through the female line. There was a prohibition against killing the totem 
(or—which, under primitive conditions, is the same thing—against eating 
it). Members of a totem clan were forbidden to practice sexual intercourse 
with one another. (p. 124, emphases in the original) 
In order to advance his psychoanalytic explanation, Freud discusses 
various theories regarding the origin of totemism in order to circle aspects 
which support his view – and also to point to a gap in the available accounts 
that could be filled by psychoanalytical research. Similarly, I shall focus on 
Freud’s arguments that most seem to suggest a grammatological reading of the 
emergence of totemism, as well as on the unanswered problems which offer a 
space for zoogrammatological approach.  
He divides such theories into nominalist, sociological, and psychological. 
He seems most interested, as I am, in the first series, insofar as they account 
                                                                
15 Freud includes a brief discussion of the psychic origin of the belief in a ‘double nature’ of 
objects – put simply, the dualism between body and soul – which he attributes to the 
opposition between perception and memory. One feels a more refined theoretical framework 
than the one provided by Freud would be necessary to approach the relation between body-
perception and soul-memory. 
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both for early human’s relationship with totemic animals, and for the parallels 
with exogamy. Citing Lang, Freud highlights that ‘the need felt by clans to 
distinguish themselves from one another by the use of names’ arose as an 
explanation for totemic systems centuries ago, only to resurface in Keane, in 
the late nineteenth century, who ‘regards totems as “heraldic badges” by 
means of which individuals, families and clans sought to distinguish themselves 
from one another’ (p. 128). And most crucial for understanding the co-
implication of animality and language (for Derrida, always already scriptural) is 
Freud’s quotation of Julius Pikler and Bódog Somló’s 1900 Der Ursprung des 
Totemismus: 
Mankind required both for communities and for individuals a 
permanent name which could be fixed in writing. . . . Thus totemism did 
not arise from the religious needs of men but from their practical, 
everyday needs. The core of totemism, nomenclature, is a result of the 
primitive technique of writing. In its nature a totem is like an easily drawn 
pictograph. But once savages bore the name of an animal, they went on 
to form the idea of kinship with it. (Pikler and Somló, quoted in Freud, p. 
128, emphases are mine) 
That totemism might have emerged as a form of proto-writing (one may 
even say arche-writing) should illuminate Freud’s entire psychoanalytic thesis 
in Totem and Taboo. Or, conversely and even more important, one might stress 
the fact that, in this reading, writing is co-implicated with animality. Equally 
crucial for both Freud’s project and mine is his defence of Lang’s indifference to 
the origin of clan animal names. For Freud, 
it is only necessary to assume that [clans] awoke one day to the 
consciousness that they bore such names and could give no account of 
how this had come about. The origin of the names had been forgotten. They 
would then attempt to arrive at an explanation by speculating on the 
subject; and, in view of their belief in the importance of names, they 
were bound to reach all the ideas contained in the totemic system. […] 
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The fact of a primitive man bearing the same name as an animal must 
lead him to assume the existence of a mysterious and significant bond 
between himself and that particular species of animal. What other 
similarity could it be than one of blood relationship? Once the similarity 
of names had led to this conclusion, the blood taboo would immediately 
involve all the totemic ordinances, including exogamy. (p. 130, emphasis 
in the original) 
What remains to be elucidated, according to Freud, is the mechanism by 
which such a notion of an animal forefather would give rise to the complex and 
deep-seated mental predispositions that shaped taboo systems and exogamy. 
The fact is that an instrumental and practical technique of nomenclature does 
not match the emotionally and psychically constituted totemic systems. He 
quickly disregards the suggestion of a natural aversion to incest, based on the 
fact that psychoanalysis reveals that the first erotic desires in childhood are 
themselves incestuous.16 Based on Darwin’s suggestion that early hominids 
would have lived according to the social organisation of higher apes (in small, 
patriarchal groups headed by an alpha male), Freud can glimpse the 
phylogenetic origin of exogamy in the monopoly of female members in the 
hands of a senior male. What seems to be puzzling now, however, is whether 
totemism emerged from such alpha male-imposed exogamy or vice-versa. 
Thus, Freud identifies the space wherein he can insert his psychoanalytic 
contribution.  
As he puts it, ‘into this obscurity one single ray of light is thrown by 
psychoanalytic observation’ (p. 147). Primarily, this amounts to the childhood 
                                                                
16 Also, a ‘natural taboo’ against incest would mean that the totemism-exogamy complex is, in a 
certain sense, natural and not, as widely regarded, a system of cultural and social organisation. 
One would also have to locate when and where in the animal kingdom, therefore, such a 
natural aversion of incest emerged. 
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phenomenon of animal phobia, in which a child suffers a sudden shift in his (all 
examples given by Freud are of boys) relationship with animals and begins to 
fear one particular species, many times one in which he showed great interest. 
According to Freud, animal phobia is the earliest form of psycho-neurotic 
disorders in children. Psychoanalysis reveals that such ambivalent feelings 
towards the animal are in fact displaced feelings for the father, towards whom 
the child feels intense rivalry – a rivalry which is then repressed and re-worked 
in the form of this animal displacement. Freud underscores  
two features in [animal phobia] which offer valuable points of 
agreement with totemism: the [child’s] complete identification with his 
totem animal and his ambivalent emotional attitude to it. These 
observations justify us, in my opinion, in substituting the father for the 
totem animal in the formula for totemism (in the case of males). (p. 152) 
From this he concludes that by reading the totem animal in totemic 
societies as literally their (fore)father, the two core taboos of totemism – not 
killing the totem and not having sex with members of the same totem clan – 
‘coincide in their content with the two crimes of Œdipus, who killed his father 
and married his mother, as well as with the two primal wishes of children’. This 
in turn allows Freud to advance that ‘the totemic system […] was a product of 
the conditions involved in the Œdipus complex’ (p. 153).  
In order to pursue that line of reasoning, Freud introduces the 
discussion on Robertson Smith’s theory of the totem meal, which the latter 
believed formed an integral part of totemic systems. Although this meal was 
rare in the accounts of existing totemic societies, Freud argues that one can 
read all rituals of sacrifice as derivations of it. Since sacrificial offerings are 
strictly edible or drinkable, he concludes that the oldest form of sacrificial rite 
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was the sacrifice of animals, ‘older than the use of fire or the knowledge of 
agriculture’ (p. 155). In such sacrifices, all clan members and the god were 
believed to be eating together, sitting at the same table, as it were, from which 
an ‘ethical force of the public sacrificial meal’ was derived, which ‘rested upon 
very ancient ideas of the significance of eating and drinking together.’ In other 
words, ‘what was directly expressed by the sacrificial meal was only the fact 
that the god and his worshippers were “commensals”’ (p. 156). And having 
learned from Freud that the totem animal was a surrogate of the father – and 
that gods were related to certain sacred animals and were many times animals 
themselves – we can understand that ‘the sacrificial animal was treated as a 
member of the tribe; the sacrificing community, the god and the sacrificial 
animal were of the same blood and members of one clan’ (p. 158). 
The totemic belief that clan members maintain a kinship with their 
totem clan – which Freud insists should be taken literally and in terms of 
lineage – ‘implies a participation in a common substance. […] [Kinship] can be 
acquired and strengthened by food which a man eats […] and with which his 
body is renewed. If a man shared a meal with his god he was expressing a 
conviction that they were of one substance,’ since they were consuming the 
same (animal) stuff. The totem meal, therefore, secures the co-substantiality of 
humans and gods, by the means of their ingestion of the (same) flesh of the 
(same) totemic animal. One may say, then, that such sort of kinship implies that 
clan members view themselves as siblings of individual totemic animals, all of 
them descended from the animal-god. In short, ‘it was […] by the killing and 
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consuming of [...] the ancient totem animal, the primitive god himself, […] that 
the clansmen renewed and assured their likeness to the god’ (p. 160). 
Reminding us of the conclusions he drew from animal phobia cases (that 
the totem animal is a stand-in for the father), Freud can explain the uncanny 
aspects of totem meal festivals, in which mourning and bewailing is in order, 
only to be concluded with rejoicing and festivities. ‘The ambivalent emotional 
attitude, which to this day characterizes the father-complex in our children and 
which often persists in adult life’ (p. 164) explains the need for ritualistic regret 
after having slayed the totem-father but also the eruption of the festival itself, 
which commemorates the victory over paternal authority. By articulating his 
psychoanalytic reading of the totem meal and festival with the Darwinian 
social organisation of early hominids, Freud is able to give the account of a 
single origin for both totemism and exogamy which explains their deep-seated 
taboos and their perseverance into later stages of civilisational development: 
One day the brothers who had been driven out [by the tyrannical alpha 
male] came together, killed and devoured their father and so made an 
end of the patriarchal horde. United, they had the courage to do and 
succeeded in doing what would have been impossible for them 
individually. […] Cannibal savages as they were, it goes without saying 
that they devoured their victim as well as killing him. The violent primal 
father had doubtless been the feared and envied model of each one of 
the company of brothers: and in the act of devouring him they 
accomplished their identification with him, and each one of them 
acquired a portion of his strength. The totem meal, which is perhaps 
mankind’s earliest festival, would thus be a repetition and a 
commemoration of this memorable and criminal deed, which was the 
beginning of so many things—of social organization, of moral 
restrictions and of religion. (pp. 164-5) 
The theory of the ‘primal crime’ – or rather, as Freud sometimes puts it, 
the ‘primal deed’, since no properly criminal acts were possible before the 
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brothers founded morality in their fraternity – is his daring scenario for 
explaining the origin of civilisation, many of its developments, as well as both 
totemism and exogamy. It neatly ties together many of the anthropological, 
sociological, psychological, and religious strands of the most troubling 
questions in early twentieth-century thought. Most instrumental for us, 
however, is the role the totem animal will play in organising society as it 
emerges after the primal deed. 
The murder could be said to have had the undesired effect of raising the 
slayed father into the realm of myth. The formidable authority he exercised 
began to be remembered with fondness and awe, certainly because the 
presence, in life, of such a feared and respected senior male had the power of 
organising their desires, identifications, and reality. Fear, hatred, awe, and 
respect easily mingled with guilt and remorse, so that the father’s main 
imperative – no access to the womenfolk in the horde for anyone else – came 
to be seen as in need of returning, in order to honour the father’s memory, so to 
speak. This guilt, of course, had very practical applications, since the 
remorseless pursuit of the original plan of overthrowing the father could only 
lead to infighting among the brothers, or simply the institution of a new alpha 
male who would likewise inspire mutiny.17 In fact, a series of successful 
mutinies in which a new tyrant emerged or after which the fraternal alliance 
                                                                
17 Freud cites J J Atkinson’s description of patricide(s) which did not result in a fraternal 
society, since Atkinson ‘supposed that, after the father had been disposed of, the horde would 
be disintegrated by a bitter struggle between the victorious sons. Thus any new organization of 
society would be precluded: there would be an “every-recurring violent succession to the 
solitary paternal tyrant, by sons whose parricidal hands were so soon again clenched in 
fratricidal strife”’ (p. 165). 
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was wiped out most certainly had occurred before the institution of fraternity 
and exogamy could arise out of guilt. All the brothers had, therefore, to give up 
access to the womenfolk – and institute exogamy – so that no one brother 
would become the tyrant in his turn, or so the brotherly alliance did not perish. 
After killing the father due to their wish to not obey him, they were forced 
precisely to do so in order to preserve the alliance: ‘What had up to then been 
prevented by [the father’s] actual existence was thenceforward prohibited by 
the sons themselves, in accordance with the psychological procedure so 
familiar to us in psycho-analyses under the name of “deferred obedience” 
[nachträglichen Gehorsams]’ (p. 166). The uncanny temporality ingrained in such 
a ‘deferred action’ (Nachträglichkeit) will be key in understanding the 
functioning of the primal deed in Freud, as well as for the bridging of him and 
Derrida that will allow us to grasp the linguistic nature of the totem and the 
totemic nature of language. 
After the crime, the totemic animal plays the central role in organising 
both the respect for the dead father and the new fraternal, exogamous society 
newly instituted. The totem animal becomes a surrogate for the murdered 
father, a ‘symbol’ of the clan’s descent from him, so that 
they could attempt, in their relation to this surrogate father, to allay 
their burning sense of guilt, to bring about a kind of reconciliation with 
their father. The totemic system was, as it were, a covenant with their 
father, in which he promised them everything that a childish imagination 
may expect from a father—protection, care and indulgence. (p. 168) 
The clan, in their turn, instituted the taboo against killing and eating the 
totem, so as to promise never again to repeat the murderous deed. Totemic 
systems, therefore, emerged from ‘filial guilt’ so as to try and appease the 
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father by obeying him retroactively (nachträglich). According to Freud, all 
religions descend from totemic systems and are all ‘attempts at solving the 
same problem’ (ibid.). 
An important aspect, which seems to contradict filial guilt, is the ritual 
festival of the totem meal, in which the taboo against killing the totem animal 
was indeed broken and thus the primal deed was re-enacted. For Freud, this 
contradiction is itself one of the strongest arguments of his theory, since it 
accounts both for the ambivalence in parental complexes (in the clan, in animal 
phobia, in the Oedipus complex, etc.) and for the mechanism by means of which 
the clan could renew the covenant with the father. This renewal is 
instrumental, primarily, for the continuation of totemism and fraternity as 
generations pass. 
This mechanism rested precisely at the heart of the controversies 
surrounding Totem and Taboo. Freud’s critics, as I discuss below, did not accept 
that one historical event could have produced a mark in a whole civilisation and 
that any mechanism could properly explain the persistent memory of such a 
remote crime. Especially because no one in recorded history could actually 
remember an actual, specific crime of that sort, Freud maintained that the 
memory of it certainly had to work in the unconscious. By means of festivals, 
fairy tales, and myths – all full of psychosexual material – an account of the 
crime and its meaning could be bequeathed to subsequent generations. 
Continuous re-emergence of the sacrifice of a god – such as the crucifixion of 
Jesus – would attest to this Freudian thesis. For him,  
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the less [the crime] itself was recollected, the more numerous must have 
been the substitutes to which it gave rise. […] No generation is able to 
conceal any of its more important mental processes from its successor. 
For psycho-analysis has shown us that everyone possesses in his 
unconscious mental activity an apparatus which enables him to […] undo 
the distortions which other people have imposed on the expression of 
their feelings. (pp. 180, 184) 
Freud in fact advances conflicting theories, so as to cover more ground: 
he concedes that the neuroses, from which he drew insights applicable to 
totemism and taboos, deal in fact with psychical realities and imagined 
transgressions. Neurotics have not, therefore, committed terrible deeds which 
must be expiated by series of taboos – the latter actually protect the subject 
from mere unconscious fantasies which the ego sees as transgressive. Freud 
supposes, then, that the primal crime could have been just as effective as a 
phantasy, even if it never took place. He even suggests that it might not matter 
whether the crime was fact or not. Other than that, another concession he is 
willing to make is to entertain that the primal deed may have repeatedly 
occurred in countless hordes, over hundreds of years. 
Critics did not seem to accept his allowances, for they generally accused 
him of having breached the basic principles of evolutionary biology, as Robert 
Paul describes:  
By assuming that a traumatic event, such as the proposed primal crime, 
could become part of the phylogenetic inheritance of subsequent 
humans, Freud seemed to have been making the “Lamarckian” error of 
assuming that a mental impression experienced by individuals—an 
“acquired characteristic”—could be assimilated into the genotype. That 
would violate the so-called “central dogma” of neo-Darwinism, 
according to which the arrow of causation can only run from the 
genome to the phenotype, never the reverse.18 
                                                                
18 Robert A. Paul, 'Yes, the Primal Crime Did Take Place: A further Defense of Freud’s Totem 
and Taboo ', Ethos, 38 (2010), 230-49 (p. 232). 
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Paul contends that Freud never advances any Lamarckian views in 
Totem and Taboo, but almost all early readers thought it adequate to address 
the issue. In his reappraisal of the book, Derek Freeman attempts to rid the 
Freudian thesis of its ‘scientifically untenable elements’ so as to maintain its 
core. In other words, despite Freeman’s sympathies towards Freud, he 
discusses at length the possibility of the primal crime’s functioning without any 
Lamarckian mechanisms of inheritance. The sheer variety of competing 
theories put forth by the end of Totem and Taboo may confuse the reader as to 
which one Freud is actually defending, although Freeman believes the book 
does postulate the ‘inheritance of psychical dispositions’.19 However, he 
supports the phantasy thesis sketched out by Freud himself.20 
In his first foray into the primal crime theory, Alfred Kroeber did not 
give weight to the similarities between neuroses (especially animal phobia in 
children) and the mental life of ‘savages’, writing that ‘the fact that a child 
sometimes displaces its father-hatred upon an animal—we are not told in what 
percentage of cases—is no proof that the sons did so’.21 Meyer Fortes criticised 
what he saw as the ‘fantastic reconstruction of the supposed prehistory of the 
Oedipus complex’,22 and as recently as 2006, Charles Hanly wrote in American 
Imago, on the state of psychoanalytic theory, that ‘psychoanalysis has 
                                                                
19 Derek Freeman, 'Totem and Taboo: A Reappraisal', in Man and His Culture: Psychoanalytic 
Anthropology after 'Totem and Taboo', ed. by Werner Muensterberger (London: Rapp & Whiting, 
1969), pp. 53-80 (p. 63). 
20 Ibid.,  p. 75. 
21 A. L. Kroeber, 'Totem and Taboo: An Ethnologic Psychoanalysis', American Anthropologist, 22 
(1920), 48-55 (p. 50) 
22 Meyer Fortes, 'Totem and Taboo', Proceedings of the Royal Anthropological Institute of Great 
Britain and Ireland, 1966 (1966), 5-22 (p. 17). 
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abandoned Freud’s hypothesis of an archaic heritage because it implied the 
inheritance of acquired characteristics, which, biochemistry has shown, cannot 
occur’.23 Both Fortes and Kroeber, however, concede that one may believe 
what Freud takes to be an act (or a series of repetitions thereof) as some sort of 
timeless structure:  
We may […] properly disregard any seeming claim, or half-claim, to 
historic authenticity of the suggested actual happening, as being beside 
the real point, and consider whether Freud's theory contains any 
possibility of being a generic, timeless explanation of the psychology 
that underlies certain recurrent historic phenomena or institutions like 
totemism and taboo.24 
[The totemic animal is] a symbolic representation of paternity 
perpetuated in the lineage, conscientious identification with which is 
crystallised in the taboo. At the same time there is no denying that these 
taboos stand for unquestioning submission to ancestral, that is, 
magnified paternal, authority which, as the ancestral cult shows is very 
ambivalently regarded.25 
In other words, they were ready to accept the reality of a synchronic 
relational structure among subjects, fathers, and animals, but not a diachronic 
account of its genesis or origin. At most, they seem to imply that the system 
itself gave rise to what is seemingly its very origin, so that the system is, in fact, 
the origin of the origin. One can still read in that a certain diachronic or genetic 
thinking, but still lacking an account of the genesis of the system itself, or a 
transcendental opening of the structure to what is not it. 
 
                                                                
23 Charles Hanly, quoted in Paul, 'The Primal Crime Did Take Place', p. 236. 
24 A. L. Kroeber, 'Totem and Taboo in Retrospect', American Journal of Sociology, 45 (1939), 446-
51 (p. 447). 
25 Fortes, 'Totem and Taboo', p. 18. 
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Totemic Writing and the Materiality of/through Language 
The bridge between the temporality of the origin of totemism and that of 
différance will allow us to read Totem and Taboo more readily in Derridean 
terms, providing a stronger foothold for an account of the co-implication of 
animality and language. Before that gesture, however, it seems crucial to 
highlight the role of the totem animal’s bodily materiality within the totemic 
writing/language that emerges in the aftermath of the primal deed. Such 
discussion, too, can illuminate the Freud-Derrida connection, since the 
difference between the materiality of language (or of the signifier) and the 
materiality of bodies, according to Butler, ‘requires first that we offer an 
account of how it is that bodies materialize, that is, how they come to assume 
the morphe, the shape by which their material discreteness is marked’. And in 
her Lacanian reading, Butler stresses that this morphology depends on 
‘language, understood as rules of differentiation based on idealized kinship 
relations’.26   
Freud’s Totem and Taboo is precisely the account of the origin of kinship 
relations and the materiality of language. If totemism is a writing technique 
emerging alongside the origin of society, the materiality of language cannot 
escape its relation to a certain materiality of the animal body. However, both 
Freud and Lévi-Strauss insist that the clan totem is never one specific animal, 
but always an animal species. Insofar as a species never appears as such, but 
always only synecdochally by the means of its tokens, a totemic animal can only 
                                                                
26 Judith Butler, Bodies That Matter: On the Discursive Limits of Sex (New York: Routledge, 1993), 
p. 69. 
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be grasped in the phenomenal, materially embodied specific animal. A species 
is always a category, a potentiality of actualisation to which direct access is 
barred. Only an individual animal can be encountered in its phenomenality, so 
that this material appearing, each encounter with or citation of the totemic 
animal, will produce the notion of a species. This is, of course, crucial, for the 
father ought not to be substituted for a material, killable being which could die 
or be killed just as he once was. That would destroy the very function of 
totemism as a way of referencing the primal crime, repeating it indefinitely, and 
atoning for it at the same time. In order for the totemic animal to substitute for 
the murdered father, a substituting mechanism must be established in which 
each individual animal can substitute (represent) for its species. That implies 
that each individual animal must be produced as material, contingent, corporeal, and 
mortal in order for them to function as instantiations of a timeless, immortal concept. 
It is significant, however, that, while it is mortal, the totem must not be 
killed. Since the totem is taken to be the clan's ancestor, it is supposed to 
protect and be protected by the clan. Killing or eating the totem is 
the taboo which institutes totemism as the naming and linguistic system which 
structures the sociality of the clan. On the one hand, this prohibition against 
the killing of animal's body recalls the guilt of having killed the primordial 
father; on the other hand, such prohibition works to disavow the animal's very 
materiality (as in its flesh and bones) so that it can be included in a linguistic 
system of substitutions – from the moment that an individual animal is 
underscored as being nothing but (living) matter, it risks losing its function 
within the symbolic system in which its materiality works in a radically 
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different way. That is, the material body of the individual totemic animal only 
appears as animated by the meaning of the totemic species. 
This animation is precisely the meaning of the signifier in traditional 
accounts of linguistic function, and it is entirely mediated by the paradigm of 
animation which is the animal. The phenomenal appearing of signifiers (the 
breath, the ink, the hand) cannot mean if not animated by the langue system of 
differences and relations, a system which never reveals itself as such, but is 
only outlined as a certain reservoir of potential meanings. The system of course 
also needs the signifiers in order for it to function, since  
relations, even the notion of différance, institute and require relata, 
terms, phenomenal signifiers. And yet what allows for a signifier to 
signify will never be its materiality alone. […] The materiality of the 
signifier will signify only to the extent that it is impure, contaminated by 
the ideality of differentiating relations, the tacit structurings of a 
linguistic context that is illimitable in principle. Conversely, the signifier 
will work to the extent that it is also contaminated constitutively by the 
very materiality that the ideality of sense purports to overcome.27 
As such, the materiality of the body and the materiality of the signifier are 
notions which are in constant communication, but which can never be allowed 
to coincide. 
It is highly significant, however, that the ritualistic sacrifice and eating of 
the totemic animal is prescribed in the totem meal in order to re-enact the 
murder and eating of the father. This rite is the only social situation in which 
the killing of the totem is allowed and it assures that the crime of killing the 
father is both atoned and never atoned, and never forgotten. Re-killing the 
father via the totem is a way of securing the workings of the symbolic system 
                                                                
27 Ibid., p. 68. 
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so as the totem will continue to symbolise the father. The corporeal materiality 
of the animal is allowed to be recognized in the rite as that which enables its 
similarity to the father. If the totem could never be killed, it would not perform 
its substitution of the (killed) father correctly and would not permit the 
(permanently unsuccessful) atonement for the crime – sparing the killable 
totem is thus a way of undoing the murder of the father, and renouncing all of 
its killability would foreclose this possibility, as would choosing as a totem a 
non-mortal object. Therefore, the animal's corporeal materiality is both that 
which must be constantly disavowed for it to work as a signifying materiality, 
and that which must be repeatedly reproduced in order for it to represent for 
the murdered father's own slayed, ingested mortal body. In a certain sense, the 
very mortality of bodies is caught up in the process of linguistic substitution 
and representation set up by totemism. 
Reading the materiality of the father’s mortal body in Butlerian terms as 
that which totemic language attempts to grasp, we can conclude that the 
materiality of the body, the ‘referent’ of linguistic categories, 
persists only as a kind of absence or loss, that which language does not 
capture, but instead, that which impels language repeatedly to attempt 
that capture, that circumscription—and to fail. This loss takes its place in 
language as an insistent call or demand that, while in language, is never 
fully of language.28 
For the phylogenetic view of Totem and Taboo, this lack or loss is read as 
the absence of the father after the murder. Despite the hatred and rivalry felt 
by the brothers, the material presence of the father in the horde gave meaning 
                                                                
28 Ibid., p. 67. 
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to the group and structured their identity via their narcissistic identification 
with him. The tyrannical father’s becoming semi-mythical totemic ancestor is 
the history of the constitution of the imago, as the image of parental maturity 
that structures the subject’s psyche via identification. 
This formulation reveals more starkly that the totemic signifying system 
both institutes the absence of the father while at the same time is constituted as 
a response to it, insofar as the material presence of the father cannot but fail to 
be captured via language. Therefore, language is, in a way, what estranges the 
clan from their forefather by the means of the very scriptural reference to him, 
while at the same time is set up as the only way of substituting for his loss. For 
Butler,  
insofar as language might be understood to emerge from the materiality 
of bodily life, that is, as the reiteration and extension of material set of 
relations, language is a substitutive satisfaction, a primary act of 
displacement and condensation. […] Those material sputterings [of 
language] are already psychically invested, deployed in the service of a 
fantasy of mastery and restoration. [Here, of the father].29  
Linda Belau explores the signifier’s attempt at restoration while also 
accounting for the uncanny temporality mentioned above, in which it both 
institutes and responds to a lack: 
The signifier marks the subject twice. It marks the subject as the 
primordial cut where the signifier carves the subject out of the body, 
and it also marks the subject in its failure to cover the void opened by 
that very cut.30  
In totemic, phylogenetic terms, one must understand ‘the subject’ as the 
(human) clan that separates itself both from the corporeality of animal totems 
                                                                
29 Ibid., pp. 69-70. 
30 Linda Belau, 'Trauma and the Material Signifier', Postmodern Culture, 11 (2001), para. 5. 
<http://pmc.iath.virginia.edu/text-only/issue.101/11.2belau.txt> [accessed 30 oct 2014]. 
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and from other clans. Belau continues by underscoring the ‘paradox […] in the 
temporality of these marks’: the fact is that  
the first mark, the primordial cutting up of the body, can only be 
produced by the signifier. However, this signifier doesn’t actually “exist” 
(or function) until the symbolic space opened up by the second 
marking—the failure of the signifier—can produce the functioning 
signifier. In the logic of this chiastic metalepsis, the signifier appears at 
the impossible intersection of the chiasmus; its effect stands in as its 
cause. Freud calls this retroaction [Nachträglichkeit].31  
Butler points out that Kristeva locates this substitutive process of 
language mainly at the site of the mouth, so that vocalisation (the materiality of 
sound) would function so as to vicariously replace the material contiguousness 
with the maternal body. For Butler,  
Kristeva argues that the materiality of the spoken signifier, the 
vocalization of sound, is already a psychic effort to reinstall and 
recapture a lost maternal body; hence, these vocalizations are 
temporarily recaptured in sonorous poetry which works language for its 
most material possibilities. […] The language that is the effect of this 
displacement [of material bodily relations onto linguistic relations] 
nevertheless carries the trace of that loss precisely in the phantasmatic 
aim of recovery that mobilizes vocalization itself. Here, then, it is the 
materiality of that (other) body which is phantasmatically reinvoked in 
the materiality of signifying sounds.32 
However, Butler’s privileging of the linguistic materiality of sounds and 
vocalisation is not present in Kristeva. The latter defines the what she calls the 
semiotic as  
a preverbal functional state that governs the connections between the 
body (in the process of constituting itself as a body proper), objects, and 
the protagonists of family structure. But we shall distinguish this 
functioning from symbolic operations that depend on language as a sign 
system—whether the language [langue] is vocalized or gestural (as with 
                                                                
31 Ibid., my interpolation. 
32 Butler, Bodies That Matter, pp. 69-70. 
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deaf-mutes). The kinetic functional stage of the semiotic precedes the 
establishment of the sign.33 
Kristeva systematically refers to the semiotic kinetic potential and is 
careful to repeatedly accommodate sign language within the symbolic realm, 
which, in opposition to the semiotic, is constituted, according to Butler, as an 
‘effort to reinstall and recapture a lost maternal body’. Kristeva seems to be 
suspicious, as am I, of privileging the oral cavity and the phenomenality of 
sound as the condensation of the matter of language, if only because it might 
betray a certain phonocentric view of language – a suspicion which apparently 
is not detected by Butler. Linguistic ability and function can exist perfectly well 
without phonation, be it in sign language or in the scriptural language of 
totemism. 
Therefore, we can more readily understand totemic language’s attempt 
to grasp at the materiality of paternal presence when Butler stresses that such 
materiality, at the same time as it is individualised into separable bodies, ‘is 
displaced onto the materiality of linguistic relations’.34 The loss of material 
proximity to the meaning-giving father is covered over by the corporification 
of discrete bodies (of totem animals) simultaneously with their application into a 
set of linguistic relations. And, for Butler, ‘every effort to signify encodes and 
repeat this loss. Moreover, it is only on the condition of this primary loss of the 
referent, that signification—and the materialization of language—can take 
place.’35 Kristeva’s philosophy is organised around the bodily relations with the 
                                                                
33 Julia Kristeva, Revolution in Poetic Language, trans. by Margaret Waller (New York: Columbia 
University Press, 1984), p. 27, emphases added. 
34 Ibid., p. 70. 
35 Ibid. 
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maternal body and not the primeval father. Belau, too, points that the lack 
instituted by the signifier is constituted as the loss of what ‘is always imagined 
[by psychoanalysis] as the symbiotic relationship between the child and the 
mother’.36  
In her discussion of Totem and Taboo in Powers of Horror, Kristeva 
stresses Freud’s imbalanced focus on his two-pronged theory. Freud states 
that his theory of totemism is an attempt to explain the relationship between 
murder (of the primal father) and (the dread of) incest. However, Kristeva 
argues that Freud loses sight of incest (and the mother figure suggested by this 
incest) in his discussion, to the benefit of primal crime against the father, which 
receives most of the attention.37 I gather that a Kristevan reading of Totem and 
Taboo would need to underscore the continuing reference to the maternal that 
obtains in the fascination with and aversion to the totemic animal’s body. In her 
theory of abjection, a logic of prohibition erects barriers in order to found 
discreet areas (pure vs. impure, man vs. woman, inside vs. outside, etc.) so that 
what is beyond the barrier will be experience as ‘ab-ject’. She concedes that the 
prohibition of incest founds social order and the symbolic by means of 
establishing ‘the discreteness of interchangeable units’ (which, as Lévi-Strauss 
shows, are both signifiers and women).38 However, she defends that this 
prohibition is especially effective because it is married to a subjective libidinal 
economy: thus, without establishing a relationship of cause and effect, she 
                                                                
36 Belau, ‘Trauma and the Material Signifier’, para. 3. 
37 Julia Kristeva, Powers of Horror: An Essay on Abjection, trans. by Leon S Roudiez (New York: 
Columbia University Press, 1982), p. 57. 
38 Ibid., p. 63. 
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establishes that social order and subjective experience safeguard each other’s 
effectiveness. The prohibition of incest soothes the threat of a return to 
primary narcissism (when desire is channelled towards an internal object in the 
form of one’s own ego), which menaces the subject with the instability of the 
inside/outside border and, ultimately, subsumption into the maternal body.39 
Thus, if the murder of the primal father and the guilty social bond arising 
from it seek to deflect the threat of castration, the fear and dread of incest 
protects the subject against losing ‘the totality of his [sic] living being’, at stake 
under the threat of the ‘archaic [mother-child] dyad’ and the ‘non-separation of 
subject/object’, which could undermine the whole of the symbolic system.40 In 
totemic terms, that means taking account of the taboo against killing/eating 
the totem animal not just as retrospective obedience to the father, but also as a 
way a token of the fear of incest and of the maternal body. Killing the totem 
animal not only kills the father again (undermining his renewed authority to 
ban intra-clan mating) but also – and crucially – upends the whole signifying 
system of the social order of the clan, throwing the subject(s) back into the pre-
symbolic stage of indifferentiation between the inside (of the subject) and the 
outside (the maternal body).41 It is also fundamental that Kristeva argues that 
the prohibition of incest is not sufficient to completely stave it off. Abjection 
originates from the weakness of the prohibition that excludes that which is 
considered abject. The fact that abject objects are constantly capable of 
                                                                
39 Ibid. 
40 Ibid., p. 58, 64. 
41 ‘An idyllic dual relationship (mother-child) […], to the extent that the father prevents it, 
changes into an ulterior aversion to incest’ (ibid., p. 59). 
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defiling and threatening the subject – as when the totemic animal continuously 
insists on its own mortal body – means that these objects have to be ab-jected. 
The archaic indifferentiated relationship to the object, whose exclusion and 
separation constitutes the social order, is always threatening to return to 
undermine that very order. Thus: 
An archaic relationship to the object interprets, as it were, the 
relationship to the mother. […] The symbolic ‘exclusionary prohibition’ 
that, as a matter of fact, constitutes collective existence does not seem 
to have […] sufficient strength to dam up the abject or demoniacal 
potential of the feminine. The latter, precisely on account of its power, 
does not succeed in differentiating itself as other but threatens one’s 
own and clean self.42 
 
Iterability, lions, and dogs 
Despite the common division of Imaginary and Symbolic realms in Lacan as 
respectively before and after the mirror stage, Butler reads in his second 
seminar that the integrity of the body can only be secured by means of 
nomination. And ‘to have a name,’ asserts Butler,  
is to be positioned within the Symbolic, the idealized domain of kinship, 
a set of relationships structured through sanction and taboo which is 
governed by the law of the father and the prohibition against incest. […] 
What constitutes the integral body is not a natural boundary or organic 
telos, but the law of kinship that works through the name.43  
Here, Butler’s vocabulary seems to echo Freud’s, with the striking 
difference that she glosses over the role of the totemic animal in establishing 
and securing that embodiment. If (clan) nomination is responsible for 
                                                                
42 Ibid., p. 64-5. For Kristeva, this is most acutely felt in those patriarchal societies in which 
female power is still strongly exercised (those with matrilineal filiation, for example, which is a 
classic feature of totemic societies). 
43 Butler, Bodies That Matter, p. 72. 
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materialising the body, and if the body is always taken to be the human’s animal 
part, it is clear that the totem animal (as that which institutes the linguistic ‘set 
of relationships’) is constitutive of the materiality of the body and of 
nomination itself. Now we can more clearly read Butler’s Derridean concepts 
in her discussion of the materiality of language as a path for understanding the 
co-implication of animal and language in Totem and Taboo: 
It is the materiality of that (other) body [Kristeva’s ontogenetic mother 
or Freud’s phylogenetic father] which is phantasmatically reinvoked in 
the materiality of signifying sounds [or totems]. Indeed, what gives 
those sounds [or animal bodies] the power to signify is that 
phantasmatic structure. […] In this sense, materiality is constituted in 
and through iterability.44 
 Iterability is Derrida’s name for the mechanism which articulates a code 
and an instance. It refers to an irreducible structure of repeatability, according 
to which a signifier must be repeatable forever and in any context in order for it 
be a signifier. That repeatability secures its ideal status, as well as the ideality 
of the system itself. Iterability emerged as an issue for Derrida especially in his 
early intervention in Husserl’s thought, as a way of accounting for the ideality 
sought by phenomenology, and in the polemics with Austin and Searle, as 
Derrida’s strategy for dispensing with the distinction between ‘serious’ and 
‘nonserious’ uses of language. In his 1967 ‘Speech and Phenomena: 
Introduction to the Problem of Signs in Husserl’s Phenomenology’, Derrida 
stresses that, when using words, one must 
from the outset operate (within) a structure of repetition. […] A sign is 
never an event, if by event we mean an irreplaceable and irreversible 
empirical particular. A sign which would take place ‘once’ would not be a 
sign. […] A signifier (in general) must be formally recognizable in spite of, 
                                                                
44 Ibid., p. 70. 
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and through, the diversity of empirical characteristics which may modify 
it. It must remain the same, and be able to be repeated as such, despite 
and across the deformations which the empirical event necessarily 
makes it undergo. A phoneme or grapheme is necessarily always to 
some extent different each time it is presented in an operation or a 
perception. But it can function as a sign, an in general as language, only if 
a formal identity enables it to be issued again and to be recognized. This 
identity is necessarily ideal.45 
If a signifier is to be recognised as one signifier, if its identity across all its 
uses and instances is to be assured, an ideal shape of it must exist. It does not, 
however, exist somewhere, or in another world as opposed to the material 
world where its signifying instances occur: this ideality is completely 
constituted by the repetition (and repeatability) of its elements, so that its non-
worldliness is neither mundane nor spiritual. Butler’s assertion that bodily 
materiality is conditioned by iterability now illuminates the dynamics between 
totem animal and totem species discussed above. Insofar as each individual 
animal can be recognized as belonging to a species, even though no two 
animals are identical, the ideality of the concept of species is produced. As it is, 
a species is never a phenomenal, empirical thing; one can never experience a 
species. It is produced solely by the repetition of specific individual animals, 
despite their material (bodily) differences. Conversely, animals can only be 
perceived as members of the same species due to the ideality that a species 
invokes. 
It is crucial, however, that Derrida stresses that in Husserl there are 
different kinds of idealities or objectivities. As Derrida argues in detail in his 
                                                                
45 Jacques Derrida, Speech and Phenomena: And Other Essays on Husserl's Theory of Signs, ed. by 
John Wild, trans. by David B. Allison (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1973), p. 50. 
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introduction to Husserl’s Origin of Geometry, pure objectivity for the latter 
would only take place in geometry, since its truths can free themselves from 
any material substrate and contingency. As expounded above, though, 
language, too, is composed of idealities. Yet, Derrida highlights that this ideality 
is for Husserl of a lesser degree, due to its dependence on an actual language 
(langue). The discussion regarding the levels of ideality in words, concepts, and 
things is taken up by Husserl – and Derrida after him – entirely in animal terms, 
for reasons, I argue, that are essentially linked to the play of corporification and 
virtualisation in the animal/species dynamics. Husserl first attests language’s 
similarity to geometry, since the former is ‘thoroughly made up of ideal 
objectivities: for example, the word Löwe [lion] occurs only once in the German 
language; it is identical throughout its innumerable utterances by any given 
persons’.46 Derrida then muses in a footnote that Husserl’s point is not 
altogether original, up to its animal ‘content’ (which I am here calling a 
structure), which had already been employed by Hegel:  
In the Encyclopedia […], the lion already testifies to this neutralization as 
an exemplary martyr: ‘Confronting the name—Lion—we no longer have 
any need either of an intuition or even an image, but the name (when we 
understand it) is its simple and imageless representation: in the name 
we think’. […] Hegel also writes: ‘The first act, by which Adam is made 
master of the animals, was to impose on them a name, i.e., he annihilated 
them in their existence (as existents).’47 
After stating that, however, Derrida reminds us that in Husserlian 
thought the ideality of a word is limited. Despite the ideal signifier’s freedom 
from any actual utterance, the word Löwe  
                                                                
46 Edmund Husserl, quoted in Jacques Derrida, Edmund Husserl's Origin of Geometry, an 
Introduction, trans. by John P. Leavey, Jr. (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1989), p. 67. 
47 Derrida, Geometry, p. 67. 
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remains interrelated, as a German word, to a real spatiotemporality; it 
remains interrelated in its very ideal Objectivity with the de facto 
existence of a given language and thus with the factual subjectivity of a 
certain speaking community. Its ideal Objectivity is then relative, and 
distinguishable only as an empirical fact from that of the French or 
English ‘lion’.48 
This first-order ideality is limited when compared to a second-order 
ideality of what Husserl terms ‘intentional content’ or ‘the unity of expression’s 
signification’. Here Derrida and Husserl are referring to the concept of a lion, 
which is not tied to any of the signifiers employed by specific languages to mean 
it: ‘This ideal identity of sense [the concept] expressed by lion, leo, Löwe, and so 
forth, is then freed from all actual linguistic subjectivity.’49 
The Husserlian vocabulary of expression, intentional content, and 
object here mirrors Saussure’s signifier, signified, and referent, respectively. 
When Derrida moves on to discuss Husserl’s thoughts on the object in this 
chain of lions, however, we encounter the totemic dynamics of iterability that 
cannot furnish a firm ground for the argument. Derrida characterises the 
object-lion as an empirical contingency that in fact contaminates the whole 
chain of idealisation, without noting, however, that the animal – as 
paradigmatic example of iterability chosen by himself, Husserl, and Hegel – 
continues to produce idealities, since even a real lion is, in a way, a signifier: 
But the ‘object’ itself is neither the expression [signifier] nor the sense-
content [signified]. The flesh and blood lion, intended through two strata 
of idealities, is a natural, and therefore contingent, reality; as the 
perception of the immediately present sensible thing grounds idealities 
under those circumstances, so the contingency of the lion is going to 
reverberate in the ideality of the expression and in that of its sense. The 
                                                                
48 Ibid., p. 70. 
49 Ibid., p. 71. 
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translatability of the word lion, then, will not be in principle absolute and 
universal. It will be empirically conditioned by the contingent encounter 
in a receptive intuition of something like the lion.50 
Derrida introduces the ‘flesh and blood lion’ in order to make the point 
that the ideality of the concept ‘lion’ is a bound ideality, since it depends on a 
supposedly empirical material thing. This, finally, is contrasted with true, third-
order free idealities, like that of geometrical objects, which are themselves, 
unlike a lion – even at the level of the object – ideal. The ideality of the lion 
would be bound since it would be tied to empirical existents. 
In her article ‘Love of the Löwe’, Marie-Dominique Garnier, too, 
discusses the lion in Derrida’s Geometry introduction, especially because of its 
status as ‘Derrida’s “first” animal-in-writing’.51 Garnier reads Derrida’s 
multilingual reference to the ‘mot Löwe’ in relation to ‘the limitrophic apparatus 
of the animot, the animal in relation to the word, to naming and appellation’ and 
to the status of both the ‘word’ itself and proper names.52 Garnier stresses the 
fact that Derrida supports Husserl’s contention that ‘the word Löwe’ occurs 
only once in the German language, since it is an ideal signifier. This ideality is, 
however, limited, since it is still tied to the factical reality and historicity of the 
German language itself. Garnier thus shows that the word Löwe registers as 
some kind of fleshy manifestation of the cross-linguistic ‘concept’ of ‘the lion’:  
“Flesh” occupies a strange middle ground between the two “ends” of the 
“word Löwe”, between naming and animality, linking “le lion en chair et en 
os”, the “flesh and blood lion”, to, on the other hand, Husserl’s wrestling 
with language. […] “Flesh” […] operates as a two-headed animal: Husserls 
                                                                
50 Ibid., second emphasis added. 
51 Marie-Dominique Garnier, ‘Love of the Löwe’, in The Animal Question in Deconstruction, ed. by 
Lynn Turner (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2013), pp. 34-53 (p. 35). 
52 Ibid. 
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always says that the linguistic or graphic body is a flesh, a proper body, 
or spiritual corporeality (Geistige Leiblichkeit).53 
However, Derrida resists the supposed ideality of the cross-linguistic, 
cross-cultural ‘concept lion’ by pointing out that this concept will depend on an 
empirical reference to ‘the contingent encounter in a receptive intuition of 
something like the lion’. Garnier explores this turn of phrase by Derrida in 
detail, asking ‘to what improbably species does Derrida’s “something-like-the-
lion” belong’? She reads this impreciseness as a token of the cross-linguistic 
aspect of the material, non-translated Löwe. Therefore, she connects the 
French lion to lien (a tie, a bond) and lié (tied, bound) and to the homophone 
lions (let us tie). For her, this lion is  
an anexact animal, something-like-an-animal lying in wait at the 
outer/utter limits of nomination, on the periphery of naming, 
paradoxically ill-said, half-unsayable and yet hyper-written.54 […] [It] 
allow[s] reading to cross the barrier between the common and the 
proper.55 
 On the other hand, I argue that Derrida’s expression ‘something like the 
lion’ is an acknowledgement of the very limits of naming that Garnier 
discusses: the name of the one living thing which one can encounter (in order to 
activate the meaning of the concept ‘lion’) is not strictly speaking ‘lion’. To 
answer Garnier’s question, ‘something like the lion’ belongs, rather simply, to 
the species ‘lion’, since ‘something like the lion’ is thus worded so as to refer to 
one specific animal.  This one animal cannot be called by a non-translated ‘mot 
Löwe’ but neither can it properly be refered to by the cross-linguistic ‘concept 
                                                                
53 Ibid., p. 38. 
54 This last adjective possibly referring to the distinctive diacritic of the word Löwe. 
55 Ibid, p. 43. 
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lion’. This concept can only make reference to the species Panthera leo and, as 
Garnier discussion shows, one specific animal could only be properly named by 
a proper name. In my reading, Derrida’s ‘something like the lion’ refers less to a 
certain plurality of (linguistic) lions than to the totemic mechanism which 
locates a species in an in-between zone between ideal concept and material 
animal referent. Animal species displays the non-wordly materiality which 
refuses to be absorbed both by non-wordly conceptuality and material 
animality. 
Therefore, there seem to be compelling reasons to hold that the concept 
of the species (which is indeed the sense of the word ‘lion’) is distinguishable 
from the object ‘species’ intended by it. And, since ‘species’ as an object is yet 
another ideality, the material object ‘flesh and blood lion’ gathered up by it is a 
fortiori also distinguishable from the concept of species, since a species is not in 
fact a flesh and blood material object. In his Introduction to the Reading of Hegel, 
Alexandre Kojève provides precedence in philosophical thought for a strict 
separation between a species of animal and the concept of that species by 
arguing that  
the word ‘Dog’ reveals the essence of the dog, and without this word this 
essence would not be revealed to man; but the essence of the dog is what 
realizes the meaning of the word, the dog is what allows man to develop 
the word ‘Dog’ into a judgment, saying: ‘the dog is an animal with four 
feet, covered with hair, etc.’56 
                                                                
56 Alexandre Kojève, Introduction to the Reading of Hegel: Lectures of the ‘Phenomenology of Spirit’, 
ed. by Allan Bloom, trans. by James H. Nichols, Jr. (Ithaca: Cornell University, 1980), p. 107. 
Unpacking his ‘notation’, we could say that ‘Dog’ (in quotes) is the essence or concept of the 
species, dog (in italic type) is the species, and the dog (in roman type) is an individual animal.  
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He qualifies this statement by stating that, for both Plato and Aristotle, 
‘there is a concept “dog” only because there is an eternal real dog, namely the 
species dog, which is always in the present.’57 In totemic terms, one could say 
that a clan’s name is separate from – albeit related to – the totemic species, 
which is, in its turn, embodied in totem animals. For Plato, the timelessness of 
the ideal species is represented by its eternal ‘present-ness’, whereas 
individual dogs can die and, therefore, remain in the past. 
It could be argued, though, that any Platonic concept follows the same 
logic. ‘Table’ is never the name of any specific table, but it is neither the same as 
the table-ness to which all of them belong: the real, Platonic table, which is 
always in the present. Onto the apparent privilege of animal examples here 
some light is shed by Kojève when he advances Hegel’s reworking of the 
Platonic triad of the word ‘Dog’ / the ‘real’ dog (Idea) / individual dog: 
As long as the Meaning (or Essence, Concept, Logos, Idea, etc.) is 
embodied in an empirically existing entity, this Meaning or Essence, as 
well as the entity, lives. For example, as long as the Meaning (or Essence) 
‘dog’ is embodied in a sensible entity, this Meaning (Essence) lives: it is 
the real dog, the living dog which runs, drinks, and eats. But when the 
Meaning (Essence) ‘dog’ passes into the word ‘dog’—that is becomes 
abstract Concept which is different from the sensible reality that it 
reveals by its Meaning—the Meaning (Essence) dies: the word ‘dog’ does 
not run, drink, and eat; in it the Meaning (Essence) ceases to live—that is, 
it dies. And that is why the conceptual understanding of empirical reality 
is equivalent to a murder.58 
Here it seems clear that the life of the Essence (of the dog) is secured by 
its close relation with the flesh and blood dog. Rather than falling into the world 
of facticity and contingency by being embodied into instances, the Essence 
                                                                
57 Ibid., pp. 141, 113. Kojève places Aristotle’s deviation from Plato in this matter only on the 
issue of the relationship between Time and Eternity. 
58 Ibid., p. 140. 
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seems to ascend to a realm of vitality due to its participation in the living body of 
the dog. Linguistic conceptualisation, on the other hand, is framed here as the 
breaking of the Essence’s life-giving connection to the mortal dog. As pointed 
out by Derrida, Hegel sees linguistic conceptualisation as murder insofar as it 
drains the Dog-essence of its life. The productive Hegelian distinction between 
living Essence and dead, deadly concept depends upon an animal example for 
its articulation – a discussion about tables and the Essence of tables would not 
generate the same conclusions. As it is, these animal examples are more 
essential to what they exemplify than the logic of a mere illustrative addendum 
might suggest. Kojève confirms it thus: 
If the dog were not mortal—that is, essentially finite or limited with 
respect to its duration—one could not detach its Concept from it—that 
is, cause the Meaning (Essence) that is embodied in the real dog to pass 
into the nonliving word. […] This abstract Concept is possible only if the 
dog is essentially mortal.59 
Kojève’s Hegelian formulas – as well as his explication of Platonic 
metaphysics – underscores the necessity of the mortality or killability of the 
(animal) instance for the production of the immortal (totemic) species. This 
Hegelian law of iterability seems to openly acknowledge its origins in the play 
of animation figured by totemism, insofar as it paradoxically asserts that the 
Concept immortalises the life of the individual only to repeatedly kill it in 
linguistic murder. As Akira Lippit puts it, ‘killed by the word, the animal enters a 
figurative empire (of signs) in which its death is repeated endlessly. In such 
transmigrations, however, death itself is circumvented.’60 The similarities to 
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60 Akira Mizuta Lippit, Electric Animal: Toward a Rhetoric of Wildlife (Minneapolis: University of 
Minnesota, 2000), p. 48. 
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the logic of totemism, in which the totem animal has to be perpetually spared 
only to be always liable to sacrifice, are striking, and they illuminate Derrida’s 
close paraphrase of Husserl’s degrees of idealities.  
Recapitulating Derrida’s Husserlian discussion, the ‘flesh and blood lion’ 
is intended through two strata of differing degrees of idealities – namely that of 
the concept ‘lion’, and that of the word lion. By reaching the bodily lion as the 
supposed end-point of a chain of references, Derrida means to expose a 
material contingency at the moment Husserl would like to posit the freest 
ideality. As we saw, Husserl’s chain of idealisation should go along the 
following route, from more to less material: instance of the word Löwe – 
signifier Löwe – cross-linguistic concept of ‘lion’. Derrida, however, reminds us 
that the concept should point to the flesh and blood lion, framing thus the 
whole sequence between two materialities, as it were.61 Kojève reminds us, 
though, that traditionally metaphysics has kept species and concept of the 
species apart. Therefore, the signified ‘lion’ does not refer to a flesh and blood 
lion, but only to its species, what Kojève would call its Essence. 
Derrida speaks of a reverberation of material contingency into the 
whole of Husserl’s sequence of idealities triggered by the flesh and blood lion. 
But here the ‘exemplary martyr’ seems to resist its use and points to another 
reverberation, since ‘the lion’ is not a ‘contingent reality’. It cannot be limited to 
a time and a space, otherwise it would be what Derrida calls a signifier which 
would take place only once, that is, not a signifier. A ‘lion’ which would occur in 
                                                                
61 That these two materialities – that of the signifier and that of the animal – are one and the 
same was my main point in the previous chapter. 
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only one point in time and space would surely not be a lion – it would be an 
aberration, it would belong to no species, and wouldn’t be recognizable as an 
animal. It would be, strictly speaking, a monster. For even if one sole individual 
of a species is known and encountered, its animality is assured only by the 
possibility of its belonging to a species. Since the issue here is precisely a variety 
of degrees of idealities, we ought to conclude that the ideality of totemic 
iterability is not as bound as Husserl or Derrida make it to be. The object of the 
expression ‘lion’ cannot be purely material, since ‘lion’ is the name of a species, 
not of an individual. One could think of a material object if one takes the next 
step and consider ‘the lion’ to be another realm of ideality (akin to the two 
other strata – expressions and concepts) which would intend a ‘flesh and blood 
lion’. In other words, one would have to find a place for one other order of 
idealities. Or, on the other hand, one could carry out the analysis not with the 
word for the species ‘lion’, but with a word which would in fact intend a ‘flesh 
and blood’ lion. But there is no such word. There is no name for a specific 
animal, for an animal is always that which is animated by its own species, and 
any unique animal would not be an animal.62 The strange materiality of the 
‘flesh and blood lion’, apparently caught up in a movement of both idealisation 
and materialisation, seems to have grasped the attention of philosophers 
attempting to think these mechanisms. Joshua Kates, when discussing the 
issue, calls attention to the fact that ‘the words Löwe and “lion” […] somehow 
                                                                
62 The only word that could refer to a specific flesh and blood lion would be a proper noun, as in 
the name of a pet. But the complexities of the question of the proper noun, as discussed not 
least by Derrida, are such that they do not resolve the issue at hand. 
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seem to be the standard examples’.63 This seductive totemic iterability, 
however, seems to betray its theoreticians by short-circuiting and overflowing 
their argument by means of the very dynamics of animals/species, which could 
be said, conversely, to have furnished the arguments themselves. 
John Berger refers to the interface between an animal and its species 
when discussing, like Freud, the impact of animals on the birth of human 
civilisation and culture.64 Berger frames the issue of anthropogenesis as a 
question of the poetic use of animals. Animals’ usefulness for metaphoricity is 
traced by him to their simultaneous similarity and dissimilarity from humans.65 
According to him, these contrasting characteristics gave rise to our concepts of 
body and soul.66 Thus, Berger believes that  
what distinguished man from animals was the human capacity for 
symbolic thought, the capacity which was inseparable from the 
development of language in which words were not mere signals, but 
signifiers of something other than themselves. Yet the first symbols 
were animals. What distinguished men from animals was born of their 
relationship with them.67 
                                                                
63 Joshua Kates, Essential History: Jacques Derrida and the Development of Deconstruction 
(Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 2005), p. 179. 
64 Arguably, Kojève does the same for the origin of words. 
65 This animal duality – or undecidability – is precisely the source of the difficulties discussed 
above regarding totemic species and the individual animal. 
66 This is particularly striking due to Husserl’s insistence in thinking of language in terms of 
spiritual and corporeal aspects, which was discussed above to a certain extent. Derrida, in his 
turn, reads the Husserlian discussion on bodies and souls for its logic of the interface between 
transcendentality and empiricism. It is precisely by inhabiting and overflowing Husserl’s 
thought – by deconstructing it, in other words – that Derrida finds a way to criticise both sides 
of the distinction, while avoiding a complete break with either. This is precisely what Haraway 
seems to have missed in her critique and constituted the bulk of my argument in my discussion 
of her thought above. It is only by the means of this critique that Derrida is able to account for 
the origin and function of something like the sign, its becoming-arbitrary, and the implied shift 
from nature to culture. This will enable us to better grasp the temporality of Freud’s account of 
the primal deed in Totem and Taboo. 
67 John Berger, 'Why Look at Animals?', in Why Look at Animals? (London: Penguin, 2009), pp. 
12-37 (p. 18). 
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This relationship could be summarised by the fact that animals stood as 
an ‘intercession between man and his origin’, since ‘they were both like and 
unlike man’.68 The similar/dissimilar lives of animals is then attributed by 
Berger to the difference between individual and species: ‘Animals came from 
over the horizon. They belonged there and here. Likewise they were mortal and 
immortal. An animal’s blood flowed like a human blood, but its species was 
undying and each lion was Lion, each ox was Ox.’69 It is not difficult to ascribe 
the mortality of an individual to the body, and its immortal species to the soul, 
according to the linguistic logic of incarnation which is described both by 
Husserl and Derrida. Berger calls the individual/species distinction (tellingly 
marked, in his text, by a typographical difference between letter cases) the 
‘first existential dualism’,70 such as the one which precisely assigns humans an 
animal component (his or her body) and a spiritual one (the soul). Indeed, 
Berger attributes the great thinker of human existential dualism, Descartes, 
with inserting the dualism of human-animal relationships into his thought:  
Descartes internalized, within man, the dualism implicit in the human 
relation to animals. In dividing absolutely body from soul, he 
bequeathed the body to the laws of physics and mechanics, and, since 
animals were soulless, the animal was reduced to the model of a 
machine.71  
Berger’s framing of the question of the animal machine in Descartes reveals 
the role the animal plays in a wide-ranging logic of incarnation or, in other 
words, animation. 
                                                                
68 Ibid., p. 15. 
69 Ibid., p. 16. 
70 Ibid. 
71 Ibid., p. 21. 
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Derrida’s Husserl, incarnation, and the two types of writing 
As Derrida exposes it in the introduction to Husserl’s Origin of Geometry, the 
latter surprises the reader by asserting, after introducing the concept of bound 
idealities and the limited objectivity of language, that the transcendentality 
and ideality of truth itself depends on its animation of language. This language, 
surrounded by Husserl’s talk of ‘linguistic flesh’ and ‘linguistic incarnation’, 
emerges as an (animal) body waiting for the inscription of the spirituality of 
meaning. To be sure, specific, constituted languages were bracketed off by 
Husserl as irrelevant to the constitution of truth,  
but the Objectivity of this truth could not be constituted without the pure 
possibility of an inquiry into a pure language in general. […] Then, it [the 
truth] would be absolutely bound to the psychological life of a factual 
individual, to that of a factual community, indeed to a particular moment 
of that life.72   
In other words, specific expressions can be considered mere vehicles of a 
previously thought, independent truth, but language in general, the mere 
possibility of language – which Husserl calls ‘constitutive language’ since it plays 
a role in the constitution of actual languages and of truth itself – is 
indispensable for truth to be communicated to other individuals (Husserl 
privileges mainly the hyper-ideal truths of geometry). Derrida highlights that 
this communication is not, however, a mere accident that may or may not 
happen to a pre-formed truth, since ‘truth’ is, for Husserl, precisely that which 
                                                                
72 Derrida, Geometry, p. 77, emphases in the original. 
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can transcend any spatiotemporality and rise above any contingency as 
Objectivity. Derrida concludes that  
whether geometry can be spoken about is not, then, the extrinsic and 
accidental possibility of a fall into the body of speech. […] Speech is no 
longer simply the expression […] of what, without it, would be already an 
object: […] speech constitutes the object and is a concrete juridical 
condition of truth.73 
Derrida then argues that Husserl is even more surprising when he 
suggests that speech is still a limited form of attaining the objectivity of truth, 
since it limits the object of truth to truth’s ‘institutive community’. Truth must 
have, for him, a ‘persisting factual existence’ which permits it to remain even 
after the death of the inventors (of geometry, in this case). It will be up to 
writing to institute the truly transcendental status of truth, since it virtualises 
the latter beyond any specific community of consciousness and constitutes 
universal validity which is, in fact, truth itself. 
Without the ultimate objectification that writing permits, all language 
would as yet remain captive of the de facto and actual intentionality of a 
speaking subject or community. […] The originality of the field of writing 
is its ability to dispense with, due to its sense, every present reading in 
general.74 
The apparent independence of written marks from any context of 
inscription or reading is mirrored in the individual totem animal’s ‘unruliness’ 
or ‘waywardness’, since it is literally a sign that can move in space. This 
contingent spatiality is, however, by its powers of citation (or iterability), the 
condition for the constitution of its species as an ideal and timeless object. 
Husserl’s emphasis on the transcendental work of writing will have immense 
                                                                
73 Ibid., first emphasis added. 
74 Ibid., pp. 87-8, emphasis in the original. 
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effects on any understanding of Derridean deconstruction, which proposes at 
the same time a more generalised (i.e. transcendental) functioning of ‘writing’ 
and an irreducible destruction of truth brought about by it. The possibility of a 
zoogrammatology, therefore, depends on Derrida’s re-inscription of 
Husserlian concerns and the Freudian discussion on the origin of totemic 
writing in Totem and Taboo. 
As of his ‘Introduction’ to Origin of Geometry, Derrida still abided to 
Husserl’s constraints in his thinking of writing. It is still conceptualised for its 
transcendental aspects, rather than its work of dissemination and difference. 
Yet, Derrida calls attention to the fact that writing can only be considered 
constituting for Husserl if phenomenological, transcendental inquiry focuses on 
‘nothing but writing’s pure relation to a consciousness which grounds it as such, 
and not its factuality which, left to itself, is totally without signification 
[insignifiante]’.75 This grounding of writing refers to its haunting by a ‘virtual 
intentionality’ which gives it meaning, somehow submitting it to the 
transcendentality of truth, despite writing’s status as constitutive of it. 
Without this haunting, Derrida tells us, in an almost poetical language, 
then there is no more in the vacuity of [writing’s] soul than a chaotic 
literalness or the sensible opacity of a defunct designation, a 
designation deprived of its transcendental function. The silence of 
prehistoric arcana and buried civilisations, the entombment of lost 
intentions and guarded secrets, and the illegibility of the lapidary 
inscription disclose the transcendental sense of death as what unites 
these things to the absolute privilege of intentionality in the very 
instance of its essential juridical failure.76 
                                                                
75 Ibid., p. 88. 
76 Ibid., emphasis added. 
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Derrida’s reference to the ‘soul’ of writing here parallels Husserl’s 
designation of signs as essentially flesh, that is a Leib, a proper body, lived flesh, 
a ‘spiritual corporeality (geistige Leiblichkeit)’.77 Contrary to Rousseau, or 
Saussure, then, writing is no longer the bringer of death, mere aid and tool for 
speech and memory, endangering them in their unlawful dependence on it. 
Taken thus, writing is no longer a simple mnemonic device for a truth which 
‘would dispense with all writing-down’. On the contrary,  
the possibility or necessity of being incarnated in a graphic sign is no 
longer simply extrinsic and factual in comparison to ideal Objectivity: it 
is the sine qua non condition of Objectivity’s internal completion. […] The 
ability of sense to be linguistically embodied is the only means by which 
sense becomes nonspatiotemporal.78 
That means that, in order to free the ideality of truth once and for all 
from all embodiment in worldly signs and to resolve the paradox mentioned 
above, Husserl will deploy a further phenomenological reduction or bracketing 
off in order to get to precisely that incarnation which is, in fact, the moment of 
truth’s constitution. For it is indeed a paradox that truth should need to be 
embodied in spatiotemporal signs in order to escape spatiotemporality, so that 
Derrida points out that  
the sign becomes the worldly and exposed residence of an unthought 
truth. […] Since, in order to escape worldliness, sense must first be able to 
be set down in the world and be deposited in sensible spatiotemporality, 
it must put its pure intentional ideality […] in danger.79 
Derrida then foregrounds Husserl’s recourse to a theory of the sign in 
order to resolve this paradox, in that the latter isolates the meaning-giving 
                                                                
77 Ibid. 
78 Ibid., pp. 88-9, 90, first and last emphases added. 
79 Ibid., p. 92. 
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intentionality that transforms the sign (whether written or spoken) into a Leib, 
into a body which would appear to not fall back into the world, since it is 
inhabited by an intentional Geist. In other words, Husserl attempts to set up the 
sign as a hybrid – or one might say even ‘as a human’ – of bodily and spiritual 
components, so as to have it do its transcendental work. Yet, the danger posed 
by the bodily share still represents too great a threat to the desired 
transcendentality of truth, so that Husserl reaches for a further 
dematerialisation and disembodiment, or, as it were, a raising of the soul 
towards Heaven. Therefore, the constitution of truth does not depend on sense 
incarnated in a sign, but on the very incarnation itself which articulates sense 
and sign.  
Derrida raises the question of what would happen to truth if the written 
marks constituting it were destroyed. He frames the question by first stressing 
that writing is ‘not merely a constituted sensible body (Körper), but also a 
properly constituting body (Leib),’ and then asking: ‘if writing is both a factual 
event and the upsurging of sense, it if is both Körper and Leib, how would 
writing preserve its Leiblichkeit from corporeal disaster?’80 As Derrida 
demonstrates it, Husserl’s new reduction aims at  
isolat[ing] the intentional act which constitutes Körper as Leib and 
maintain this act in its Leiblichkeit, in its living truth-sense. Such an 
analysis no longer has any need of Körper as such. Only in the intentional 
dimension of properly animate body, of the geistige Leiblichkeit, more 
precisely, in the Geistigkeit of the Leib […] is sense intrinsically 
threatened. Although in a word [mot], Körper and Leib, body and flesh, are 
                                                                
80 Ibid., p. 97. 
 
A non-worldly body and a third type of writing | 117 
 
 
in fact numerically one and the same existent, their sense are definitely 
heterogeneous, and nothing can come to the later through the former.81 
It is precisely on Husserl’s thesis on the sign, brought upon by himself in 
order to think the articulation between transcendental and empirical writing, 
that Derrida focuses in an attempt to overcome Husserlian phenomenology. 
That would result both in his book-length essay Speech and Phenomena and the 
more consistent thinking of both kinds of writing as arche-writing in Of 
Grammatology. Husserl’s impasse, as well as Derrida’s solution, should help 
illuminate the project of a zoogrammatology, with regard to all Derrida himself 
has called ‘the animality of writing’.82 Joshua Kates argues that Derrida,  
having begun from this divide that falls straight out of Husserl’s own 
analysis and program—a divide between constituting and constituted 
language and writing […] — seeks to find a way to bridge this gap, to 
bring these two views of writing together and to consider whether 
writing, globally conceived, has implications that ultimately run against 
the grain of Husserl’s own program. […] The reason Derrida contrives 
deconstruction, this unparalleled way of working, in 1966 or 
thereabouts is to capture the force of a writing and language which 
Derrida […] glimpsed in 1962 [when writing the ‘Introduction’]—a 
writing and language genuinely constituting and constituted at once, 
truly simultaneously the condition of truth’s appearance and its 
disappearance—a more comprehensive, global writing and language.83 
 
A non-worldly body and a third type of writing 
In Totem and Taboo, the totemic clan represents the human and its human 
power of speech. As in Husserl, however, truth is not simply constituted in 
speech, since it has to be animated by meaning (i.e., the Geist). In Freud, that is 
                                                                
81 Ibid., pp. 97-8. 
82 Jacques Derrida, The Animal That Therefore I Am, ed. by Marie-Louise Mallet, trans. by David 
Wills (New York: Fordham University Press, 2008), p. 52. 
83 Kates, Essential History, pp. 68, 73. 
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indeed the murdered primal father, in whose evoked presence the clan exists 
as its own condition of possibility. And, as the system goes, the meaning 
deposited in the disavowed body of speech (sound, the clan) is thought to be 
embodied for the first time in the body of writing (ink, the totemic animal). 
As we saw, however, the body of the totemic animal is caught up in a 
paradoxical construction in which it is both completely material (life and blood) 
but also to a certain extent ideal insofar as it functions as a signifier. In fact, as 
stressed by Butler and Belau, the status-as-signifier of this body could not 
come to be without this material mortality, but, conversely, this bodily matter 
is in its turn constituted by the workings of the signifier. In the totem, 
therefore, one encounters two matters, as it were: the first one a vulgar matter, 
whereas the second is stuck in a middle ground between pure materiality and 
pure ideality. The uncanny materiality of the totem animal is strikingly similar 
to the materiality of semiotic processes as described by Kristeva. In Kristevan 
terms, one could argue that the materiality of the individual totemic animals 
contains a semiotic potential which is harnessed for the symbolic functioning of 
totemic nomination and social organisation.84 This is analogous to the 
functioning of poetic language:  
[A] phoneme, as distinctive element of meaning, belongs to language as 
symbolic. But this same phoneme is involved in rhythmic, intonational 
                                                                
84 It is important to note, however, that within Kristeva’s semiotic/symbolic dialectic there is 
no space for a ‘vulgar’, simple materiality. The materiality of the semiotic is always already 
psychically invested and characterised by the distinctiveness of rhythmic, kinetic repetitions 
and thus is already, precisely, semiotic. The symbolic sign attempts to ignore this semiosis and 
retroactively characterises it as a signifier – a category that can only have meaning within the 
symbolic function – thought to be merely material. Derrida’s characterisation of the signifier as 
never simply material can be read as close to Kristeva’s deconstruction of the symbolic 
function. 
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repetitions; it thereby tends towards autonomy from meaning so as to 
maintain itself in a semiotic disposition near the instinctual drives’ body; 
it is a sonorous distinctiveness, which therefore is no longer either a 
phoneme or a part of the symbolic system. […] It is poetic language that 
awakes our attention to this undecidable character of any so-called 
natural language. […] Language as symbolic function constitutes itself at 
the cost of repressing instinctual drive and continuous relation to the 
mother.85 
It is precisely the perceived materiality of these semiotic sounds in their 
‘autonomy from meaning’ which can be detected in and characterises poetic 
language for Kristeva. Thus, she will argue that poetic language in a way breaks 
the taboo that requires language to never recognise the semiotic, material 
source of its functioning: 
If it is true that the prohibition of incest constitutes, at the same time, 
language as communicative code and women as exchange objects in 
order for a society to be established, poetic language would be for its 
questionable subject-in-process the equivalent of incest.86 
Within poetic language, the subject-in-process 
simultaneously prevents the word from becoming mere sign and the 
mother from becoming an object like any other—forbidden. This 
passage into and through the forbidden […] constitutes the sign and is 
correlative to the prohibition of incest. [This forbidden is] the social 
body’s self-defense against the discourse of incest as destroyer and 
generator of any language and sociality.87 
If poetry as a cultural practice does not seem to threaten to destroy 
sociality, Kristeva’s description of the semiotic’s power to undo symbolic 
language resonates well with totemic taboos. Art, poetry, the festival is the 
exceptional site where social taboos are lifted, and in totemic societies this 
                                                                
85 Julia Kristeva, Desire in Language: A Semiotic Approach to Literature and Art, ed. by Leon S 
Roudiez, trans. by Thomas Gora, Alice Jardine, and Leon S Roudiez (New York: Columbia 
University Press, 1980), pp. 135, 136. 
86 Ibid., p. 136. 
87 Ibid. 
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manifests as the totem meal in which the taboo against killing the totem animal 
can and should be collectively transgressed. The taboos surrounding the totem 
animal do not seek merely to buy its protection: sparing the totem actively 
signifies not killing the primal father – hence also not challenging his monopoly 
of the horde’s females. In the post-crime sociality, that monopoly is translated 
precisely into the prohibition of incest which is secured by means of the 
totemic taboos.  
Killing the totemic animal ‘utters incest’ because it recognises the 
animal as material and undoes the symbolic, linguistic system of totemic 
nomination which depends on its function as sign. Just as poetry dares to view 
words as material things, totemic murder dares to view the totem as just 
another animal. If the totemic animal fails to be a sign, clan nomination 
collapses and the lines separating licit and illicit marriages (or available and 
unavailable females) disappear, creating the possibility of incest. Likewise, 
totemic murder registers the killer’s desire to kill the primal father by himself 
and thus claim the clan women for himself.88 Breaking a totemic taboo thus 
registers as a sort of artistic challenge that plays freely with the rules of 
totemic language. This artistic expression is only accepted in the exceptional 
time of the totem meal festival when the poetic character of the totem’s 
                                                                
88 It should be clear, however, that killing the leader of the horde is not the same as the 
symbolic killing of the totemic animal within the clan. In the horde days, there was no sociality, 
no laws, and no prohibition of incest – the monopoly of females was secured by the primal 
father himself by means of brute force. Therefore, killing the totem animal is an aggression 
towards not only the father whose memory the brothers wish to serve but also to the clan itself 
as based on the agreement (or law) that no one male will claim the females (now his kinsfolk) 
for himself. That is why totemic murder is permitted during the meal festival since it is 
undertaken by the whole clan as one.  
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materiality is recognised, since this recognition serves to strengthen clan 
fraternity and sociality themselves.89 
This middle ground between two kinds of totemic materiality is 
precisely what Derrida attempts to get at by means of his generalised concept 
of writing, which would still do the transcendental work attributed to it by 
Husserl (making it ideal), but while still exposing truth to spatiality (thus, 
material). Derrida raises this point in Speech and Phenomena when discussing 
Husserl’s phonocentrism. He wishes to frame the Husserlian privilege of the 
voice (the phenomenological voice, ‘the voice that keeps silent’, as Derrida puts 
it) as the step that was necessary in attaining an absolutely ideal object. Or, to 
be precise, Derrida identifies a teleology in Husserl marked by the 
determination of being as presence which will forcefully make sure that only 
the self-present voice is capable of securing the ideality of objects. Therefore, 
Derrida points out that, for Husserl, ‘the ideality of the object […] can only be 
expressed in an element whose phenomenality does not have worldly form. The 
name of this element is the voice.’90 To be sure, the Saussurean distinction 
between the acoustic reality of sound and the phoneme holds here,91 so that 
the phenomenological voice refers to the phonic signifier, which, as we saw, 
while not completely ideal as the signified, is not simply material. Derrida, 
                                                                
89 We could say that poetic language as a contemporary practice is not punished either 
because it is always already undertaken in exceptional, collective situations, or because it does 
not in fact transgress a social taboo anymore. 
90 Derrida, ‘Speech and Phenomena’, p. 76, emphasis in the original. 
91 Ferdinand  de Saussure, Course in General Linguistics, ed. by Charles Bally and Albert 
Sechehaye, trans. by Wade Baskin (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1966), p. 7. 
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however, makes a distinction between the ideality of the phoneme and the 
grapheme: 
My words are ‘alive’ because they seem not to leave me: not to fall 
outside me, outside my breath, at a visible distance. […] The objection 
will perhaps be raised that this interiority belongs to the 
phenomenological and ideal aspect of every signifier. The ideal form of a 
written signifier, for example, is not in the world, and the distinction 
between grapheme and the empirical body of the corresponding graphic 
sign separates an inside from an outside, phenomenological 
consciousness from the world. And yet every non-phonic signifier 
involves a spatial reference in its very ‘phenomenon,’ in the 
phenomenological (nonworldly) sphere of experience in which it is 
given. The sense of being ‘outside,’ ‘in the world,’ is an essential 
component of its phenomenon. Apparently there is nothing like this in 
the phenomenon of speech.92 
It is crucial for Derrida, then, to call attention to the Husserlian attempt 
of bracketing off any ‘body’ from the production of transcendental idealities, 
insofar as this exclusion of the body from the constitution of truth is revealed 
as the very notion of the body. Therefore, the interiority of speech (which is 
also the certainty of timeless and non-contingent objectivity) is secured by 
means of the exclusion of the body. It is well known, however, that a simple 
overturning of this hierarchy – prioritizing the body which was foreclosed – 
does not challenge the hierarchical logic and can actually serve to entrench it 
even deeper, as we saw with Haraway. In fact, Derrida inaugurates to a certain 
point his deconstructive method by indeed respecting Husserl’s 
phenomenological methodology of reduction (attaining, therefore, a claim of 
transcendentality, thus avoiding the dangers of naïve materialism and 
empiricism) to its final consequences and finding there the borderline 
                                                                
92 Derrida, ‘Speech and Phenomena’, p. 76, emphases added. 
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oxymoronic transcendental spatiality which seems to break both from purely 
transcendental philosophy and from empiricism. Thus, he argues: 
The ‘apparent transcendence’ of the voice thus results from the fact that 
the signified […] is immediately present in the act of expression. This 
immediate presence results from the fact that the phenomenological 
‘body’ of the signifier seems to fade away at the very moment it is 
produced; it seems already to belong to the element of ideality. It 
phenomenologically reduces itself, transforming the worldly opacity of 
its body into pure diaphaneity. This effacement of the sensible body and 
its exteriority is for consciousness the very form of the immediate 
presence of the signified.93 
As we saw, this apparent immediate presence of the signified to 
consciousness actually constitutes the interiority of said consciousness. The 
disavowed exteriority of the bodily aspect of the signifier is the meaning of the 
body itself, both in the animal and in the animal body of the human. In the 
experience of ‘hearing-oneself-speak’ which is invoked by the priority of 
speech, the physical world and the worldly aspect of the phoneme seem to be 
subject to a complete erasure. Speech is, thus, a pure ‘phenomenon’ in the 
Husserlian sense of the term. More importantly for Derrida, ‘hearing oneself 
speak [s’entendre parler] is experienced as an absolutely pure auto-affection, 
occurring in a self-proximity that would in fact be the absolute reduction of 
space in general.’94 
On the apparent contradiction with the Husserl from The Origin of 
Geometry, where he asserts that writing in its external spatiality is constitutive 
of truth, Derrida points out that the Origin represents what is in fact the 
                                                                
93 Ibid., p. 77. 
94 Ibid., p. 80. 
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culmination of a thought of language as ‘a secondary stratum of experience’, 
confirming thus ‘the traditional phonologism of metaphysics’.95 Ultimately, the 
writing Husserl privileges is still phonetic writing, which ‘incarnate[s] an 
already prepared utterance’.96 Therefore, ‘to reactivate writing,’ that is, to 
confirm the transcendentality of the truth therein inscribed regardless of any 
one moment of inscription or reading, ‘is always to reawaken […] a word in the 
body of a letter, which as a symbol that may always remain empty, bears the 
threat of crisis itself,’ that is, of forgetting of the truth. ‘The moment of crisis is 
always the moment of signs’, and since in Husserl one can bracket off any 
status-as-a-sign of the phonic sign, writing then comes to be the sign itself.97 
And in this discussion Derrida reaffirms the logic that essentially connects 
Husserlian thought to a thinking of bodies. Writing is only apparently privileged 
by Husserl, this writing is still only an artful aid to a speech always threatened 
by scriptural mis-inscription, because  
what governs [in Husserl] is the absolute difference between body and 
soul. Writing is a body that expresses something only if we actually 
pronounce the verbal expression that animates it. […] The word is a body 
that means something only if an actual intention animates it and makes 
it pass from the state or inert sonority (Körper) to that of an animated 
body (Leib).98 
Yet, in Husserl’s purity of phenomenological reductions, which aims to 
get to the innermost self-presence of the subject, Derrida encounters an 
irreducible, essential difference which cannot be understood in accidental terms 
as the signifier since it constitutes the subject. In other words, this is a 
                                                                
95 Ibid. 
96 Ibid., p. 81. 
97 Ibid. 
98 Ibid. 
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difference which, unlike all other thematics of difference such as writing and 
the signifier, cannot be thoroughly considered to be empirical and contingent – 
it is a constitutive difference, ‘before’ any constituted difference such as writing, 
signs, space, etc. This difference lies in the auto-affection Husserl identifies as 
the basis for the hearing-oneself-speak which is characterised as the 
constitution of the subject, since, for Derrida, ‘auto-affection suppose[s] that a 
pure difference comes to divide self-presence.’99 One may say that what is able 
to touch or affect itself is no longer one and is thus divided by a primordial 
difference: that means that even respecting all of Husserl’s theses and all of his 
transcendental guidelines means thematising this pure difference. As Derrida 
puts it,  
it was necessary to pass through the transcendental reduction in order 
to grasp this difference in what is closest to it—which cannot mean 
grasping it in its identity, its purity, or its origin, for it has none. We come 
closest to it in the movement of différance. The movement of différance is 
not something that happens to a transcendental subject; it produces a 
subject.100 
And as Joshua Kates argues,  
[Différance] is itself brought forward by means of the operation of the 
voice within phenomenological interiority and the unique auto-affection 
it implies. All of Derrida’s other ‘signature terms’ […] are […] versions of 
what is in effect a new, quasi- or ultra-transcendental life (life being, 
again, the notion to which the auto-affection that has come forward 
here corresponds).101 
Derrida indeed became known for the quasi-transcendental aspects of 
his theses, especially when it comes to Of Grammatology and the introduction 
of arche-writing. In the Husserlian terms explored in Speech and Phenomena, 
                                                                
99 Ibid., p. 82. 
100 Ibid., translation modified and emphases added. 
101 Kates, p. 155. 
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writing understood in its literal, technological (or even material) sense cannot 
furnish any transcendental truths due to its contingency and empiricism. And 
ideal and transcendental for Husserl can only be the ‘voice that keeps silent’ 
when the subject hears himself speak, obliterating any need for actual signs. 
Thus, arche-writing would be the name for the ‘transcendental difference’ – if 
one may grant Derrida the privilege of this oxymoron – which would 
transcendentally make possible specific forms of difference (such as writing) but 
that, at the same time, would never aspire to the complete disembodiment and 
self-sameness of the transcendental subject as expounded by Husserl. 
This Derridean reading of Husserl (obeying and disobeying his logic at 
the same time, that is, deconstructing him) allows us to see that Freud’s totem, 
too, becomes a sort of trace or arche-writing. The totem is material and 
corporeal insofar as it is a substitute for the mortal, murdered father, but can 
never be reduced to its corporeality since, as we saw, it has to outlive its bodily 
incarnation. Totemism introduces, then, what Derrida calls an essential 
difference. The totem is nothing if not empirical (killable) but remains always 
already transcendental in that it outlives these specific, differential 
incarnations, and actually makes them possible. In other words, the totem 
transcends any totemic animal, but this transcendental totemic species is still tied to 
the bodily reality of animality. This body of the species is, thus, the transcendental 
difference which would skirt both disembodiment and contingency. As Berger 
argues, the animal origin of meaning and metaphor depends on the animal’s 
simultaneous proximity to and distance from the human – the animal is equal 
to and other than the body. Berger’s theory of animal metaphor seems to 
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account for the same deconstructive procedures that allowed Derrida to think 
a ‘writing before the letter’. That would lead us to conclude that the totem 
allows for a thinking of an ‘animality before the animal’, or an arche-animality. 
 
Nachträglichkeit 
The parallels between Derrida’s arche-writing and the arche-animality 
readable in Totem and Taboo come forward especially with regard to Derrida’s 
explorations of the issues of repetition and arbitrariness. For him, arbitrariness 
forcefully evokes the notion of institution – so that he replaces ‘the sign’ by ‘the 
instituted trace’ – mainly because a relationship which is arbitrary cannot 
simply have been furnished by nature and must, therefore, have been invented, 
or instituted. Saussure himself, however, declares that the arbitrariness of the 
bond between signifier and signified cannot mean that a collective decision 
was once historically made with regard to which signifiers would correspond to 
which signifieds.102 All speakers, he insists, are born into language, and receive 
language like the law – that is, ready-made and with the full authority of that 
which recognises no debatable origin, since a definitive origin and history of 
the correspondence between meaning and sound could arguably be open for 
discussion: one could contest the grounds on which such and such bonds were 
instituted. That is not the case, according to Saussure, since signs are as much 
arbitrary as they are unmotivated, meaning that there can be no motivation 
behind the sound-meaning combinations, and, similarly, no reasons or grounds 
                                                                
102 Saussure, Course, p. 71, passim. 
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on which to dispute them. A symbol is that which, for Saussure, contains an 
actual resemblance between ‘signifier’ and ‘signified’, to the point that one 
cannot even apply the Saussurean terminology to it. It is clear that between the 
natural functioning of the symbol and the arbitrariness of the sign lies the 
difference between nature and culture, physis and nomos, a division that 
Derrida insists to be ‘regulated precisely by law’.103 In one ‘linguistic’ stroke, 
then, the ‘formation of form’ seems to witness the emergence of law as that 
which divides between nature and culture. This conclusion, which is also an apt 
description of the argument of Totem and Taboo, is further explored by Derrida 
with regard to the temporality of such emergence(s). 
Similarly to Saussure’s contention that one would not be able to identify 
the moment ‘outside’ or ‘before’ language when its elements were apparently 
decided upon, Derrida stresses that the ‘becoming-unmotivated of the trace’ 
cannot have occurred in a moment prior to any instituted trace. The shift to 
institution can only occur on a ground of institution itself. If, on the one hand, 
the instituted trace necessitates the difference between nature and culture as 
well as the passage from one to the other, its becoming-unmotivated, its 
institution, ‘takes place, and does so repeatedly, within a world and meaning 
already under way, and even in some sense within a language already given’.104 
In a passage that will permit us to read critically those who could only accept 
Freud’s primal crime as timeless, synchronic structure and not as a historical 
event, Derrida writes that 
                                                                
103 Derrida, Grammatology, p. 48. 
104 Kates, p. 184. 
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[w]e are from the outset within the becoming-unmotivated of the 
symbol, [the shift from symbol to sign]. With regard to this becoming, 
the opposition of diachronic and synchronic is also derived. […] The 
immotivation of the trace ought now to be understood as an operation 
and not as a state, as an active movement, a de-motivation, and not as a 
given structure.105 
The passage from nature to culture, the transformation of animals from 
natural symbols to arbitrary tokens of totemic clans, cannot have been a 
timeless structure with no origin. The being-instituted of the totem ought to be 
its becoming-instituted.  Nevertheless, Derrida seems to suggest that neither 
can this passage be temporally localised in one primal crime. From the ‘opening 
of the game’, from the very ‘origin’ of language and culture – which, in this case, 
is no longer a simple origin – the symbol is always already becoming sign, the 
animal is becoming totem, and nature is becoming culture. This becoming, for 
Kates, ‘turns out […] to be an originary movement, […] occurring within a world 
(a conventionalized nature) already there, a work going on in its midst, and thus 
never takes place for a first time, nor simply once and for all’.106 Kates glosses 
this, which is one of the densest arguments in all of Of Grammatology, thus – 
and I quote him at length for the clarity and import of his conclusions: 
[T]he instituted trace, […] permitting signs to go to work as signs, thus 
proves to be the origin of this system (eventually including, in Derrida’s 
eyes, even the signifieds and the things themselves); yet it is not itself a 
structure, not something there in its own right, but always a kind of work 
within what it constitutes. The trace thus everywhere assumes what one 
might call the ‘vertical’ functioning of all these already constituted 
systems—of signifiers, language, meaning, thought, things, world, and 
finally even transcendental subjectivity—even as its own movement is 
ultimately the operation generative of them all, and thus itself represents 
an instance of what Derrida elsewhere calls an inscribed origin. Its work 
is indeed that of a genesis of structure within structure: a movement, a 
                                                                
105 Derrida, Grammatology, pp. 55, interpolation is mine. 
106 Kates, p. 185. 
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genesis—in fact, always referring back to a prior instance of its own 
occurrence, […] coming after an earlier result of its own work, yet which, 
in so doing, follows on nothing at all, never itself takes place (having 
already given way to what it gives rise to as it is in the process of taking 
itself up again).107 
Derrida attests that the trace ‘produces itself as self-occultation’,108 so 
that its emergence can never be determined and its work and movement are 
only ever products of itself, of its own prior iterations. The trace does not name 
a structure with no origins, which stretches back to the dawn of time itself, but 
neither does it control transcendentally, from outside, a structure which would 
simply postdate it. This work of inscribed origin is, again, another aspect of 
Derrida’s attempt of shunning both the immanent empiricism of experience 
and embodiment, and a transcendent origin marking a radical difference 
between before and after. 
The inscribed origin of arche-writing or the trace is what brings forth its 
uncanny temporality. Derrida writes of ‘an always-already-there that no 
reactivation of the origin could fully master and awake to presence’,  and he 
argues that ‘this impossibility of reanimating absolutely the manifest evidence 
of an originary presence takes us back therefore to an absolute past’,109 which 
Kates reads as ‘a prior instance with no mode of being other than simply being 
prior’.110 This ‘dead time’ of the absolute past, a temporality which allows 
Derrida to break once and for all with Husserl, is linked by him ultimately to the 
                                                                
107 Ibid. 
108 Derrida, Grammatology, p. 51. 
109 Derrida, Grammatology, pp. 71, 71-2. 
110 Kates, p. 186. 
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time of Freud’s Nachträglichkeit,111 usually termed in English ‘deferred action’ 
or ‘deferred effect’ and in French après-coup. Kates describes the working of 
Nachträglichkeit thus: 
[A]n ‘absolute past’ demands that an essentially foreign term, an ‘X,’ be 
thought to have taken hold, […] between what are otherwise apparently 
continuous, successive nows: stipulated as ‘now-s’ ‘A,’ ‘B,’ and ‘C,’ 
themselves successive moments of past, present, and future. Though 
nowhere present within the line of time itself, […] a ‘moment’ of ‘time,’ 
an ‘X,’ must nevertheless be thought to have already been at work 
within temporalization (among the nevertheless continuous sequence 
of now’s A, B, and C), according to Derrida. This ‘X’ makes itself known 
only as ‘always already there,’ as always already past, as always already 
come and gone, through an essentially delayed contribution to what is 
present.112 
One would call the effect of this X deferred or delayed since it would 
never have been experienced as a present, not even in ‘the first time round’. It 
would not have figured in the experiencing of the sequence of present 
moments, and would only retroactively – nachträglich, in German – be identified 
as contributing to the present just as much as A, B, or C, which are past 
moments which were indeed once ‘present’ for consciousness. This dead time 
of the absolute past cannot, therefore, ever be reactivated and recaptured as it 
‘really’ was in its ‘own’ time, since it does not have one. No amount of re-living 
of the past can encounter it, and no matter how far back one returns,113 one 
                                                                
111 While the noun Nachträglichkeit and the adverb and adjective nachträglich are part of 
Freud’s recurring vocabulary, they do not seem to ever emerge as a full-fledged concept in his 
writings, so much so that some translators miss it as a discreet notion and translate it in a 
variety of ways even within the same text. Laplanche attributes Lacan as the one who 
‘discovered’ this Freudian word as a concept, having identified its important contribution to 
Freud’s essay on the Wolfman, to which I will return on the next chapter (Jacqueline Hamrit, 
'Nachträglichkeit', PSYART: A Hyperlink Journal for the Psychological Study of the Arts, (2009) 
<http://www.psyartjournal.com/article/show/hamrit-nachtrglichkeit>. 
112 Kates, pp. 189-90. 
113 In my discussion of Lispector’s The Apple in the Dark in Chapter 3, I shall focus precisely on 
such a return to the origins as one of the novel’s main themes. 
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would always already be encountering its effects only, without ever finding it 
during this backwards journey.114 
Derrida signals Nachträglichkeit as Freud’s true discovery and its impact 
is all the more felt due to the scope of the latter’s treatment of it: not only 
limited to the psyche of the individual, its functioning ‘is at work over large 
historical intervals’,115 as can be seen both in Moses and Monotheism and in 
Totem and Taboo. Besides relating Nachträglichkeit to supplementarity in ‘Freud 
and the Scene of Writing’, Derrida ties his own thought to Freud’s also in 
‘Différance’, where he defends the article’s namesake as something which 
exceeds the dichotomy of presence and absence, as a radical alterity ‘to which 
Freud gives the metaphysical name of the unconscious’. Like the unconscious, 
the trace and différance cannot be made present by a re-activation of 
something that has only now become past, since ‘the structure of delay 
(Nachträglichkeit) in effect forbids that one make of temporalization 
(temporization) a simple dialectical complication of the living present’.116 
 
                                                                
114 In ‘Freud and the Scene of Writing’, gathered in Writing and Difference, Derrida discusses 
Nachträglichkeit in Freud’s thought in more depth. Regarding the existence of a conscious text, 
which could be considered as a sort of translation of unconscious contents, Derrida argues that 
the pre-conscious text does not simply pre-exist said translation. The truth which would be 
lodged in the unconscious would be stuck in a ‘dead time’, an absolute past which was never 
experienced as present (Jacques Derrida, 'Freud and the Scene of Writing', in Writing and 
Difference, trans. by Alan Bass [Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1978], pp. 196-231 [p. 
211]). 
115 Ibid., p. 203. 
116 Jacques Derrida, 'Différance', in Margins of Philosophy, trans. by Alan Bass (Chicago: 
University of Chicago Press, 1982), pp. 1-28 (pp. 20-1). 
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Arche-animality and the inscribed origin of the primal crime 
The thought of a writing before writing as we know it, which would encompass 
both writing and speech, functioning on the grounds of itself as an inscribed 
origin, and according to the logic of Freudian Nachträglichkeit, opens the 
possibility of reading in Totem and Taboo a more complex account of the primal 
crime, all the while opening a space for arche-animality. ‘Before’ the distinction 
between human and animal as the metaphysical distinction between spirit and 
body, there must be a sort of pure species difference, which makes the 
differentiation between human and animal possible. No concept of the human 
as bearer of a soul and/or capable of language seems possible without the 
animalistic notion of animation. Similarly, the metaphysical, vulgar concept of 
the animal also reveals to be a modification of this pure difference. 
As stated previously, Leonard Lawlor identifies paleonymy as the 
‘second phase’ of deconstruction, after the initial overturning of a metaphysical 
dichotomy. The second phase ‘reinscribes the previously inferior term as the 
“origin” or “resource” of the hierarchy itself’, so that this term ‘becomes what 
Derrida calls an “old name” or a “paleonym”’.117 He proceeds to explain some 
Derridean examples, starting from Dissemination’s pharmakon as it ‘refers to 
the resource called the logos, language, but language prior to the division 
between living voice and dead writing’. It is ‘the “indissociability” of the 
signifier and signified concept’.118 
                                                                
117 Leonard Lawlor, This Is Not Sufficient : An Essay on Animality and Human Nature in Derrida 
(New York ; Chichester: Columbia University Press, 2007), p. 30. 
118 Ibid. 
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The pharmakon then refers to language prior to the decision to separate 
and make determinate the signified concept or form from the sensible 
body of language; it refers to language prior to the decision to value the 
form more than the matter. The pharmakon is therefore prior to the 
decision that instituted Platonism or metaphysics. […] The pharmakon is 
not a medium […] in which prior pure elements come to be mixed; it is 
not a mixture that is second; it is also not the simplicity of a coincidentia 
oppositorum. […] Being prior to all oppositions and purifying separations, 
the pharmakon is an ‘element-medium’, which means that the milieu is 
itself the prior element.119 
Thus, to adopt Freud’s term, the totem is a paleonym which refers to the 
prior indistinction between human and animal, clan and totemic species – it is 
the medium/milieu through which the difference between clans and animals can 
be thought, but which must itself be thought as the ‘prior element’. The 
spatiality which essentially accrues to the totemic body – this paleonymic body 
of the totem before the animal (neither spiritualised like a human’s, nor simply 
material like an animal’s) – is what makes possible the relationship with the 
father as the relation to alterity and death. As the Husserlian writing explored 
by Derrida, the embodiment of the animal communicates essentially with the 
nonwordly materiality of the totem. The paleonymic difference between human 
and animal (and between body and soul, etc.) must be an animal for all the 
essential reasons that has the animal signify most formidably species 
difference in general. Not only that, as we saw, but also the continuing chain of 
animation, corporification and disembodiment – the ‘moment when’ the human 
becomes technical or ‘when’ he ascends to Heaven – are still modifications of 
this primordial totemic difference. 
                                                                
119 Ibid., pp. 30-1. 
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It seems clear now after revising the inscribed origin of arche-writing 
that what I called the ‘virtual taking-place’ of the primal crime has to be read 
according to the logic of Nachträglichkeit. As I argued, Oedipal psychic 
structures seem to require an originary moment of institution (which Freud 
furnishes in the shape of the crime), but this deed is virtualised to the extent 
that it is revealed to be an inscribed origin. The murder of the primal father 
cannot but keep repeating, cannot but occur only on the grounds of a prior 
instance of ‘another’ primal crime. Even if one accepts that ‘primal crimes’ 
occurred countless times over hundreds of years, there can be no first primal 
crime since each one depended, to a certain extent, on a prior instance of the 
crime in order to function – there are only always already repetitions of the 
crime. The primal crime itself, as primal, is not locatable since it is, as ‘Now X’, 
impossible to be experienced as presence and can only retroactively be 
determined to have occurred in an inaccessible past, despite its contribution to 
the present. In other words, critics of Freud who insisted in the atemporal 
structurality of the Oedipus complex as capable of explaining its own origin 
seem to miss the fact that the complex itself can be seen as another instance of 
the primal crime in a long chain of iterations which emerge out of one another. 
I believe this discussion of the history of materialisation in Freud and 
Derrida should reinscribe the literary focus on animals based solely on their 
embodiment, once we understand that this body is just as metaphysical a 
construct as the transcendental concept of a disembodied soul. Traditional 
humanism and animal materialism are two sides of the same process and 
actually depend on each other for their articulation. As Derrida has shown, it is 
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ineffective to simply rely on materialism to solve the philosophical problems of 
metaphysics. Vulgar, commonsensical, metaphysical animal embodiment ought 
to be signalled as the modification of a prior, more generalised difference 
which metaphysics represses. This repression is, unfortunately, what texts 
most readily practice in their reliance on the articulation of sense and 
substance (‘ideas’ and ‘words’) to produce meaning. Textuality, thus, becomes 
an important, privileged site on which to challenge the repression of arche-
animality and the vulgar concept of matter inherited both by the signifier and 
animals. 
The simple overturning of the body/mind dichotomy in literary analysis 
of ‘animal texts’ is not new and would in fact correspond simply to Derrida’s 
‘first phase’ of deconstruction. Moreover, this shift in privilege has a long 
history for metaphysics itself, which knows it as sin, idolatry, or aberration. 
Derrida calls attention to the fact that sin has been defined by Malebranche 
and Kant ‘as the inversion of the natural relationship between the soul and the 
body’. And this ‘problem of soul and body’ is attributed by Derrida to be 
‘derived from the problem of writing’,120 which should explain the logic 
according to which Saussure attacked writing as a form of ‘tyranny’. It is for him 
the threat of idolatry, the ‘perverse cult of the letter-image’.121 It is, in other 
words, the scandalous sin of worshipping the proxy instead of the origin, God 
the Father. Writing, in Saussure, now easily morphs into a golden calf, or a 
totemic effigy being worshiped in the place of the Father, following Freud’s 
                                                                
120 Derrida, Grammatology, p. 37. 
121 Ibid., p. 41. 
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psychoanalytic history of religion according to which totemism gives rise 
eventually to monotheism in a ‘return of the repressed’ – the return of the 
murdered primal father, whose forgiveness has now been bought. Therefore, 
shifting from a monotheistic-inspired disembodied account of meaning to a 
simple affirmation of sin and idolatry does not seem to escape the perverse 
logic of disembodiment itself. 
In other words, arche-animality ought not to be confused with animality. 
Regarding this confusion with respect to arche-writing and vulgar writing, we 
saw that Bennington defends that 
something of this 'new' sense is legible in the traditional discussions  
(and to that extent the sense is not exactly new at all […]), and the place 
of that legibility is systematically where writing (in its current or 'vulgar' 
sense) is at issue.122  
This legibility explains the procedure according to which Derrida is able 
to advance arche-writing by a reading of Husserl’s thought on signs and vulgar 
writing. The Derridean paleonym – arche-writing – while presenting itself as a 
‘new’ word, a neologism, is argued to be ‘older’ than vulgar writing and its 
opposition to speech. Similarly, Freud’s Totem and Taboo allows for an older 
animality – which I name here by the paleonym arche-animality – to precede 
both vulgar embodied animality and the sublimated, spiritualised human body. 
It is, therefore, precisely on those textual sites where (vulgar) animality is most 
at stake that the legibility of arche-animality is sharpest, and Totem and Taboo 
is an example. Freud’s Derridean totem must be responsible, as an ‘old word’, 
                                                                
122 Geoffrey Bennington, 'Saussure and Derrida', in The Cambridge Companion to Saussure, ed. 
by Carol Sanders (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004), pp. 186-204 (p. 195). 
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for the production of any new words, to the extent that this arche-animality 
will be at work in any textual procedure, although its legibility is more 
productive there where animality is being relied on in order to produce 
meaning. This reliance is that which unleashes arche-animality, making it thus 
readable. Totem and Taboo, even while writing the animal in all its vulgarity in 
its entire discussion of totemism, produces a breach through which the 
paleonym of arche-animality is legible. This mechanism described by 
Bennington and discussed here, which Totem and Taboo is subject to, but also 
an initiator of, will be the ultimate object in the readings I undertake in the 
following chapters. Therefore, more than an analysis of literary 
representations of animality, this project aims to account for the (arche-
)animality of texts as it is revealed by their textualisation of the animal. 
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Chapter 3: Black Swan 
Introduction: memories of a ballet goer 
Deleuze and Guattari open their chapter ‘1730: Becoming-Intense, Becoming-
Animal, Becoming-Imperceptible…’ in A Thousand Plateaus with an account of a 
film titled Willard (1971, Daniel Mann, but also remade in 2003 by Glenn 
Morgan). For them, ‘it is all there’, in this film about a man’s becoming-rat:  
there is a becoming-animal not content to proceed by resemblance, […]; 
the proliferation of rats, the pack, […] undermines the great molar 
powers of family, career, and conjugality; there is a sinister choice since 
there is a ‘favorite’ in the pack with which a kind of contract of alliance, a 
hideous pact, is made; […] there is a circulation of impersonal affects, an 
alternate current that disrupts signifying projects as well as subjective 
feelings, and constitutes a nonhuman sexuality; and there is an 
irresistible deterritorialization that forestalls attempts at professional, 
conjugal, or Oedipal reterritorialization.1 
‘I recall the fine’ libretto of Tchaikovsky’s ballet Swan Lake (Лебединое 
озеро [Lebedinoye ozero], 1875-6), and ‘I will recount the story in broad outline’, 
placing in quotes phrases removed from Deleuze and Guattari’s account of 
Willard. It is the story of a prince in the midst of festivities commemorating his 
coming-of-age, alongside his subjects and court. However, the party is 
interrupted by ‘his authoritarian mother’, the Queen, who insists that now he 
must marry and that a ball will be held the next day where he will have to 
choose a bride. ‘Dreadful Oedipal atmosphere’. The Prince then goes on a hunt, 
presumably to enjoy his last moments of boyhood, and follows a flock of swans 
to a lake. When the swans are revealed to be maidens, the prince stops his 
                                                                
1 Giles Deleuze and Félix Guattari, ‘1730: Becoming-Intense, Becoming-Animal, Becoming-
Imperceptible…’, in A Thousand Plateaus: Capitalism & Schizophrenia (London and New York: 
Continuum, 1987), pp. 233-209 (p. 233). Henceforth referred to as ‘Becoming-Animal’. 
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friends from shooting them; ‘he spares one (or two or several)’. ‘He likes the 
principal [swan] he saved’, the queen of the swans, who reveals she is Princess 
Odette and that under the spell of a sorcerer they are imprisoned in the form 
of swans during the day. Only the true love of a man can break the spell, but if 
and only if he has never vowed to marry any other woman. The Prince then 
offers to save her by pledging her his love. During the ball the next day, the 
Prince is indeed presented to a number of maidens he mostly ignores, but the 
Prince ‘experiences a pause in his destiny, in his becoming-[swan]’: a new guest 
arrives with his daughter in tow. Although she is introduced as Odile, she looks 
exactly like Odette, which leads the Prince to believe she managed to attend 
the ball, in her human form. He ‘tries with all his might to remain among 
humans. He even responds to the advances of a young woman in the [ball] who 
bears a strong “resemblance” to a [swan]–but it is only a resemblance’. The 
Prince seems, effectively, ‘all set to be conjugalized, reoedipalized’ in believing 
he can marry a human Odette. He swears eternal love to the evil copy Odile, 
only to realise he was deceived and that Odile’s father was in fact the sorcerer. 
‘[Odette] suddenly reappears’, in swan form, through the window of the palace, 
‘throwing [the Prince] a long, hard [look]’. He runs to the lake to meet Odette, 
‘where a pack of countless [swans] is waiting for him’, and explain, but the 
enchantment means that now she will remain in swan form forever. She prefers 
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to kill herself instead. For his regret, the Prince, too, commits suicide. His 
sacrifice is the sorcerer’s downfall and he dies as well.2 
I propose that Deleuze and Guattari find in Willard a paradigmatic 
structure of narrative and themes that was already present in Swan Lake, and 
fairy-tales before that:3 texts that present the lure of animal becomings which 
are more than merely a symbol of escape from restrictive human societies. The 
lines of flight, to use their term, engendered by these becomings-animal are not 
– at least not mainly – constructed on the basis of negation of human sociality. 
In the ballet, the Prince’s sexuality (curtailed in its free expression by the 
parental indictment to procreate and contribute to the Oedipal structure) is 
rerouted towards dancing with swans beside the mysterious lake he 
encounters in the woods. As is clear in Matthew Bourne’s 1995 new 
choreography to the ballet (which ultimately rewrites its libretto),4 the Prince’s 
search for psychosexual liberation from Oedipalised territories engenders a 
flight that could be termed queer, to the extent that we might stretch the word 
to mean a borderline non-human sexuality.5 
                                                                
2 All quotations describing Swan Lake are from Deleuze and Guattari, ‘Becoming-Animal’, p. 
233. Plot summary adapted from Cyril William Beaumont, The Ballet Called ‘Swan Lake’ 
(Binsted: Dance Books, 2012), pp. 19-26. 
3 Beaumont, Swan Lake, pp. 19-26. 
4 In this version, the protagonist is clearly the Prince and all the swans are portrayed by male 
dancers. 
5 Judith/Jack Halberstam produces a new understanding of queer in In a Queer Time and Place: 
Transgender Bodies, Subcultural Lives. There the focus is not such much on queer as a sexual 
concept, but as a different way of relating to temporalities: ‘Queer uses of time and space 
develop, at least in part, in opposition to the institutions of family, heterosexuality, and 
reproduction. They also develop according to other logics of location, movement, and 
identification. If we try to think about queerness as an outcome of strange temporalities, 
imaginative life schedules, and eccentric economic practices, we detach queerness from sexual 
identity and come closer to understanding Foucault's comment […] that “homosexuality 
threatens people as a ‘way of life’ rather than as a way of having sex”’ ([New York: New York 
University Press, 2005], p. 1). 
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Admittedly, most audiences since the nineteenth century have read the 
ballet as the story of a girl who is transformed into a swan. This can be attested 
from the very first performances in Russia by their emphasis on the ballerina 
who plays both Odette and Odile.6 Both in Moscow and in Saint Petersburg, 
Swan Lake never seemed to awaken a questioning regarding the status of this 
animal transformation, what it meant for Odette or for the audience. The 
twentieth century has seen a preoccupation, however, with the character of 
the Prince. The story starts, after all, with him, and not with Odette. She will 
only make her first appearance in Act Two. It could be argued that focus on the 
Prince could bring to the surface the animality of the text, insofar as he is 
haunted by it at the very moment he hunts it, only to have it transform into the 
bride he is so hesitant to take. This emphasis reads the ballet as the staging of a 
young sexuality’s indecision between the abandon offered by becoming-swan 
and the acceptance of Oedipal laws. 
The tension between these two different narrative centres of gravity – 
Odette or the Prince – goes to the heart of the nature of Deleuze and 
Guattari’s concept of becoming-animal. On the one hand, it is clear that in a 
literal sense it is Odette which turns into an animal. On the other hand, reading 
the Prince’s attraction to the swans as the real becoming-animal aligns the 
ballet more closely with other texts about animal lines of flight, such as some 
fairy tales. However, I shall ignore this tension as a false one, and I argue that 
this unclear functioning of becoming-animal (beyond both transformation and 
                                                                
6 Beaumont, pp. 19-26. 
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attraction) is due precisely to the extent to which it challenges (human) 
‘signifying projects’ absolutely.  
In order to analyse this challenge to signification, this chapter will read 
Darren Aronofsky’s 2010 film Black Swan as a reworking of Swan Lake which in 
fact exposes the becoming-animal of the ballet for its disruptive qualities. By 
putting the ballerina Nina Sayers centre stage, the film conflates the Prince and 
Odette in one character who is both transformed into a swan and attracted to 
its non-Oedipal possibilities. However, if a certain attention to the character 
psychology of Nina in this densely psychoanalytic film is warranted, I propose 
an analysis of this becoming-swan which reads it for its textual effects in the 
film. Or rather, for its extra-textual effects. 
Continuing the discussion of my previous chapters, in this chapter I 
propose that the arche-animality that I have formulated somehow escapes 
signifying projects and practices in a way which is similar to Deleuze and 
Guattari’s becoming-animal’s lines of flight. This escape, unlike the 
overdetermined field of (animal) embodiment, is not constituted by that from 
which it escapes and does not, ultimately, mean anything. This is particularly 
important for any reading of Black Swan since, at first sight, its intertextual 
relationship to Tchaikovsky’s ballet seems to be one of metaphor. It is safe to 
say that the audience is led to believe that the madness suffered by the 
protagonist is caused (or least informed) by the libretto of the ballet on which 
she is working, so that her becoming-swan is revealed as a suggestive balletic 
hyperbole of madness. More than that, however, it is clear that the plot of the 
ballet is particularly challenging for the character due to her own psychosexual 
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plot. In other words, it would appear that a personal, ‘real-life’ psychosexual 
conflict is replaced by the ballet metaphor, which is in its turn duplicated 
metaphorically by Nina’s mad bodily transformations.  
Contrary to that, I argue that the arche-animality ‘present’ in the film 
(which is, as I have discussed, repressed by its animal signifiers) – or its 
becomings-animal – disrupts the metaphorical relations between the textual 
strata. What this means is both that (arche)animality resists signification (as 
understood by metaphysics), so as to foreground what Derrida and Barthes 
have termed signifiance, and that the laws of Oedipal psychosexuality have not 
so strong a grasp on reality. Becoming-swan, or becoming-arche-animal, 
challenges the stable hierarchy between reality and representation/metaphor 
by unseating the interiority of psychosexual subjectivity from its privileged 
position with respect to, among others, fiction.7 Becoming-swan may be a line 
of flight suggested by the ballet for escaping psychosexual normativity, but 
equally, such normality is also, to a certain extent, conditioned by the fictional 
libretto. Black Swan, therefore, exposes a certain operatics or histrionics of the 
Oedipus Complex.8  
Rather than doing its classical metaphorical work, animality in Black 
Swan points to a way out of the oversignification of the psyche. Psychoanalysis, 
                                                                
7 As we saw, Husserl establishes that interiority not only as the grounding of reality but also as 
the yardstick separating essence from material accident. Conversely, the essential difference 
of auto-affection that Derrida reveals to be the condition of that interiority introduces a level 
of fictionality to the whole structure – in the silent monologue, the integrity of psychical 
interiority is a story one tells oneself. 
8 The latter should be read, of course, in light of the previous discussion of its emergence in 
Totem and Taboo, and also in Lacanian terms as the process through which the subject accedes 
to language. 
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as critiqued by Deleuze and Guattari, strives to map all phenomena into the 
Oedipal territory with which it is familiar. Becoming-animal is precisely the 
resistance to this territorialisation. As such, it mirrors arche-animality in its 
independence from the stifling dialectics of meaning and representation.  
I start my discussion with a brief outline of the film’s plot as evidenced 
by my analysis of one crucial scene, along with what could be called a standard 
Lacanian interpretation. After that, I delve more deeply into some of the 
thematic strands that organise the textuality of the film and set up its 
investment in arche-animality. I move on to discuss animal representation 
more specifically, which leads me into its role in psychoanalysis in general, and 
especially in Freud’s case-study about the Wolf Man. I read Freud’s account for 
its disruptive arche-animality, before connecting it both to Deleuze and 
Guattari’s becoming-animal and the film’s becoming-swan.  
 
Mirrored swans 
In a crucial scene in Black Swan, Nina and her mother Erica are both reflected in 
a three-part mirror while adjusting Nina’s ballet slippers, but in a cross-
Fig. 1 Nina and her mother Erica reflected in the three-part mirror, whose central portion 
remains empty. 
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reflection: Nina is reflected next to her mother and Erica is reflected close to 
Nina.9 What is especially striking in this cross-identification reflection is the 
fact that the central mirror does not reflect anything. Something in the three-
part structure suggested by the mirror is missing in this moment of mother-
daughter mirroring (Fig. 1).10 
The scene seems to inquire about the element suggested by such 
absence. The familial context would invite the image of a father, or another 
female element halfway between mother and daughter, a sort of intermediate 
state between girl and woman. The alignment of the central mirror with the 
frame, however, seems to suggest the appearance of the viewer’s own 
reflection, or of the filmic apparatus (camera, director, etc.). The growing 
distance between mother and daughter that has been building up in the film 
prior to this scene might indicate the reason for such a gap between the two 
reflections, as well as the larger distance between Nina and the mirror. 
Of the film’s many scenes containing mirrors, this may be the one which 
most warrants a Lacanian reading, one which would argue that the connection 
between mother and daughter depicted in the film is a metaphor for Lacan’s 
Imaginary order, which is precisely concluded by the Mirror Stage.11 According 
to that, Nina is being smothered by her mother’s Imaginary identification in 
which Nina is the phallic signifier which compensates for Erica’s failed career. 
                                                                
9 It seems relevant, too, that Nina’s reflection appears much closer to her mother than the 
latter’s to herself. 
10 Black Swan, dir. Darren Aronofsky (Fox Searchlight Pictures, 2010). 
11 The Imaginary order is either concluded by the mirror stage or is, at least, characterised 
primarily by it. Nevertheless, one must go through the mirror stage order to overcome the 
Imaginary. 
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Because of that, Nina seeks in the mirrors that surround her the possibility of 
constructing an ego of her own. But precisely because of her ‘madness’ (which 
would be a result of her mother’s domination), mirrors do not offer her 
anything other than doubles – images which she does not recognize as herself. 
And the father figure, which by means of the Name of the Father would 
structure the ‘healthy’ girl’s sexuality when she enter the Symbolic order, is 
only marginally present due to the mother’s exaggerated influence. Erica does 
not admit that Nina break the child-like relationship with the mother and 
identify with the image of a woman, sexually available to a man-father. Because 
of that, Nina sees her own impulses which desire precisely that as another 
person: her understudy or alternate, the sensuous Lily. 
The dual structure of a personality that does not identify with its own 
double is introduced primarily by Nina’s professional dilemma as the soloist in 
Swan Lake, having to dance two completely different characters. To be cast as 
both Swans, Nina must capture the male attention of the company director, 
Thomas. In this quest, she identifies with the company’s prima ballerina who is 
about to retire, Beth, who enjoys an enviable intimacy with him. Nina wishes to 
impress the director, to be able to “seduce” him and catch his attention like 
Beth.  
Such rivalry for male attention is sharpened during the auditions for the 
soloist in Tchaikovsky’s ballet. Nina easily expresses the sweetness and 
vulnerability of the White Swan, but she must also show skill with the sensual 
choreography for the Black Swan. Thomas tells her to ‘show [him her] Black 
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Swan’, but during the famous fouettés in Odile’s Coda,12 Nina is interrupted by 
Lily’s bursting into the room and slamming the door, appropriately dressed all 
in black. Nina loses balances, and stumbles, and when she asks Thomas if she 
should try again, she must wait for several seconds for his negative answer 
while he admires Lily. 
The psychoanalytical structuring of the film is thus clear: Nina wishes to 
be desired by Thomas, the father figure, and for that she identifies with Beth as 
her adult imago. However, the typical process of the mirror stage which would 
have her identify in her own body the image (even if a false one) of a coherent 
and mature being is problematic for Nina. Her domineering mother seems to 
preclude such identification, and thus Nina displaces this ego-ideal to her rival 
Lily. She is then visited by the ‘phantasm of the broken down body’ – the 
incoherent and fragmented body of early childhood which is mitigated by self-
identification in the mirror stage – when her body apparently starts to dissolve. 
That both scenes described above (the one with the three-part mirror, 
and that of the audition) feature mirrors prominently is understandable in a 
film about ballet. Dancers follow their own dancing in their mirrored 
reflections so as to assess their skill: that is the diegetic reason for the large 
                                                                
12 The execution of thirty-two consecutive fouettés en tournant is a traditional ballet move now 
strongly associated with virtuosity and technical achievement. It was originated by Italian 
dancer Pierina Legnani in 1893 in Marius Petipa’s choreography for Fitinhoff-Schell’s 
Cinderella, in St. Petersburg. After that, it was famously included in Petipa’s choreography of 
Swan Lake, being therefore consecrated as the pinnacle of balletic technique from then on. It 
possibly gained special traction from its inclusion in Swan Lake due to its apparent importance 
to the plot itself: in the libretto, it is the Black Swan Odile, in trying to seduce the prince, who 
executes the move, in a clear exhibitionist fashion. It is, moreover, unclear whether dancing, in 
this scene, can still be considered a ‘mere’ aspect of the genre, or whether the characters are 
indeed diegetically dancing. It could be argued, therefore, that the character Odile herself is 
performing an impressive ballet feat in a courtly ball, in a clear balletic breaking of the fourth 
wall. 
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mirrors which are present even in Nina’s apartment, where she practises. 
Cinematically, on the other hand, mirrors both explore the nature of the screen 
itself (as well as other optic apparatuses, such as lenses), and visually represent 
characters’ relationships to themselves. Thematically, Black Swan revels in the 
latter cinematic function (as well as the diegetic one), whereas an even 
stronger impact may be garnered by the former function, of mirrors as textual 
hinges between different realms of signification. All these functions seem to 
coalesce around the prominent Lacanian concept of the mirror stage, which is, 
not surprisingly as I hope to show, conceptually formulated in relation to 
animality. 
Lacan states that the ‘conception’ of the mirror stage ‘originated in a 
feature of human behaviour illuminated by a fact of comparative psychology’,13 
that is, a comparison of human and animal psychologies. A human child, he 
describes, 
at an age when he is for a time, however short, outdone by the 
chimpanzee in instrumental intelligence, can nevertheless already 
recognize as such his own image in a mirror. […] This act, far from 
exhausting itself, as in the case of the monkey, once the image has been 
mastered and found empty, immediately rebounds in the case of the 
child in a series of gestures in which he experiences in play the relation 
between the movements assumed in the image and the reflected 
environment.14 
For Black Swan, Lacan’s grounding of the mirror stage on species 
difference seems particularly crucial since it is, according to most accounts, a 
film about the horror of one’s double when it takes an untameable animal form. 
                                                                
13 Jacques Lacan, ‘The Mirror Stage as Formative of the Function of the I as Revealed in 
Psychoanalytic Experience’, in Écrits: A Selection, trans. by Alan Sheridan (London: Routledge, 
2001), pp. 1-6 (p. 1), my emphases. 
14 Ibid. 
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In other words, the horror seems to lie on the fact that the otherness of her 
double, besides clearly emanating from herself, reveals the otherness of 
animality. In the plot, doubling is triggered by Nina’s professional requirement 
to both perform two characters,15 and to outperform her rival – and later 
understudy – Lily, who threatens to take both roles. It certainly does not help 
that most ballet dancers shown in the film look similar.16 The paradoxical 
working of the mirror stage – where one’s reflected image is, to a certain 
extent, both self and other – is clearly reproduced in the plot of the film: Nina 
must identify with Odile in order to play her, but is constantly projecting the 
character onto Lily, who supposedly embodies it more easily.  
Viewers are led to believe that the animal shape taken by this double is 
thoroughly informed by the libretto of the ballet. Because Nina’s problem is 
tackling the Black Swan as a character (which, we learn, means locating within 
herself a freer sexuality than the one she is used to), she sees herself being 
threatened in her hallucinations by the large, black bird of Swan Lake, which 
                                                                
15 In the plot of Swan Lake, Odette and Odile – the White and the Black Swan – are clearly two 
different characters, who only look the same under the influence of magic. However, it is telling 
that Thomas, the ballet director in Black Swan, constantly frames them as two sides of the same 
woman, as when he talks about the White Swan’s ‘metamorphosis into her evil twin’. Patricia 
Belzil argues that Thomas ‘insists on the metamorphosis as if the two personae inhabited the 
same body, whence the role’s inherent schizophrenia’ (‘Noir Cygne de Perfection’, Jeu: Revue de 
théâtre, 140 [2011], 129-134 [p. 132], my translation). It could be argued, of course, that the 
staging that Thomas is directing is already based on his psychoanalytic reading of the ballet, 
where the two characters are indeed supposed to represent two aspects of the same persona. 
16 Accordingly, Barbara Nelson reads Black Swan alongside Jane Eyre for their wealth of 
interchangeable females. The similar body types and dress of ballerinas, as well as their quick 
disposal for the sake of new talent, strikes Nelson as a symptom of the same patriarchal 
structure that allows Rochester to ‘recycle’ women. That Nina is disposable and easily 
replaceable by another dancer certainly fuels her anxiety regarding her inefficiencies and Lily’s 
prowess, and is cast in stark light by the fact that, ultimately, she took Beth’s place just as she 
fears Lily might take hers. For Nelson, ‘Nina replays and re-reads her former life, recognizing 
that she was always, already the Black Swan (from other’s perspectives, such as Beth’s, and 
innately)’ (‘Two Ways of Looking at a Blackbird: Darren Aronofsky’s Black Swan’, 
Cinematographic Art & Documentation, 5 (2012), 29-36 (p. 34)). 
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comes to stand both for the sensual Lily and for the her own stifled sexual 
persona. It certainly must have occurred to Nina that having her place taken by a 
seductive but otherwise identical woman is precisely the fate of Odette – that 
would be, indeed, the psychological, or even Oedipal, reading of the animal 
double in the film. I propose, however, that a more thorough perusal of the 
signifying practices undertaken by the film when exposing its plotlines can 
point to a different understanding of becoming-swan with regard to the 
suffocatingly multi-layered textuality around it. That is, one can read the 
animal in the text –  the swan – as the product of repression of arche-animality. 
 
Transcendanse 
The premise outlined above regarding the dual role of Black and White Swan is 
introduced very early in the film and codified throughout, in a signifying 
saturation which recalls the over-determination of dreams (see Fig. 2,  Fig. 3, 
and Fig. 4). In one of the first scenes, Nina informs her mother, a retired dancer, 
that the company director may feature her more prominently this season, to 
which her mother replies: ‘Well, he certainly should. You've been there long 
enough.’ The comment is clearly not well received by Nina, who detects the 
implication that she is getting old and that her position is threatened by 
younger dancers. 
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Fig. 2 The dancers in the collective warm-up display the black-and-white palette of the film.  
 
Fig. 3 Thomas’s office displays a monochromatic colour scheme. 
 
Fig. 4 Thomas’s apartment is similarly black and white. 
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In the underground on the way to the theatre, Nina is reflected in the 
darkened window of the train, whose arrival at a station, rushing by lights and 
other trains, is accompanied by the rustling sounds of flapping wings, which are 
also visually represented in her feathery scarf. While Nina admires her own 
reflection and contemplates whether her place will be taken by another, the 
film frames this mirroring and doubling movement in animal, bird terms, 
foreshadowing the Black Swan as the signifier for the usurping doppelgänger 
(Fig. 5). 
 
Fig. 5 Nina stares into her poor reflection in the darkened glass of the subway window. 
If the glass of the train window functions as a somewhat successful 
reflector, the more effectively transparent glass of the door between two 
wagons offers what appears to be a truer mirroring. Through the door, she sees 
a girl in the next wagon who looks very much like her and is wearing her hair 
the same way, but is dressed in dark clothes. The girl indeed has the same face, 
since she is in fact being played by Natalie Portman ( 
Fig. 6). While staring puzzlingly at her doppelgänger, who has quickly turned 
her face away, Nina notices that her own brushing of her hair behind her ear is 
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mirrored by the girl.17 Whereas the actual reflection seen in the window is a 
poor, blurry image, the reality beyond the glass door not only looks but also 
acts the same. Thus, this initial scene blurs the essential distinction between 
transparent glass and reflective mirror, exterior reality and self-referential 
interiority. This blurring has consequences both for the thematic concerns of 
the film – the double is both inside and outside oneself – but also to the 
functioning of its visual textuality.  
Replacing and doubling continues to be explored in the next scenes: 
Nina stops to admire the two identical season promotion posters featuring the 
retiring prima ballerina Beth, obviously hoping to take her place, and in the 
female dancers’ dressing room, the topic of conversation is precisely Beth’s 
refusal to realise that she is past the age when she could attract audiences. The 
room is so crowded with mirrors, that the viewer can easily feel lost as to the 
number of girls in it and their position relative one another (Fig. 7). 
 
Fig. 6 Point-of-view shot of Nina looking through the glass doors at her doppelgänger. 
                                                                
17 What is interesting and perhaps telling is that, to show us that they are both brushing their 
hair simultaneously, the film cuts from the doppelgänger’s movement to Nina half-way through 
her own, who looks clearly taken aback by being copied by the stranger. In a way, it could be 
said that, due to the editing order, it is Nina who is mirroring the girl.  
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Fig. 7 In the dressing room, the dancers are surrounded by mirrors. 
During their collective warm-up, the dancers are joined by Thomas, the 
company director, who summarises the plot of Swan Lake: 
We all know the story. Virginal girl, pure and sweet, trapped in the body 
of a swan. She desires freedom, but only true love can break the spell. 
Her wish is nearly granted in the form of a prince. But before he can 
declare his love, her lustful twin, the Black Swan, tricks and seduces him. 
Devastated, the White Swan leaps off a cliff, killing herself, and in death 
finds freedom. 
He then pronounces his challenge: ‘Which of you can embody both swans? The 
white and the black.’ And regarding the staleness of Swan Lake as a standard 
part of the repertoire, he argues that it has ‘not [been done] like this. We strip it 
down, make it visceral and real.’ This new production thus ‘needs a new Swan 
Queen. A fresh face to present to the world.’ In his presentation, Thomas 
reveals a great deal about his interpretation of the ballet. If the dancers act 
towards him as if he were a Prince figure, pining for his attention and approval, 
it is clear that he is also Rothbart (Fig. 8), willing to transform a girl into a 
seductive performer for a captivated audience (taken to mean the Prince and 
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the ball guests, the ballet audience, and the wider world both inside and 
outside the film).18 
 
Fig. 8 Thomas’s reflection is split between two mirrors; he is both Prince and Rothbart. 
Thomas’s version of Swan Lake is, as many others, the story of Odette, 
and not the Prince. But more than that, it is the story of Odette’s body, as 
woman, as swan, and as image to be copied by Odile. The bodily prison of swan-
being registers as a familiar Cartesian indictment against the human (animal) 
body itself as a cage for true humanity – spiritual reason and, in this case, love. 
Descartes’s metaphysical belief that all bodies are animal bodies – and that all 
animals are machinic – is literalised in the ballet in the story of a human inside 
an animal body. Not even Odette’s ‘actual’ human body – her woman form – 
escapes the logocentric contempt for embodiment, since this body is easily and 
fraudulently copied. Nothing essential adheres to a body, Thomas’s ballet 
seems to tell us. This is even more strikingly clear in his interpretation of the 
climax, in which bodily death equals liberty. Therefore, it is safe to say that his 
                                                                
18 Later, one of his directions to Nina performing the Black Swan is to ‘seduce us, not just the 
Prince, but the court, the audience, the entire world’. 
Transcendanse | 157 
 
 
version of Swan Lake is ‘visceral’ only to the extent that it enacts an aversion of 
and an escape from viscera, a disdain for the mortality of the animal bodies of 
humans, which will become even clearer in Thomas’s assessment of Nina after 
she begs for the part. 
The actual audition is interesting for a number of reasons, not least 
because the viewer can see Nina dance for the first time.19 She is dancing the 
White Swan part and the audience (which includes the viewer, Thomas, and 
other dancers) is supposed to be impressed by her performance, so that 
Thomas tells her that if he were only casting Odette, she would clearly be the 
right choice – but alas, subjectivity is not so simple, and Nina as the subject 
must struggle with her double. As is expected, the audition room is surrounded 
by mirrors, where we can constantly see Nina’s reflections as the camera 
moves around her. Most interestingly, the camera does not show in the mirror: 
even though the cinematic point of view of the moving hand-held camera gets 
aligned with a mirror more than once, the camera fails to be captured by 
specularity (see Fig. 9 and Fig. 10). 
                                                                
19 Natalie Portman’s ballet training before filming received considerable media coverage and 
may have been responsible for her Academy Award for Best Actress. However, it was probably 
known to most viewers that special effects and camera tricks were used to create the 
impression she could actually dance ballet, while she in fact used a dance double, Sarah Lane, in 
the most technically challenging scenes. Ironically for a film concerning the danger posed by 
understudies, a controversy originated regarding the extent to which Lane’s work was not 
given full credit: an entire Wikipedia page is dedicated to this polemics (Wikipedia 
contributors, 'Black Swan dance double controversy', Wikipedia, The Free Encyclopedia, 
http://en.wikipedia.org/ [accessed 6 June 2015]). The double Lane claims she was even asked 
by producers not to give interviews before the Oscars ceremony, presumably to preserve the 
fantasy that Portman had indeed danced all her scenes (Christopher John Farley and Sarah 
Lane, ‘Natalie Portman’s “Black Swan” Dance Double Says She Deserves More Credit’, The Wall 
Street Journal, available at http://blogs.wsj.com/speakeasy/2011/03/26/natalie-portman’s-
black-swan-dance-double-says-she-deserves-more-credit/ [accessed 6 June 2015]. 
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Fig. 9 The camera has been digitally erased so that it is not visible behind Thomas’s reflection. 
 
Fig. 10 The camera, clearly positioned near Portman’s right arm, is not visible in the mirror. 
Whereas in the three-part mirror scene I mentioned earlier the camera 
could have been concealed by a mere tilt of the mirror frame, during the 
audition it is clear that it has been digitally erased. Such refusal to allow the 
cinematic apparatus to be visually captured by reflective surfaces resonates 
with by now classic discussions in film theory regarding the place of the gaze in 
filmic discourse. Laura Mulvey, initially, but also others have argued that the 
seeing perspective of the camera is constituted (psychoanalytically) as a 
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masculine gaze that objectifies female bodies.20 If we include the mirror stage 
in this psychoanalytic discussion, one may conclude that the masculine seeing 
apparatus refuses to undergo the series of resemblances, (mis)identifications, 
and visual (self-)seduction that constitutes ‘normal’ subjectivity. In other 
words, if Nina cannot be cast only as the White Swan – if she has to come to 
terms with the double in the mirror who is both her and not her – it seems that 
masculine identity (here clearly aligned with Thomas’s) can forgo that in order 
to reach its home in the Symbolic, safe from haunting, visually-constituted 
embodiment. This gender-biased specularity is relevant both for Black Swan’s 
filmic nature but also for its operatic background. Insofar as romantic ballet 
and opera were clearly intertwined, Swan Lake is ‘about the death of women’, as 
Catherine Clément argues in her book Opera, or The Undoing of Women. Opera, 
for her, and here one can see the import to male invisibility in Black Swan, is 
about the ‘countless forms in which men want and want not to hear the 
woman’s voice . . . to know and not know what she knows about men’s 
desires’.21 In this light, Thomas’s focus on Odette/Odile to the expense of the 
                                                                
20 Cf. Laura Mulvey, ‘Visual pleasure and narrative cinema’, Screen 16 (1975), 6–18. In a sense, 
this is the case even if they are the bodies of males. Dancers, especially, are affected by the 
objectification of bodies in performance. Pietro Banchi argues that discipline and practice aim 
at ‘making the body of the dancer [danzatrice] an object put to use so as to embody [incarnare] 
without remainders or imperfections the object of the Other’s desire (whence the primarily 
[elettivamente] feminine nature of the dancer [di chi danza], whether man or woman)’ (‘La Ferita 
del Desiderio’ [The Wound of Desire], Cineforum 502 (2001), 32-34 (p. 33), my translation). 
21 Catherine Clément, quoted in Cary Wolfe, ‘When You Can’t Believe Your Eyes (or Voice): 
Dancer in the Dark’, in What is Posthumanism? (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota, 2010), pp. 
169-202 (p. 174). The invisibility of males in Black Swan results in the film’s failure to pass what 
has come to be termed the Reverse Bechdel Test. The Bechdel Test, introduced by and named 
after Alison Bechdel, rates films from 0 to 3 points on whether they fulfil the following criteria, 
each one worth one point: ‘[a] The movie has to have at least two women in it, [b] who talk to 
each other, [c] about something besides a man.’ (Bechdel Test Movie List, available at 
http://bechdeltest.com/ [accessed 6 June 2015]) The purpose of the test seems to be to 
highlight the fact that an alarming number of films cannot pass what are widely fulfilled criteria 
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Prince is articulated with the invisibility of the camera – and of the father 
figure in the three-part mirror. Men, Clément would say, want not to have their 
own sexuality narrated,22 or captured in the never-ending reflections of truth 
and image in the mirror stage. 
As described above, Nina fails the Black Swan portion of the audition 
due to Lily’s interruption (or to Nina’s displacement onto Lily of her own 
limitations, triggered by the repression of her inner Black Swan23), so she 
decides to try and convince Thomas to change his mind the next day. This 
scene is crucial not only because she does succeed in getting the part, but 
because during it Thomas expounds on his metaphysics of dance.24 We learn 
that he has no criticisms of Nina’s technique, but that he has never seen her 
‘lose herself’ while dancing, and without such abandon she cannot dance the 
Black Swan. Nina claims that she ‘just want[s] to be perfect’, but for Thomas, 
‘perfection is not just about control. It’s also about letting go. Surprise yourself 
so you can surprise the audience. Transcendence. Very few have it in them.’ 
                                                                
in its Reverse form: as a rule, mainstream films seem to be made with the Reverse Bechdel Test 
in mind. It is, therefore, symptomatic of the male invisibility I am discussing that no two males 
are ever shown to converse in Black Swan about something other than the female dancers. 
22 Matthew Bourne’s version of Swan Lake, with a Prince protagonist and an all-male cast of 
swans, would seem to offer the precise opposite possibility: the thematisation of male 
sexuality. Its queer aesthetics, therefore, seems to stem from the very fact that masculinity is 
not made invisible – visibility thus both objectifies and eroticises. 
23 This is suggested by Nina’s second failure to finish the 32 fouettés when practising in front of 
the mirror at home later. This time, she is interrupted by a searing pain in her toe, which turns 
out to be a bloody, broken toenail. Her own body and Lily are thus allied in frustrating her 
virtuoso move. 
24 Next to his office’s window and reflecting the window light, Thomas has a framed poster of 
the Bournonville ballet La Ventana [The Window] (Fig. 11). In one of its most famous scenes, a 
‘señorita’ dances with her own reflection while reminiscing about a man she met. From the 
window she hears the sounds of his serenading, and she dances to his music from the window 
(‘La Ventana’, Bournonville.com, available at http://www.bournonville.com/bournonville31.html 
[accessed 6 June 2015]). The poster, and the plot to which it refers, works to collapse a series 
of framing devices – mirror, window, picture frame – not unlike the blurring of opaque, 
reflective glass and transparent window produced in the train scene. 
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Thomas’s theories of art and dance are, unsurprisingly, akin to his take 
on Swan Lake: bodily technique, for him, can only take the dancer so far. 
Technique, and the body itself, is only a tool the dancer-artist uses in order to 
express an artistic vision. The Black Swan may be carnal and seductive, but 
Nina is, ironically, too embodied to play her, since Thomas believes she would 
need to sever her intimate connection to her own body in order, precisely, to 
transcend it. At this point, the rhetoric of animality seems confused and 
scattered along Thomas’s discourse and mine. For Thomas in fact insists that 
Nina touch herself in order to unleash the sensuality she ought to portray. This 
is one of the first evidences of the fact that the supplementary work of arche-
animality articulates so many textual elements in Black Swan that animal 
rhetoric seems to occupy many, diverging positions. 
 
 
Fig. 11 Thomas's framed poster of the ballet La Ventana next to the window. 
One of these positions is the aspect I discussed above regarding the 
metaphysical dualism of Thomas’s libretto, in which animal bodies constitute 
nothing but cages for human souls. This is reworked by his exposition of his 
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beliefs about art – what I call his belief in transcendanse.25 Transcendanse is 
precisely the ultimate instrumentalisation of (and contempt for) the dancing 
body so as to make it convey ideal artistic content. True virtuosic achievement 
transcends the body and lies outside it, even though it must initially stem from 
within, since some (‘very few’) ‘have it in them’. Thus, the body contains that 
which will transcend it and in so doing make true art, all the while failing to be 
acknowledged as such an origin.26 
This dance neologism is closely related to another one, by Lacan, which 
will be especially relevant for reading Nina’s becoming-swan. In ‘Subversion of 
the Subject and the Dialectic of Desire in the Freudian Unconscious’, he refers 
to what he calls the animal’s dancity (dansité, densité + danse). While discussing 
the deception of Speech and of the signifier, Lacan concedes that animals are 
capable of some level of pretence, ‘to be found in physical combat or sexual 
display’ or hunting, and is ‘deployed in imaginary capture, and is integrated into 
the play of approach and rejection that constituted the original dance, in which 
these two vital situations find their rhythm, and in accord with which the 
partners ordered their movements’.27 This animal possibility of pretence, 
however, is still essentially different from that of a human subject, who is, 
                                                                
25 Thomas Leroy is a French character – I believe that he would hear the word danse in the 
French word transcendance. 
26 In his analysis of the film, Pietro Bianchi frames Black Swan as a discourse on the body as that 
which is the object of dance as an art form, instead of its subject. For him, ‘dance thematises […] 
the division that traverses any subject: if the body is the object of dance, who is its subject?’ (‘La 
Ferita’, p. 32, my translation). To all purposes, the dance subject is outside it, the director or 
choreographer, ‘an Other, […] who would like to reduce the body to an objectified element of 
representation, played in this film by Vincent Cassell’ (ibid., my translation). 
27 Lacan, cited in Derrida, The Animal That Therefore I Am, ed. by Marie-Louise Mallet, trans. by 
David Wills (New York: Fordham University Press), p. 129. 
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according to Lacan, a subject of the signifier. That means that, while animals 
are captured in the density of the Imaginary’s dance, human deception belongs 
to the Symbolic. This formulation is, of course, deeply interrelated to his 
conceptualisation of the mirror stage as an apparatus of Imaginary capture. 
Derrida’s critical reading of Lacan in The Animal That Therefore I Am28 is 
useful for my analysis of Black Swan since Derrida is able to deconstruct the 
opposition between human and animal relations to the signifier and the mirror 
in Lacan so that the ‘animality’ of Nina’s body can be understood to be located 
prior to the distinction between transcendanse and dancity. Derrida’s 
interpretation is centred around the question of the opposition between 
reaction and response. However ambitious and innovative Lacan’s thought 
proved to be regarding animality in comparison to the philosophical tradition, 
Derrida still detects an irreducible Cartesianism in Lacan’s insistence that the 
animal can only react, and not respond. Mere reaction is, of course, all that 
Descartes thought an animal conceived along the lines of a programmable 
automaton was capable of. In this distinction we can see summarised the 
dilemma set up by Black Swan: in Thomas’s view, Nina’s technique is so perfect 
to the point of automatic predictability and is thus not able to respond to the 
artistic and emotional requirements of the role. 
                                                                
28 The section ‘And Say the Animal Responded?’ in The Animal Therefore I Am (pp. 119-140) was 
repeated by Derrida as part of the lectures now comprising the published seminar The Beast 
and the Sovereign, Volume 1 (Jacques Derrida, The Beast and the Sovereign, Volume 1, ed. by 
Michel Lisse, Marie-Louise Mallet, and Ginette Michaud, trans. by Geoffrey Bennington 
[Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 2009], pp. 111-135). 
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Derrida shows that Lacan’s reaction/response and animal/human 
oppositions are based upon a theory of Otherness. He quotes Lacan: 
The Other as previous site of the pure subject of the signifier holds the 
master position. […] One can speak of a code only if it is already the code 
of the Other, […] since it is from this code that the subject is constituted, 
which means that it is from the Other that the subject receives even the 
message that he emits.29 
Of course, for Lacan the very accession and relation to Otherness will 
depend on a certain response to the mirror stage. It is by means of the subject’s 
self-recognition/mis-recognition in the mirror that he or she will be able to 
identify the Other, starting with the imago. If Derrida signals that Lacan goes 
beyond the traditional thinking on animals by granting animals access to the 
Imaginary (the mirror stage), he also criticises Lacan for denying them a way 
out. Thus: 
the passage through the mirror forever immobilized the animal, 
according to Lacan, within the snare of the imaginary, thus depriving it 
of any access to the symbolic, that is to say, to the law and to whatever is 
held to be proper to the human.30 
This reaction/response, Imaginary/Symbolic distinction is thus mapped 
onto another one between pretending and pretending to pretend. The human 
subject, by breaking free of Imaginary capture in the specular image, accedes 
to the Symbolic and to the signifier, which grants him or her the ability to 
mislead the Other by telling the truth under the assumption the Other will take 
it as a lie.31 That underscores for Lacan the sovereignty of the signifier and 
symbolic meaning with respect to reality – or, to be precise, the difference 
                                                                
29 Lacan, cited in Derrida, The Animal That Therefore I Am, p. 120. Omissions are mine. 
30 Ibid. 
31 Likewise, one could, conversely, tell the truth by providing false information to an Other who 
one knows will expect a lie. 
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between truth and fact. By being subject of and subjected to the signifier, the 
human subject can utter either truth or un-truth independent of the factual 
content of his or her utterance. Here we could call this delicate deception game 
transcendanse, since it describes a human dance in which truth can transcend 
fact (and lie can transcend falsehood). The Imaginary, animalistic opposite of 
that is what Lacan calls dancity, in which the animal, for not having access to the 
signifier and to the Symbolic, can only simply deceive. Derrida explains that 
‘dancity refers to the capacity to pretend by means of a dance or lure, by means 
of the choreography of the hunt or seduction, the parade that is practiced 
before lovemaking or as a movement of self-protection when making war’.32 
Crucially, the reason why the human breaks away from the Imaginary, 
as we say with Butler and Belau, refers to a certain human lack that the animal 
lacks. It is precisely because of this lack that the human will find so much solace 
in the mis-/self-recognition of his or her own image in the mirror, and thus 
construct the ego, obey the Symbolic order etc. Derrida points out that this 
logic follows ‘the tried and true biblical and Promethean tradition’, which 
‘relates the fixity of animal determinism […] to a type of originary perfection of 
that animal’.33 The human thus ‘receive[s] speech and technics only inasmuch 
as he lacks something’,34 which Derrida identifies as central to Lacan’s writing 
on the mirror stage as the ‘fact of the real specific prematurity of birth in man’.35 
                                                                
32 Ibid., p. 128. 
33 Ibid., p. 122. 
34 Ibid. 
35 Lacan, cited in Derrida, The Animal That Therefore I Am, p. 122. Emphasis is Lacan’s.  
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In Black Swan, Thomas upholds that the body of the (human) dancer, 
despite being her ‘animal part’, should deal with a circulation of signifiers, and 
with them make art. The reflection in a mirror of a properly human dancing 
body should provider the dancer with the identification necessary for 
recognition and confirmation, as well as displacement of the bodily morphe 
onto other fellow dancers. Conversely, the overly technical characterisation of 
Nina’s dancing body frames her as simply projecting an image of artistic 
achievement. The film shows us an animalistic capture by the mirror in the way 
she is captivated before her own reflection in her attempt to transcend her 
limitations. Crucially, her reflected image, even before it morphs into 
hallucinations, presents the challenge of an Other rather than the confirmation 
of the self. And, of course, once her reflection begins to move of its own accord, 
the collapse of the mirror stage function is complete, and the self-recognition 
that should lead into an understanding of otherness gives way to a sense of 
threat from the self-as-other. 
Under that light, it is especially important to consider the meaning of 
Nina’s bodily transformations into the black swan. As Thomas or any of the 
other dancers could have told her, the job of the dancers in Swan Lake is not 
exactly to pretend that they are swans. The swan imagery is achieved by means 
of a Symbolic system, which seeks to erase and transcend the actual 
movements of the dancing body. In her psychosis, however, Nina seems to 
literalise the necessity of transcending bodily technique in order to reach the 
swan: from her body a swan literally emerges. This becoming-swan is precisely 
that which I argue to undermine the distinction between transcendanse and 
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dancity, between a responsible artistic achievement and a reactive technical 
ability. If transcendanse views the (always human) body as a transparent 
signifier that can disappear to allow artistic meaning to show forth, dancity 
describes the (always animal) body that is opaque and dense: a pure image that 
can only reproduce itself mechanically (whether in the mirror or not). 
Becoming-swan is the hidden paleonym of this dichotomy: it is the non-worldly 
materiality of the trace that is both material and immaterial and makes 
possible both transcendanse and dancity. Thus, the human body – rather than 
transcending or being equal to an animal – both means and is the arche-animal. 
This is the conclusion that Derrida reaches in his reading of Lacan. The 
different between reaction and response, and between pretence and 
deception (the possibility of pretending to pretend), cannot be sustained in its 
purity, since, especially in Lacan, ‘the unconscious is founded on a logic of 
repetition’, which inscribes iterability and mechanicity in the very functioning 
of the signifier. And because language – and Lacan admits that – is precisely 
that non-worldly materiality. Finally, if ‘it is from the Other that the subject 
receives even the message that he emits’, that means that the difference 
between reaction and response must be reconfigured, since even a human 
response would contain a trace of a mechanical, non-sovereign reaction. 
Film critic A. O. Scott identifies a very similar tension in the film when he 
writes that ‘the subject of Black Swan […] is the relationship, in art, between 
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technique and emotion’.36 However, the status of emotion remains unclear: if 
opposed to the mechanicity of technique it can register as profoundly human; 
as opposed to humanist rationality, though, emotion promises an inhuman, 
carnal realm of possibilities. The latter formulation is explored in depth by Ariel 
Osterweis in her ‘Disciplining Black Swan, Animalizing Ambition’, in which she 
places technique firmly on the side of the human world, and emotion and 
ecstasy on the side of carnality and animality. Therefore, she argues: 
Black Swan portrays artistic ambition through Nina's – and 
Odette/Odile's – erratic transformation from human to animal. […] 
Aronofsky draws out the tension between technique's mechanical, 
disciplining function and the refined, animalistic characteristics of 
ecstasy. In doing so, he recognizes the idea that technique is often 
thought to provide formal tools with which an artist can express carnal 
emotion. […] That Nina grows larger-than-life black feathered wings 
during the culminating fouetté turn sequence of Swan Lake […] is 
significant, marking the point at which the pinnacle of her technical 
achievement coincides with raw animalistic attributes associated with 
the ecstatic. […] Nina and her own "other" evoke the struggle of the 
artist to achieve balance between the human capability to master 
mechanical technique and the untamed animalistic emotion necessary 
to sustain ambition and evoke passion onstage.37 
Osterweis seems to second Thomas in her belief that an artistic truth 
must be extracted from within Nina’s technically mobilised body,38 and that 
becoming-swan is the signifier of its liberation. Interiority, however, functioned 
according to the opposite logic in Thomas’s account of Swan Lake, since there it 
was the case of a human being liberated from within an animal. Also, both 
                                                                
36 A. O. Scott, ‘Natalie Portman Embraces Monster and Victim’, New York Times, 30 December 
2010 <http://www.nytimes.com/2011/01/02/movies/awardsseason/02scot.html> [accessed 
21 May 2017]. 
37 Ariel Osterweis, ‘Disciplining Black Swan, Animalizing Ambition’, in The Oxford Handbook of 
Dance and the Popular Screen, ed. by Melissa Blanco Borelli (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
2014), pp. 68-82 (pp. 71, 74). 
38 She writes: ‘Human body parts are mangled and removed, and what remains are wounds 
from which the animalistic emerges’ (ibid., p. 73, my emphasis). 
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Thomas and Osterweis seem to overlook the logic according to which the 
animalistic and the mechanical share the same space as the non-human, as that 
which operates automatically, unstoppably and is instrumentalised by human 
intention. In short, they ignore both Descartes’s conflation of animals and 
machines and the logic of supplementarity which grounds it: to human spiritual 
intentionality, both embodiment itself and machinery represent prosthetic 
supplements. The confusing status of some terms in the chain of supplements, 
such as carnality, emotion, and ecstasy, is explored in depth by Derrida in Of 
Grammatology with respect to Rousseau, but may be tracked in the Cartesian 
discussion at hand: both the mechanicity of technics and spontaneous ecstasy 
may figure either prior to or after humanity.39 I believe Osterweis exposes this 
work of supplementarity when she refers to ‘bodily technique’, crucially when 
comparing it to techniques of the cinematic apparatus:40 if technique may be 
bodily, if human’s ‘animal component’ may be an instrument of technique, it is 
not clear how this same animal embodiment may give rise to carnality as the 
other of technics. This philosophical promiscuity, as it were, of the concept of 
animality in signifying practices (such as in Black Swan) is, I have argued, an 
effect of the repression of arche-animality, by means of which the vulgar 
                                                                
39 Technicity may be seen as present in the automatic world of animal instinct, which the 
advent of humanity breaks by means of reason and intentionality, but may also be 
feared/adored as that which comes to supplement, via culture, a vulnerable human nature. On 
the other hand, carnality can be located in the immanence of animal-being, consequently 
interrupted by human rationality, or as a posterior remedy for corrupt, overly mechanised 
humanity, as Osterweis suggests is Nina’s case. 
40 ‘In terms of virtuosity, Black Swan creates a parallel between the cinematic apparatus (the 
full schematic technicity of cinema, including camerawork) and the dancer's bodily technique, 
an alternating concealment and exposure of the mechanical’ (Osterweis, ‘Disciplining Black 
Swan’, p . 74). 
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concept of the animal is produced and textually scattered for diverse rhetorical 
uses.  
 
Ci-ferae 
In his CIFERAE: A Bestiary in Five Fingers, Tom Tyler writes extensively about 
some of these rhetorical treatments of animals in which the latter ‘are 
nonentitites, of no importance or worth in their own rights, designated to “fill a 
place”, […] codes awaiting interpretation, […] symbolic characters in animal 
form, hieroglyphs utilized by philosophy that a meaning might be conveyed’, in 
what amounts, in Tyler’s words, to a ‘textual abuse’.41 This is what he terms 
ciphers, which he traces etymologically to the Sanskrit for ‘empty’ and then, 
later, to the sixteenth century meaning ‘of a person or thing “who fills a place, 
but is of no importance of worth” in its own right. The real power residing 
elsewhere, the cipher remains “a nonentity, a ‘mere nothing’”’ – cipherous 
animals, thus, ‘do little more in the text than fill a place’.42 Tyler takes issue 
especially with the arbitrary fashion in which most animals are employed as 
ciphers, since almost any other animal or even thing could play the same role in 
the philosophical discussions he analyses. Therefore, he believes ‘we must 
cease to understand them as arbitrarily chosen placeholders, unwittingly 
serving some higher pedagogic purpose. We must de-cipher the ciphers, that is, 
stop treating them as ciphers altogether.’43 This last sentence, especially, is 
                                                                
41 Tom Tyler, CIFERAE: A Bestiary in Five Fingers (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota, 2012), 
p. 29. 
42 Ibid., p. 23. 
43 Ibid., p. 29. 
Ci-ferae | 171 
 
 
crucial for the unusual sense of the verb ‘decipher’ – for Tyler, the work at hand 
is precisely not to decipher animals in the standard acceptation of the word, so 
that we would finally be in the presence of the signified concept these animals 
were deployed to mean, their signifying bodies now disposable. Rather, de-
ciphering means countering the very logic of ciphering, and – primarily, I 
believe – underscoring the role that the metaphysical concept of animality 
plays in the very structure and process of ciphering. 
Thus, in opposition to the animal cipher, Tyler also describes what he 
calls animal indices. An animal cipher, on the one hand,  
is employed to make a point, and there is no obvious or necessary reason 
for choosing this particular animal.  […] An index, on the other hand, 
points out what is of interest, using a quality or behaviour peculiar to the 
animal, and is therefore intrinsic to the philosophical argument.44  
While Tyler does stress that both types of discursive use of animals are 
forms of textual abuse, he makes it clear that an animal index is, in a certain 
way, more attuned to that animal’s being, relying on its ‘significant attributes’.45 
In my view, however, employing an entire species as a placeholder for a 
signified concept still registers too close to the workings of the cipher, and does 
not challenge in any way the animalistic schema of the material substrate 
giving signifying support to ideal meanings. Despite this reservation, I believe 
Tyler’s text points in that direction when he stresses the importance of de-
ciphering as the practice of refusing the desired transparency of signification. 
He writes:  
                                                                
44 Ibid., p. 32, emphasis in the original. 
45 Ibid., p. 33. 
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Whenever we meet a cipher, there is every chance that all the careful 
work undertaken for their master has already begun to come undone. 
These animals are not content to remain mere ciphers and demand to be 
treated otherwise. […] The overworked cipher finally rats on his or her 
employer. Animal indices […] can disclose the direction we must take 
next.46 
One could say that Tyler is arguing for an impure, contaminated reading, 
in which the signifying body is not allowed to vanish so as to present the 
signified in its glorious presence. Tyler is exclusively writing about animal 
signifiers, but in truth one could talk about reading any signifier non-
transparently, without for all that leaving the field of zoogrammatology. This is 
due to the fact that, as I have argued, signification as is traditionally 
conceptualised is bound up with animal concepts. In Cartesian terms, one could 
say that Tyler is arguing against the existential dualism in which the soul is 
unaffected by the body. De-ciphering Descartes would mean taking account of 
the fact that the soul is to some extent dependent on its material support, and 
this conclusion has clear animal connotations. 
The issue for Black Swan, and for the overall project of 
zoogrammatology, is precisely the extent to which animal representation can 
break free of what one could call an Oedipal matrix. Whereas Tyler’s language 
is not overtly psychoanalytic, the textual abuse suffered by animals – insofar as 
it is linguistic – can be read as an aspect of the Symbolic, and produced by the 
normative Oedipal structures that give rise to signification. Even if, or precisely 
because, Nina’s madness points to a failure of Oedipal resolution, becoming-
swan could be read, still Oedipally, as its failure. That Nina’s bodily 
                                                                
46 Ibid., pp. 29, 30, emphasis in the original. 
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transformation appears to disobey Thomas’s paternal law of transcendanse in 
no way means that it functions outside of this law. As I have argued, naïve, 
triumphalist materialism does not offer a solution to the problems of dualistic 
metaphysics, precisely because the meaning of matter is constituted by this 
duality. In short, dancity may be the opposite of transcendanse, but only as the 
other pole of the same system. 
The problem can be summed up by the fact that becoming-swan still 
means something. Even if it can be taken as the hyperbole of a dancer’s 
embodiment and of the avoidance of dance’s transcendence in relation to the 
body, it still carries meaning. In Tyler’s words, we can say that Nina’s body and 
the swan that sprouts from it have both been de-ciphered. However, de-
ciphered animals should not, at first sight, be able to ‘mean something’, if by 
that we understand standing in place for something else. Tyler’s description of 
de-cipherment, though, clearly does not refute all meaning. Therefore, de-
ciphered animals should be understood, I argue, to simply mean. 
This discussion goes to the heart of the role of animals in 
psychoanalysis, and of the extent to which they participate in the structure of 
the psyche and of signifying systems. For Tyler, Freud consistently turned 
animal ciphers into indices, so that in his work ‘CIFERAE […] unleash the FERAE 
within’.47 
 
                                                                
47 Ibid., p. 34 
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Wolf tales 
Undoubtedly, Freud’s richest exploration of the signifying power of animals is 
also one of his most famous works, From the History of an Infantile Neurosis, also 
known simply as The Wolf Man, finished in 1914 and first published in 1918.48 
This case-study of the analysis of his patient Sergei Pankejeff (Сергей Панкеев), 
dubbed ‘the Wolf Man’ (der Wolfsmann) for privacy reasons, offered Freud the 
opportunity to consolidate the importance for his psychoanalysis of childhood 
sexuality and the castration complex, which had come under attack from some 
of his detractors. 
Most importantly for my discussion of Black Swan is the fact that The 
Wolf Man is a heavily intertextual essay, in which intertextuality constructs a 
chain in order to secure the place of a psychosexual event, namely the sighting 
by an infant Pankejeff of the ‘primal scene’ (Urszene) – his parents having 
intercourse. Four ‘texts’ stand out in this intertextual chain: the dream about 
wolves thanks to which Pankejeff got his moniker, the fairy-tale ‘The Wolf and 
The Seven Little Goats’, a children’s book illustration depicting the wolf from 
this tale, and what Freud calls ‘the wolf story’. The dream, narrated and 
illustrated (Fig. 12) by Pankejeff,49 goes as follows: 
I dreamt that it was night and that I was lying in bed. (My bed stood with 
its foot towards the window; in front of the window there was a row of 
old walnut trees. I know it was winter when I had the dream, and night-
time.) Suddenly the window opened of its own accord, and I was 
                                                                
48 Sigmund Freud, ‘From the History of an Infantile Neurosis’, trans. by Alix Strachey and James 
Strachey, in An Infantile Neurosis and Other Works, vol. 17 of the Standard Edition of the Complete 
Psychological Works of Sigmund Freud, ed. by James Strachey (London: Hogarth Press, 1955), pp. 
7-122. Further references are given parenthetically in the text, and under the title The Wolf 
Man. 
49 Freud, in Whitney Davis, Drawing the Dream of the Wolves: Homosexuality, Interpretation, and 
Freud’s “Wolf Man” (Bloomington and Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, 1995), p. 35. 
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terrified to see that some white wolves were sitting on the big walnut 
tree in front of the window. There were six or seven of them. The wolves 
were quite white, and looked more like foxes or sheep-dogs, for they 
had big tails like foxes and they had their ears pricked like dogs when 
they pay attention to something. In great terror, evidently of being 
eaten up by the wolves, I screamed and woke up. (p. 29) 
‘The Wolf and The Seven Little Goats’ is, unlike the ‘wolf story’, as we 
shall see, an actual fairy-tale, described by Freud thus:  
the number seven occurs, and also the number six [of wolves on the 
tree], for the wolf only ate up six of the little goats, while the seventh hid 
itself in the clockcase. The white [of the dream wolves], too, comes into 
this story, for the wolf had his paw made white at the baker’s. […] The 
tree appears. The wolf lay down under a tree after his meal and snored. 
(p. 31) 
An illustration from this story, in which the wolf is ‘standing upright and 
striding along’ (p. 16), ‘one foot forward, with its claws stretched out and its 
ears pricked’ (p. 39), was used by his sister to terrify him when we was little, 
Fig. 12 Pankejeff’s drawing of the tree and wolves from his dream. 
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and this terror played its part in his phobia of wolves. Finally, Pankejeff was 
told the wolf story by his grandfather, and was imparted to Freud when the 
latter asked Pankejeff for a possible explanation for why the wolves in the 
dream would be on a tree. Freud narrates it as follows: 
A tailor was sitting at work in his room, when the window opened and a 
wolf leapt in. The tailor hit after him with his yard—no (he corrected 
himself), caught him by his tail and pulled it off, so that the wolf ran away 
in terror. Some time later the tailor went into the forest, and suddenly 
saw a pack of wolves coming towards him; so he climbed up a tree to 
escape from them. At first the wolves were in perplexity; but the 
maimed one, which was among them and wanted to revenge himself on 
the tailor, proposed that they should climb one upon another till the last 
one could reach him. He himself—he was a vigorous old fellow—would 
be the base of the pyramid. The wolves did as he suggested, but the 
tailor had recognized the visitor whom he had punished, and suddenly 
called out as he had before: “Catch the grey one by his tail!” The tailless 
wolf, terrified by the recollection, ran away, and all the others tumbled 
down. (pp. 30-1) 
Based on these texts and their interrelations, Freud was able to 
construct the primal scene wherein an eighteen-month-old Pankejeff 
witnessed his parents have sex a tergo, that is, from behind. This scene gave him 
visual evidence of what satisfaction from his father looked like, which 
supposedly he masochistically sought in the form of beatings by the means of 
his neurotic tantrums from around four years of age (the infantile neurosis 
from the title). The scene made possible for him to learn of the reality of 
castration by means of the position of the genitals, and produced in him the 
realisation that to be sexually satisfied by his father implied his own castration. 
It is precisely this unpleasant realisation, rejected by his narcissistic attachment 
to his own penis, that was transmitted or confirmed by the wolf dream, and the 
reason why it frightened him so. 
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Now Freud must explain in what way the dream about wolves relates to 
his parents’ intercourse and to the reality of castration. He connects the 
parents’ position, ‘the man upright, and the woman bent down like an animal’ 
(p. 39), to the fact that the wolf was standing in the terrifying illustration. From 
then on the wolf becomes for Pankejeff an ‘anxiety-animal’, but it is not clear 
why all instances of wolf fear did not trigger his castration-denying breakdown, 
or how exactly anxiety translates into castration complex in the dream. In 
short, it’s not clear why the terrifying dream was formed by his unconscious 
with wolves when they were not always articulated with castration anxiety. 
Admittedly the dream may have merely laid bare to (pre-)consciousness that 
all instances of wolf anxiety were, in fact, cases of castration anxiety. But if that 
is all, it is not obvious why so much of the dream is significant for the primal 
scene. I would argue that the only reason why wolves became for Freud the 
master signifier – signifying both castration and its opposite – is the 
grandfather’s wolf story. Without it, the textual line connecting the dream to 
the primal scene cannot be drawn. Freud writes: 
Let us now proceed with our discussion of the relations between his 
dream and the primal scene. […] At this point some connection is 
missing, some associative bridge to lead from the content of the primal 
scene to that of the wolf story. This connection is provided once again 
by the postures and only by them. In his grandfather’s story, the tailless 
wolf asked the others to climb upon him. It was this detail that called up 
the recollection of the picture of the primal scene; and it was in this way 
that it became possible for the material of the primal scene to be 
represented by that of the wolf story. (p. 41-2)50 
                                                                
50 Another connection between the dream and the wolf story is the fact that there are several 
wolves. The dream should represent the parents by means of only two wolves, but, in the story, 
the tailless wolf needed several pack mates in order to form a pyramid. The excess of wolves 
needed for the pyramid seeps into the dream. This is relevant both for Deleuze and Guattari’s 
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The story establishes the relation between tails and the phallus, thereby 
equating the tailless wolf of the story to the state of castration and the 
peculiarly bushy tails of the wolves of the dream to defiantly-displayed 
phalluses. Both the primal scene and the wolf story establish the crucial 
dichotomy between tailed and tailless – or between phallic male and castrated 
female – upon which the entire neurosis is grounded. The male penetrates the 
female; the tailless wolf had the other wolves climb upon him, and still cannot 
accomplish the erection of the pyramid. 
In other words, the dichotomous nature of sexual difference itself is the 
main fuel of Pankejeff’s anxiety and neurosis, but interchangeability never 
interests Freud. It makes no difference for him that the wolves could not reach 
the tailor on the tree, but were on the tree in the dream. It matters not at all 
that the wolves are looking, whereas it was the dreamer who was watching in 
the primal scene. For Freud, ‘taillessness [appears in the dream] in the over-
compensated form of the bushy tails of the putative wolves’ (p. 41-2). If 
taillessness and bushy tails are interchangeable, that should mean the 
distinction on which sexual difference is based is a false one. The different 
states of the tail should be the only stable signifiers, for without them that 
which supposedly matters in the primal scene – the reality of castration – loses 
all meaning.  
It is possible, therefore, that the wolves in the dream did not uphold the 
distinction between castrated and non-castrated at all. In fact, they are 
                                                                
discussion of The Wolfman in their ‘One or Several Wolves?’ and for Black Swan / Swan Lake and 
the need for a whole group of swans in the form of the corps de ballet. 
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completely indifferent to this distinction, since they are clearly able to signify 
both the phallus and its lack. And since the grandfather’s wolf story is not really 
a fairy-tale and thus not verifiable, it is perfectly possible that it is the story, 
instead of the dream, which is the secondary production. Indifference to the 
phallus in the shape of the wolf is collapsed into one possibility, castration, in 
the form of the wolf story. Certainly its counterpart, a text signifying the phallic 
aspect of the wolf, could be found elsewhere in Pankejeff’s life. After de-
ciphering the wolves thus, we can say that the wolves do not mean anything. All 
they can ‘mean’ is the possibility of meaning, which is then Oedipally collapsed 
into the two signifying possibilities conceivable to psychoanalysis, castration 
and non-castration. The terror of the dream lies precisely in the radical 
affirmation of the non-necessity of the dialectics of castration. 
 
A multiplicity of feathers 
Before I move on to showing that the Black Swan haunting Nina’s body – in 
other words, becoming-swan itself – functions according to the same structure 
as the wolf dream, it is illuminating to discuss Deleuze and Guattari’s 
reservations regarding Freud’s analysis of the Wolf Man and how it relates to 
becoming-animal. The first chapter of A Thousand Plateaus is dated and titled in 
reference to The Wolf Man (‘1914: One or Several Wolves?’51), clearly with 
connection to the issue highlighted above of the ‘correct’ number of wolves in 
the dream. One may start by a cross-linguistic comparison – appropriate, given 
                                                                
51 Giles Deleuze and Félix Guattari, ‘1914: One or Several Wolves?’, in A Thousand Plateaus: 
Capitalism & Schizophrenia (London and New York: Continuum, 1987), pp. 26-38. 
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the transcultural character of the analysis itself – of Pankejeff’s Freudian name. 
Originally, in German, he is called der Wolfsmann, meaning literally ‘the 
Wolfman’, or even ‘the Man of the Wolf’. Both the English and German 
versions, therefore, create the appearance of a single, lone wolf instead of the 
six or seven of the dream.52  
For Deleuze and Guattari, what is most striking (and condemnable) in 
The Wolf Man is Freud’s indifference towards the multiplicity of the wolves: 
regardless of whether one or several wolves actually appeared in the dream, ‘it 
was already decided from the very beginning that animals could serve only to 
represent coitus between parents, or, conversely, be represented by coitus 
between parents.’53 Thus, they are able to summarise Freud’s ability to find the 
same primal scene symbolised by any number of wolves: seven wolves of the 
fairy-tale, where only six are eaten, the parents had sex at five o’clock, three 
times, two parents, one terrifying, castrating father.54 This reverts back to the 
multiplicity inherent in Deleuze and Guattari’s becoming-animal as opposed to 
the unity of Freudian concepts such as the penis, the father, the vagina. 
Regarding the neurotic ability of seeing in a sock a symbol for the vagina, Freud 
                                                                
52 The plural of Wolf in German is Wölfe, rendering the several-wolves, accurate version of the 
nickname der Wölfemann (Wolves Man), or der Mann der Wölfe (the Man of the Wolves). 
Interestingly, Romance languages (such as the French in which Deleuze and Guattari are 
writing) refer to him by means of several wolves: l’homme aux loups in French, o homem dos 
lobos in Portuguese, el hombre de los lobos in Spanish, and l’uomo dei lupi in Italian. (The French 
expression, however, is homophonous to its singular counterpart, l’homme au loup.) Unlike its 
Germanic siblings, Dutch follows the Romance languages with the plural de Wolvenman 
(instead of de Wolfman). Finally, in Russian the expression also has only one wolf: человек-волк 
(chelovek-volk), and not волки (volki), despite the fact that another Slavic language, Polish, 
rejects agglutination in favour of the plural genitive construction of człowiek od wilków (and not 
wilka). The same would also be possible in Russian as человек волков (chelovek volkov). 
53 Deleuze and Guattari, ‘One or Several’, p. 28. 
54 Ibid. 
 
A multiplicity of feathers | 181 
 
 
asserts that psychosis would prevent this identification since the sock is, in fact, 
an entire surface of cavities instead of only one – the assumption being that, 
from the moment one notices the multiplicity of holes, one cannot think of a 
vagina, since it is apparently defined by its singularity. Deleuze and Guattari: 
‘comparing a sock to a vagina is OK, it’s done all the time, but you’d have to be 
insane to compare a pure aggregate of stitches to a field of vaginas: that’s what 
Freud says.’55 
For them, similar to my argument regarding the dream wolves’ 
indifference to castration, becoming-animal implies a multiplicity which is 
precisely averse to the kind of singular entities found in psychoanalysis.  
Who is ignorant of the fact that wolves travel in packs? Only Freud. 
Every child knows it. Not Freud. […] Freud obviously knows nothing 
about the fascination exerted by wolves and the meaning of their silent 
call, [their libidinal meaning], the call to become-wolf.56  
For them, ‘every animal is fundamentally a band, a pack. […] We do not 
become animal without a fascination for the pack, for multiplicity.’57 They 
therefore stress the inherent multiplicity in becoming-animal. One becomes-
animal in direct relationship to the pack. Often, they argue, becoming-animal 
occurs through one ‘exceptional’ individual of the pack – the favourite, the 
Unique, the anomalous, with whom an alliance is made that makes becoming 
                                                                
55 Ibid., p. 27. 
56 Ibid., p. 28, 31. In this light, it is interesting to note that Matthew Bourne’s version of Swan 
Lake seems to borrow two striking images from the Wolf-Man’s dream, the setting of the wolf 
dream, and the dream itself: during the ballet overture, the Prince as a child has a nightmare in 
bed, while through the window behind his bed, one of the swans can be seen flapping his wings. 
And, during the ballet climax, a sick Prince lies again in bed, when the swans come to perch on 
the headboard one by one, resembling both Hitchcock’s The Birds and Pankejeff’s dream. 
57 Deleuze and Guattari, ‘Becoming-Animal’, p. 240. 
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possible.58 This individual belongs to the pack but to its margins, the periphery, 
where it ‘is neither an individual nor a genus; [it] is the borderline’.59 
In Black Swan, as in Swan Lake, multiplicity is present in the corps de ballet 
or swan flock. The fact that classical or romantic ballet choreographies are 
usually organised around the duality soloist vs. corps is possibly the entire 
reason of Nina’s crisis.60 That there is an entire troupe of dancers trained to 
dance alike and dressed to look alike both highlights the importance of the 
soloist and threatens the soloist with replacement. In the libretto of Swan Lake, 
the Prince pursues the flock, but ultimately finds the Swan Queen, Odette. As I 
argued, in his flight from the Oedipal constraints of royal succession, he seeks 
to lose himself in the multiplicity of the pack, but the fairy-tale plot reinserts 
marriage into the proceedings by the means of Odette, the shape-shifter, who 
ultimately serves to merge Oedipal and non-Oedipal projects so as to allay the 
audience’s fear of marriage. In Black Swan, thus, it could be said that the 
dancers compete to determine who gets to be the one exceptional individual 
who makes the alliance of becoming-animal with the Prince, an alliance which, 
nevertheless, only confirms the marriage obligation it apparently diverged 
from. 
Nina revels in being chosen to be the Swan Queen, and berates her 
mother for implying she is not up to the job: ‘I’m the Swan Queen! It’s you who 
never left the corps!’ However, she does not wholly ascribe to this special 
                                                                
58 Ibid., p. 243-9. 
59 Ibid., p. 245. 
60 One might even speak about a corps of wolves in the wolf story: since the castrated wolf 
must form a pyramid to reach the tree, he as good as commands a troupe of dancing wolves. 
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individuality, since throughout the film she is startled to see the whole of the 
corps dancers actually have her face. Nina wants the role of Odette not to be 
above the other dancers, but in some level to ‘lose herself’ in the flock 
multiplicity of becoming-animal – in an entirely different fashion of losing 
oneself from the one encouraged by Thomas. 
It is in what one may call Nina’s becoming-animal drive (interpreted 
psychoanalytically as simply her inner Black Swan) that we can trace the 
similarities between Black Swan and The Wolf Man. I mentioned that, for Freud, 
the image of the primal scene gave rise to the dream by means of the 
vocabulary of the wolf story. However, we saw that the wolf story could be a 
product of the dream itself, so that the line of influence from primal scene to 
dream actually functions both ways (Fig. 13). 
That means that not only can the primal scene have influenced the wolf 
story and the wolf dream, but that the dream may have retroactively 
(nachträglich) influenced the primal scene by means of the vocabulary of the 
Wolf 
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Fig. 13 Bidirectional line of textual influence in The Wolf Man. 
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wolf story. This is a similar schema to the one presented by Whitney Davis (Fig. 
14). 
 
Fig. 14 Davis’s diagram for the structure of Nachträglichkeit in the Wolfman’s childhood.61 
In his diagram, events in the past influence and shape coming events, but the 
latter also shape and determine the past retroactively. My own diagram, 
despite being simpler, includes the additional influence of the wolf dream on 
the child’s sexual history, which I conflate with the ‘authoring’ of the wolf story. 
If in The Wolf Man the signifying power of the wolves was collapsed into 
two possible meanings (castrated and non-castrated), the same is true 
regarding Black Swan. Initially, the duality in question might obviously appear 
to be between the White and the Black Swans, but I believe this is a misleading 
path. For one, one could say that this is the distinction at stake in Swan Lake, 
and that Black Swan is a different text. Black Swan, as a text, is much more 
invested, as I hope to have shown, in the contrast between transcendanse and 
dancity, where the former represents the disdain for and instrumentalisation of 
                                                                
61 Whitney Davis, Drawing the Dream of the Wolves: Homosexuality, Interpretation, and Freud’s 
“Wolf Man” (Bloomington and Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, 1995), p. 35. 
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embodiment in the pursuit of something ‘greater’, and the latter the image of 
animality as an undifferentiated, dense materiality, where one is lost and 
undistinguished ‘as water in water’.62 As I hope it is now clear, these are the 
two most common answers to the problem of animal embodiment – 
transcendanse would be the standard Cartesian stance, whereas dancity would 
be the name for the materialistic approach to animal being in the strand of 
Animal Studies I am criticising. As I have argued, both are the two sides of the 
same linguistic conceptuality and are secondary products of arche-animality. 
As it is, I have already shown how becoming-swan does in fact function to 
represent both signifying procedures. 
However, we can return to a psychoanalytic interpretation – and 
confirm that Black/White is derivative of transcendanse/dancity –, by focusing 
on the textual strata of the film. As in The Wolf Man, becoming-swan is supposed 
to be interpreted as a translation of Nina’s psychosexual development as 
influenced by the Swan Lake libretto. Whereas the primal scene apparently 
inaugurates Pankejeff to the world of sexual difference as based on castration, 
Nina’s psychosexual development similarly frames reality in terms of a duality. 
Girl/woman, reflection/reality, Imaginary/Symbolic are all related to the 
primordial psychoanalytic distinction between presence and absence of the 
phallus, castrated female and non-castrated male. Nina’s mother’s phallic-ness 
and cherishing of her daughter as a vicarious phallus work together to prevent 
Nina from entering the ‘correct’ understanding that only males are phallic, that 
                                                                
62 Georges Bataille, ‘Animality’, in Theory of Religion, trans. by Robert Hurley (New York: Zone 
Books, 1989), pp. 17-26 (p. 19). 
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females are castrated, that the seduction of mirror images in the Imaginary is 
unimportant, and that only subjection to the signifier in the Symbolic 
constitutes subjectivity. These last two points reveal the complicity between 
the psychoanalytic material and the arche-animal themes of transcendanse (the 
overcoming of reflections, and their resulting invisibility, by means of entry 
into the Symbolic) and dancity (Imaginary capture in specularity). 
In the film, the issue of castration as a hinge for Oedipus’ textual 
coherence is presented in Nina’s scratch on the back, a compulsively self-
inflicted wound. This scratch is ambiguous, since it could, on the one hand, be 
read as the castration wound that normative femininity should learn to accept, 
meaning that Nina resists her mother’s infantilising influence by castrating 
herself, in order to finally actualise womanhood (i.e. the Black Swan). Ana 
España, in her ‘El Doble y el Espejo en Cisne Negro’, suggests as much when she 
argues that Nina’s scratching works as a form of relief from maternal influence, 
as well as an ‘onanistic substitute’.63 The crucial moment of auto-affection – as 
is the case of masturbation – has been productive ground for philosophical 
discussions, as can be attested by Derrida’s reading of Husserlian auto-
affection in the form of ‘the voice that keeps silent’. Nina’s relationship to 
herself in masturbation, however, cannot help but go through the moment of 
specularity/otherness (the distinction here being irrelevant): this is revealed 
not only in the fact that the scratch is only visible to herself in a mirror’s 
                                                                
63 Ana España, ‘El Doble y el Espejo en Cisne Negro’, Fotocinema: Revista Científica de Cine y 
Fotografía, 4 (2012), 120-139 (p. 130), my translation. 
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reflection (Fig. 15),64 but also in her explorations of sexuality, which are 
haunted by her doubles.65 
 
Fig. 15 Nina inspects the self-inflicted wound on her back with the help of a mirror. 
On the other hand, the scratch can also be rightly read as the vehicle for 
becoming-swan which, as we shall see, shuns the distinction between 
castration and phallus. This means that castration registers not as the wound, 
but as the attempts by both Nina and Erica at preventing further scratching. 
Nina’s nails emerge as a phallic power that threatens Erica’s influences, 
rendering their clipping, by both of them, as a sort of castration. Nina’s nail-
clipping is, in fact, interrupted by the ‘Black Swan’ as it takes control while Nina 
holds the scissors in front of the bathroom mirror. Shown in the reflection, her 
face becomes that which the viewer comes to associate with the ‘evil’ Swan, 
and she ends up cutting her own finger (Fig. 16). España frames this as the 
                                                                
64 Ibid., p. 131. 
65 Her attempt at ‘touching herself’ as instructed by Thomas happens in the presence of her 
(hallucinated?) sleeping mother, and her sexual experience with Lily is framed by the film as 
fantasy or, in other words, as auto-eroticism channelled through Otherness. 
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Black Swan’s attempt at ‘halting auto-castration – and thus allowing the 
growth of the scratch’.66 
 
Fig. 16 While clipping her nails, Nina looks in the mirror. Her characteristic “Black Swan” facial 
expression stares back at her, and she cuts her finger. 
It is in this light that it becomes crucial to inspect what consequences 
becoming-swan has for the reality of castration and for normative Oedipal 
sexuality. As it is, the scratching  wound is the ideal signifier for the duality of 
castration, but the entire project of symbolising such duality fails. The scratch 
plotline reaches its climax when Nina feels movement underneath it, sees (in 
the mirror) little black bristles pushing out, and finally fishes out a single black 
feather (Fig. 17). 
This scene foreshadows her becoming-animal, but also explains the 
presence of the scratch, as it is indeed irresistible to think its position signifies 
she will sprout wings out of her back, wings that have been silently working 
their way out of her body all along and causing the rash. One black feather, one 
scratching wound: the pillars of Freudian poetics. However, becoming-swan 
multiplies penises and vaginas, and extends to Nina’s whole body the reality of 
                                                                
66 España, ‘El Doble’, p. 132, my translation. 
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becoming: after this scene, corporal transformations include legs bent 
backwards like a bird’s, elongated neck, and interdigital webs. Crucially, during 
her bravura performance of the Black Swan in the opening night, after having 
been completely taken over by becoming-swan, her entire skin ripples with 
bumps and valleys, all castrated wounds from which phallic feathers emerge 
(see Fig. 18 and Fig. 19). 
 
Fig. 17 Nina extracts a black feather from under her skin. However, other feathers can be seen 
erupting around it. 
The multiplication of the unitary master concepts of psychoanalysis (phallus, 
vagina) is presented by Deleuze and Guattari as one of the main aspects of 
becoming-animal’s multiplicity, which they connect to the Wolf Man both in 
regard to the wolf dream and his other symptoms.67 Continuing on their 
discussion on the ‘field of vaginas’ of the sock, they write: 
Salvador Dali, in attempting to reproduce his delusions, may go on at 
length about THE rhinoceros horn; he has not for all that left neurotic 
discourse behind. But when he starts comparing goosebumps to a field 
of tiny rhinoceros horns, we get the feeling that […] we are now in the 
presence of madness. Is it still a question of comparison at all? It is, 
rather, a pure multiplicity that changes elements, or becomes. […] The 
                                                                
67 ‘The Wolf-Man’s pack of wolves also becomes a swarm of bees, and a field of anuses, and a 
collection of small holes and tiny ulcerations’ (Deleuze and Guattari, ‘Becoming-Animal’, p. 
249). 
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little bumps “become” horns, and the horns, little penises. No sooner 
does Freud discover the greatest art of the unconscious, this art of 
molecular multiplicities, than we find him tirelessly at work bringing 
back molar unities, reverting to his familiar themes of the father, the 
penis, the vagina, Castration with a capital C. […] We’re not far from 
wolves. For the Wolf-Man, in his second so-called psychotic episode, 
kept constant watch over the variations or changing path of the little 
holes or scars on the skin of his nose.68 
 
 
Fig. 18 Nina’s arms get covered by ‘goosebumps’. 
 
Fig. 19 Black down feathers sprout from the goosebumps. 
                                                                
68 Deleuze and Guattari, ‘One or Several’, p. 27-8, emphases in the original. 
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And the Wolf Man dreamed about ‘six or seven’ wolves, but, as we saw, 
they had ‘to be purged of their multiplicity’.69 Therefore, in Freud, ‘the little 
scars, the little holes, become subdivisions of the great scar or supreme hole 
named castration; the wolves become substitutes for a single Father.’70 I 
cannot stress enough that Nina’s multiplicity of phalluses is not merely an 
illustration of a philosophical concept by Deleuze and Guattari. As I have 
argued, Black Swan as a text concerns itself entirely with the mapping and 
manipulation of Nina’s body as the site of tension between different accounts 
of animality (how does the human ‘inhabit’ his or her animal body, and what can 
this animal mean?) and different sexual realities (how real and necessary is 
castration?). These sexual realities, moreover, could indeed be termed sextual 
possibilities, since it is in the wider drama of the castration complex – including 
the Imaginary order, the mirror stage as the promise of bodily plenitude, and, 
finally its relinquishment in the Name of Father and the Symbolic for the 
master signifier, the phallus – that linguistic meaning as commonly understood 
takes shape. Thus, the diffraction of arche-animality or becoming-animal 
across Nina’s body engages in a literality – actually rejecting Oedipal projects – 
that abandons the entire field of philosophical illustration.  
                                                                
69 Ibid., p. 28. 
70 Ibid., p. 31. 
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As with The Wolf Man, a bidirectional line of influence can be drawn for 
Black Swan (Fig. 20), where, besides the standard interpretation of swans as 
metaphors for sexual personae, the signifying power of the becoming-animal, 
indifferent to the distinction between phallus and castration, transcendanse and 
dancity, furnishes the meanings which are inscribed in the libretto of Swan Lake 
which, in turn, fuels the Oedipal drama. It should not be so shocking to suggest 
that a ‘fictional’ text such as Swan Lake should influence psychosexual 
development, if only one remembers that the Oedipus complex is itself based 
on a play. Beyond that, this schema helps uncover a certain fictionality of the 
standard Freudian psychosexuality. 
It is thus fitting that the climax of becoming-swan is precisely Nina’s 
dancing of the thirty-two fouettés during the opening night. After giving full 
reign to her becoming, all the excitations of her skin – the field of vaginas and 
penises – gradually sprout black feathers with each turn, until her arms have 
transformed into vast black wings (Fig. 21). 
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Fig. 20 Bidirectional line of textual influence in Black Swan. 
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Fig. 21 Nina’s arms fully transform into black wings. 
This fuller transformation lays bare the textual aporias scattered in the 
text: is Nina really gradually becoming a bird? Have all the other dancers 
actually acquired her face temporarily? Will the audience flee in riotous horror 
at the monstrosity taking shape on the stage? More than anything, it is the 
reaction of the audience which will determine the ‘meaning’ of becoming-swan, 
whether it will be collapsed into any of its possible significations or remain as 
pure potentiality of signification. In a sense, the reality of monstrous 
transformation – a horrified audience – would endorse dancity: the truth of 
animality is its body; meaningless material density constitutes reality; 
consciousness is an effect of matter. The other option, applause, confirms that 
Nina has been hallucinating all along, and sides with transcendanse: animals and 
their bodies (even the ones human inhabit) are only metaphors, instruments 
put to use by a psyche, either conscious or unconscious; there is no reality 
outside mental life. 
The audience applauds. Thomas has won. 
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There is a remainder, however: she stands with bare arms, as a 
completely unfeathered human, but her shadow still reveals her wingspan (Fig. 
22). With this image the film offers a glimpse of what it could look like if 
becoming-swan were not collapsed into Oedipal alternatives. A much braver 
film would end before the audience provides its answer. All Black Swan does is 
show us the tragic consequences of this answer. All that follows the climax of 
becoming-swan rehearses its reduction into normative Freudian sexuality. 
Becoming-swan can now mean nothing but the simply sexual Black Swan, who 
can vanquish the virginal White one and make it accept female castration and 
the male phallus as the price of entry into Symbolic normalcy. 
 
Fig. 22 A (slightly) more objective shot of the winged Nina shows that the feathers were not 
real, despite the fact that they are present in the shadows. Whether the wing shadows are 
diegetic is not clear. 
According to my argument in the previous chapter, the truth of 
animality – arche-animality – is outside language but also its more intimate 
condition. Therefore, it cannot be said to be reducible to linguistic meaning. 
Similar to Kristeva’s semiotic, it produces no specific signification, despite still 
‘having’ meaning. This springs from the difference, highlighted by Barthes, 
between signification and what he calls signifiance: the former ‘belongs to the 
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level of the product, of the statement, of communication’.71 Signifiance 
constitutes  
the signifying work, which belongs to the level of production, 
enunciation, symbolisation. […] [It] closely resembles the dream-work, 
such as Freud began to describe it. […] What ‘dream-work’ and ‘text-
work’ have in common […] is that they are a labour outside exchange, 
inaccessible to ‘calculation’.72 
Derrida, too, underscores the commonality between signifiance and 
Freudian dream-work. In ‘Freud and the Scene of Writing’, he writes: 
The absence of an exhaustive and absolutely infallible code [for dream 
symbols] means that in psychic writing, which thus prefigures the 
meaning of writing in general, the difference between signifier and 
signified is never radical. Unconscious experience […] does not borrow 
but produces its own signifiers; does not create them in their 
materiality, of course, but produces their status-as-meaningful 
(signifiance). Henceforth, they are not longer, properly speaking, 
signifiers.73 
As both Black Swan demonstrates in its working, and I demonstrate in 
my analysis of its ‘animality’, the animal can and indeed does break away from 
text. Not to affirm the primacy of non-textual matter, however, but to locate a 
site which comes in principle before this distinction, which makes it possible 
and that cannot, therefore, mean anything. 
                                                                
71 Roland Barthes, ‘Theory of the Text’, trans by Ian McLeod, in Untying the Text: A Post-
Structuralist Reader, ed. by Robert Young (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1981), pp. 31-47 (p. 
37). 
72 Ibid., p. 37-8, 40. 
73 Jacques Derrida, ‘Freud and the Scene of Writing’, in Writing and Difference, trans. by Alan 
Bass (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1978), pp. 196-231 (p. 209). Interpolation of 
the original French is the translator’s. 
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Chapter 4: The Apple in the Dark 
Introduction 
In his Sexuality and Being in the Poststructuralist Universe of Clarice Lispector: The 
Différance of Desire, Earl Fitz notes that Lispector’s ‘extensive use of animals has 
been widely commented on. […] Critics have long felt that, for Lispector, 
animals represented some form of “primitive,” prehuman (and therefore 
prelinguistic) existence against which […] women and men can orient and 
define themselves.’1 It is clear from his assertion that the critics mentioned 
work under the understanding that animals are indeed the material backdrop 
out of which linguistic humanity emerges, or at least that this is the 
philosophico-theoretical schema they can read in Lispector’s texts. To read 
animality in Lispector as bound up with language is not a controversial move, 
since the question of language – or poststructuralism, as per Fitz’s title – is 
considered to be the main concern for the author. It would logically follow that 
if a writer interested in language were to explore animality, taken to be a site of 
non-language, it would be as a way to discuss the nature of human 
linguisticism. More than that, Fitz argues that her entire oeuvre was devoted to 
the exploration of the poststructuralist insight into language, thus writing 
poststructuralism avant la lettre. For Fitz, Lispector’s texts are grounded in the 
poststructuralist belief that ‘[l]anguage, that most definitely human of our 
traits, structures our awareness of our existence at the same instant or 
                                                                
1 Earl E Fitz, Sexuality and Being in the Poststructuralist Universe of Clarice Lispector: The Différance 
of Desire (Austin: University of Texas Press, 2001), pp. 119, 120. 
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moment (these also being key Lispectorian motifs) that it “deconstructs” it’.2 
Her fiction is therefore a way of dramatizing philosophy so as to make it more 
accessible,  
humaniz[ing] the seemingly sterile and alien poststructural condition by 
making the reader feel the confusion, anger, fear, and frustration that 
arise from it and that, at its deepest level (the “primitivism” […] that 
permeates Lispector's work), define our condition as human beings, as 
the self-conscious language animal.3 
He connects this overarching Lispectorian project to her fourth and 
longest novel The Apple in the Dark (1961) by drawing attention to the 
theological overtones of the title:  
In Lispector's language-inscribed world, our quest to understand 
inevitably exist just one word, one meaning, one interpretation away. 
Brilliantly captured in the semiotic complexities of her “apple” (The 
Apple in the Dark), the biblical symbol of perfect decoding that lies 
forever just out of our reach, our struggle to understand inevitably takes 
place in “the dark,” just beyond our capacity to grasp what we desire to 
grasp and always one sign away.4 
Even if the symbolism of the Biblical apple as Fitz formulates it can 
readily be accepted, close attention to the textual semiotics of the novel show 
that the “darkness” that envelops it is far from being easily interpreted. It might 
surround the apple so as to keep it hidden from us, but it might, according to 
the novel, also mean that the apple can in fact be grasped, before or instead of 
being seen. Either lost in darkness or so at hand that it need not be lit, the 
apple’s relationship to light stands at the core of a flickering hesitation that 
structures the whole novel. Similarly to the hesitation between transcendanse 
and dancity in Black Swan, this undecidability reverts back to a prior, 
                                                                
2 Fitz, p. 13 
3 Ibid. 
4 Fitz, p. 9. 
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grammatological instability regarding the status of animality. Or rather, this 
hesitation inhabits the very direction of the question: is its truth to be found by 
reverting back or moving forward? Are animals the backdrop from which 
humanity emerges, or are they the first bodily supplement to metaphysico-
spiritual humanity? Who follows whom: do humans supplement animality, or 
does humanity supplement animals? I argue that, in The Apple in the Dark, 
Lispector works through these questions by revealing the extent to which it is 
animality itself – or, more precisely, the arche-animal – which performs the 
work of supplementarity that makes possible these articulations, in whichever 
direction they appear to advance. 
 
Escuridade 
In a novel with such a sparse plot, any summary will inevitably incur an 
interpretation. Rather than provide a synopsis myself, I shall initially discuss 
others’ description of the novel as indices of their own interpretation, against 
which I can situate my own. One of Lispector’s most famous readers, Hélène 
Cixous, states that ‘The Apple in the Dark is the lengthy story of a man who flees 
civilisation, thinking that he has murdered his wife, and of his encounter with 
two women on an isolated farm in the Brazilian countryside’.5 Her emphasis on 
the man’s encounter with the two women – as well as on the relatively minor 
plot point of his crime – is illuminated by her assertion that the novel ‘can be 
                                                                
5 Hélène Cixous, ‘The Apple in the Dark: The Temptation of Understanding’, in Reading with 
Clarice Lispector, ed. and trans. by Verena Andermatt Conley (Minneapolis: University of 
Minnesota Press, 1990), pp. 60-97 (p. 60). 
 
Escuridade | 199 
 
 
read around questions of sexual difference and of different libidinal 
economies’.6 While I do not dispute that, it is crucial to examine Cixous’s 
textual evidence regarding the novel’s engagement with sexual difference. As I 
hope to show, they are short-circuited by a hesitation that grounds them in 
sphere of ‘grammatological evolution’, as it were. That man – Martim – Cixous 
tells us,  
has left the conventional world of the known. As the reader is led to 
guess, he was able to accomplish this only through a gesture of rupture, 
in his case a crime. […] He had to accomplish a break in order to escape 
the ready-made, the world of likeness, that is to say, of death in life. [As 
in Kleist's On The Marionette Theater], after a passage to the infinite, 
after a fall and a return, there is a reconstruction, but outside the world 
of imitation and reproduction. Concretely, in the novel, Martim is 
apprehended by the police. This is but a metaphor. It illustrates the 
question Clarice [will ask] in The Passion According to G.H. [1964]: If I 
leave the world of the known in order to find the life of the unknown, 
what do I become? 7 
Others have similarly described the novel in the terms of a linguistic 
rupture. The English translator Gregory Rabassa believes that ‘the story begins 
with the impression that something new will come about, that there will be a 
rebirth. The early symbolism is both biblical and Darwinian.’8 For him, Martim’s 
rupture means that  
he has been expelled, in a sense, as if out of Eden, and he hopes for some 
kind of regeneration as he loses language, the gift that raised man above 
the beast. He wants language, but he also rejects the form in which he 
has known it. His struggle for language is one symbolic track of the 
futility of his rebirth and rebuilding as he goes back to what he had 
before.9 
                                                                
6 Ibid. 
7 Cixous, ‘The Temptation of Understanding’, pp. 61-2. 
8 Gregory Rabassa, ‘Introduction’, in Clarice Lispector, The Apple in the Dark, trans. by Gregory 
Rabassa (London: Virago, 1985), pp. ix-xvi (p. xiii). 
9 Rabassa, p. xiii-xiv. 
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Rabassa, like many others, also stresses the multi-layered character of 
the novel, composed as it is of stages which complement or overturn the 
other.10 Thus Martim is said to go ‘from rock to plants to vermin to cattle to 
children and finally to contact with other humans, whom he had abandoned 
before’, in a progression which Rabassa terms ‘the evolutionary scale’,11 
readable – as the beginning of the novel – both in biblical and in Darwinian 
terms.  
Kristin E. Pitt frames the novel initially as a post-criminal 
reconstruction: ‘Believing that he has indeed killed his wife, Martim suffers a 
profound existential crisis that drives him to flee society at the beginning of A 
maçã no escuro [The Apple in the Dark] and attempt to redefine himself 
throughout the course of the text.’12 However, she, too, stresses the 
importance of Martim’s linguistic quest: ‘The novel explores the bases and 
limitations of language, reason, and knowledge: the narrative is driven in large 
part by the constructive construction of “como se” [as if] that simultaneously 
suggests and undermines the possibility of comprehensible similarity.’13 For 
Pitt, the recurrent phrase ‘as if’ is crucial, as ‘in the end, The Apple in the Dark 
suggests that all Martim has done is to occasionally act as if it were possible to 
understand without categorizing, without appropriating, and without 
                                                                
10 For example, Mara Negrón-Marrero sections her book-long monograph Une genèse au 
‘féminin’: étude de ‘La pomme dans le noir’ de Clarice Lispector [A Genesis in the ‘Feminine’: A Study of 
Clarice Lispector’s ‘The Apple in the Dark’] (Amsterdam: Rodopi, 1997) according to Martim’s 
stages of ‘development’: ‘Cosmic Phase’, ‘Vegetal Phase’, ‘Animal Phase’, etc. 
11 Rabassa, p. xiv. 
12 Kristin E Pitt, ‘Discovery and Conquest Through a Poststructural and Postcolonial Lens: 
Clarice Lispector’s A maçã no escuro’, Luso-Brazilian Review, 50 (2013), 184-200 (p. 184). 
13 Pitt, p. 185. 
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devouring.’14 Negrón-Marrero defends that the novel ‘is a book of origins [livre 
d’origine]. It tells of the originary [originaire] crime of humanity’ – linking it 
inevitably to a quasi-mythical narrative as the one in Totem and Taboo.15 
Nancy Gray Diaz also calls attention to Martim’s attempt at 
engendering a new form of understanding and language, and she stresses the 
stages this process is made to go through:  
Martim’s quest is the attempt to establish, experientially and 
existentially, a new self. […] The process of re-establishing an identity 
functions as perception and cognition of otherness: first the rocks, then 
plants, then animals, then Ermelinda and Vitória, and finally the four men 
who come to arrest him. […] As Martim works the earth, he begins to feel 
a part of it. This stage of his renewal is dominated by physical labor, 
silence, the absence of thought. His encounter with the cows is the 
awakening of primitive communion of other sentient beings. He feels 
reduced, senses the cows sensing him, feels himself become a presence, 
become concretized. He gives himself over to ‘cow time’.16 
She, like many others, foregrounds the ubiquitous thematics of light and 
dark – present in the title, no less – as contributor to the poetics of 
progression: ‘In the darkness which precedes the birth of consciousness and 
conscience, a darkness rife with alterity and fear, the apple occurs as a vital, 
life-affirming symbol of materiality and knowledge.’17 Rabassa agrees with the 
importance of the title, stating that it ‘is a kind of symbol of all that goes to 
make up the final theme of the book, and what message we are left with, 
hopeless as it may be, is summed up in it.’18  
                                                                
14 Pitt, p. 198.  
15 Negrón-Marrero, p. 44, my translation, as are all further references to her study. Ironically 
for my animalistic focus, livre d’origine is also the French term for a breed registry, or a 
herdbook, or a specific animal’s pedigree. 
16 Nancy Gray Diaz, ‘A Maçã no Escuro’, in Clarice Lispector: A Bio-bibliography, ed. by Diane E 
Marting (Westport: Greenwood, 1993), pp. 93-97 (p. 94, my emphases). 
17 Diaz, p. 96. 
18 Rabassa, p. xv. 
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Rebecca Biron stresses that the evolutionary scale of Martim’s 
progression is treaded with a view towards linguistic renewal. For her, Martim  
wants to escape language altogether. […] The stages of Martim’s 
progressive identification with rocks, then rats, then cows, then the 
hilltop view of nature, all revolve around his desire to free himself from 
the constraints of the ‘language of other people’. […] Because he wants 
to make himself over ‘in his own image,’ this character rejects a system 
of communication that relies on imitation, repetition, and relation.19 
Martim’s apparent dislike of the world of imitation and repetition 
readily clashes with the chain of supplementation at work in the flux of his 
developmental stages, and in the progression/alternation of days and nights 
which is how the novel signifies this supplementation. Negrón-Marrero calls 
attention to the play of light and dark when she writes that ‘slowly, from day to 
night, from chapter to chapter, we discover the world in Martim’s company’, or 
when she refers to the ‘circular succession of days and nights’.20 
Since I share Rabassa’s opinion regarding the importance of the title, 
and in light of my focus on unstable dichotomies (tailed vs. tailless, dancity vs. 
transcendanse), I shall refer to the novel’s exploration of the play of light and 
dark as its escuridade. In this neologism, I combine the word escuro (‘dark’) from 
the title, with the noun claridade (‘clarity’), which is recurrent throughout the 
novel. It is interesting that escuro, like the English ‘dark’, is more often than not 
an adjective, which can function as a noun when preceded by an article: o 
escuro (‘the dark’). The noun proper, just as in ‘dark-ness’, would have a suffix 
attached – escur-idão. Thus, escurid-ade, despite gesturing towards ‘clarity’, 
                                                                
19 Rebecca E Biron, ‘Crime and Punishment Reconsidered: Clarice Lispector’s A maçã no escuro’, 
in Murder and Masculinity: Violent Fictions of 20th-century Latin America (Nashville: Vanderbilt 
University Press, 2000), p. 75. 
20 Negrón-Marrero, p. 51. 
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consists in fact of the ‘wrong’ suffix being attached to the noun/adjective 
escuro. This underscores, I hope, the fact that, in the play of light and dark 
throughout Martim’s journey, darkness is bound to ‘win’, since it not only 
appears as one of the elements of the dichotomy, but it also installs the very 
différance which structures the difference between light and darkness – that is, 
shades of light and dark are always already products of darkness. Also, I hope 
that it reveals the work of paleonymy involved in revealing the elements 
différants which structure the dichotomies they subsequently appear to take 
part in. If the difference between speech and writing is produced by an arche-
writing, if before the human/animal distinction lies an arche-animal, if 
becoming-swan furnishes the possibility of opposing dancity and transcendanse, 
then before there can be a play of escuro and claridade, there is an arche-
darkness – escuridade.  
Escuridade as the alternation of days and nights is in itself a figure of 
supplementation, but this alternation is tied up with a different – albeit related 
– instance of supplementation from the very start of the novel. The novel is 
divided into three parts: ‘How a Man Is Made’ (eleven chapters), ‘The Birth of 
the Hero’ (nine chapters), and ‘The Apple in the Dark’ (seven chapters). The 
very beginning of chapter one of part one describes the darkness of ‘a night as 
dark as night can get when a person sleeps’,21 which is then contrasted with a 
daytime image:  
                                                                
21 Clarice Lispector, The Apple in the Dark, trans. Gregory Rabassa (London: Virago, 1985), 1.i.3. 
All further references are to this edition and are given parenthetically in the text, containing an 
Arabic numeral representing one of the three parts, a Roman numeral for the chapter number, 
and a page number. Rabassa’s published translation, and his punctuation, have been most times 
silently modified in order to match the original more closely. 
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By day, however, the countryside was different, and the crickets, 
vibrating hollow and hard, left the entire expanse open, shadowless. […] 
[A]nd like a point designed upon the point itself, the voice of the cricket 
was the very body of the cricket, and it told nothing. (1.i.4) 
The last chapter of ‘How a Man Is Made’ presents a different image, 
which together with the cricket figure serves to frame the first part and 
establish precisely ‘how a man is made’. Martim is climbing a hill on horseback 
along with his boss, Vitória, the same hill he had also climbed when he had first 
arrived at her farm. Climbing the hill a second time, and on horseback, will 
finally mark his entrance into the ‘human’ stage of his reconstruction: 
As he faced the extension of enormous and empty land, with a 
suffocated effort Martim was painfully approaching—with the difficulty 
of someone who is never going to arrive—he was approaching 
something that a man on foot would humbly call the desire of a man, but 
which a man on horseback could not resist the temptation to call the 
mission of a man. And the birth of that strange eagerness was provoked, 
now as it had been when he first walked upon the slope, by the vision of 
an enormous world which seems to be asking a question. And which 
seemed to call [clamar] for a new god, who, understanding, would in that 
way complete [concluísse] the work of the other God. Confused there on 
a jumpy horse, jumpy himself, in just a second of looking Martim had 
emerged totally and as a man. (1.xi.116-7) 
Between the cricket’s voice and its body – but also between God and 
god – there is displayed a case of supplementary addition. They represent the 
two possible meanings of the supplement according to Derrida: an 
unnecessary addition to something whole, or an essential part that comes to 
complete something unfinished. The addition of voice to the cricket is wholly 
external and accidental, to the point that it changes nothing: it can neither 
improve nor undermine the wholeness of its body. On the other hand, Martim 
as a supplementary ‘god’ is the emissary whose task is to ‘complete [God’s] 
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work’. The work of God is incomplete without external help – which in the end 
is no longer external for becoming an essential part of the work. 
The trajectory of hominisation – of how a man is made – goes from a 
stage of non-supplementarity (of the supplement erased for being external) to 
a point of ‘essential’ supplementation. From the undifferentiated world of 
animality emerges the human who can, apparently, both be a supplement and 
also manipulate it. Martim as ‘god’ completes ‘God’, but he must also act in order 
to finish His work, so that the human is both the object and subject of 
supplementation. 
Hominisation is framed as the history of spacing. The daylit expanse 
opened by the vibrating cricket represents nevertheless the plenitude of self-
presence that neutralises all distance into accessible proximity. In contrast, the 
‘extension of enormous and empty land’ faced by Martim during his epiphany is 
irreducibly distant, despite his clear desire of conquering and understanding it. 
That is, Martim’s hominisation conforms to the traditional picture of the human 
as that which is an instance of the maximum distancing from the background of 
nature, but also that which is able to perceive that distance, only to then believe 
itself capable – because of this ability – of neutralising all this spacing by the 
power of logos. 
 
That dangerous supplement 
These paradoxes are famously explored by Derrida in Of Grammatology. He 
writes that, in Rousseau’s thought, 
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[t]he difference between the glance [used in gestural language] and the 
voice [needed for true, human language] is the difference between 
animality and humanity. Transgressing space, mastering the outside, 
placing souls in communication, voice transcends natural animality. That 
is to say a certain death signified by space. Exteriority is inanimate. The 
arts of space carry death within themselves and animality remains the 
inanimate face of life.22 
Here Derrida lays bare the contradiction ingrained in humanism’s view 
of animality: that which is life-infused and closest to nature, but also that which 
is most inanimate, embodying writing, technology, prosthetics – as death-   
giving ‘arts of space’ – by being embodiment itself.23 There is a radical 
difference, ‘at once interior and exterior’, that cleaves every possible meaning 
of life, nature, animality, or humanity. That will mean that ‘the animal who […] 
has no relationship to death is on the side of death’, whereas speech (or logos, 
reason, etc.) ‘is living speech even while it institutes a relation to death, etc’. 
Human speech ‘is more natural to man but more foreign to a nature which is in 
itself dead nature [still life]’.24 
                                                                
22 Jacques Derrida, Of Grammatology, Fortieth Anniversary Edition, trans. by Gayatri 
Chakravorty Spivak (Baltimore: John Hopkins University, 2016), p. 213, emphasis in the 
original. 
23 ‘Human nature’ is constructed as a stage between animality (inferior because ‘not yet’ 
human) and technology (decadent, and corruptive of the natural state). This human nature, 
despite characterised as natural, is considered to be thoroughly human, and is thus never 
confused with the natural world of animality. The latter, however, would seem to come ‘before’ 
the human, but the uncanny temporality of technology can shed light on the animal’s 
secondarity, for the animal is, despite this apparent primordiality, still a modification of 
originary human nature. Technics, in its turn, is promptly coded as a threat as it distances the 
human from its origin and essence. But this technical threat is always shaped like an animal 
haunting, an animalistic threat. This is due to the fact that technics emerge as supplements to 
the human body, or rather, as supplements alongside the body, taken to be the first human tool, 
the first technical supplement of human nature, of the human I, which, in fact, simply animates 
this body. Therefore, since the body represents the animality of the human, pre-human animal 
and post-human technics merge as the two sides of the same worldly supplementation to 
human essence. This essence is, in short, what all metaphysics and theologies of 
disembodiment attempt to liberate from the threat of animal technics, now understood as the 
same danger. Embodiment itself is the first dangerous insinuation of technics, bounding the 
human to the earth and the world. 
24 Ibid. 
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In other words, the cricket has no relationship to the supplement and 
cannot understand it by dint of being plunged in the expanse of nature. It 
nevertheless is still ‘on the side’ of the supplement, instituting death, spacing, 
exteriority, since it has not the interiority of the voice, which, as we saw, cannot 
be distinguished from its body. That is why, after the continuous 
supplementation of stages in an evolution of the supplement – in which the 
human world becomes more and more marked by supplementary relations – 
the human can ‘return to nature’ by neutralising the very spacing that marks 
that humanity. Speech, language, signification – the very things that, by 
supplementing reality and standing in for real things, take the human out of 
nature – dream of their own spiritual power of eliminating the very 
supplementary space between thing and sign which makes signification 
possible. The break from nature which both necessitates and engenders 
language is undone by the belief that (human) signification can make the leap 
back and close the distance between reality and sign. It is indeed the same 
issue, discussed above with regard to Totem and Taboo, of the murder of the 
father which will make possible and necessary the signification of this very 
murder. While discussing Rousseau’s writings on singing, Derrida formulates it 
thus: 
On several levels, nature is the ground, the inferior step: it must be 
crossed, exceeded, but also rejoined. We must return to it, but without 
annulling the difference. This difference should be almost nil; separating 
the imitation from what it imitates. Through the voice [vowel] one must 
transgress animal, savage, mute, infant or crying nature; by singing 
transgress or modify the voice. But the song must imitate cries and 
laments. This leads to a second polar determination of nature: it 
becomes the unity—as ideal limit—of the imitation and what is imitated. 
[…] If that unity were accomplished, imitation would become useless: 
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the unity of unity and difference would be lived in immediacy. Such, 
according to Rousseau, is the archeo-teleologic definition of nature.25 
This absolute unity, the complete annulation of space, would only revert 
to animal immediacy. Nature is thus that from which (archeo) and to which 
(teleo) the human supplementary march should advance. In this sense,  
[a]nimal language—and animality in general—represents here the still 
living myth of fixity, of symbolic incapacity, of nonsupplementarity. If we 
consider the concept of animality not in its content of understanding or 
misunderstanding [méconnaissance] but in the function reserved for it, 
we shall see that it must locate a moment of life which knows nothing 
whose appeareance and play we wish to describe here: symbol, 
substitution, lack and supplementary addition, etc. […] A life that has not 
yet broached [entamé] the play of supplementarity and which at the 
same time has not yet let itself be breached [laissée entamer] by it: a life 
without differance and without articulation.26 
And according to this logic,  
[m]an calls himself man only by drawing limits excluding his other from 
the play of supplementarity: the purity of nature, of animality, of the 
primitive, of childhood, of madness, of divinity. The approach to these 
limits is at once feared as a threat of death, and desired as access to a life 
without differance. […] All concepts determining a non-supplementarity 
[…] obviously have no truth-value.27 
Thus, reaching the stage of nonsupplementarity is both feared and 
desired, an ambiguity which is essential to Martim’s oscillations regarding his 
crime and his progress. His first thoughts regarding his criminal act come to 
him soon after he flees the hotel at night, during the clear day that follows in 
which he, clearly in his ‘stone stage’, has ‘his first clear thought since leaving the 
hotel’: ‘Today must be Sunday’, and ‘Sunday is a man’s first day’ (1.ii.18). With 
this Biblical conceptual background, Martim suddenly has an unexpected and 
                                                                
25 Ibid., p. 214, emphasis in the original. Interpolation is the translator’s. 
26 Ibid., p. 263, emphasis in the original, interpolations are mine. 
27 Ibid., pp. 266-7, emphasis in the original. 
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unfamiliar feeling. After puzzling it for a while, he concludes that ‘that thing 
was a man thinking… Then, with infinite displeasure, physically confused, he 
remembered in his body what a man thinking is like’ (1.ii.25). Martim instantly 
revolts against what he sees as ‘the insidious return of a vice’; his whole project 
– at least as he now sees it – was to leave humanity behind and thus never 
‘think’ again, to which he succumbs soon after his rebirth. Martim is clearly 
disappointed with the widespread functioning of the supplement: ‘thinking’, for 
him, is ineluctably tied to conceptual signification as grounded in signifying 
substitution – ‘[a] man thinking was that which, upon seeing something yellow, 
would say with dazzled effort: that thing which is not blue’ (ibid.). He attempts 
to fight it off, though, demonstrating Derrida’s argument that the supplement, 
while feared, is also employed as protection against itself or against the 
seductive danger of nonsupplementarity: 
Unprotected, he shifted about on the hot stone: he seemed to be 
searching for an argument that might protect him. He needed to defend 
what, with such enormous courage, he had conquered two weeks 
before. With such enormous courage, that man had finally stopped 
being intelligent. 
Or had he ever really been intelligent? […] 
“The fact is,” he then thought, using great care as he tried that 
defensive trick, “the fact is that I was only imitating intelligence just as I 
could swim like a fish without being one!”28 The man moved about 
contentedly: “I was imitating, of course!” […] The fact is, he concluded 
with great interest, he had only imitated intelligence, with that essential 
lack of respect which makes a person imitate. And along with him, 
millions of men were copying with great effort the idea of a man, next to 
thousands of women who were attentively copying the idea of a woman 
and thousands of people of good will were copying with superhuman 
effort their own face [cara] and the idea of existing; not to mention the 
anguished concentration with which acts of good or evil were imitated—
                                                                
28 Lispector uses dashes to introduce dialogue, as is usual in Portuguese. Internal thoughts are 
usually given inside double quotation marks. The English translation loses this distinction by 
employing quotation marks to frame spoken dialogue as well. 
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with a daily caution so as not to slip toward an act that is true, and 
therefore incomparable, and therefore inimitable, and therefore 
disconcerting. […] Discomfort is the only warning of the fact that we 
copy, and we listen to ourselves attentively under the sheets. But so 
distanced are we by imitation that what we hear comes to us as 
soundless as if it were a vision as invisible as if it lay in a darkness [trevas] 
which is so dense that hands are useless.29 Because one [a pessoa] would 
even imitate comprehension. Comprehension which had never been 
made but of the language of others and words. 
But there was still disobedience. 
Then—by means of the great leap of a crime—two weeks previously 
he had taken the risk of having no guarantee, and he had come to not 
comprehending. (1.ii.25-6) 
In the original, ‘the idea of a man’ is ‘a ideia que se fazia de um homem’,30 
the particle se making the verb impersonal (i.e. ‘the idea one had of a man, or 
‘the idea of man that people had’). While the verb ‘to have’ can also be used in 
the expression meaning ‘to have an idea (of something)’ – ter uma ideia – the 
same can be conveyed, as in the passage above, with the verb fazer, ‘to do, to 
make’. Thus, while ter uma ideia can mean both ‘to come up with an idea’ and ‘to 
have a concept (of something)’, fazer uma ideia has only the latter meaning. In 
the quotation above, the use of the verb fazer seems to emphasise a certain co-
construction of the meaning of ‘man’, ‘woman’, etc. 
                                                                
29 ‘Mas tão distanciados estamos pela imitação que aquilo que ouvimos nos vem tão sem som 
como se fosse uma visão que fosse tão invisível como se estivesse nas trevas que estas são tão 
compactas que mãos são inúteis.’ (Clarice Lispector, A maçã no escuro [Rio de Janeiro: Rocco, 
1999], i.2.34). Possibly the strangest sentence in the novel, mostly due to the nesting of 
relative clauses with the structure ‘so much that’, the repeated ‘as if’ pattern, and the merging 
of distance, sound, vision, and touch. A more literal translation would be ‘But so distanced are 
we by imitation that the thing we hear comes to us so soundless as if it were a vision that were 
so invisible as if it lay in the darkness which it is so dense that hands are useless.’ The last 
relative pronoun que (‘which’) is also confusing, since the clause that follows it is not a relative 
clause, but an independent one (it has estas as its subject). The pronoun links two independent 
clauses as if one were subordinate. Of course, the idea of a darkness so dense where not only 
vision but also touch is of no use is important for the image suggested by the title and the 
apple’s supposed accessibility, in the dark, by hand. 
30 Ibid. 
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Therefore, Martim produces a fully-fledged – if acutely traditional – 
theory of representation. For him, humans live out their lives according to the 
supplement, imitating and referencing what they believe is transcendental 
reality. They constantly refer to that which they purport to wish to reach, but 
Martim is aware that people know that the full presence of reality would be 
lethal, and must therefore be kept at bay by means of the supplement. For 
Derrida, 
[a] terrifying menace, the supplement is also the first and most secure 
protection; against that very menace. This is why it cannot be given up. 
[…] The supplement has not only the power of procuring an absent 
presence through its image; procuring it for us through the proxy 
[procuration] of the sign, it holds it at a distance and masters it. For this 
presence is at the same time desired and feared. The supplement 
transgresses and at the same time respects the interdict. […] Enjoyment 
[jouissance] itself, without symbol or suppletory, that which would accord 
us (to) [nous accorderait (à)] pure presence itself, if such a thing were 
possible, would be only another name for death.31 
The ‘interdict’ both respected and breached by the supplement – in this 
case, against access to the ‘real thing’ – resurfaces later in the novel as what 
Martim calls ‘the Prohibition’ and can easily be read both in Totem and Taboo 
and in the Biblical Genesis. Totemism is through and through a system of 
supplementation of the father’s absence which both respects the interdict 
(‘thou shalt not overthrow the father’, ‘thou shalt not kill nor eat the father or 
totem animal’) and transgresses it (‘replace the father with a signifying animal’, 
‘kill and eat it in rituals’). Similarly, the Biblical Father-God presents Adam with 
an interdict, a foreclosed possibility: ‘thou shalt not eat the apple’. If the 
Forbidden Fruit was in fact capable of granting godly Knowledge to 
                                                                
31 Derrida, Of Grammatology, p. 168, last interpolation is mine. 
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humankind, transgressing the interdict equates to overthrowing the father, 
committing the primal crime. Adam, like Martim, feels that the human language 
that he was given falls short of grasping reality. After all, God can actively 
shape reality with His language alone. Desire for the apple thus registers as the 
wish for a ‘better’ language, devoid of the differential gap that cleaves the 
human subject and installs lack. 
In this sense, Martim’s identity as ‘god’ cannot be read only as the 
positive supplement that completes God’s work. If his mission and desire of 
‘completing God’s work’ may stand for the obedient side of the supplementary 
sign-function that respects the interdict, he also transgresses it by offering up 
the difference that interrupts the uniqueness of capital-G-God, so as to 
inaugurate the plurality of gods-in-lower-case. The graphemic distinction 
between God and god represents the scriptural arche-difference (of the ‘arts of 
space’) that inaugurates differentiation in the heart of the self-present 
plenitude of the (divine) voice. The Edenic tale serves as a prologue that 
justifies the human condition as it is experienced by Fallen Man: exposition to 
supplementarity and mortality. The nudity revealed in the Fall underscores 
more than anything else the human need of supplementation (in this case, 
clothing). The double functioning of the supplement – obedience and 
transgression – figures as cognate to the ‘double nature’ of humanity: the 
human is materialised in an animal body but is also endowed with divine 
patronage and gifts (having been made in His image, having a soul, speaking, 
etc.). In truth, the human’s animal embodiment, seen in the light of the 
supplement’s mythology, is none other than the threat, posed by the signifier, 
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of opening distance from the origin – or posed by writing itself as the ultimate 
signifier. On the other hand, humanity’s spiritual ascendancy reveals the 
obedient side of the sign, the one which dreams of the sign’s effacement so as 
to let truth shine in full presence. And as can readily be seen in the 
philosophical tradition – for example in Rousseau, Saussure, or Husserl – the 
obedient type of sign is more often than not associated with speech, whose 
medium (air) appears to readily erase its own materiality. In more than one 
sense, then, the difference between God and god is a zoogrammatological one, 
or, one could also say, a product of the arche-animal. 
 
Neoteny, or the internal cleavage of Nature 
Thus, I propose that the novel’s poetics of light and dark as the key in which the 
logic of the supplement – as escuridade – is inscribed. This logic, and the 
enchainment of supplements, will be understood both as an obstacle in 
Martim’s quest for a non-supplementary language, and as crucial to reading the 
novel’s arche-animality as it is intimately connected to this play. After the deep 
darkness with which the novel opens, variations of light are used throughout 
the text as a way of charting Martim’s relationship to the stages he is going 
through and the level of mediation he experiences. Escuridade encodes the 
supplementary articulation between elements – such as original and copy, or 
thing and word – and between stages in a progressive line. Usually, light 
represents the immediate world of accessible things and transparent truth – a 
form of transcendence. Darkness, on the other hand, usually means the 
textural density of a world with intervals and gaps. Escuridade, therefore, 
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signifies both the difference between proximity and distance, and the 
distinction between free-flowing and intermittent. This is animalised in several 
moments in which the extension and openness of light is contrasted to animals’ 
supposed independence from light for knowing their environment. Vitória 
qualifies ‘animals’ as ‘the animals out of which the dark is made’ (3.iii.245). In a 
crucial passage, Martim observes: 
The maximum clarity had given in to our inhabited darkness: was that 
perhaps what Martim waited for each day as he stood there? As if with 
that submission [vergar-se] of the clarity he had been shown just how the 
harmonious union is made – not intelligible but harmonious, not with 
any finality but harmonious – as if in that submission of the clarity 
before the darkness there had finally come about the union of the 
plants, of the cows, and of the man that he had begun to be. Each time 
that day turned into night, the man’s dominion would become renewed, 
and a step forward would be taken, blindly, in the end blindly, as is the 
advance of a person in wishing [no querer]. (2.i.130) 
Clarity submits (verga-se, literally ‘bends itself’) to darkness, and that is 
the only way through which a union can be made between stages in his 
development. Only by accepting the interruption by night-time darkness can 
clarity move forward and bind together – by illuminating – the coming stages in 
this human evolution. By means of the cyclical, pendular movement between 
day and night, Martim can move forward; each alternation signifying one step 
ahead. Darkness thus articulates: it is that which both separates elements in 
their differentiating specificities but also keeps them together. In The Apple in 
the Dark, the emergence of the human – understood as a journey from out of 
nature and through animality – is encoded by escuridade as a supplementary 
force that can articulate and unite, while also separating and keeping things 
apart. As expected, humanity’s self-image is again grounded in a paradox: the 
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human is expected to be that which instrumentalises darkness so as to leave 
the dark behind, only to then illuminate everything in its wake.32 
Thus, the issue of writing in The Apple in the Dark is not only relevant as a 
result of my theses on the resemblances between arche-writing and arche-
animality: it also proves crucial to read the movement from nature to culture 
(‘the harmonious union’) as made possible by a certain scriptural 
supplementation (‘that submission of the clarity before the darkness’). After all, 
in ‘“…That Dangerous Supplement…”’, Derrida analyses Rousseau’s opinions 
about writing and speech so as to reveal that they also refer to opinions about 
the relation between culture and nature. Similar to the way metaphysical 
thought requires us to leave nature to return to it, writing will be both 
demonised and praised by Rousseau: ‘Rousseau condemns writing as 
destruction of presence and as disease of speech. He rehabilitates it to the 
extent that it promises the reappropriation of that of which speech allowed 
itself to be dispossessed.’33 So the positive, obedient sense of writing (or the 
supplement) is brought forward when Rousseau writes of Nature as it should 
have been, ‘to the extent that it should be self-sufficient’. Nature’s 
supplements, ‘art, technè, image, representation, convention, etc.’, are thought 
to cumulate and accumulate it.34 Their description as mere supplements (the 
surplus, the extra, the unessential, the spare) constitutes the meaning of Nature 
                                                                
32 The human claims to be able, unlike the animal, to read its own origins under the clear light of 
reason. Its future, however, while thought to be illuminated at least to a certain extent by the 
backward-looking light, has to be approached ‘blindly’. This experience of blindness, too, 
justifies the ultimate objective of universal illumination, in the name of which darkness is 
employed. 
33 Derrida, Of Grammatology, p. 154, emphasis mine. 
34 Ibid., p. 157. 
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as self-sufficient. Thus, Nature suffices, which means that it is irreplaceable: its 
substitutes will always fall short.  
This internal cleavage of Nature (as that which must be abandoned and 
improved only to be rejoined) will be most productive in Rousseau’s 
discussions of education, the ‘keystone’ of his thought. Childhood and 
education lay bare the intricacies of the supplement, and, not coincidentally, 
also underscore the meaning of animality as a supplementary concept when 
viewed in conjunction with ‘human nature’. The paradox of the supplement is 
revealed by the fact that education is good and necessary to the extent that it is 
‘destined to reconstitute Nature’s edifice in the most natural way possible’.35 It 
must, as a cultural artefact, be added to Nature, but only to fulfil and realise the 
latter’s perfection. Culture must supplement what ‘cannot by definition be 
anything but an accident and a deviation from nature’.36 
The Apple in the Dark exposes the anxieties that surround childhood 
purity for their reliance on a certain incompleteness of the human child, the 
default of human Nature which calls for supplementation in a way the animal 
does not. In fact, it has been widely noted that not even the young of non-
human animals face the need of being supplemented, so that animals seem to 
not only be perfect, but also be born perfect.  
This human-animal difference with respect to the need of 
supplementation has been noted at least as early as Plato. In the Protagoras, he 
                                                                
35 Ibid., p. 158. 
36 Ibid., emphasis mine. 
 
Neoteny, or the internal cleavage of Nature | 217 
 
 
recounts the myth of creation according to which the gods fashioned men and 
animals out of elements and then ‘they ordered Prometheus and Epimetheus 
to equip them, and to distribute to them severally their proper qualities’.37 The 
two brothers’ names mean, respectively, foresight and hindsight, which is 
revealed to be meaningful by the end of the tale.  
Epimetheus said to Prometheus: “Let me distribute, and do you inspect.” 
This was agreed, and Epimetheus made the distribution. […] Thus did he 
compensate [the mortal creatures] with the view of preventing any race 
from becoming extinct. […] Thus [distributed] Epimetheus, who, not 
being very wise, forgot that he had distributed among the brute animals 
all the qualities which he had to give, and when he came to man, who 
was still unprovided, he was terribly perplexed.38 
Epimetheus, as his name lays bare, was unable to work with foresight 
and so did not plan ahead of distributing nature’s gifts that would compensate 
the creatures for their nakedness. His brother comes to inspect and realises 
that humans were left with no qualities, and attempts to come up with a 
solution: 
Prometheus came to inspect the distribution, and he found that the 
other animals were suitably furnished, but that man alone was naked 
and shoeless, and had neither bed nor arms of defence. The appointed 
hour was approaching when man in his turn was to go forth into the light 
of day; and Prometheus, not knowing how he could devise his salvation, 
stole the mechanical arts of Hephaestus and Athene, and fire with them 
(they could neither have been acquired nor used without fire), and gave 
them to man.39 
Thus, animal characteristics are furnished by Nature (here the stock of 
gifts Epimetheus has to distribute). Animals are indeed compensated for an 
otherwise thankless and arduous existence, but such compensation derives 
                                                                
37 Plato, Protagoras, in Plato in Twelve Volumes, Vol. 3, trans. by W.R.M. Lamb (Cambridge: 
Harvard University Press, 1967), 320d. 
38 Ibid., 320d-321c, emphasis mine. 
39 Ibid., 321c-321d. 
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from Nature. Humans are compensated in relation to animals, they are 
supplemented so as to measure up to animals. The arts, technics, technology, 
culture, etc. that Prometheus steals for humanity are a supplement to correct a 
fault or lack which is only revealed as such in comparison to animals. And this 
compensatory supplement does not stem from Nature, whose work and stock 
had come to an end at that point, but from the gods themselves. Despite the 
gods, since they are robbed of such gifts, and so cannot be held responsible for 
human difference from animals or for their ‘having a share of the divine 
attributes’.40  
Humans in control of fire are a match for animals and can therefore 
survive. They managed to create ‘articulate speech and names; and [they] also 
constructed houses and clothes and shoes and beds, and drew sustenance from 
the earth’.41 But they are not above animals yet, they do not live in the polis, 
since ‘mankind at first lived dispersed, and there were no cities’,42 despite the 
divine means by which they face up to the animal world. In an attempt to stave 
off animal threat, humans gather in cities for protection, but cannot co-exist 
peacefully as they are bereft of political abilities.43 Zeus finally grants humanity 
political wisdom so that humans shall not destroy each other while attempting 
to live side by side in cities.44 But cities were themselves founded as a 
protection against animals, highlighting the supplementary aspect of what is 
                                                                
40 Ibid., 322a. But, most importantly, man’s gifts originate from lesser gods, and not from Zeus 
himself. It is stressed in the tale that Prometheus did not succeed in entering Zeus’s citadel, 
from where he could gather ‘political wisdom’ for humans (Ibid., 321d). 
41 Ibid., 322a. 
42 Ibid. 
43 Ibid., 322b. 
44 Ibid., 322c. 
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proper to humanity. Political existence is thus a compensatory supplement for 
a certain immaturity of the human. That man had to come forth into light as yet 
incomplete contrasts with the mature state of other animals who came into 
existence perfect and finished. Childhood can therefore be seen as a state 
which, while transient, reveals the essence of humanity as always yet 
unfinished. The technical term for this retention of juvenile traits into 
adulthood is neoteny.45 
A famous discussion of the biological concept of neoteny is Ontogeny 
and Phylogeny (1977) by biologist and palaeontologist Stephen Jay Gould, who 
defines neoteny as ‘the retardation of somatic development for selected 
organs and parts’.46 Two of his chapters focus on neoteny since that is a crucial 
aspect of his main topic, recapitulation, a popular nineteenth-century biological 
concept that Gould tells us influenced most areas of thought, including 
Freudian psychoanalysis.47 This influence would explain why, in Totem and 
Taboo, Freud attempts to explain the reality of the Oedipus complex as a 
recapitulation, in ontogenetic (personal) psychosexual development, of a stage 
undergone in the phylogenetic development of the human species (the primal 
crime). In biology, recapitulation refers to the notion that stages in one 
person’s development (be it embryonic, physiological, or intellectual) retrace 
the steps previously undertaken in a macro level by the whole of humanity. It 
results from the comparison ‘between stages of ontogeny and a sequence of 
                                                                
45 ‘neoteny, n.’, OED Online (Oxford University Press, 2015), accessed 23 January 2016. 
46 Stephen Jay Gould, Ontogeny and Phylogeny (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1977), p. 
9. 
47 Ibid., pp. 155-163. 
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adult organisms’.48 Neoteny emerges as a strange temporality within 
recapitulation since it describes the fact that what would be, in one’s ancestors, 
a transient stage before maturation actually becomes one’s permanent state 
achieved after sexual maturity. Humans are highly neotenic due to the ‘striking 
resemblances between juvenile pongids [great apes] and adult humans’ and the 
subsequent ‘obliteration of this similarity during pongid ontogeny’ (the ape’s 
aging process which, among other modifications, enlarges its jaw beyond 
human likeness).49 
Human personal development – that is, ontogeny – recapitulates the 
history of hominid species, but only up to a certain point. Our juvenile 
characteristics (large rounded skulls, small jaws, big eyes, hairlessness, etc.), 
which we share with the young of our hominid ancestors, are retained into 
adulthood, so that the recapitulatory clock appears to be detained. We are 
born incomplete and remain so, a fact that is represented both in the sudden 
discovery of nudity in Genesis and in Epimetheus’ realisation that no other gifts 
are left for humans. The state of infancy that so puzzled Rousseau is, in fact, a 
proper of the human, and but the other side of political existence. Because we 
are (for all our lives) imperfect animals by nature, we need supplementary 
education, politics, and culture.  
Ironically, human imperfection and lack when compared to animals still 
result in anthropocentrism insofar as what is remarkable about the human – 
language, thought, culture, etc. – is precisely grounded on such a lack. Derrida 
                                                                
48 Ibid., p. 13. 
49 Ibid., p. 353. 
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concludes as such when he comments on Lacan’s views on the difference 
between humans and animals, as quoted in chapter 3 of this thesis. The 
(human) Symbolic order is more developed than the Imaginary in which 
animals are trapped, but the former can only come to be when the human 
subject is subject(ed) of(to) the signifier. This subjection is a result of this 
originary lack constituted both by human neoteny and the castration complex, 
so that they are two aspects of the same defect.50 For Lacan, because animals 
are not born essentially lacking, their subjectivity is not constructed around an 
emptiness that would otherwise throw them against the Symbolic order. Their 
perfection is their downfall, so to speak, since human symbolicity justifies ‘the 
superiority of man over beast’.51 
 
The double nature of Nature 
It is clearer now, after this discussion of the meaning of human neoteny, why 
Derrida would say that ‘[w]ithout childhood, no supplement would ever appear 
in Nature. Now the supplement is here both humanity’s good fortune and the 
origin of its perversion.’52 The child is the site where the border between the 
human and the animal is erected, to the extent that all discourses of neoteny 
are, to a certain extent, theses on species difference, on the human/animal 
dichotomy, and on the passage from Nature to culture.  
                                                                
50 Jacques Derrida, The Beast and the Sovereign, Volume I, trans. by Geoffrey Bennington 
(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2009), p. 125. 
51 Ibid. 
52 Derrida, Of Grammatology, p. 160. 
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Childhood first tempts the human with the supplement when the child 
learns to act by proxy, ‘through the hands of others, […] mov[ing] the world by 
simply moving the tongue’,53 getting others to do, via language, what the child 
is too lazy to do him- or herself. Here the scandal of infantile laziness lies with 
the corruption brought about by the linguistic sign, insofar as ‘supplementation 
always has the form of the sign. The sign, the image, or the representer, 
become forces and make “the universe move.” Such is the scandal’.54 For 
Rousseau, this scandal can become truly catastrophic when one realises that 
the best cure for such childish imperiousness may have to be, not another 
social intervention, but to leave the child to his or her own ‘illness’ so as to be 
‘naturally’ ‘cured’. The catastrophe resides in the fact that Nature here is not 
loved for itself, but is being instrumentalised as a remedy, as a supplement to 
corrupted culture. This is particularly striking if we read Martim’s ‘criminal 
project’ as a typically modern-day attempt at an ‘alternative therapy’ in which 
Nature is brought as a supplement to diseased culture. Exhausted by the hall of 
mirrors of human societal imitation, Martim may have chosen to radically 
‘disconnect’ and go ‘off the grid’ by means of a criminal act that would have 
others disconnect him from society themselves.55 
                                                                
53 Rousseau, cited in Derrida, Of Grammatology, p. 160. 
54 Derrida, Of Grammatology, p. 160. 
55 In Human Error: Species-Being and Media Machines, Dominic Pettman analyses the desire for 
‘connection with nature’ in contemporary discourse as actually a sort of un-plugging. Discussing 
zoophiles’ accounts of their own activities, Pettman emphasises the use of the word 
disconnected. For him, zoophiliac desire for a connection to animals and nature is configured as 
an act of disconnection, since, ‘in contrast to the alienation of modern life […], postmodern 
people today are all too connected to each other. Communication is felt to be constant and 
instantaneous, allowing little room to perform the daily ablutions of self-reinforcement. This 
creates a kind of meta-alienation. […] In a world of ubiquitous media, the urge to unplug is 
strong (as both MTV and The Matrix showed in the 1990s). Disconnecting from the grid thus 
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The recourse to Nature as a remedy against corrupted culture is further 
explored by Rousseau – and discussed by Derrida – in the form of time spent 
among plants as substitution for poor or rare human interaction. His focus on 
plants will lead him to juxtapose them to the riches found underground, in 
mines. Derrida’s deconstruction of Rousseau’s logic is not only an illuminating 
instance of paleonymy but also relevant to the thematics of darkness in 
Lispector’s novel. 
Thus, for Rousseau, one ‘digs in the entrails’56 of Mother Earth’s 
womb/breast searching for richness to supplement ‘the true wealth which is 
more within [one’s] grasp’57 – plants – according to one’s level of corruption. 
The darkness of mines institutes the blindness to the ‘real’ goods that Nature 
offers when one pursues ‘imaginary’ ones buried deep ‘at the risk of [one’s] life 
and the expense of [one’s] health’.58 Derrida makes it explicit that metallurgy, 
agriculture, and society are, for Rousseau, entangled in one another at the very 
moment when the human passes from Nature to culture. This ‘mine-blindness’ 
thus produces that which emerges with society: language, substitution, and the 
supplementarity of signs. But this blindness also assures that one is blind to the 
                                                                
becomes a powerful gesture, albeit a temporary one. And in this extreme, particular case 
[zoophilia], it speaks of the desire to turn away from the human-machine interface and reorient 
the self toward the neglected third term of cybernetic triangle: the animal’ ([Minneapolis: 
University of Minnesota Press, 2001], p. 82). Martim can hardly be described a postmodern 
alienated subject, but his protests against the vacuity of language register a similar alienation 
before a proliferation of signs. For the communication which is felt to be constant in the 
postmodern condition is lamented precisely because it is felt not to be real communication – 
only ever empty signs constantly doing the loops of optic cable without carrying any meaning. 
Similarly, Martim’s flashbacks show his discontent with what he perceives as the technology of 
language alienating humans from ‘real’ experiences. 
56 Derrida, Of Grammatology, p. 161. 
57 Rousseau, cited in Derrida, Of Grammatology, p. 161. 
58 Rousseau, cited in Derrida, Of Grammatology, p. 161. 
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very work and law of the supplement. ‘Mine-blindness’, as the blindness 
instituted by cultural corruption, is both ‘the dark’ that prevents Martim as the 
generic human from being able to see the plenitude of Natural truth, and ‘the 
dark’ that mystifies and mythologises the Apple by hiding the functioning of the 
supplement. 
The ‘dangerous supplement’ in Rousseau – not surprisingly, as Derrida 
shows – refers also to the auto-eroticism of masturbation. Because the 
masturbator compensates for the absence of actual objects of desire with his 
imagination (and here it is indeed a concern for boys), masturbation is a 
supplement to actual erotic attachment. And this supplementation is described 
in the same language as the dangers of mine-blindness: ‘that dangerous 
supplement that cheats nature and saves up for young men of my temperment 
many forms of disorders at the expense of their health, of their vigor, and 
sometimes, their life.’59 
Crucially, Rousseau differentiates between the loss of innocence 
brought about by masturbation, and the actual loss of virginity which would be 
inscribed in the body by the act of sexual attachment. He acknowledges he is 
no longer a virgin, since he has been spiritually deflowered by himself in 
masturbation, but corporeally he still recognises his pucelage – his ‘anatomical’ 
virginity.60 For Derrida, the difference between the two kinds of virginity 
                                                                
59 Rousseau, cited in Derrida, Of Grammatology, p. 164. 
60 As Spivak reminds us in her translator’s note, ‘“pucelage” is the more earthy French word for 
the actual physical fact of sexual intactness, in the female the membrane itself’ (Derrida, Of 
Grammatology, p. 163). It is interesting that masturbation is discussed solely as a concern for 
males – surrounded as it is by the threat of castration and the ‘loss of the vital substance’ – 
whereas even male virginity is thought in female terms. Foreshadowing the parallels between 
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(which is, in fact, a difference between spiritual and bodily inscriptions) 
represents ‘the irruption of the dangerous supplement in nature, between nature 
and nature, between natural innocence as virginity and natural innocence as 
hymen-intactness [pucelage]’.61 The supplement – here masturbation – irrupts 
within Nature itself to cleave it in two, shattering its self-identity. In a sense, the 
supplement inaugurates a certain articulation within that which it supplements, 
so that difference is installed not simply outside but also within the 
supplemented. Significantly, this hinge inside (human) Nature is located 
between two natures – two realms taken to be natural – which are always in 
tension: spiritual nature and animal nature. The truth of internal articulation 
highlights precisely the unstable characterisation of the human as that which 
must have a ‘stratum’ (the animal) to which something else is added (the spirit, 
language, etc.), without for all that accepting that either of them is the artificial 
supplement of the other. This tension structures most of the thematics of the The 
Apple in the Dark. Martim is unsure whether he ‘has gone back in time’ in order 
to find the ground of spiritual nature or animal nature. If the former, his quest 
would comprise the attempt of securing this spiritual nature against the 
corruption brought about by (animal) embodiment and the technical 
secondarity of language. If the latter, he would then be trying to find protection 
in animalistic human origins so as to stave off the fogging of ‘reality’ by 
                                                                
masturbation and writing, one could say that Rousseau multiplies scriptural meanings by 
simultaneously discussing masturbation and virginity: if masturbation configures the body as 
the masculine source of inscripting substances, virginity as pucelage entertains the notion of 
the (male) body as the feminine surface of inscription on which sexual experience can be 
marked. 
61 Derrida, Of Grammatology, p. 163, first emphasis mine. 
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linguistic conceptuality. Interestingly, in both cases language is the enemy, 
whether due to its opaque materiality or its abstract ideality.62 
That Nature can be cleaved internally by the supplement (added from 
the outside, so to speak) will mean that the dialectics between essential and 
accidental needs to be understood outside the logic of metaphysics. The most 
extraneous detail can generate essential consequences at the core of being, 
whose essence becomes divided and non-identical to itself, to the point that 
the origin of being is not an origin at all. In Derrida, Nature is thus always 
already broken down into two natures, the articulation of which will figure as 
the ‘true’ origin of all that is engendered by or added to Nature – the 
paleonymy here exposing the scandalous logic of difference as originary to 
presence. I argue that this paleonymy is woven throughout The Apple in the 
Dark in the form of escuridade. The extent to which Lispector presents this 
paleonym as function of arche-animality will be crucial to my argument 
regarding the zoogrammatologics of the novel.  
 
The cow of all cows 
As mentioned above, Martim’s journey is caught up with the question of 
otherness. Initially, alterity is shunned in the same gesture with which he 
rejects common language, which he terms ‘the language of others’. Later on in 
his progress, however, Martim realises that, in order to fully accede to 
humanity, he must create otherness. Since he experiences his stages as 
                                                                
62 These two possibilities are discussed in more detail in the next chapter in relation to poetic 
language. 
The cow of all cows | 227 
 
 
moments of creation – thus engendering new beings and new realities in a new 
world, like a poststructuralist Adam creating beings with a faltering language – 
he concludes he must create (i.e. give birth) to other humans so that he can be 
fully human. Not only that, however, but he comes to believe that his 
anthropogenic project is so heroic that all his discoveries and epiphanies 
should and will become the saving truth for the grateful throng of other 
humans, those who have not created their own language or made themselves 
in their own image.63 Thus: 
What a strange thing. Up to now I seemed to be wanting to reach with 
the tip of my finger the very tip of my finger – it's true that with that 
extreme effort I grew; but the tip of my finger remained unreachable. I 
went as far as I could. But why didn't I understand that the thing that I 
could not reach in me was already other people [os outros]? Other 
people, who are our deepest plunge! We who are you as you yourselves 
are not you. In that way, concentrating very hard on the birth [parto] of 
others, in a task that only he could carry out, Martim was there trying to 
be one with [fazer corpo com]64 those who will be born. (3.vii.335-6) 
In the original, ‘we who are you as you yourselves are not you’ is ‘nós 
que vos somos como vós mesmos não vos sois’.65 This sentence is syntactically 
innovative since it treats the verb ser (‘to be’) as a transitive verb with an object 
pronoun as direct object. While ser can be used transitively, it normally takes a 
personal pronoun as object (e.g. ‘I am she’), and not an object pronoun (e.g. ‘I am 
                                                                
63 If his deeds shall become guidance for the others to come – as some sort of postmodern 
Gospel – the recurrent words for Martim-as-Reborn-Messiah are ‘giant’ and ‘hero’. If the 
passage when Martim considers writing a book about himself were not so suffused with 
bathos, it is fair to say it could be called, not The Birth of the Hero, but The Gospel of the Giant 
According to Himself. 
64 ‘Fazer corpo com’, literally ‘make body with’, is cognate with the French ‘faire corps avec’ – 
much more common in French than its Portuguese counterpart is in Portuguese – which means 
‘to be united so as to make one thing only’, ‘to be one with’, ‘to sync with’, ‘to be joined to’, ‘to 
form one body with’, ‘to fuse with’, ‘to connect to’. 
65 Lispector, A maçã no escuro, 3.vii.310-1. 
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her’). Thus, vos somos instead of somos vós suggests the intriguing notion of 
being as something that not only one can be, but also as something that can 
happen to one. 
Cixous reads this passage as a ‘scene […] of masculine birth’, where ‘the 
metaphor and the bodily labor’ of giving birth ‘cannot not be borrowed from 
the real other, here the woman’.66 However, the entire passage is also readily 
connected to escuridade since it consists of Martim’s reflections on lighting a 
bonfire; his ultimate direct manipulation of light, after chapters fascinated by 
it, intoxicates him. In one of the few long dialogue passages of the novel, which 
many critics consider to be its climax, Vitória monologues about her life and 
her secrets. She tells of the only time she loved, which was when admiring a 
young man lighting a bonfire. A few days later, she asks Martim to light one 
while she observes. Interpelated by her into the bonfire-lighting young man’s 
position, Martim feels both uncomfortable and victorious. Light extinguishes 
all doubt and all distances, and Martim has created it himself, as a man – a 
proper, heroic one – should:  
Dealing with the fire had been the work of a man, and he was proud and 
calm. […] And the promise that was made to us—the promise was there. 
He could feel it there—it was only a matter of extending his hand that 
had finally been burned in the exercise of his function as a man. 
(3.vi.316) 
This is part of a clear sequence of events that transpire in the third and 
last part of the novel, which shares the latter’s title. Chapter 3 could also be 
considered the climax of the novel, when a torrential rain interrupts the 
                                                                
66 Cixous, ‘The Temptation of Understanding’, p. 61. 
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suspenseful drought that had plagued the farm during the two previous parts, 
releasing tension for all three main characters. Chapter 4 is dedicated to 
Vitória’s long, winding monologue to Martim while he cuts down an old apple 
tree under her orders. He finds her so pathetic that he doubts she could pose 
the threat of turning him in. Chapter 5 is only a few pages long, and paints a 
picture of calm now that all three characters have found some sort of closure. 
Surprisingly, Martim feels strangely victorious despite his terrifying conclusion 
in the woods that he had failed. His embrace of the light of victory stands in 
contrast to how deeply and irreversibly marked his character had appeared to 
be by the darkness in the woods. Cixous’s reading leads us to conclude that 
Martim more readily succumbs to the seductive promise of metaphysical, 
transparent language, the more he feels superior to Vitória. In this sense, belief 
in a transcendental language devoid of supplementarity seems to be closely 
tied to phallocentrism and the question of sexual difference. Chapter 5 starts: 
And as if everything had come to an end before its appointed time, and 
as if everybody had got whatever it was they had wanted from the man 
[Martim] – they suddenly left him alone. The air was soft and full, and in 
the morning the cow gave birth to a calf [bezerro]. (3.v.309) 
Victorious light is confirmed: 
There followed a period of great calm. Life revealed obvious 
progress the way one suddenly perceives a child has grown. […] And the 
few days that followed mounted up without incident, like one single day.  
They were clear and tall days, woven into the air by the birds. […] 
And in spite of the distance, the clear air brought the mountain within 
the range of a shout. 
[…] And in the cowshed, after the birth of the calf, serenity reigned.  
[…] [T]he sky was so high and beautiful that Martim, in spite of 
himself, joined in with the light and went over to the side of what wins.  
And taking advantage of the crest of a wave [onda] to raise himself 
up, he let himself be carried along carelessly by the surge [vaga] of 
plenty. (3.v.309-10) 
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Sexual difference seems to short circuit Martim’s most acute and 
productive insights – after having accepted, in the woods, the inescapable 
reality of ‘the dark’ which envelops ‘the apple’, Martim succumbs to the illusory 
power of light to reveal all of reality. This is connected both to Vitoria’s 
monologue, which seems to Martim to confirm his sexist assumptions about 
her, and to the thematics of giving birth. ‘Giving birth’, in The Apple in the Dark, 
is irreducibly related both to the impersonality (and otherness) contained 
within the notion of animal reproduction, and to escuridade. 
Martim’s first developmental stage in the farm – his kinship with the 
plants – is prefaced in terms of light: ‘It was only with a stupid effort that the 
man was able to bear the intense light of the countryside during the confusing 
days that followed as if he were not yet ready to understand clarity’ (1.vi.79). 
And then:  
But, day by day […], he would come down from the high and open 
light of the countryside, from whence he came blind with 
incomprehension. […] He would finally go to that Tertiary plot where life 
was only fundamental. […] In that vegetal pit, which the light at best 
made hazy, the man would take refuge. […] 
The Tertiary plot had great perfection about it. Not even when the 
light came close did it change the air of the silence. Clarity, coming after 
stages and stages [etapas] of silence, became reduced there to mere 
visibility, which is the most that eyes need. […] 
And it was somehow so perfect that even the perspective of 
distance became a part of that world without God. (1.vi.79-80) 
At this stage, Martim revels in the mere visibility of his plot of land 
which for him signifies the primitive life of plants and even rats. Not the 
darkness that surrounded the meaningless sleep which opens the novel, but 
neither the meaning-giving light that recognises distance only to undermine it 
in infinite illumination: only a sort of hazy visibility that gets life going. In 
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contrast to this, Martim’s entrance in his next, cow phase is marked by the 
different luminosity associated with the cows: 
[A]s if he had been imitating in his task of becoming concrete a 
fateful evolution whose traces he felt groping–thus it was that his new 
and confused steps led him one morning out of his reign in the plot into 
the half-light of the cowshed where cows were more difficult than 
plants. 
[…] The light of the cowshed was different from the light outside to 
the point that at the door some vague threshold was established. 
(1.viii.93-4) 
The cow stage is interesting since it not only introduces Martim to the 
realm of higher animals, but also encodes in the novel the meanings of sexual 
difference and reproduction which will crucially reoccur later. And, most 
importantly, the cow passages all make clear the deep connection between 
reproduction and escuridade: 
In the dim filth [of the cowshed] there was the sense of a workshop and 
of concentration, as if from out of that shapeless entanglement little by 
little one more form were being concretely prepared. […] Cows were 
made there. […] [O]n the threshold of the stable he seemed to recognize 
the dim light that came out of the animals’ [bichos] snouts. That man had 
seen that vapor of light [vapor de luz] wafting from sewers in certain cold 
dawns. And he had seen that light emanating from warm garbage. He 
had also seen it like a halo around the love of two dogs; and his own 
breath was that same light. […] [H]e seemed to realize with reluctance 
that things had been arranged such that once in a stable a child had been 
born. For the great smell of matter was right. Only Martim was not 
ready for such a spiritual advance. […] [H]e hesitated at the door, pale 
and offended like a child to whom the root of life has suddenly been 
revealed. (1.viii.94) 
And further on, the passage from the light of the morning of plants into 
the ‘half-light’ of the cowshed endows both reproduction and escuridade with 
the evolutionary scale motif, the gradual addition of cumulative stages or steps 
that bridge nature and culture. That there could be stages at all, The Apple in the 
Dark implies, that time and space can be textured according to spacing, one 
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needs darkness and the differentiating capacity it brings to a world of diffuse 
light. Distance, difference, and spacing are part of a chain which, together with 
language, the sign, and the supplement, seems to accidentally happen to 
undivided presence: 
[A]ll that was needed was a step backwards, and he would have 
found himself in the full fragrance of morning which is a thing already 
perfected in the smallest leaves and smallest stones, a finished work 
without fissures—and at which a person can look without any danger 
because there is no place to enter and lose oneself. A step backwards 
would have been all he needed. 
He then took a step forward. […] [T]he cows, used to the darkness, 
were aware of the stranger. And he felt in his whole body that his body 
was being tested by the cows: they began to moo slowly and moved 
their feet without even looking at him—bypassing, as animals do, the 
necessity of seeing in order to know, as if they had already crossed the 
infinite extension of their own subjectivity to the point of reaching the 
other side: the perfect objectivity that no longer need be demonstrated. 
While he, in the cowshed, had been reduced to weak man: that dubious 
thing that has never passed from one margin to the other. 
[…] Then, sacrificing his own identification, he almost took on the 
form of one of the animals. And by doing just that he suddenly seemed 
to understand, with surprise, what a cow is like. (1.viii.95-6) 
Rabassa’s translation reads ‘what it was like to be a cow’. However, the 
Portuguese como é uma vaca contains no suggestion of the cow’s subjective 
experience. In other words, it describes Martim learning about cow-ness as an 
object rather than as a possible subject. Rabassa’s misunderstanding might help 
explain the insistence among some critics to frame this passage as a moment of 
understanding otherness for Martim. Pitt, despite quoting the novel 
exclusively in the original Portuguese, nevertheless interprets that passage as 
Martim’s being ‘able to identify with a group that already inhabited the new 
space he has entered, to put himself in their position, and to become part of a 
bigger whole’ by means of ‘bypassing language so as to not be hampered by its 
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imperfect ability to communicate’.67 However, Martim does not yet ‘have’ 
language in order to bypass it – if anything Martim is bypassing the clarity of 
the morning and its promise of direct knowing, unhampered by the vicarious 
working of language, in the name of the animal darkness of the cows. Negrón-
Marrero acknowledges that ‘we cannot talk about a personification of the cow’, 
but she foregrounds the bodily sensations in the passage, according to a logic 
which is not quite clear. She reads the objectivity of the cows not in terms of 
the lack of a (human) ability that appears to put cows above humans, but as a 
kind of objectivity ‘that is not abstracted from feeling and thus from the body’. 
The motif of animal perfection built upon a lack is not touched upon, so she 
contrasts a ‘regular’ objectivity which would rationalise objects with the 
‘perfect objectivity’ of the cows, which according to her is set apart by the fact 
that it ‘makes of [the body’s] experience a tool of knowledge’.68 
Martim’s birthing of others in his meditation about otherness is 
connected to the previous cow passages in its focus on impersonality. Martim 
initially wants to become so totally himself so as to be completely 
incomparable to any other human, in a dream of exceptionalism that shuns any 
semblance or any interchangeability. However, afterwards he seems to 
conclude that being the most human means being the least personal, like a cow 
that has extinguished all her subjectivity, so that he can be all humans: 
A few hours before, beside the bonfire, he had attained an 
impersonality inside of himself: he had been so profoundly himself that 
he had become the “himself” of any other person, the way a cow is a cow 
of all cows. But if beside the bonfire he had made himself, right then he 
                                                                
67 Pitt, p. 195, my emphasis. 
68 Negrón-Marrero, p. 107. 
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was using himself: now he had just attained the impersonality with 
which a man, falling, another rises up. The impersonality of dying while 
others are born. The altruism of the existence of others. […] 
[…] [A]fter all, “the other man” is the most objective thought that a 
person can have! he who had so much wanted to be objective. 
[…] 
Then, as many promises had been made to us, one of them was 
fulfilled right there: other people [os outros] existed. They existed as if 
he, Martim, had given them to themselves. (3.vii.335, 336) 
(Animal) reproduction had already been flagged in the cowshed passage 
as intimately related to escuridade: 
The cowshed was a warm and good place which pulsated like a thick 
vein. It was by [à base de] that thick vein that men and beasts [bichos] had 
children. Martim sighed exhausted at the enormous effort: he had just 
“unveiled” [descortinar].69 […] It was through [à base de] a cowshed that 
time is indefinitely replaced by time. It was because of that pulsating that 
migrating flocks went from cold zones to temperate ones. (1.viii.97, my 
emphasis) 
Time is created at the base of a pulsating vein, by the means of which life 
can articulate stages by linking generation to generation. The chaining of time 
as the continuing movement of supplementarity structures the impersonality 
that Martim seeks, which is none other than the impersonality brought about 
by animal mortality. Death makes all living things impersonal to the extent that 
they must merge with the chaining of countless generations. This mortality is 
                                                                
69 ‘Descortinar’, always between quotation marks, is a repeated word that occurs every time 
Martim enters a new stage. Unfortunately, Rabassa does not translate it uniformly in all its 
instances. It is clearly formed from the word cortina, ‘curtains’, and the Aurélio dictionary 
defines it as: ‘1. To make manifest, to show, by drawing the curtains. 2. To see, to espy: From the 
window of the palace, he espied [descortinou] the crowd gathered in the square. 3. To discover, to 
notice, to distinguish: In that explosion of rage he noticed [descortinou] his friend’s temperament. 
4. To make manifest; to reveal: The secret document revealed [descortinava] the revolutionaries’ 
actions. 5. To open clearings in (the woods)’ (my translation). Also interesting is the fact that, 
according to the Aurélio, it is a transitive verb, but Lispector constantly employs it as if it were 
intransitive. Martim ‘unveils’, but does he unveil something? Is he revealing himself, even though 
the verb is not reflexive? Is he being unveiled before a third perspective? 
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the foremost experience of time as articulation, as discreet stages which 
interrupt an otherwise steady, undifferentiated time of an eternal ‘now’. 
 
The light that therefore I give (to) 
However, the inter-connectedness between reproduction, alterity, and 
escuridade is made most acute in the short chapter describing the feeling of 
victorious calm after Vitória’s monologue. As stated above, the first paragraph 
of the chapter informs that ‘in the morning the cow gave birth to a calf’ 
(3.v.309). The relevance of this sentence would probably not make itself felt in 
a translated version of the novel, or to someone like Cixous who famously read 
Lispector in Portuguese but who is also well known for her shortcomings in 
Portuguese.70 The original sentence reads ‘de manhã a vaca deu à luz um 
bezerro’ (3.v.287), which literally translates as ‘in the morning the cow gave to 
the light a (male) calf’. As in Italian and Spanish, the common-place expression 
in Portuguese for ‘giving birth’ directly references light. ‘Give to the light’ 
would be cognate with expressions in which the mother is said to ‘bring [the 
child] forth’ onto the world (of light).71 However, it would be correct to affirm 
that dar à luz is not the only form of the expression used to describe giving 
birth, since it is simply one variety, in fact the normative, high-register one. A 
similar construction, although considered incorrect and thus informal, is ‘dar a 
                                                                
70 Rosemary Arrojo, ‘Interpretation as possessive love: Hélène Cixous, Clarice Lispector, and 
the ambivalence of fidelity’, in Postcolonial Translation: Theory and Practice, ed. by Susan 
Bassnett and Harish Trivedi (London: Routledge, 1999), pp. 141-161. 
71 Interestingly, ‘to come out into the light’ is the expression used in Plato to refer to the 
moment when the human should come into the world after having been prepared by 
Epimetheus. 
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luz’, without the grave accent.72 Making use of a preposition, dar a luz a um 
bezerro literally translates to ‘give the light to a calf’. The distinction between 
the two forms hinges on which is the direct object of the sentence and which is 
the indirect one. In dar à luz um bezerro, the calf is the direct object of the act of 
giving, and he is being given to the light, the indirect object. In dar a luz a um 
bezerro, the light is the direct object which is being given to the darkness-
dwelling indirect object, the calf. The confusion between the two forms 
probably stems from the fact that, in Brazil, a and à are pronounced the same.73 
Earlier editions of The Apple in the Dark did indeed contain in this 
passage the ‘incorrect’ informal variety of the expression. More recent editions 
of Lispector novels in Brazil are not prone to correct her language, giving her 
free rein to explore and flaunt normative rules as she sees fit. The current 
Brazilian publisher of Lispector, Rocco, until recently appended to all her 
novels an introductory note explaining their editorial policy regarding possible 
                                                                
72 The grave accent over the a in the standard expression marks the gemination of the 
preposition ‘to’ (a) and the article ‘the’ (also a), in what is known in Portuguese as crasis: thus, *a 
a luz is rendered à luz. 
73 “In the case of [the preposition] a plus the feminine article a, contraction of the geminate 
vowels was definitive. […] Since European Portuguese typically has a vowel of open quality of a 
contraction of this type, the agglutinated form [a] is there opposed to [ə] for either the 
preposition or the article alone. In Brazil, on the other hand, neither the central vowel nor the 
mid vowels are ever open when in unstressed position, but there is, in compensation, a 
secondary stress on the agglutinated preposition plus article form, which therefore is open just 
as above. There is a slight difference, however, since secondary stress is possible, and indeed 
frequent, even on the simple preposition. This results, of course, in the loss of the phonological 
distinction between the latter and the agglutinated form” (Joaquim Mattoso Câmara Jr, The 
Portuguese Language, translated by Anthony J Naro [Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 
1972], pp. 156-7). “In European Portuguese, […] [the] vowel /a/ is always realized as [ɐ] in 
unstressed position” (Maria Helena Mateus and Ernesto d’Andrade, The Phonology of 
Portuguese [Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000], p. 18). “In BP [Brazilian Portuguese], the 
unstressed vowel [ɐ] only occurs in word-final position” (Ibid., p. 134). It is worth noting that 
the slightly raised version of /a/ is sometimes transcribed either as [ə] or [ɐ]. Therefore, in 
Portugal, deu à luz (“gave birth”) is pronounced /ˌdewaˈluʃ/, whereas deu a luz is /ˌdewɐˈluʃ/. In 
Brazil, both forms are pronounced /ˌdewaˈlujs/. 
 
The light that therefore I give (to) | 237 
 
 
contradicting versions of the same Lispector text.74 They quoted a letter from 
her in which she explains her own editing process, which consisted in careful 
rewriting and editing her manuscripts while she typed them out.75 She did not, 
however, keep any manuscripts or originals after sending them to the 
publisher, and never re-read her own books either for pleasure or to revise 
them. The publisher presented that quote as justification of their strict 
adherence to the first published edition as the ‘true originals’ of her works76 
and as explanation for their unwillingness to correct her punctuation and 
grammar as if these were the result of absent-mindedness.  
Lispector’s writing is indeed marked by an abundance of constructions 
which would be considered grammatically wrong or colloquial, despite the 
general erudite diction.77 Despite the disclaimer, a number of corrections have 
                                                                
74 The note, authored by Marlene Gomes Mendes, responsible for revising Lispector’s texts for 
Rocco, calls attention to the fact that books with various editions may present alterations that 
‘range from errors committed by absent-minded typists to the well-meaning “corrections” by 
revisers and copy editors’. She then concludes that it is necessary to pit editions against each 
other so as to ‘restore to [the text] its fidelity and legitimacy’ (my translation). 
75 She writes in the letter: ‘I have always done the last copy of my books because every time 
that I copy I modify them, add to them; ultimately, alter them’ (my translation). 
76 Mendes concludes that ‘it is not possible to work with Clarice Lispector’s texts unaware of 
the fact that she did not revise them and therefore did not make alterations from one edition to 
the next. In preparing this edition, we chose the first edition, published in 1961, by [the 
publisher] Francisco Alves, as the copy-text’ (my translation). Rocco’s webpage for The Apple in 
the Dark states that the current (1998) edition of the novel ‘went through a rigorous textual 
revision, undertaken by the textual criticism specialist Marlene Gomes Mendes, based on the 
first edition’ (‘A Maçã no Escuro’, Rocco 
<http://www.rocco.com.br/index.php/livro?cod=2213> [accessed 26 January 2016], my 
translation). Curiously, the first edition does indeed contain the incorrect, colloquial ‘dar a luz’ 
(without the accent), which Rocco and Mendes have indeed corrected in the current edition 
despite their disclaimer to the contrary. As it is, one cannot know whether Lispector originally 
wrote the informal variety or whether the first edition might have changed her ‘correct’ use of 
the expression to the informal one that they published. 
77 A common feature of her prose that is very rarely preserved in the English translation is her 
colloquial use of adjectives where adverbs should be employed: ‘He was guided by the softness 
that animals have, that makes them walk gracefully’ (1.ii.16) was originally ‘Guiava-o a 
suavidade dos brutos, a mesma que faz com que um bicho ande bonito’ (Lispector, A maçã no 
escuro, 1.ii.24). A metaphrase of the last clause would be ‘that a “critter” walk beautiful’. Thus, in 
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indeed been silently incorporated to the latest editions, namely the changes 
prescribed in the 2009 Portuguese spelling reform. Considering that this is the 
second spelling reform since The Apple in the Dark was published, three 
differently spelled editions exist. However, this does not explain why there 
should be a discrepancy between dar a luz a in earlier editions and dar à luz in 
more recent ones, since this difference has never been the focus of spelling 
reforms. Previous editions, as Rocco likes to point out in their disclaimer, were 
more likely to correct Lispector’s writing, hence it is improbable that the earlier 
construction was a result of editorial correction, since that would mean it was 
changed to what is technically a grammatical error. 
The ambiguity between the two forms speaks of an irreducible flicker 
between two different ways of relating light and reproduction. Is the ‘light’ 
something that can be manipulated by a subject and thus given to the next 
generation, added to a stratum so as to constitute the next evolutionary step? 
Or are subjects, conversely, passively added to the light as that which will 
obscure it? Are subjects foreground objects that can occlude the light, or are 
they visited by it so as to be outshone? In a certain sense, this asks the very 
                                                                
that sentence the colloquial word bicho (‘critter’) contrasts with the literary brutos (‘brutes’), 
but above all the use of the adjective to modify the verb is a colloquial use which creates a 
jarring effect with the formal, literary syntax. Bicho is an interesting word in the novel and in 
Lispector’s work in general. An MA dissertation on animals in Lispector was titled O Bicho 
Outro (‘The Animal Other’, but replacing animal by bicho). Derived from the Latin bestius, which 
also gave rise to the English ‘beast’ and the French bête, bicho is a mostly colloquial noun that 
can describe ‘any terrestrial animal’ (Aurélio), thus near to the meaning of ‘critter’. However, 
bicho is commonly and popularly used also to describe small insects, akin to the word ‘bug’ – 
possibly by influence of the similar word bicha, a colloquial, old-fashioned word for ‘parasitic 
worm’. ‘Critter-bicho’ and ‘bug-bicho’ may be a pair of polysemous homonyms, two separate 
words that are spelled and pronounced the same, but with different, albeit similar meanings. 
Another Portuguese word also derived from bestius is besta, which can mean either any riding 
animal, or a mule, although it is also cognate with the French bête in the sense of ‘stupid’, which 
is also true for besteira and bêtise. 
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question of subjectivity, and thus prohibits the framing of the discussion in 
terms of subjects – especially since the novel provides this discussion in the 
clef of cows, who/which we are informed to have reached post-subjectivity. 
Only the free manipulation of light would constitute sovereign subjectivity, 
while being instrumental to the light equates to being objectified. Rather than 
the actions of a subject, the flickering grave accent (a vs. à) interrogates the 
mechanics of subject-creation. In the living being’s relationship to death as that 
which chops up life’s flow of time, ‘giving the light’ does admittedly come across 
as acceptance of mortality, but only insofar as death – as darkness – separates 
stages so as to take the light to a more advanced one. In other words, mortality 
is accepted simply because it is only way of being able to ‘pass on the torch’, 
and assumes the origin of life as light. Conversely, ‘giving to the light’ sees in 
mortality a more radical finitude rooted in embodiment, whose darkness would 
indeed be the origin of life as living-in-a-body. Giving offspring over to the light 
would register as approaching the ‘light at the end of the tunnel’ at the end of 
one’s life, a light which by definition cannot be reached while living and thus 
must be left to the next generation. ‘Giving the light’ assumes a primordial light 
being interrupted by the dark, while ‘giving to the light’ supposes an original 
darkness kept only alive by the ‘spark’ of movement which death brings about. 
Human logos – or Lispectorian ‘light’ – equals absolute self-presence and 
the complete illumination of all the space of the world, an illumination that in 
fact neutralises the world as space. Like speech, the world drenched in light in 
The Apple in the Dark has only one dimension, it is a linear extension through 
time and thus can be wholly comprehended instantaneously in each moment. 
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Darkness introduces spacing and distance themselves and makes of the 
luminous whole a series of discrete, different chunks. Dialectically, this 
darkness is pure negation. It only is to the extent that it is not and that it can 
interrupt light. Escuridade – understood as the play of light and dark, or the 
succession of days and nights – is revealed to be grounded on an escuridade 
that is in fact the very possibility of articulating light and dark, day and night. 
One night can separate two days – and thus make them two – only on the 
condition that there exists articulation and supplementation. Martim’s quest 
and project – committing a crime so as to be driven from society and returned 
to square one – seems to attempt to run back along the chain of days and 
nights, of supplemented and supplementer, to encounter the originary element 
that had first to be supplemented. But rather than that, he finds that 
everything actually ‘begins’ with supplementation itself, and thus does not 
really begin. The dark ‘spark’ that sets the chain of supplements going can only 
be, like the primal crime in Totem and Taboo, an inscribed origin. 
Human relationship to ‘light’ here rehearses the same questions raised 
in previous chapters about the relationship between human culture and animal 
nature. Whereas I described ‘the animal’ – as embodiment – as the first 
technological supplement to (and corruption of) luminous, spiritual humanity, it 
is also reasonable to picture humanity coming after animality, coming about by 
the means of and in the form of the addition of light to the darkness of animal 
density. Human nature, in onto-theological terms, is primordial: the first spark, 
which then gets corrupted by its descent into the materiality of the world, its 
incarnation into animal corporeality. Crucially, that is also true in 
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phenomenology. Parallel to that, however, and in the same tradition, humanity 
is also what emerges, as an improvement, from the background of natural 
animality, abandoning the dark realm of instinct and unreason. 
It is well known that Derrida in ‘The Animal that Therefore I Am (More 
to Follow)’ inscribes identity, subjectivity, the ‘I am’ (je suis) or the ergo sum 
within the act of pursuit, of the ‘I follow’ (je suis). I am only to the extent that I 
follow and pursue something or someone (je suis donc je suis, I follow therefore I 
am), so that the pursued element emerges as primary. I am/follow an animal 
since humanity comes after animality so as to supersede and improve it, or so 
the humanist and/or evolutionary story goes. But, as we saw, the idea of the 
animal embodiment of the soul suggests a primacy of the thinking subject – if I 
follow the animal, things start with the I. Crucially, the connection between the 
verbs ‘to follow’ and ‘to be’ in French only exists in the first person singular. 
 
I am given (myself?): donner le change 
The vacillation between the two varieties of the expression dar (à) luz maps out 
onto the flickering of another a with a grave accent in the Derrida passage 
quoted above. He argues that ‘presence is at the same time desired and feared’, 
hence the double functioning of the supplement as that which approximates us 
to presence while also protecting us from it. For Rousseau, as we saw above, it 
was a question of re-routing his pleasure from the direct access to sexual 
experience towards masturbation, as a compensatory stand-in for the 
presence of sexual enjoyment, which Derrida describes as ‘enjoyment 
242 | CHAPTER 4: THE APPLE IN THE DARK 
 
 
[jouissance] itself, without symbol or suppletory, that which would accord us (to) 
[nous accorderait (à)] pure presence itself’.78 
The parentheses suggest two symmetrically opposed options: either 
presence is delivered to us, or we are delivered to it. This is the same 
undecidability which is at the heart of the issue of ‘giving (to) the light’ and, as 
Derrida makes clear, ultimately describes a concept of death. After all, the full 
presence of enjoyment itself ‘would be only another name for death’, hence the 
fear and the need for the supplement. If supplements mediate the relationships 
that we, as subjects, entertain with presence, one would think that bypassing 
supplementation would grant us presence as an object to be attained. 
However, in a certain sense the fullness of presence could never be an object: 
the human subject would need to be the object which is then given over to 
presence or, in other words, to death. As Derrida has pointed out, life is 
another name for auto-affection79 and that which touches itself is not one and 
not self-present. 
Both dar (à) luz and la jouissance elle-même […] qui nous accorderait (à) la 
presence pure interrogate what it means to be given – whether one is given 
something or is given to it (light/presence), communion with which would stop 
the work of escuridade/supplementarity and thus equal death. Interestingly, 
Derrida introduces the idiomaticity of French in order to stress this point. We 
learn that Rousseau believes he is misleading his own desires by rerouting them 
into himself instead of prostitutes. Fearing ‘habitation with women’ – jouissance 
                                                                
78 Derrida, Of Grammatology, p. 168. 
79 Ibid., p. 180. 
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itself – Rousseau conjures up their presence by means of the apparent self-
presence of masturbation. This restitution of presence by means of symbols is 
experienced as immediate, despite being itself a form of mediation. This is the 
case ‘because as experience, as consciousness or conscience, [this symbolic 
restitution] passes over passage through the world. The toucher is touched, auto-
affection gives itself as pure autarchy’.80 However, Derrida demonstrates that 
this restitution is illusory insofar as it depends on the supplementary structure 
of auto-affection. Rousseau himself is thus sidetracked or deceived by the 
supplement: 
But what is no longer deferred is also absolutely deferred. The presence 
that is thus delivered to us in the present is a chimera. Auto-affection is 
a pure speculation. The sign, the image, the representation, which come 
to supplement the absent presence are the illusions that sidetrack 
[donnent le change] us.81 
Derrida foregrounds the French idiom donner le change as mapping the 
functioning of the supplement as the latter promises to procure an absent 
presence by means of the (false) self-presence of auto-affection:  
Donner le change [literally “giving change”]: in whatever sense it is 
understood, this expression well describes the recourse to the 
supplement admirably. In order to explain his “disgust” for “common 
prostitutes,” Rousseau tells us: […] “I had not lost the pernicious habit of 
sidetracking [donner le change] my needs”.82 
In their article ‘What Gives (Donner le change)’, Ravindranathan and 
Traisnel discuss Derrida’s use of this idiom. They point out that ‘in hunting 
parlance, donner le change was originally used to refer to the substitution by 
                                                                
80 Ibid., p. 167. 
81 Ibid., translator’s interpolation. 
82 Ibid., p. 167-8, translator’s interpolation. 
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which a chased animal, most often a deer, would escape by offering up another 
of its species in its place’.83 However, in modern-day French, the expression 
means ‘simply to deceive or to mislead, to pass one thing for another’, often used 
pronominally and reflexively (or auto-affectionately, as it were) as se donner le 
change, ‘to convince oneself of an untruth’.84 Therefore, Rousseau believes it 
possible to mislead or deceive his own desires into accepting self-eroticism 
instead of intercourse, but the symbolic restitution performed by auto-
affection is only an illusion brought about by denial. Like the deer which can 
give the change by giving the hunter the slip and offering up another as if it 
were the self-same, the supplement gives Rousseau the change by offering an 
image of himself in auto-affection as if it were truly himself. When something 
gives you the change, one could say that 
the enjoyment [jouissance] of the thing itself is thus worked over, in its act 
and in its essence, by frustration. […] Promising itself there as it hides 
there, giving itself as it displaces itself, is something that cannot even be 
rigorously called presence. […] The supplement is maddening because it 
is neither presence nor absence.85 
After all, what does it mean to ask whether the deer who has given the 
change is present when it is able to give the change ‘by inscribing a difference 
for which there is no mark of concept’?86 For Ravindranathan and Traisnel, the 
Derridean supplement as donner le change inscribes the possibility of an animal 
subject, an animal able both to give and to give another as itself. In this scene of 
                                                                
83 Thangam Ravindranathan and Antoine Traisnel, ‘What Gives (Donner le change)’, SubStance, 
45 (2016), 143-160 (p. 146). 
84 Ibid., p. 147. 
85 Derrida, Of Grammatology, p. 168. 
86 Ravindranathan and Traisnel, p. 147. 
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giving by an animal of its own likeness there is a challenge to our ‘current 
economy of signification […] in which the animal disappears, or appears merely 
as (a) given’.87 
The belief that animals are simply given or a given implies that they are 
part of Nature, conceived as the inert background against which human 
intentionality plays and which it fashions. The given would be that which is 
immediately ready to hand, as the Apple shrouded in darkness promising the 
direct intimacy of the touch. And, of course, auto-affection as suggested by 
masturbation is the ready-to-hand par excellence. And, like masturbation, the 
direct access to the animal as a given is complicated by the law of 
supplementarity, the moment the animal slips away from its status as a given 
raw material onto the confusion of the giving-given brought about by passing 
another as oneself. The animal presence sought in pursuit is thought to be 
reachable by means of the self-presence of the pursuing subject (as 
engendered by auto-affection), but the very mediation betrayed by auto-
affection is also revealed in the interchangeability between the deer and its 
change: if I know that I who is following am I only by means of an auto-affection, 
which I is touched and which is touching? Which one gives and which one is 
given? Which one is using the other so as to ‘pass one thing for another’, like 
money, and thus engender presence? Similarly, which deer am I following? 
Is/are the deer/s merely matter given to be fashioned, lit under the subject’s 
                                                                
87 Ibid. 
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eye, or is/are it/they, conversely, the shadowy trickster with the presence of 
mind to elude us? 
The sentence I coined previously, describing the necessity of following 
to being – je suis donc je suis – displays the same undecidability. It can mean 
both ‘I follow therefore I am’ and ‘I am therefore I follow’, with the latter 
establishing the primacy of the I – I can follow only to the extent that I am an I. 
In this sentence, it is not clear which version of phrase je suis follows which, 
since the phrase ‘gives the change’ as it exchanges itself with its double within 
the sentence unnoticeably. 
 
The labour of self-creation 
Hence, dar (à) luz is the pivot around which all the other undecidables in the 
novel turn. As discussed above, the title may refer either to a pessimistic view 
of human linguistic existence (we are always lost in dark, the Apple always out 
of reach), or to a triumphant affirmation of the vast knowledge we have at hand 
(if we abandon language and reason, we can actually access the Apple directly). 
Similarly, Martim’s original intentions when committing murder, due to his 
borderline amnesia in its aftermath, are also enigmatic and ambiguous. 
Especially because of this amnesia, the reasons he gives himself for the crime 
might be illusory and produced after the fact.88 Often, he is certain he 
endeavoured to leave behind the human world of language, understood here in 
                                                                
88 Of course, the ‘original’ motivation for the crime and the project may just as well be a 
mythical originary element that never existed. All explanations for the crime are all 
retrospectively given, nachträglich. 
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the supplementary sense: he believes he has revolted against the secondarity 
of language and the undermining by supplementarity of originary truth, in 
search of a magical, transcendental language. Other times he seems convinced 
that he has leapt out of humanity in order to shun conceptuality for good – to 
find pre-human wisdom and remain there – and that any evolving he 
undertakes after that is both the defeat of his project and the tragedy of 
inevitable human perfectibility. 
Rebecca Biron, like Cixous, also calls attention to the thematics of the 
feminine and of gestation present in the novel. She reads The Apple in the Dark 
alongside Crime and Punishment as the story ‘of the protagonist’s attempts to 
escape the mundane by way of murdering women’.89 The protagonists of both 
novels, however, repent their crimes before a woman and experience a rebirth 
which is framed as a kind of feminine labour (in both senses). In a way, Martim 
acknowledges Cixous’s suggestion that his metaphors of birth cannot not be 
borrowed from the feminine. 
[H]e knew that she [Vitória] would never forgive him. Then Martim 
kneeled down in front of her and said: 
“Forgive.” 
[…] 
But the woman with a sudden irrepressible movement clasped her 
womb [ventre] with her hands, there where a woman pains, her mouth 
trembled as it was touched by it, the future was a difficult birth:90 with 
the movement of an animal she clasped her womb, where fate [destino] 
makes a woman pain, and joy was such a misery. (3.vii.352) 
For Biron, both Martim and Crime and Punishment’s Raskolnikov repent 
before women they did not wrong, as if asking for forgiveness to the feminine, 
                                                                
89 Biron, p. 72. 
90 Here, time itself must be brought about by animal reproduction, as I discussed above 
regarding ‘giving (to) the light’. 
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so that its love may re-create them. ‘They must be humbled before an external 
power in order to be freed of the burdensome responsibility of self-creation. 
They must ask a woman to give them a new birth.’91 For Lispector, spiritual 
renewal must come from submission, but  
a submission to the lack of control we have over our own birth. 
Language creates us precisely by placing us always in relation to other 
people, as a ‘whole long past’ of ‘images of women and kneeling men’ 
[3.vii.353] […] God is created in the shared experience of two human 
beings' recognizing that only impotence results from the solitary search 
for selfhood.92 
This ‘responsibility for self-creation’, which Martim initially wants to 
take up for himself, clearly resists both meanings of ‘giving (to) the light’ since it 
assumes an absolute independence from escuridade and the reality of 
articulation (of stages, of generations, of time, etc.). But Biron goes even 
further by linking this ‘articulation’ of living states or stages with the 
articulation brought about by and of language, understood here as arche-
writing. In other words, the finitude inaugurated by birth and death is the same 
as the finitude established by language, an equation I defended when I read 
Cary Wolfe’s two finitudes as one and the same. 
 
The stream-like transparency of writing 
Martim’s sexist-infused developmental phase is particularly interesting for 
introducing the image of the stream that crosses the farm, whose transparency 
is equated with the immediate access to reality available to a perfect language 
                                                                
91 Biron, p. 83 
92 Biron, p. 84 
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and/or writing. As mentioned above, he seems more readily susceptible to 
desiring non-supplementarity when he is convinced of a hierarchy of sexual 
difference. After spending the night with Ermelinda in the woodshed, Martim 
steps out in the morning towards the stream: 
Martim breathed deeply as if until now he had been wearing a gag. It 
was sweet and powerful for a man to go out and for a woman to stay 
behind. That was probably the way things should be. Going down to the 
water of the river to wet his face he felt pride and calmness. Now that he 
had had a woman it seemed natural to him that everything should 
become understandable and within the reach of his hand. […] Within his 
reach was the water, which the sun had turned into a hard mirror, and 
that was how it should be. […] Before the water, which was cutting him 
down with its scythe-like brilliance, everything was his, a stupid 
happiness filled his head, in his arms he could still feel the weight that a 
submissive woman has. (2.vii.174) 
In contrast to that, but affirming his sexist views, ‘afternoon’ is said to 
‘ha[ve] arrived’ due to Ermelinda’s pushing the woodshed door open and 
joining him. ‘Like a continuation of the shadows of the room the whole 
afternoon had fallen apart. […] The countryside was nothing but a larger 
woodshed. […] And the countryside had lost its limitlessness’ (2.vii.179). That 
night, buoyed by the masculinist, logocentric views triggered by his 
relationship with Ermelinda, Martim attempts to write down his achievements 
and goals. In what I name his ‘writing lesson’, Martim comes into contact with 
the impossibility of simply notating, writing down truth. The full force of the 
supplementary work of language, of the signifier, and of writing powerfully 
undermines the certainties that followed sex with Ermelinda. Feeling the 
power of the inability to write ‘the other things’, the proper word, truth itself, 
Martim considers writing something else, another word, to compensate for the 
absence of the word he cannot seem to write: 
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And the choice became deeper yet: either keep the zone intact and live 
off it [by not writing anything]—or betray it for what he certainly would 
be able to do [write another word] and what would be simply this: the 
unreachable. Like one who could not drink the water of the river except 
by filling up the hollow of the hands—but then it would not be the silent 
waters of the river, it would not be its frigid movement, or the delicate 
eagerness with which water tortures stones, it would not be the thing a 
man is in the afternoon beside the river after he has had a woman. It 
would be the hollow of his hands. He would rather have the silence 
intact. For what one drinks is little; and one lives off what is given up. 
(2.viii.183-4) 
His ‘writing lesson’ is readily paired with the night spent in the woods as 
his two main ‘moments of darkness’, so to speak. His distrust of the promises of 
the light, and his acute awareness of escuridade, is brought forward in these 
two moments but, as I argued before, his assumptions about sexual difference 
and about the dynamics between the sexes undermine both insights. If his 
sense of masculine power is sparked by his relationship with Ermelinda, only to 
be frustrated by the very act of writing that had been inspired by such power, 
this same relationship will rapidly bring him back to his previous assumptions 
about his project. And, similarly, lighting the bonfire for Vitória undoes his 
painful epiphanies in the woods. Only when confronted with the authorities 
that come, in the guise of society, to arrest him does Martim revisit his 
conclusions when writing and when reflecting in the woods. Perhaps most 
importantly, the only two references to apples in the dark are inserted in this 
context. 
The first one outlines one of the meanings of the title and is marked by 
Martim’s lighting of the bonfire. Despite having realised in the woods that his 
self-fashioning project had been an illusion, after the bonfire he seems to revel 
in the success of said project: 
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Unexpectedly, the first step of his great general building had been 
accomplished: if little by little he had created himself, now he was 
inaugurating himself. He had just reformed man. The world is vast, but 
so am I. With the obscure satisfaction of having worked at the fire and 
of having frightened what had to be frightened in a woman, his first 
honor had been remade. It seemed to him that from now on he would no 
longer need to have the voice of a man or try to act like a man: he was 
one. (3.vi.316) 
He references his previous decision in the woods of giving up on his project 
based on the insight that it had been a sham: 
“How is it that he could have imagined [in the woods] that time had run 
out?”, his heart beat vigorously. For it had just, just begun... As if time 
had been created by the most profound freedom, now the future 
was suddenly being reborn for him. […] [H]e […] had been certain of 
having given up on his reconstruction. (3.vi.317) 
Ironically, the reason he ascribes to his previous lack of success is an 
insufficient selfishness: 
The time was ripe and the moment had arrived. […] It was because until 
that moment he would not have been able to do it—as long as he had not 
recovered in himself the respect for his own body and for his own life, 
which was the first way of respecting the life that there was in other 
people. But when a man respected himself, then he had finally created 
himself in his own image. And then he would be able to look other 
people in the eye. Without the embarrassment of our great mistake, and 
without the mutual shame. (3.vi.318) 
Martim then produces one possible interpretation of the title of the 
novel, in a tone full of bravado that should remind readers of the importance of 
producing resistant readings against the grain of the unreliable narrator in The 
Apple in the Dark. That this whole train of thought originated from his sexist 
musings about the bonfire should keep us alert to the fact that Martim must 
not always be taken seriously. In fact, most of the irony and absurd humour of 
the novel seems to be lost in Cixous’s and Negrón-Marrero’s readings, to the 
point that they side with Martim in passages where I argue that an attentive 
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reader should detect Lispector’s irony, such as in Martim’s first take on the 
title: 
And as for not understanding other people… […] [t]here was a way of 
understanding that did not need any explanation. And which came from 
the final and irreducible fact of standing up, and from the fact that 
another man too has the possibility of standing up—because with that 
minimum of being alive everything was already possible. No one until 
this day ever had greater advantage than that. 
Besides—Martim thought, feeling that he was being slightly 
excessive but no longer able to hold himself back—besides, it was silly 
not to understand. “You don’t understand only if you don’t want to!”93 
he thought boldly. Because understanding is a way of looking. Because 
understanding is, besides, an attitude. Martim, very satisfied, had that 
attitude. As if now, stretching out his hand in the dark and picking up an 
apple, he recognized on his fingers made so clumsy by love that it was an 
apple. Martim no longer asked for the name of things. It was enough for 
him to recognize them in the dark. And rejoice, clumsily. 
And afterwards? Afterwards, when he went out into the light, he 
would see the things his hand had felt before [pressentidas com a mão],94 
and he would see those things with their false names. Yes, but he would 
already have known them in the dark like a man who has slept with a 
woman. (3.vi.319) 
We can readily contrast to this brief manifesto the lessons he painfully 
had when colliding with the reality of writing and when reflecting in the woods. 
He approaches the experience of writing since ‘he had had the very sensible 
idea of putting his thoughts in order, summing up the results that he had 
reached that afternoon—since that afternoon he had finally understood what 
he wanted’ (2.viii.180). He is feeling particularly successful after sleeping with 
Ermelinda and standing next to the river with its transparent surface. At that 
                                                                
93 ‘Só não entende quem não quer!’ Extremely informal. Literally, it translates as ‘only doesn’t 
understand who doesn’t want’. Rabassa has it as ‘A person doesn’t understand just because he 
doesn’t want to!’. 
94 Pressentir (composed so as to literally mean ‘pre-feel’) normally means ‘to sense, to presage, 
to forebode, to augur, to foreshadow, to foresee’. The common noun pressentimento has a 
cognate in the English ‘presentiment’, which Ermelinda is prone to having. Here, the word 
seems curiously to be used to mean its composite parts: ‘to feel before’. 
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moment, Martim realised that his ‘reconstruction’ would be carried out not 
only for his own sake, but for other people’s (2.vii). He wonders if that means he 
is a preacher, which might explain his will to write down what he believes may 
one day be humanity’s salvation. Writing, however, reveals to be more difficult 
than mere notation, and his failure is presented in the very start of the chapter: 
At night Martim had an excellent idea that would prove to be the 
opposite of excellent. Actually later on the man had occasion to 
compare the excellence of his idea and its subsequent disillusionment 
with a round fruit that he had once eaten—a pomegranate—and which 
had proven to be hollow to his teeth. (2.viii.180) 
The reference to writing as a fruit seems to be a direct reference to the 
apple of the title as a symbol of knowledge and/or language. If the apple, with 
its sweet core, is language, the frustration occasioned by writing is figured by a 
hollow, disseminating fruit. Clumsily holding a pencil, Martim feels that ‘as soon 
as he wrote the first word it would be too late—so disloyal was the power of 
the simplest word over the broadest thought’ (2.viii.181). Martim wishes for 
writing – and here it could stand for the whole of language – to transparently 
notate reality and thoughts, but he is shocked ‘as if his task were not that of 
simply noting down what already existed, but of creating something yet to 
exist’ (ibid.). He tries to reduce himself so as to be only ‘a sitting man who was 
going to note down what had already been thought’, but he is surprised to 
conclude that ‘there was no denying that he did not know how to write’ 
(2.viii.181-2). One might be excused for perhaps believing that Martim’s leap 
backwards has been so powerful so as to make him illiterate, were it not for the 
fact that we are told, many chapters previously, that Ermelinda finds a 
shopping list written by Martim. He is unable to write only insofar as he 
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understands ‘writing’ as the notation of pre-existing reality, and, coming in 
contact with the frustration of that idea, he comes to believe he ‘does not know 
how to write’. He experiences a disenchantment of magical language that is 
readable in the transformation of the Apple into a pomegranate and in the 
appearance of another mythical garden: 
As in the fables in which the distracted prince fatally happens to touch 
the one forbidden rose in the garden and to his astonishment 
disenchants the whole garden—Martim had carelessly executed among 
a thousand innocuous gestures some unfamiliar act that involuntarily 
had brought him face to face with something greater. (2.viii.182) 
By taking writing in this passage as arche-writing or language writ large, 
the Biblical overtones appear even clearer, as when Martim feels like ‘an old 
man who had never learned to read’; he then ‘measured the distance that was 
separating him from the word and the distance that was suddenly separating 
him from himself’. He asks: ‘Between the man and his own nakedness was there 
some possible step that could be taken?’ He cannot write as he had wished, and 
this ‘not being able had taken on the greatness of a Prohibition’ (ibid). This 
Prohibition reverberates with a primordial law that connects both the 
Forbidden Fruit and the animal taboos that arise from the primal crime. The 
finitude revealed by writing — the impossibility of arriving through signs and 
language at reality — emerges theologically for Martim as God’s ‘no’ 
surrounding the Apple. To be sure, the Apple is not reality, but would give the 
eater a language capable of producing signs flush with reality. A special, 
magical sign appears to be Prohibited, then – a transcendental signifier, as it 
were –, ‘as if there was a word that once uttered by a man…’ (2.viii.183). 
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Martim then recoils in horror at this conclusion, fearing that he may 
come close to the Prohibited word. We are told that ‘he had fallen into that 
sacred zone a man will not let a woman touch, but two men sometimes sit in 
silence by the front door at dusk’ (ibid.). The ‘incomplete’ syntax of the 
sentence seems to contribute to the preservation of the ‘sacred zone’, as if a 
relative pronoun linking the two clauses might indeed pinpoint and thus expose 
the masculine zone to the feminine touch.95 This zone offers a choice, already 
discussed above in connection to the transparency of the river: he can either 
live off its intactness, or barter it for what would only be ‘the other thing’. In 
writing, he can respect the Prohibition and preserve the ineffable character of 
reality, or write down what is only possible but never sufficient. ‘In that way 
then, sitting there, restless, Martim had failed. The paper was blank [branco]. 
His brow was furrowed and attentive’ (2.viii.184).96 This failure is quickly 
                                                                
95 The homoerotic undercurrent in this sentence is repeated in other passages of the novel, to 
the extent that the whole book could be read around such an allergy to, and then acceptance 
of, homoerotic – or homosocial – contact.  In the early pages of the novel, when firmly in his 
stone stage, Martim tries to explain his crime to the rocks in the field: ‘How can I explain to 
you—who have the calm of having no future—that every face had failed, and that this failure 
had in itself a perversion as if a man slept with another man and thus children aren’t born’ 
(1.ii.30). This is referenced towards the very end, in a comical flow of bravado in which Martim 
tries, for the last time, to reject what he knows he must do – he curses everyone to hell, and 
attempts to convince himself of his own ‘rights’: ‘we have, thank God, good instincts and good 
teeth, not to mention intuition, and finally we have from birth this capacity to sit at night in 
silence by the front door. From which some ideas are born… Yes, that was the way it had 
happened to him. Some ideas, and fright. Fright, rage, love, and then the front door becomes 
small, and those feelings and those rights are not enough, something else remains to be born… 
[…] When the house itself becomes small, the man leaves at dawn to bring something back’ 
(3.viii. 346). The first ellipsis in this quotation marks the slacking of his bravado and the return 
to sincerity: it is possible to suppose that the ‘ideas’ that are born are precisely connected to 
the ‘sacred zone’ that male vanity attempts to preserve. The birth of these ideas might trigger a 
reconstruction such as Martim’s, in all its ambiguities regarding this very zone. The zone can 
readily be understood as the lack established in the subject by the signifier, the castration 
complex the male subject attempts to conceal from femininity. 
96 Interestingly, this sentence is followed by the first of the extremely few blank spaces 
interspersed between two paragraphs inside the same chapter, a feature preserved in 
Rabassa’s translation. 
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reconfigured as a sort of victory, since there is a certain perfection to the 
Prohibition, and maybe the silence he is left with more than compensates for 
the right words – he feels, for the first time, that he has not deceived or been 
deceived. 
He feels immense relief for not breaking the Prohibition and for ‘having 
escaped unscathed from the hollow darkness’, and, crucially, he feels that ‘none 
of his future thoughts would be untouched by this real cowardice of his, which 
had only been revealed just now. No heroic act of his would be completely free 
of that experience, which had immediately become old, like wisdom’ 
(2.viii.186). This recognition should qualify all of his subsequent feelings of 
victory, as for example his heroic meditation on not needing the Apple to be lit. 
I argue that the two choices faced by Martim when attempting to write 
– either preserving ineffable reality, or writing down what is possible but 
insufficient – are akin to the two competing claims concerning the nature of 
animal embodiment and the functioning of the sign, and are in fact both 
products of the repression of arche-animality. In the novel, arche-animality is 
shown to be engendered by the supplementary alternation of days and nights, 
but this kind of supplementary substitution is in turn held up, in Martim’s 
‘writing lesson’, as responsible for the very process of signification by means of 
which a sign stands in for something else. In the movement by which culture 
seemingly supplements nature – only to turn back to it as when Martim reverts 
to the dawn of time – the work of the sign as a supplement to real, natural 
world is established. And The Apple in the Dark theorises that it is animal 
embodiment and death, the enchainment of time by means of reproduction and 
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the sequence of generations, which give rise to this articulatory, 
supplementary work responsible for signification.  
 
Aping(,) the arche-animal 
However, this productive impotence revealed to him (and in him) by writing is 
quickly forgotten in his interactions with the women, which infuse him with 
sexist heroics. These insights will only return to him in his terrified reflections 
in the wood, during the rainy night that marks a peak of intensity for all three 
characters. He comes to realise that he has as good as taken no steps in his 
reconstruction or project, and that, in the woods, he has just leapt back to his 
starting point in is realisation that his progress was illusory, and ‘Martim at that 
moment no longer even wanted any of the minimal things that he had once 
proudly wanted and he was even surprised at having wanted them’ (3.iii.233). 
He entertains the possibility that, instead of the grandiose project of self-
construction, he has been unwittingly tracing another journey, as if ‘until now 
he had been traveling along superimposed paths’, and ‘his real and invisible 
journey had actually been made underneath the path he thought he was 
tracing’ (3.iii.233-4). And surprisingly the narrator informs us exactly what the 
real journey was. 
And the real journey had been this: that one day he had left his house of 
man and his city of man seeking, through adventure, precisely that thing 
that he was now experiencing in the dark, seeking the great humiliation, 
and along with himself, with ferocious pleasure, he was humiliating a 
whole human race. (3.iii.234) 
As Rebecca Biron puts it, Martim humiliates himself before the lack of 
freedom he has in his own creation and birth. Beyond the hesitation regarding 
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his project of rebirth, breaking free both from the spiritual quest for infinite 
knowledge and the material regrounding into one’s animality – in other words, 
beyond dar a luz and dar à luz – there exists a more primordial articulation that 
gives rises to these possibilities: escuridade itself. The primariness of escuridade 
is not, of course, structured as an origin, otherwise it would be a safe 
transcendental root onto which Martim could hold. It is only ever an inscribed 
origin, the non-origin which is originary différance. 
And the novel intimately bonds escuridade and arche-animality when 
Martim recognises in fury the primariness of the secondarity of symbolicity, 
representation, and supplementarity. Moments after confessing his 
(attempted) murder, Martim tries to explain himself to God. He argues that he 
elected to suffer so that he could become the symbol of suffering to which other 
people could refer. ‘Suffering’, as a concept, would only be conceivable in 
reference to that which would be the ‘symbol of suffering’ – absolute, Ideal 
suffering, the most suffering of all: 
But—he rebelled immediately then, justifying himself to God—someone 
had to sacrifice himself97 and bring unconsoled suffering to its ultimate 
term and then become the symbol of suffering! someone had to sacrifice 
himself, I wanted to symbolize my own suffering! I sacrificed myself! I 
wanted the symbol because the symbol is the true reality and our life is 
symbolic of the symbol, just as we ape [macaqueamos]98 our own nature 
and try to copy ourselves! now I understand imitation: it’s a sacrifice! I 
                                                                
97 Se sacrificar, gender-neutral in Portuguese. 
98 The verb macaquear, from the noun macaco (‘ape’ or ‘monkey’), has the meaning of ‘to 
imitate’, as the English ‘to ape’. Many other languages form a verb meaning ‘to imitate’ from the 
noun for ‘ape’: French singer, (from singe); Italian scimmiottare (from scimmia); German nachäffen 
(from Affe); Polish małpować (from małpa); Greek πιθηκίζω [pithikízo] (from πίθηκος [píthikos]), 
Russian обезья   нничать [obezʹjánničat’] (from обезья   на [obezʹjána]), Esperanto simii (from 
simio), Finnish apinoida (from apina), Dutch na-apen (from aap), Persian ﯽﭘﮐ ندرﮐ  [kapi kardan] 
(from ﯽﭘﮐ [kapi]), Romanian maimuțări (from maimuță), Icelandic apa eftir (from api), Ukrainian 
мавпувати [mavpuvaty] (from ма  впа [mávpa])  
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sacrificed myself! he said to God, reminding Him that even He had 
sacrificed a son [filho, also ‘child’] and that we also had the right to 
imitate Him, we had to renew the mystery because reality is getting 
lost!99 (3.iii.238-9) 
This dense passage addresses most of the issues of the novel, and 
presents clearly an arche-animality (macaquear) which is other than a simple 
animal representation (e.g. macaco). Human nature, that from which the human 
emerges and which should not coincide with animal nature, can only exist 
through a structure of referencing and imitation, articulated by an animal – as 
arche-animal. This arche-animal emerges as a procedure by means of which the 
human can imitate the very thing which is in fact created by this imitation: here 
copying is originary. Theologically, also, the God/god structure implicated in 
this passage (between God and Jesus, and between God and Martim) 
delineates a case of originary secondarity. Imitatio Christi is a common 
theological concept which dictates that the righteous life is found in following 
Jesus’ example. But here imitating Jesus gets easily confused with imitating 
God due to the process of multiplication God undergoes when He is incarnated 
as Christ. An imitation of Christ in this context would mean both a sacrifice and 
a self-sacrifice, blurring the lines between original or copy, or rather hesitating 
between an imitation which glorifies the original and one which empowers the 
copy. The human would originate from imitation regardless and the passage 
seems to suggest the scandalous notion that the sacrifice of Christ is not only 
                                                                
99 Porque a realidade se perde could also be translated as ‘because reality gets lost’, or ‘because 
reality is lost’ (in the present habitual sense), or ‘because reality loses itself’, or even ‘because 
reality, one loses it’. 
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also a sacrifice of God but that only through this self-sacrifice (of otherness) 
can God establish His own reality. 
A similar blurring of God and god can be read in the complicity between 
the concepts of imitatio Christi and simia Dei. In The Open, Agamben similarly 
explores this aping power of self-imitation (which he calls anthropophorous, 
‘human-forming’) by which the human constructs itself. Human identity, for 
him, is in fact  
a machine or device for producing the recognition of the human. […] It is 
an optical machine constructed of a series of mirrors in which man, 
looking at himself, sees his own image always already deformed in the 
features of an ape. […] [Man] must recognise himself in a non-man in 
order to be human.100 
This non-man is not, however, simply an ape, since it is in fact a device. 
The non-man is in fact aping, macaquear, animality as a process of imitation and 
articulation that makes human identity possible. And theologically, the 
human’s aping of itself so as to be human is called simia Dei: ‘in medieval 
iconography, the ape holds a mirror in which the man who sins must recognize 
himself as simia dei [ape of God]’ (see Fig. 23).101 By looking back and forth 
between his own reflection in the mirror and the ape holding it, the human is 
supposed to conclude that he must ape God in the same way that the ape is 
said, precisely, to ape humans. 
                                                                
100 Agamben, The Open: Man and Animal, trans. by Kevin Attel (Stanford: Stanford University 
Press, 2004), p. 26-7. 
101 Agamben, The Open, p. 27. 
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Fig. 23 Simia Dei, detail of an illuminated initial. 102 
Macaquear, an arche-animal, is thus another instance of paleonymy in 
the novel, alongside escuridade and the flickering itself between ‘dar a luz’ and 
‘dar à luz’. Interestingly, paleonymy in inscribed in the very opening of the book, 
in the epigraph taken from the Upanishads: 
By creating all things, he entered into everything. By entering into all 
things, he became what has form and what is formless; he became what 
can be defined and what cannot be defined; he became what has 
support and what has no support; he became what is crude and what is 
subtle. He became every kind of thing: that is why wise men called him 
the Real One.103 (p. v) 
Martim similarly acknowledges paleonymy, in his case with regard to 
escuridade, understood here as the differentiating source of difference: 
In the night of the woods his enormous fatigue made the man lose his 
lucidity, and instinctively his blind thought made him want to seek the 
most remote source. He guessed that in that dark source everything 
would be possible because in it the law was so primary and vast that 
                                                                
102 Hunterian Psalter, folio 176r, ca. 1170. Available at 
<http://special.lib.gla.ac.uk/exhibns/psalter/psalterindex.html>. Accessed 2 March 2016. 
Another ape holding a mirror is included in an initial in folio 76v. 
103 Lispector’s Portuguese version has ‘o Real’, which could be translated simply as ‘the Real’. 
This is taken from the sixth Anuvaka of the second Valli of the Taittiriya Upanishad. Max 
Müller translated it as: ‘He wished, may I be many, may I grow forth. He brooded over himself 
(like a man performing penance). After he had thus brooded, he sent forth (created) all, 
whatever there is. Having sent forth, he entered into it. Having entered it, he became sat (what 
is manifest) and tyat (what is not manifest), defined and undefined, supported and not 
supported, (endowed with) knowledge and without knowledge (as stones), real and unreal. The 
Sattya (true) became all this whatsoever, and therefore the wise call it (the Brahman) Sattya (the 
true).’ Available at <https://en.wikisource.org/wiki/Taittiriya_Upanishad#Sixth_Anuvaka_2>. 
Accessed 2 March 2016. 
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within it the great confusion of a man would also fit. […] [But] [t]o be 
admitted into that vast source, that man knew that he had to believe 
only in light [claridade] and in darkness [escuridão]. (3.iii.240)
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Chapter 5: Hughes and Poetry 
Introduction 
Ted Hughes opens his Poetry in the Making with an essay titled ‘Capturing 
Animals’ in which he suggests that ‘capturing animals and writing poems have 
much in common’.1 He justifies this similarity with the argument that poems 
are ‘a sort of animal’: ‘they have their own life, like animals, by which I mean 
that they seem quite separate from any person, even from their author, and 
nothing can be added to them or taken away without maiming and perhaps 
killing them.’2 
With this opening, Hughes puts forth a sort of zoogrammatological 
understanding of poetics. If, as we shall see, his intriguing theorisation on the 
animality of poems is fraught with old metaphysical assumptions that can 
prove quite tricky to disentangle, that is due to the special challenges 
presented to zoogrammatology by poetry. In other words, the poetics of 
philosophy, of film, and of fiction, if still intent in repressing arche-animality for 
the sake of the vulgar animal, seem to present a less daunting task than the 
question of the animal in poetry. However, the very nebulous character of so-
called ‘animal poetry’ – and its difficulty – also provides a productive site to 
establish zoogrammatology and its consequences for poetic – and literary – 
language.  
                                                                
1 Ted Hughes, ‘Capturing Animals’, in Poetry in the Making: An Anthology of Poems and 
Programmes from ‘Listening and Writing’ (London: Faber and Faber, 1967), pp. 15-31 (p. 15). 
2 Ibid. 
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In this chapter, I read Hughes’s poem ‘The Thought-Fox’ (first published 
in 1957 in the collection The Hawk in the Rain) for its zoogrammatological 
contribution to debates concerning the nature of poetic language. I shall start 
by discussing Derek Attridge’s presentation of Roman Jakobson’s ‘poetic 
function’ and the aporias it raises, which I argue are derived from the 
repression of arche-animality. I then review Gérard Genette’s account of 
theories of linguistic representation and how different strands of poetics dealt 
with them. This segues into a discussion of the benefits and traps of formalist 
criticism for Literary Animal Studies and how the field has positioned itself 
regarding formalist approaches. The apparent advantages of formalism is 
called into question by a revision of Derrida’s critique of the material and ideal 
aspects of the linguistic sign in Of Grammatology. Finally, I analyse how ‘The 
Thought-Fox’ responds to these concerns by means of its intertwining the very 
nature of poetic representation with animal representation. I argue that the 
poem acknowledges the arche-animality of the fox in its constitutive role in the 
functioning of linguistic meaning. 
 
The poetic function and its bodily form 
Hughes is famous for nature and ‘animal’ poems such as ‘The Thought-Fox’, but 
in ‘Capturing Animals’ he strengthens his zoogrammatological point by 
emphasising that any poem can be ‘like an animal’. His formulation thus 
supports the idea that Literary Animal Studies and zoopoetics are concerned 
with much more than simply the animal subject-matter of texts: 
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How can a poem, for instance, about a walk in the rain, be like an animal? 
Well, perhaps it cannot look much like a giraffe or an emu or an octopus, 
or anything you might find in a menagerie. It is better to call it an 
assembly of living parts moved by a single spirit. The living parts are the 
words, the images, the rhythms. The spirit is the life which inhabits them 
when they all work together. It is impossible to say which comes first, 
parts or spirit.3 
For Hughes, animality in poetry is to be found not in the poetic 
‘message’ or in any animal ‘presence’ in the text but in the very procedure of 
signification undertaken by the poetic form. The animality of a poem resides in 
its nature as an articulation of living parts – they are living insofar as they are 
‘animated’, moved by a spirit that breathes life into them, according to the 
etymology of the word ‘animal’. The hesitation encountered here between the 
primacy of the livings parts and the primacy of the spirit comes across as very 
Derridean: it rehearses the same caution that underpins Derrida’s refusal to 
support either materialism or idealism and thus his fashioning of iterability as 
the repetition of material iterations of a concept concomitant with the ideality 
of that concept. In the anima-ted poem, the life or spirit comes about when the 
living parts work together, but it is equally true that the parts need to be 
animated in the first place. By refusing to place either the initiative of the parts 
or the spark of spirit as primary, Hughes ultimately circles animation itself as 
the principle underpinning poetry. 
To be fair, the same could be said and has been said about any literary 
text or any use of language, for that matter. Derrida, after all, was writing about 
language in general when criticising the materialism of Saussure’s signifier, or 
                                                                
3 Ibid., p. 17. 
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Husserl’s phenomenological idealism. However, there is something particularly 
tempting about poetry that seems to make writers and theorists isolate it as a 
special form of (literary) language in which the animality of meaning is felt 
more acutely. Derek Attridge describes this seemingly special status of poetry 
thus: 
Far from being seen as held apart, signifier and signified […] are seen as 
unusually united in poetry. […] The idea that the distinctiveness (and 
special pleasurability) of poetic language lies in its capacity to heal, at 
least momentarily, the breach between signified and signifier, to 
produce a revitalized language that is not arbitrary and conventional 
but motivated and natural, echoes through discussions of poetry down 
the ages and receives both learned and popular expressions. […] [Paul] 
Valéry’s comment, “A poem should create the illusion of an indissoluble 
compound of sound and sense” could be matched in a hundred places 
from the writing of poets and their readers.4 
Besides identifying that the relationship between signifier and signified 
(or living parts and spirit, as per Hughes) is deemed to be special in poetry, 
Attridge is also able to chart a polemics in the history of ‘both learned and 
popular’ poetic discussions regarding the exact character of this special 
relationship. He identifies it primarily in Jakobson, one of his main 
interlocutors in this essay. Attridge names Jakobson’s main concern as the 
attempt to define what the ‘literariness’ of a literary text is, or in what way the 
language of literature differs from other forms of language.5 Jakobson’s answer 
was to classify the different functions of language so as to isolate the so-called 
poetic function which would account for literary language. One sees in 
Jakobson’s terminology that the literariness of literature will more readily be 
                                                                
4 Derek Attridge, ‘Literature as Imitation: Jakobson, Joyce, and the Art of Onomatopoeia’, in 
Peculiar Language: Literature as Difference from the Renaissance to James Joyce (London: Methuen, 
1988), pp. 127-157 (pp. 132-3). 
5 Ibid., p. 128. 
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found, for him, in poetry rather than prose. That becomes clearer when he 
defines the poetic function as language which is primarily focused on the 
‘message as such’ and not on other linguistic elements identified by him, such as 
addresser, addressee, context, code, or contact. As Attridge explains, the 
‘message’ is not in fact the referential meaning produced by the piece of 
language in question, but the utterance itself. It becomes clearer that literary 
prose, concerned as it often is with the referential meaning – here termed 
‘context’ – cannot rise to the task of embodying Jakobson’s poetic function 
fully. 
However, Attridge highlights that the very formulation of the poetic 
function is not without sizable problems. Most importantly, the line 
demarcating the difference between ‘“the context” (the orientation toward 
which is the referential function) and the “message”’6 is found to be shifting 
constantly so that the status of both functions remain unclear. For Attridge, 
Jakobson employs the term ‘message’ so as  
to isolate meaning that is present as an inherent part of the sign in 
contradistinction to a more strictly referential meaning. The “message” 
thus includes not only the chain of material signifiers, aural or visual, 
organized into grammatical relations with one another but also their 
meanings as given by the linguistic system, though without reference to 
the world beyond language.7 
In Saussurean terms, one could say that Jakobson is equating the 
message not only with the signifiers but also with their signified concept, 
without for all that signalling towards the referent. According to Attridge, 
                                                                
6 Ibid., p. 129. 
7 Ibid. 
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Jakobson avoids the term ‘referent’ precisely because, for the latter, ‘the only 
relevance “reference” can have in a discussion of the language system is as an 
aspect of linguistic meaning’.8 The delicate distinction here between referential 
and poetic function – grounded as they are on a focus on context (referent) and 
message (meaning) – will depend on how clear one finds the difference 
between concepts and real referents to be, especially when the referents are 
themselves abstract concepts.  
For Attridge, though, the main problem with this formulation is that one 
of the two functions is bound to have a very limited domain of language 
assigned to it. On the one hand, if the ‘message’ foregrounded by the poetic 
function comes to name the semantic functioning of linguistic signs, very little 
of language would be left to be accounted for by the referential function. As he 
puts it, ‘the “set towards the message” that characterizes poetry would 
embrace all language’s business with meaning and communication’.9 Jakobson 
does not wish to make of poetry and the poetic function such an ordinary 
aspect of language, and thus insists that what he calls the referential function 
equates to what others have named, as the bulk of language’s functioning, 
‘ideation’ or the ‘denotative’ or ‘cognitive’ function. On the other hand, then, 
this concession pushes the poetic function to a very limited domain of 
language, detached from almost all linguistic meaning. 
Attridge ascribes this conundrum to the conflict between two 
conceptions of poetic language that arrive to us (and to Jakobson) from a 
                                                                
8 Ibid. 
9 Ibid. 
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philosophical tradition which I argue is inseparable from the poetics and 
metaphysics of animality. Attridge differentiates these two conceptions 
according to their views regarding the bodily reality of poems and the role their 
signifiers and their form play in the creation of their meaning. This old 
conundrum is the one that challenged Saussure to account for a material non-
materiality of the aural signifier, or the one encountered by Husserl when 
trying to frame the ideality constituted by the materiality of writing,  or, as 
mentioned above, the dilemma that Derrida faced, between ideality and 
materiality, when he proposed the trace, iterability, différance, or the inscribed 
origin, as explored by Joshua Kates. It is also the difficulty posed by the totem 
to our understanding of an animal species as neither material nor ideal, but also 
both material and ideal. Finally, it is the hesitation between embodiment and 
transcendence – collected in the flickering between dancity and transcendanse 
and between dar a luz and dar à luz – that now haunts the field of Animal 
Studies in general, but particularly of Literary Animal Studies, which does not 
know what to do with the bodies of animals and the animality of bodies. 
The linguistic body of texts – their signifiers – is neglected in the 
transcendental practice of paraphrase and privileged in the formalist tendency 
to focus on the materiality of the text. Both stances are two ways of accounting 
for the production of meaning, therefore it is not surprising that the tension 
between them will be felt even more acutely in poetry, said to be even more 
powerfully meaningful. 
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Starting with the second of his scenarios, wherein the referential 
function is able to account for most of linguistic meaning-making, Attridge 
outlines one of the conceptions of poetic language:  
If meaning is largely the preserve of utilitarian discourse, poetry may be 
said to be a linguistic practice that specially emphasizes the material 
properties of language in certain organized forms and the capacity of 
these forms to provide pleasure and significance independently of 
cognitive content—a position with which a Renaissance theorist like 
[George] Puttenham would have had some sympathy.10 
In this idea, the ‘being’ of poetry is found in the opacity of its language 
and the specificity of its bodily reality as opposed to, or independently from, its 
signified concept(s). However, and especially confusing as Attridge points out 
later, this conception does not in any way challenge the idea that poetry is 
‘distinctive’, ‘pleasurable’, and ‘powerful’ or, in other words, that it is able to 
breach the distance between language and world. In this sense, the ‘opacity’ of 
words when they foreground their own material constitution would still 
reinforce the poetic impression that words are not so dislocated from reality as 
one feels in the case of prose or everyday language, since the very sounds and 
textures of words would be  able to constitute meaning. ‘If, on the other hand’, 
writes Attridge,  
the task of poetry is to heighten attention to the meanings of words and 
sentences, the distinctiveness of poetic language must lie in the 
particular forcefulness with which it presents its semantic content—a 
view much closer to that of the Romantic poets and given forceful 
expression in Wordsworth’s Preface to Lyrical Ballads.11 
And to emphasise both the age of the dilemma and how enmeshed in it 
Derrida’s thought always was, Attridge argues that ‘we see here the familiar 
                                                                
10 Ibid., p. 130, my emphasis. 
11 Ibid. 
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structure of supplementarity which has characterized discourse on the 
distinctiveness of literary language since classical times’.12 I suggest that the 
reason this discursive structure regarding poetics is so old and lasting is 
because it feeds (on) the productive, primordial force of arche-animality as well 
as the result of its repression: the vulgar animal (body) in all its philosophical 
promiscuity, as I argued in the chapter on Black Swan. Finally, Attridge 
summarises the dilemma thus: 
We seem to be confronted, then, both in Jakobson’s own theory and in 
the traditional ways, whether academic or popular, of talking about 
literature, with two conflicting accounts of the role of speech sounds13 
in the reader’s experience of poetic language as distinctive and 
gratifying. According to one, the sounds of language draw attention to 
themselves and their configuration, independently of their referential 
function; according to the other, they tend to disappear in an enhanced 
experience of referentiality. […] The divergence of view is, of course, a 
version of the old battle between formalism and realism, a restatement 
of the fundamental disagreement between Hermogenes and Cratylus.14 
 
Mimologism 
Attridge’s reference to Hermogenes and Cratylus cited above, as well as in the 
title of his section (‘Hermogenes or Cratylus?’), is a clear nod to Gérard 
Genette’s 1976 book-length study Mimologiques: Voyage en Cratylie, translated 
                                                                
12 Ibid. 
13 Attridge – and Jakobson – seems to foreground the aural mimeticism of words, but, as we 
shall see with Hughes, sound is not the only aspect of signifiers that can be said to imitate the 
world, not least because the world is not made up only of sounds. 
14 Attridge, pp. 133-4. The sheer challenge of the task is compounded by the fact that the two 
positions themselves undergo constant blurring, even if their essential difference is not erased. 
For example, Attridge points out that Stephen Ullmann names the two ‘kinds’ of words 
employed by each mode of poetry as, respectively, ‘opaque’ and ‘transparent’ words. However, 
the Group µ use the terms ‘opaque’ and ‘transparent’ in the opposite way. This lack of clarity 
renders Todorov’s definition of Jakobson’s poetic function as ‘a language that tends to become 
opaque’ both inescapably correct and inevitably incorrect given Jakobson’s own ambiguous 
position (p. 134). 
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by Thaïs E Morgan in 1994 as Mimologics: Voyage in Cratylusland. Mimologics is 
an arduous compilation and discussion of the history of the claim that 
language, both literary and not, can and does imitate the world, as well as of the 
counter-claim that language is simply conventional and unmotivated. Genette 
starts off with a careful analysis of Plato’s Cratylus and attributes the belief that 
language is mimetic to the eponymous character of the dialogue, while finding 
in Hermogenes’ arguments a defence of language as conventional. The 
character of Socrates in the dialogue disagrees slightly with Cratylus in that 
the former believes that actual natural languages fall short of the mimetic 
potential inherent in the linguistic raw materials (phonemes). That leads 
Genette into separating mimologism, the belief in mimetic language, into 
absolute (or primary) and secondary. Whereas Cratylus believes in primary 
mimologism insofar as he credits actual (Greek) language with realising its 
mimetic potential, Socrates would be an adherent of secondary mimologism 
since he believes that actual words fall short of the mimetic ideal that language 
can and should achieve. This mimologism is secondary to the extent that it 
invites its believer to interfere in the present linguistic status quo so as to 
artificially create the mimetic capabilities of which language is naturally capable. 
This secondary mimologism will have a considerable impact on poetic thinking 
throughout the centuries. 
Hermogenes, in his turn, does not express any opinion on whether the 
best natural language should be a mimetic one, but he insists that the linguistic 
material is not able to truly function mimetically due to its conventionality, 
which naturally leads to the conclusion that actual language is wholly 
Mimologism | 273 
 
 
conventional and thus not mimetic. Conventionalism would come to name the 
rather more modern stance taken by Saussurean linguistics, which views 
language as completely structural and differential. Saussurean 
conventionalism would reject entirely the notion that language should ideally 
be mimetic, since that would be an impossibility for a linguistics that ascribes 
linguistic functioning to differential relations. Finally, Genette finds yet 
another possible position in Leibniz, who agrees with Cratylus that language is 
mimetic (to some extent) but sees that as non-ideal. For him, the best language 
would be entirely philosophical and rational, devoid of the attempt to capture 
worldly reality, so that a philosophical necessity is felt to reform actual 
languages so as to make them less mimetic and more rational, in what Genette 
calls secondary conventionalism. He provides a helpful table which I have 
adapted here (Table 1). 
 Language should 
be mimetic 
Language can 
be mimetic 
Language is 
mimetic 
Absolute mimologism (Cratylus) Yes Yes Yes 
Secondary mimologism (Socrates) Yes Yes No 
Hermogenes  No No 
Absolute conventionalism (Saussure?) No No No 
Secondary conventionalism (Leibniz) No Yes Yes 
Table 1 Absolute and secondary mimologism and conventionalism.15 
                                                                
15 Gérard Genette, Mimologics: Voyage in Cratylusland, trans. by Thaïs E Morgan (Lincoln and 
London: University of Nebraska, 1994), p. 51. 
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Poetic reformation and animal reality 
The most relevant chapter for our purposes in Mimologics addresses the poetic 
and literary versions of secondary mimologism. While other thinkers had 
concluded that language needed to be reformed in order to fully take 
advantage of the mimetic resources provided by linguistics sounds, others 
believed that this reformed language would need to be poetry. For Socrates in 
Cratylus, the divine ‘law-giver’ who invented words and the names for things 
has clearly made a series of mistakes by combining sounds and things that do 
not resemble each other.16 Genette will thus point out that, for many, this 
failing in languages is the calling and task of poetry. The chapter, titled ‘Failing 
Natural Languages’ (‘Au défaut des langues’), addresses primarely Mallarmé’s 
poetics, and his belief on such a compensatory task for poetry: 
Languages are imperfect because multiple, the supreme one is missing. 
[…] [S]ince the immortal word remains tacit, the diversity of the idioms 
on earth prevents anyone from uttering words which, otherwise, were 
they to appear in a single flash, would be truth itself incarnate. […] I 
regret to see how discourse fails to express objects by means of keys 
that would correspond to them in coloring or in aspect – keys that do 
exist in the instrument of the voice. […] We long for words of brilliant 
splendour in sounds and sense […] – only let us remember that were it 
so, verse would not exist: philosophically speaking, verse remunerates the 
failing of natural languages, being their superior complement.17 
Genette points out that reference to the multiplicity of languages is a 
traditionally Hermogenist or conventionalism argument and is clearly 
presented in Saussure: the bond between the signifier and the signified is 
                                                                
16 Morgan remarks that, ‘for Christian thinkers, […] this “failing” in languages becomes 
implicated in the notion of original sin – the falling away of humanity form God and of human 
language(s) from Nature (unity)’ (Mimologics, p. 201), a Christian theorisation of language that 
we have seen at play in The Apple in the Dark. 
17 Mallarmé, quoted in Genette, pp. 212-3. 
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proved to be unmotivated by the existence of different signifiers for the same 
signified across languages. However, this multiplicity has not always been able 
to undermine the Cratylist position: for the Cratylus character in Plato, 
language in general (langage) is synonymous with the Greek language (langue), 
to the point that there is indeed only one language. Other mimologists simply 
assumed their own language to be the superior one among all others and the 
only one to accurately represent the word mimetically. And a third, ingenious 
Cratylist strategy is to point out that the objects of the world are multi-faceted, 
so that each culture will represent objects linguistically by choosing to 
foreground one of their aspects.  
As we saw, though, Socrates in the Cratylus points out that the actual 
lexicon falls short of true mimetic resemblance. However, language is still 
considered to be mimetic since it is simply a case of equating ‘language’ with 
‘the language of the gods’ – a better version of Greek, as it were. A similar shift 
can be seen in the Christian myth with regard to the language of God. Genette 
argues that this privileged language, whether Homeric or Adamic, has ‘the role 
of a nostalgic or consolatory myth into which are projected from afar all the 
virtues in which one’s own language is lacking as a real natural language – the 
one I write in and speak in’.18 This insight is crucial for my reading of zoopoetics 
and the theorisations that come with it in the field of Literary Animal Studies. 
For the ‘language of nature’ as gathered in the prelapsarian divine language can 
in modernity be read as ‘animal language’ or, perhaps more accurately, ‘animal 
                                                                
18 Genette, p. 214. 
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reality’. This self-titled non-humanist model would identify traditional (read: 
‘failed’) literary and linguistic representations of the ‘real’ (i.e. animal, natural) 
world as symptoms of a corrupt human culture. In blunt terms, fables and the 
metaphoric use of animals as a whole are seen as consequences of some 
Babelian catastrophe or a Fall from Nature which has produced a 
contemporary poetics unable to represent animals ‘accurately’. We shall have 
to read Hughes’s animal poetry in the context of these claims and as an attempt 
to circumvent this supposed corruption in language that severs a linguistic 
human from an animal Natural world. 
Animal poetry such as Hughes’s, which I argue attempts in a way to 
refashion language so as to get at animal reality, thus finds in Mallarmé a 
theoretical predecessor. The latter, rather than advocating that language be 
reformed to fully exploit its mimetic capacity, posits poetry – or ‘verse’ – as 
charged with ‘remunerating’ this failure inherent to natural languages. Poetry 
would thus not correct or change language, but, ‘compensate for it through 
some use of an order and a level (“superior complement”) other than that of 
natural language’.19 Two interconnected strange conclusions emerge. Firstly, 
this compensatory function of poetry turns out to be its raison d’être and that 
for which and from which it exists. And secondly, it logically follows that,  
if natural language were ‘perfect,’ ‘verse’ would have no reason for 
being; […] language itself would be a poem: poetry would be everywhere 
and consequently nowhere. […] A naturally mimetic language system20 
would render useless the poet’s art, which is the creation of an 
                                                                
19 Ibid., p. 215, emphasis in the original. 
20 This ‘naturally mimetic’ language would be opposed to the artificial supplement of poetry 
that seeks to artificially render language mimetic – although in the name of the natural mimetic 
capacity believed to have always already been present in the linguistic system. 
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artificially motivated (artificially natural, all in all) language system: 
‘verse’.21 
Here we are not very far from the claim that, if everyone were a poet 
and if language were perfectly mimetic, humans would be ‘at one’ with animal 
reality and the natural world. We shall see that, for Hughes, the task of poetry 
is not so much to reform language so as to make it more mimetic, but actually 
to bridge the gap between a failed everyday language and the rich world of 
animal reality. In short, a perfect (natural, mimetic, etc.) language is 
synonymous with a communion with the animal world. 
However, animality will be at play not only as the utopian realm which 
an imperfect language keeps foreclosed to us but, as we saw in Hughes’s 
statement, will also be lurking behind the very conceptualisation of literary 
meaning. In a way, this is entirely symptomatic: the bridging of the gap 
between the cultural human world of imperfect languages and natural animal 
reality is rehearsed, evoked, and projected in the attempt to fuse form and 
content, signifier and signified, word and meaning. The ubiquity of animality in 
this discussion may at first seem dizzying and court analytical inaccuracy, but 
will be key to finding an appropriate answer to the questions raised by the 
linguistic portrayal of animals and by the history of Western poetics. 
Therefore, the successful poem for Hughes comes across as an animal, a 
living entity with a life of its own, ‘but if any of the parts are dead… if any of the 
words, or images or rhythms do not jump to life as you read them… then the 
                                                                
21 Genette, p. 215. 
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creature is going to be maimed and the spirit sickly.’22 A failing poem would not 
even be a poem, but a simple collection of words, which are not alive and are 
not moved by a spirit. Mallarméan ‘verse’, as Genette describes it, rejects the 
element of chance (the arbitrariness of the sign) at work in everyday language 
and seeks to create ‘the irrefrangible necessity of a perfect, “supreme,” and […] 
divine language’.23 The fusion of Mallarmé’s and Hughes’s formulations points 
us to a desire for a divine language to the extent that it is able to create perfect, 
whole living beings. The poet would thus be an envious Adam, wishing to 
replicate in verse the power of God of creating animals by the means of the 
Word. 
 
The formation of ‘form’ 
At this point, it can be said that the question of form emerges as crucial to a 
discussion of the poetics of the animal or the animality of poetry. Genette 
refers to it as ‘the autonomy of the poetic form in relation to its signification’.24 
In Cartesian terms, the formalism that poetry seems to invite suggests an 
independence of the (animal) body from the soul-or-mind, or even some kind of 
radical materialism that prioritises bodies before souls. This has direct 
consequences for the field of Literary Animal Studies for two apparently 
contradictory reasons: firstly, as we saw, most scholarship on animality in 
literature does not work within a formalist framework even if, secondly, it 
                                                                
22 Hughes, ‘Capturing Animals’, p. 17. 
23 Genette, p. 218. 
24 Ibid. 
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strives precisely for a radical materialism that would resist speciesist accounts 
of animality. These complications derive from the very concept of form and 
how it has been understood in poetics.  
Angela Leighton, in her On Form, lays bare the discursive grid which 
form feeds and into which it emerges – it is veritably a matrix of disembodied 
spirits and material bodies which seem to suffuse the discourse of species. 
Looking back towards German Romanticism and Victorian aesthetics, Leighton 
quotes Schiller as saying: 
In a truly successful work of art the content should effect nothing, the 
form everything . . . Subject-matter, then, however sublime and all-
embracing it may be, always has a limiting effect upon the spirit, and it is 
only from form that true aesthetic freedom can be looked for. Herein, 
then, resides the real secret of the master of any art: that he can make 
his form consume [vertilgen] his material.25 
According to Leighton, the complex formulation connecting body and 
soul here can best be understood by light of the biological, animalistic 
overtones of the word vertilgen. Here we have the schema that reads ‘form’ as 
spiritual, in opposition to material matter. For Schiller, aesthetic form, 
therefore, ought to consume the (subject-) matter it attempts to express, if not 
obliterating it, at least ‘digesting’ and incorporating it into its spirituality. 
Material subject-matter, as the animal, biological substrate of the spirit, is 
disavowed and discredited in the call for spiritual, formal privilege. 
It is curious to note, thus, that in Schiller the artistic subject-matter is in 
no way conceptual or abstract, but actually thought of as the materiality of the 
                                                                
25 Schiller, quoted in Angela Leighton, On Form: Poetry, Aestheticism, and the Legacy of a Word 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007), p. 6. 
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‘real world’. Form, therefore, avoids embodiment and animality by discrediting 
not only the materiality of things, but also the materiality of art itself: if one 
were to read the quote as referring to painting, for instance, there is no 
reference – especially when discussing form – to paint as the material stuff of 
art. 
Schillerian form is defined as forma efformans, ‘forming form’, as the 
principle that gives shape to objects. This is the Ancient Greek concept of form, 
expounded by Aristotle, and discussed by Judith Butler: 
For Aristotle the soul designates the actualization of matter, where 
matter is understood as fully potential and unactualized. As a result, he 
maintains in de Anima that the soul is ‘the first grade of actuality of a 
naturally organized body.’ He continues, ‘That is why we can wholly 
dismiss as unnecessary the question whether the soul and the body are 
one: it is meaningless to ask whether the wax and the shape given to it 
by the stamp are one, or generally the matter [hyle] of a thing and that of 
which it is the matter [hyle].’ In Greek, there is no reference to ‘stamps,’ 
but the phrase, ‘the shape given by the stamp’ is contained in the single 
term ‘schema.’26 
Therefore, in Aristotle, too, ‘form’ stands for a shaping, immaterial 
principle that gives the shape through which matter appears. Wax exists 
materially, of course, even before taking the shape given to it by the stamp, but 
once stamped, it is not possible to separate the wax itself from the insignia 
whose shape it has taken. The materiality that the formal principle itself has in 
this analogy – the stamp – conveniently vanishes in the word schema so as to 
secure its spirituality. On the other hand, the difference between Schiller and 
Aristotle is also clear: whereas the former makes no mention of the material 
                                                                
26 Judith Butler, Bodies That Matter: On The Discursive Limits of “Sex” (London and New York: 
Routledge, 1993), pp. 32-3. 
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substrate of form (e.g. wax), the latter does not refer to subject-matter, that 
which the waxen seal design is supposed to represent. This difference, 
however, points towards my ongoing argument that both these ‘instances’ of 
materiality (i.e. material things in the world, and the matter of signifiers and 
media) are mirrors of each other, both effects of a body being disavowed by the 
spirit.  
One could also conclude that Schiller and Aristotle collapse differences 
in different ways. Aristotle, despite claiming that the wax and its shape are 
indistinguishable, does differentiate between them, to the point of proposing a 
distinguishing terminology. But he conflates the schema, the image the wax 
takes, with that which it represents. That truth in the real world for Greeks 
resided not in the empirical phenomenality of things but in the abstract schema 
that made them possible is well-known, therefore enabling Aristotle’s 
conflation of image and reality here. Reality is thus abstract and spiritual, 
comprising of things and schemata, while only unrealised, potential, formless 
matter such as wax – or animal flesh – is purely material. Schiller, on the other 
hand, conflates the difference, in painting, between paint and brushstroke, in 
fact heeding Aristotle’s dismissal of the possibility of distinguishing between 
paint’s materiality and the lines and shapes it takes on the canvas. Schiller’s 
body and soul dichotomy is reversed, since he believes that spiritual form 
(comprising both ‘wax’ and its shape) is opposed to the materiality of the things 
in reality it represents. 
Leighton shows that this confusion regarding form is both unsettling 
and productive. Coleridge, for example, ‘worries about [form’s] dual affiliation 
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to shaped thing and imaginative outline’, so that ‘he writes that “all form as 
body, i.e. as shape, & not as forma efformans is dead.” […] Form is not a body 
but an agent. It forms’.27 While form is still spiritual, the idea of a disavowed 
(animal) body is still there, as the formed product of form. Victorian aesthetics, 
however, shifts the meaning of the word to give it a bodily presence, equating it 
with the visual shape of art and, ultimately, with beauty.28 Form is associated 
with sensual tactility, but also – perhaps when overdone – criticised as 
‘affectation’ getting in the way of a direct message, that is, becoming opaque.29 
The dichotomy between form and message is already sedimented in Oscar 
Wilde, shifting the positions of matter and spirit: if for Schiller subject-matter is 
material and form spiritual, for Wilde and other Victorians form is the bodily 
aspect of art, which conveys not the material world, but a conceptual 
message.30 This formulation of the relationship between form and content is 
the one that most agrees with Saussure, the linguistic turn, the structuralist 
revolution that followed, and, of course, the one most relevant for Hughes’s 
Modernist poetics.  
Modernist aesthetics mostly ascribed to this formula, with British 
painter Clive Bell, for instance, insisting on the privilege of ‘forms and colours’ 
over subject matter or message, echoing the traditional autonomy of form in 
                                                                
27 Leighton, p. 7. 
28 Ibid., p. 9. 
29 The moral overtones of this formulation are clear: the sensuousness of embodiment always 
poses a threat to the natural primacy of spiritual conceptuality. This threat is perceived both as 
the danger of animalisation and as the ‘sins of the flesh’. In Of Grammatology, Derrida connects 
the similar definition of sin by Malebranche (‘the inversion of the natural relationship between 
the soul and the body in passion’ [p. 37]) to the subjugation of writing to speech. 
30 Leighton, p. 11. 
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poetry as described by Genette.31 Bell, in fact, famously used the term 
‘significant form’ to refer to the formal aspects of painting he was 
foregrounding. If, on one hand, ‘lines and colours’ seem to be isolated from 
signification by their privileging, the fact that such formal features are 
‘significant’ complicates matters. As Leighton puts it,  
‘Significant Form’ in fact registers the contrary pressure of significance. 
[…] Mostly, of course, Bell is simply arguing that ‘lines and colours’ are 
more significant than the thing they represent. But the fact that 
‘significance’, in the sense of both ‘importance’ and ‘import’, is essential 
to form does somewhat qualify the formalist sounds of the phrase. […] 
The need for ‘significance’ compromises the purity or self-sufficiency of 
form.32  
The form of art must have priority over the message, but it must still be 
‘significant’, in a hesitant formulation that betrays an inability to find the 
proper place of, precisely, significance. This problem is strikingly similar to the 
tricky issue faced by Jakobson, as described by Attridge, of how to account for 
interaction between the poetic function and the referential function. This 
points to a systematic difficulty in decoupling bodily form from immaterial 
meaning and ultimately derives, I argue, from the fraught poetics and 
conceptualisations of animality as the result of the repression of arche-
animality. 
 
                                                                
31 Ibid., pp. 12-3. 
32 Ibid., p. 13. 
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Mimological contradictions 
Genette sums up the paradox operating in many accounts of poetic language, 
also pointed out by Attridge when he stresses how the word ‘opaque’ can 
describe both a mimetic and a non-mimetic word, depending on the author: 
In this way, paradoxically (we encountered this paradox […] in Valéry […] 
[and] in Jakobson), far from increasing the transparency of the vocable, 
its very mimetic virtue seems to be the necessary and sufficient 
condition for its aesthetic autonomy and opacity. The more ‘semblant’ 
the poetic word is, the more perceptible it becomes.33 
We are here back to Jakobson’s conundrum as described by Attridge. 
Genette points out that Jakobson initially put forth a formalist understanding 
of poetics grounded on the palpability of the signifiers when they call attention 
to themselves independently of their meaning.34 However, Jakobson presents 
a different side of his theorisation which actually defends that ‘poetic language 
no longer deviates from the expressive potentials of natural language; it 
respects and exploits them’.35 In poetry, Jakobson argues that ‘the internal 
nexus between sound and meaning changes from latent to patent and 
manifests itself most palpably and intensely’.36 It is clear that now poetic 
language is credited with being able to copy reality, even if the palpability of 
this nexus stands in stark contrast to the palpability that was said to be 
produced by the independence of sound and sense. Genette tries to provide an 
account of how these two different, seemingly contradictory kinds of 
palpability can be made to co-exist: in a formalist framework, ‘the “arbitrary” 
                                                                
33 Genette, p. 238. 
34 Ibid., pp. 239-40. 
35 Ibid., p. 241. 
36 Jakobson, quoted in Genette, p. 241. 
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signifier is perceptible because it is arbitrary and therefore made prominent by 
its very lack of motivation, its mimetic inadequation, ultimately its incongruity, 
which is a form of defamiliarization (ostranenie)’.37 However, according to a 
mimological desire,  
the mimetic sign (or the sign considered to be mimetic), theoretically 
‘transparent’ through its mimeticism, is in fact unusual and therefore 
perceptible for this very reason, especially if it produces a contrast and 
an exception within the context and/or within the system.38 
In this second scenario, we have the apparently paradoxical idea of a 
perceptible transparency, whereas in the former it was the opacity of 
arbitrariness that was perceptible. Both these ‘palpabilities’ seem counter-
intuitive, though, for different reasons: if perceptible transparency seems to be 
contradictory, the perceptibility of arbitrary signs would have to be present in 
every utterance produced with regular linguistic signs, even in ‘ordinary’ 
everyday language. What I have called the philosophical promiscuity of such 
animalised concepts is pointed out by Genette when he stresses that ‘these 
theoretical rationalizations are perfectly reversible, and the positions actually 
determine each other’ and that it is at the level of unarticulated and unthought 
biases that Jakobson’s (and others’) ‘Formalist attitude enters into conflict with 
Cratylian desire – to the great advantage, here, of the latter’.39 As it is, 
formalism comes across as a theoretical position of principle, even if its 
practical application is uncertain of success and undermined by a mimological 
desire. 
                                                                
37 Genette, p. 242. 
38 Ibid. 
39 Ibid. 
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This seems to confirm what Genette argues to be the ‘untenable’ status 
of an essentially formalist poetics for Genette. However, the animalised 
meanings that underpin the very formulation of formalism would seem to 
invite us to strive to make formalism work in the name of a non-speciesist 
poetics that would liberate the body of form from subjugation to the soul of 
content. The whole problem seems to stem from the double pressure exercised 
on form, and this connects to some of Derrida’s complications of the concept of 
the signifier. 
 
The Derridean trace as a meditation on bodily form 
As I have shown before, Susan McHugh, in her position papers on Literary 
Animal Studies, arrives at a dilemma: assuming that an animal has a subjectivity 
similar to a human’s threatens to efface species difference, and ignores the 
metaphysical basis for the difference between body and mind. On the other 
hand, defending an animal transcendence to textuality overlooks the 
limitations of philosophies of materialism. As I have consistently argued, I 
believe there is a Derridean, paleonymic answer to the problem. 
This conundrum is the same that Derrida faces when deconstructing the 
linguistic sign. More specifically, the question of how to approach the 
materiality of signs is the problem that opens the way for Derrida to propose 
most of his ideas. This is also, not coincidentally, analogous to the age-old 
discussion regarding form I attempted to outline above. Either form is material 
as opposed to an ideal content, or it is ideal as opposed to material matter. This 
materiality, however, is never clearly delineated, since neither paint or wax – to 
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use the same examples – are ever seriously considered to be actual formal (i.e. 
material) aspects. The material aspect of artistic expression is never purely 
material and can always refer to an even more material substrate. Hence, 
a. Speech is the material medium for signifieds, but is in turn supported by 
the voice, which is grounded on sound, whose material substrate is air; 
b. Writing is traditionally thought to represent speech, so it is already a 
material manifestation of something else. But written words exist 
phenomenally as ink, graphite, pixels, etc. and these in turn require a 
substrate such as paper; 
c. In painting, one speaks of form when referring to brushstrokes, but they 
are made entirely out of paint itself, which also requires a material 
support such as canvas; 
d. In (written) literature, ideas or content are ‘expressed’ by means of 
words, or, more rigorously, signifiers. Written signifiers (graphemes) 
are, however, supposed to be nothing but the materialisation of aural 
signifiers (phonemes). Even graphemes, however, cannot coincide with 
their own instances: each grapheme occurs only ‘once’ in a language and 
each instantiation of it is only a citation. These instantiations are, again, 
constituted by a material such as ink, which needs a support such as 
paper. 
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In literature, therefore, one would hardly consider pertinent to a formal 
analysis the chemical composition of the ink, the typography of the text,40 or 
the texture of the paper. Yet these are the most material aspects of texts, in 
which formalism is purportedly interested. This insight can be found already in 
Saussure and Husserl, for example, for whom signifiers, though more material 
than the concepts they express, are nevertheless reconfigured as a ‘sound-
image’ or ‘the voice that keeps silent’. ‘Material’ signifiers are constituted, 
according to Saussure and Derrida, by a play of differences, and cannot, 
therefore, be entirely material. For this and other reasons, Derrida in Of 
Grammatology will multiply the form/content duality into three elements: 
expression, form, and content. He credits Hjelmslev with  
isolat[ing] a concept of form which permitted a distinction between 
formal difference and phonic difference, and this even within ‘spoken’ 
language [langue] itself. Grammar [form] is independent of semantics 
[content] and phonology [expression]. […] The idea of a linguistic 
function […] excludes then not only the consideration of the substance 
of expression (material substance) but also that of the substance of the 
content (immaterial substance). […] The study of the functioning of 
language, of its play, presupposes that the substance of meaning and, 
among other possible substances, that of sound, be placed in 
parenthesis.41 
In his deconstruction of Husserl, Derrida identified in the former’s 
conception of subjectivity the unspoken possibility of both Husserlian idealism 
                                                                
40 With the exception, perhaps, of concrete poetry and prose – texts which work the 
possibilities of page layout, typography, etc. However, as Genette argues, the radical formalism 
of concrete literature may be ultimately untenable, since it would invite poets and readers to 
consider words and signs as things, which, as we saw, risks the very identity of the sign. 
Concrete poetry, for Genette, is ‘the ever open possibility of an activity that would effectively 
utilize the phonic and/or graphic material of natural language for artistic ends’. However, the 
limitation to this possibility is that ‘this material would then no longer consist of “words,” or at 
least that these words would no longer exist as such’ (p. 233). 
41 Jacques Derrida, Of Grammatology, Fortieth Anniversary Edition, trans. by Gayatri 
Chakravorty Spivak (Baltimore: John Hopkins University, 2016), p. 62, first interpolation is the 
translator’s. 
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and of a naïve empirical materialism. Originary difference, its play and work, 
différance, the trace, iterability – these are all names for that which is enmeshed 
in its material support but which cannot be reduced to it. Literary Animal 
Studies can, therefore, find both the specific materiality of the animal and the 
bodily form of texts in the impure undecidable of that which is neither material 
nor immaterial. 
It is also no coincidence that the only passage in Of Grammatology that 
addresses literature as a theoretical problem emerges precisely in the 
discussion I have just quoted. Hjelmslev’s glossematics, for Derrida, frees the 
functioning of form from any specific substance, but, on the other hand, it also 
calls attention ‘to everything that, in the stratification of language [langage], 
depends on the substance of graphic expression’.42 In Of Grammatology, 
Derrida frees writing from its subordination to speech by showing that 
language depends on arche-writing. Therefore, he suggests that by  
recognizing the specificity of writing, glossematics did not merely give 
itself the means of describing the graphic element. It outlined access to 
the literary element, to what in literature passes through an irreducibly 
graphic text, linking the play of form to a determined substance of 
expression. If there is in literature something which does not allow itself 
to be reduced to the voice, to epos or to poetry, one cannot recapture it 
except by rigorously isolating the bond that links the play of form to the 
substance of graphic expression. […] It radicalizes the efforts of the 
Russian formalists, […] who in their attention to the being-literary of 
literature, perhaps privileged the phonological instance and the literary 
models that it dominates. Notably poetry. That which, in the history of 
literature and in the structure of a literary text in general, escapes that 
instance, merits a type of description whose norms and conditions of 
possibility glossematics has perhaps better brought forward. It has 
perhaps thus better prepared itself to study the purely graphic stratum 
                                                                
42 Ibid., p. 64, my emphasis. 
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within the structure of the literary text within the history of the 
becoming-literary of literality, notably in its “modernity.”43 
For Derrida, the play of form and difference is, to a certain extent, 
inseparable from all that is spatial and differential in writing. Here we find what 
in literature is essentially animalistic, insofar as ‘the animal’ and ‘writing’ 
rehearse the same questions concerning materiality. But it would mean no step 
away from a simple phenomenology of animal embodiment if it completely 
reduced the play of form to the spatiality and materiality of writing. It is the 
articulation between materiality and ideality, as mentioned above, gathered 
under the names supplementarity or arche-writing, that allows us to 
satisfactorily secure both the ‘literary’ and the ‘animal’ of Literary Animal 
Studies. Thus, Derrida adds that  
if the phonic substance lost its privilege, it was not to the advantage of 
the graphic substance, which lends itself to the same substitutions. […] 
Glossematics still operates with a popular concept of writing. […] It is 
very dependent and very derivative with regard to the arche-writing of 
which I speak here.44 
From this passage we can conclude that Derrida wishes to privilege not 
writing as a substance of expression, but arche-writing – not as a substance, but 
as the play of form. However, it is impossible for this play to emerge 
phenomenally, in texts, as such, for that would require the process of 
signification to appear without actually signifying anything – what Derrida and 
Barthes call signifiance. Similarly, there is no signification which is not, in a way, 
trapped in the support of a substance, since there are no signs without a 
sensible face. It is therefore only possible to identify the moment when or the 
                                                                
43 Ibid., p. 64-5. 
44 Ibid., p. 65. 
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site where textuality reveals the scar of the impossibility of simply signifying. 
Animal embodiment resides there, as the process of incarnation where that 
which is immaterial takes on a bodily shape. However, the act of embodiment 
proves elusive, even though to circle it might mean to isolate animality in 
textuality. This is the case since all that is embodied is immaterial as a spirit, 
and comes to reside in what is solid as a body, when we were, conversely, 
seeking a way of bracketing off both the immateriality of meaning and the 
bodiliness of signs. This is related to the impossibility of the sign as such, as 
exposed by Derrida: ‘There is no sign as such. Either the sign is considered a 
thing, and it is not a sign. Or it is a reference, and thus not itself’.45 In a text, 
signification appears to collapse into the material substance of expression or 
the immaterial substance of semantics, both of which I have argued are 
counter-productive objects for Literary Animal Studies. But signification as 
such – the signifiance that makes specific meanings possible – even if crucial for 
a zoogrammatological understanding of arche-animality, is not simply locatable 
for the reasons quoted above: it is either a referential arrow, and then not 
itself, or it loses its status of signification. 
 
Hughes 
These are indeed profound questions that could guide the most arduous, 
Derridean attempts at reading texts’ unspoken conditions of meaning-making. 
In order to provide examples of reading practices that may be guided by such 
                                                                
45 Ibid., p. 222. 
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questioning, but also as some kind of manifesto exposing the difficulties of 
animal poetry, I turn to Ted Hughes’s ‘The Thought-Fox’, originally published in 
The Hawk in the Rain in 1957: 
 I imagine this midnight moment’s forest:  
 Something else is alive  
 Beside the clock’s loneliness  
 And this blank page where my fingers move.  
 
 5 Through the window I see no star:  
 Something more near 
 Though deeper within darkness  
 Is entering the loneliness:  
 
 Cold, delicately as the dark snow,  
10 A fox’s nose touches twig, leaf;  
 Two eyes serve a movement, that now 
 And again now, and now, and now  
 
 Sets neat prints into the snow  
 Between trees, and warily a lame  
15 Shadow lags by stump and in hollow  
 Of a body that is bold to come 
 
 Across clearings, an eye, 
 A widening deepening greenness,  
 Brilliantly, concentratedly,  
20 Coming about its own business 
 
 Till, with a sudden sharp hot stink of fox 
 It enters the dark hole of the head. 
 The window is starless still; the clock ticks, 
 The page is printed.46 
This poem rehearses not only many of the issues raised in the discussion 
above regarding the ability of poetic language to capture and/or represent 
accurately the other-than-human world but also the poetics of animality (or 
the animality of his poetics) that Hughes espouses in Poetry in the Making. In 
                                                                
46 Ted Hughes, ‘The Thought-Fox’, Ted Hughes: Poems, selected by Simon Armitage (London: 
Faber and Faber, 2000), p. 3, line numbers added. 
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fact, the chapter ‘Capturing Animals’ does include ‘The Thought-Fox’ as an 
‘example’ of the poetics Hughes describes, and the cover of Poetry in the Making 
contains a drawing of a fox. Hughes ends up by offering the poem as a form of 
compensatory poetic activity analogous to capturing animals, since he 
confesses that ‘an animal that [he] never succeeded in keeping alive is the fox’, 
as the ones he captured were either set free or killed by others.47 ‘The 
Thought-Fox’ is then presented as his first ‘animal’ poem, as a direct 
compensation for those ‘lost’ foxes. 
Thus, Alex Davis argues that the poem sets out to be clearly mimetic in 
its attempt to ‘render its object […] in all its physical actuality’ and he quotes 
Neil Roberts as stating that the poetic fox becomes ‘a real autonomous 
creature moving the natural world’. Most importantly, Davis points out that 
the poem comes across as almost a poetic manifesto by Hughes, and that he 
selected this poem to open his three collections of poetry.48 What is surprising 
for Paul Bentley is that ‘early critical response to Hughes [resists] the idea […] 
that Hughes’s animals have any symbolic meaning’. As one critic puts it, his 
poetry is ‘a kind of naïve admiration for animal life – a kind of raw nature cult, 
which assumes that human consciousness brings only limitation’ and, in the 
words of another, his interest is in ‘the bruising darkness of instincts and 
sensations, where the mind runs itself hard against the brute physical facts of 
                                                                
47 Hughes, ‘Capturing Animals’, p. 19. 
48 Alex Davis, ‘Hughes and Post-Modernism’, in Ted Hughes, ed. by Terry Gifford (London: 
Palgrave, 2015), pp. 25-39 (p. 27). 
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blood and action, landscape and weather’. Finally, Bentley summarises that 
Hughes’s ‘animals are just animals, their violence, life itself, without meaning’.49 
From a slightly different perspective, Bentley shows that A. Alvarez 
‘places Hughes in the context of an age of psychoanalysis, an age coming to 
terms with new revelations about the Holocaust’,50 similar to Davis’s claim that 
Hughes’s poetry ‘is a monumental chapter in that which [Carrie] Rohman, [in 
her book Stalking the Subject: Modernism and the Animal], describes as “[t]he 
twentieth-century eruption of animality, often encoded as the eruption of the 
unconscious, [which] parallels the Modernist explosion of linguistic 
convention”’.51 This debate goes to the heart of the issue of the transparency of 
poetic language and of the reality of that which is perceived beyond the glass of 
the linguistic sign. Alex Davis shows that, for Antony Easthope, Hughes ignores 
Modernism and the linguistic turn of the twentieth century so that his poetry 
aims, instead, for transparency. However, Davis himself argues that Easthope 
identifies only ‘the desire for unmediated “transparency” in Hughes’s poetics, 
[and] ignores the nagging recognition, repeatedly raised in Hughes’s poetry and 
prose, that language is a sign-system by means of which the referential world is 
constructed, and thus occluded, rather than simply accessed’, and he cites ‘The 
Thought-Fox’ as an instance of an animal poem that seek to capture what is 
‘out there’ all the while recognising itself as a poem.52 Given that Hughes 
                                                                
49 Paul Bentley, ‘The debates about Hughes’, in The Cambridge Companion to Ted Hughes, ed. by 
Terry Gifford (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011), pp. 27-39 (pp. 28-9). 
50 Ibid., p. 29. 
51 Davis, p. 34. 
52 Ibid., p. 33. 
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admits in ‘Capturing Animals’ that ‘the words [of ‘The Thought-Fox’] have made 
a body for [the fox] and given it somewhere to walk’,53 Davis’s point would 
suggest that Hughes’s is a poetics of tragedy: it constantly asserts the necessity 
and desire to break with and from the limitations of human linguistic 
conceptuality for the sake of a unity with the animal energies of Nature, but 
also constantly admits the failure to do so. 
However, the hesitation already present in Hughes’s formulation of the 
interface between a poem’s ‘parts’ and its ‘spirit’ emerges again in his 
description of the poem in a way that points towards a more sophisticated 
answer than those described above: 
This poem does not have anything you could easily call a meaning. It is 
about a fox, obviously enough, but a fox that is both a fox and not a fox. 
What sort of a fox is it that can step right into my head and where 
presumably it still sits… smiling to itself when the dogs bark. It is both a 
fox and a spirit. It is a real fox; as I read the poem I see it move, I see it 
setting its prints, I see its shadow going over the irregular surface of the 
snow. The words show me all this, bringing it nearer and nearer. It is 
very real to me.54 
As I argued before, this hesitation may suggest an attempt to eschew 
the paralysing dilemma sketched out by Attridge and Genette regarding the 
true character of the poetic function and the true extent of language’s mimetic 
power. Richard Webster, however, sees it as an inevitable consequence of 
Hughes’s proclaimed interest in fusing with Nature as it clashes with his own 
identity as a rational, intellectual, masculine poet:  
It might be suggested that the sensibility behind Hughes’s poem is more 
that of an intellectual – an intellectual who, in rebellion against his own 
                                                                
53 Hughes, ‘Capturing Animals’, p. 20. 
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ascetic rationalism, feels himself driven to hunt down and capture an 
element of his own sensual and intuitive identity which he does not 
securely possess.55 
For Webster, ‘the orthodox rationalist, it might be said, inflicts the 
violence of reason on animal sensuality in an obsessive attempt to eliminate it 
entirely’, ‘for he doesn’t want the hot sensual reek of fox clinging to his pure 
rational spirit, reminding him that he once possessed such an obscene thing as 
a body’.56 Hughes, however, apparently celebrates this sensual reek, but the 
poem reveals a surprising similarity to the ‘puritanical rationalist’ in that 
Hughes ‘unconsciously inflicts the violence of an art upon animal sensuality in a 
passionate but conflict-ridden attempt to incorporate it into his own rationalist 
identity’.57 For him, Hughes only allows himself to nurture his ‘feminine’ poetic 
sensibility if encased and protected by a hard shell of ‘masculine’ violence. 
Thus, he points out that the poem’s delicate description of the fox’s nose – and 
its fascination with the sensual stink of the fox – is overthrown by the 
‘predatory impulse’ behind the equation of poetic creation with capturing 
animals. The last stanza of the poem, recording the success of poetic craft and 
animal capture, would come across as ‘a ritual of tough “manly” posturing’.58 
Therefore, Webster reads the poem as ‘one in which a sensuality or 
sensuousness which might sometimes be characterised as “feminine” can be 
incorporated into the identity only to the extent that it has been purified by, or 
                                                                
55 Richard Webster, ‘“The Thought-Fox” and the Poetry of Ted Hughes’, Critical Quarterly 26.4 
(1984), 35-45 (p. 38). 
56 Ibid., p. 39. 
57 Ibid. 
58 Ibid. 
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subordinated to, a tough, rational, artistic will’.59 These arguments are 
extremely relevant to Hughes’s own claim that he was able to make a body for 
the fox in the very words of the poem. According to Webster’s reading, the 
corporeality of the fox – which the poet allegedly celebrates – is sacrificed and 
transmogrified into the corporeality of poetic form. As we saw, Hughes does 
indeed conceive of poetic form in animal terms, so that it may be said that he 
believes ‘The Thought-Fox’ operates a successful act of translation of vulpine 
corporeality into textual corporeality. Webster disagrees: for all the 
concessions given by the poet that he treasures bodily sensuality, he reveals an 
allergy to it which is in fact soothed by the ideality of poetic form. In other 
words, Webster believes that Hughes chooses to overlook the limitations of 
poetic formalism and the inevitably ideal status of the supposedly material 
signifiers of poetry. 
Surely, in ‘Capturing Animals’ Hughes does come across sometimes as 
defending what Genette would call a naïve ‘mimological reverie’ with regard to 
the mimetic power of language. Consequently, in order to grant a poem the life 
he believes it deserves, he says one must picture it like an animal with living 
parts and a spirit. Poetically, that means that, ‘as a poet, you have to make sure 
that all those parts over which you have control, the words and rhythms and 
images, are alive.’60 He then produces a list of ‘words that live’, which for him 
mean words that mimetically present what they mean: click, chuckle, freckled, 
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veined, vinegar, sugar, prickle, oily, tar, onion, flick, and balance.61 These living 
words not only stimulate the senses, but  
belong to several of the senses at once, as if each one had eyes, ears and 
tongue, or ears and fingers, and a body to move with. It is this little goblin 
in a word which is its life and its poetry, and it is this goblin which the 
poet has to have under control.62 
Hughes’s recipe to be able to exert that control and not allow words to 
‘kill each other’ is to  
imagine what you are writing about. See it and live it. Do not think it up 
laboriously, as if you were working out mental arithmetic. Just look at it, 
touch it, smell it, listen to it, turn yourself into it. When you do this, the 
words look after themselves, like magic. If you do this you do not have to 
bother about commas or full-stops or that sort of thing. You do not look 
at the words either. You keep your eyes, your ears, your nose, your taste, 
your touch, your whole being on the thing you are turning into words. The 
minute you flinch, and take your mind off this thing, and being to look at 
the words and worry about them… then your worry goes into them and 
they set about killing each other.63 
This passage is striking and presents a coherent if rather familiar 
poetics. Living, poetic words should be transparent, and they achieve that 
transparency when they emulate that which they are representing so as to 
vanish in resemblance. The words may be unusual and eccentric in their 
vividness, but the successful poet does not pay attention to them as words. 
Attention is entirely focused on the subject-matter of the poem, which is then 
‘turned into words’ by a rather magical procedure of coupling the sensual 
aspects of reality to the sensual aspects of words. It is unclear what role the 
semantic meaning of the words play, if at all, and whether it guides the poet 
into selecting them for the poem. If this formulation comes across as simple 
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62 Ibid., p. 18, my emphases. 
63 Ibid. 
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mimologism, it also presents a clear vision of the interrelatedness of the 
corporeality of reality and the corporeality of the text. This interrelatedness, 
however, is not theorised in enough detail by Hughes himself. After all, as Davis 
pointed out, this passage could be read as an extremely vague description of 
language as ‘constructing’ the referential world, which is then ‘occluded, rather 
than simply accessed’: the reason why the poet can find ‘living’ words that 
match the vividness of reality is that this very vividness is composed of the 
vitality of the words. For Davis, ‘the thought-fox’s corporeality, its “body”, is 
linguistic; and Hughes is determined, in this context, to emphasize the 
animating power of poetic language’.64 At any rate, we do not need to find in 
this Hughes passage a definite position regarding il n’y a pas de hors-texte. More 
likely than not, Hughes shows here poets’ familiar shortcomings when talking 
about their own work and giving an account of their own poetics, which can 
usually come across completely differently in their poems. Alternatively, these 
suggestions can be read as guidelines for beginners and children interested in 
writing poetry, reassuring them that they do not need to worry about 
technique. 
The notion that Hughes’ poetry represents, not reality itself, but the 
poet’s mental experience of that reality, can not only be read in the passage 
quoted above about concerted imagining, but is brought out by Davis when he 
writes that ‘Hughes’s is an expressive form of mimesis; that is, it seeks not only 
to render its object […] but also the experiencing subject’s (the poet’s) 
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emotional and imaginative response to that object’, which he recognises as a 
Romantic influence.65 An important difference would be that, ‘whereas in 
Romanticism the “organic form” of a poem is usually perceived as comparable 
to that of vegetable life, in Hughes it is here rendered in bestial terms’,66 as we 
could see in his equation of a poem with animal life. For Keith Sagar, Hughes 
adopts the fox as his ‘totem’, which means that Hughes ‘recognized it (along 
with the wolf) as an outward living embodiment of everything within his own 
psyche which has been persecuted, injured, imprisoned, either by his culture or 
by his own rational intellect’, which is similar to Webster’s argument. ‘The poet 
must,’ Sagar continues, ‘hunt for what will give his thought a living body, with a 
life beyond his own.’ The hunting image, already highlighted by Webster, is 
then softened by the assertion that ‘the first words [of ‘The Thought-Fox’], “I 
imagine”, are his opening of the door, his invocation to “something else” to visit 
him out of the darkness’.67 
 
Pawprints and onomatopoeia 
In an attempt to experiment with the zoogrammatological poetics that I have 
been discussing, and to tentatively give in to the formalist seduction as it is 
apparently triggered by the poetics of animality, I shall read ‘The Thought-Fox’ 
for the procedure of its formation as it tries to capture the form of animality. 
                                                                
65 Ibid., pp. 26-7, my emphasis. 
66 Ibid., p. 28. 
67 Keith Sagar, ‘The Thought-Fox’, Keith Sagar: Literary Critic and Poet  
<http://www.keithsagar.co.uk/downloads/hughes/thought-fox.pdf> [accessed 14 February 
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Rather than the fox ‘itself’, the most animal aspect of the text seems to be a 
technique one could simultaneously call visual rhyming and visual 
onomatopoeia: the recurrent appearance of the letter w, seemingly 
representing the pawprint of the fox. The third stanza has three lines ending in 
w, its fourth line also containing two internal word-ending ones. The fourth 
stanza contains two lines ending so. A letter thus isolated does not, of course, 
constitute a morpheme and has, therefore, no meaning. It has simply a material 
face. Not thoroughly material, though, otherwise we would not be able to say 
that it is a repeating letter: strictly materially speaking, each of the inky shapes 
we are calling instances of the letter w are completely independent, unique 
material occurrences. Repeatability, or what Derrida calls iterability, requires a 
certain ideality so that the ‘same’ letter can be manifest in different instances. 
What the text seems to mark as its bodily, material aspects already seem to 
betray some textuality. 
This is especially relevant since onomatopoeia is precisely Attridge’s 
focus in the remainder of his essay ‘Literature as Imitation’, since 
onomatopoeia is, for him, ‘a concrete example of what appears to be language 
functioning unproblematically as direct imitation of the real world’.68 In 
analysing the use of onomatopoeia by Joyce, Attridge intends to address the 
problems he himself identified in Jakobson and other commentators on poetry. 
Attridge separates onomatopoeia into nonlexical and lexical. Regarding 
nonlexical onomatopoeia, which he defines as ‘the use of the phonetic 
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characteristic of the language to imitate a sound without attempting to 
produce recognizable verbal structures’,69 he lists eight complicating factors to 
their task of sound imitation, being four of them focused on the supposed 
directness of the onomatopoeic representation and the other four on the 
alleged preciseness of that representation. 
His first example, from Ulysses, consists of a series of ‘words’ 
representing the sounds of farts and a passing tram: prrprr, fff, pprrpffrrppffff, 
kran kran kran, krandlkrankran, kraaaaaa, etc. Attridge’s first and second 
points stress the fact that onomatopoeia, despite appearing to autonomously 
reference a non-linguistic reality, depend wholly on a language system for their 
functioning. The reader must be familiar not only with the phonological system 
of English but also with its writing system in order to interpret these 
graphemes as representing a specific sound. In short, even these nonlexical 
strings must make reference to ‘common’ words that employ the same letters 
so as to offer the reader the sound they are meant to represent, so that 
‘onomatopoeia does not lead us into a realm of direct and concrete significance 
[…]; we remain firmly held within an already existing system of rules and 
conventions’,70 and the mimetic capacity the strings seem to have are entirely 
dependent on these conventions. Not only that, but the reader cannot help but 
read these sequence of letters within what Bolinger calls a ‘phonesthetic 
constellation’ or what Genette calls ‘eponymy’. Hence, the series of fs suggests 
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the word ‘fart’, ‘kran’ resembles ‘tram’, ‘krandl-’ connects to other words 
ending in ‘-le’ that refer to ‘movement and noise’, such as ‘trundle’, ‘rumble’, 
‘grumble’, ‘scramble’, etc.71 And ‘prrr-‘ suggest the word ‘purr’ which is, 
according to Attridge, like a fart, ‘another long-drawn-out sound made by the 
expulsion of air through a restricted passage’,72 a physiological point made in 
passing that I shall come back to in order to discuss the perceived success of 
onomatopoeia. 
His third and fourth points also discuss the necessity of conventionality, 
especially of onomatopoeia itself as a genre. For example, the reader must be 
aware that a long sequence of f’s is supposed to represent an elongated sound, 
even though a multiplication of letters does not result in that effect in the 
regular lexicon. Also, the difference between the onomatopoeia ‘cran’ and the 
alternative ‘kran’ is only understandable within the conventions of the genre, 
since they are both able to represent the sound /k/ equally well. Attridge 
ascribes the advantage of ‘kran’ over ‘cran’ to the fact that k sounds harsher 
than c owing to the latter’s possible ‘soft’ pronunciation in words like ‘cease’. 
This entirely graphemic distinction leads Attridge to the visual aspects of 
onomatopoeia, which comes closer to the phenomenon at stake in Hughes’s 
poem. Therefore, not only does k have harsher aural connotations than c, its 
sharp, angular shape can represent a harsh sound better than the smooth 
curve of the c. Possibly, the fact that the sequence of letters do not form a word 
                                                                
71 All these words are composed, etymologically, by means of the frequentative verbal suffix ‘-
le’, which derives words such as ‘suckle’ from ‘suck’, and describes actions that occur 
repeatedly. 
72 Attridge, p. 139. 
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would lead the reader into considering them in their materiality and shape. 
Some of the sequences are in fact unpronounceable, which would in fact 
undermine their status as onomatopoeia, so that they must rely in their visual 
effect. ‘Pprrpffrrppffff’, for example, differs from the other ones in that it 
contains letter that protrude above and below the line, perhaps suggesting the 
electricity cable of the tram above and the noisy wheels below connecting to 
the tracks. 
Points six and seven argue that onomatopoeic sequences cannot tell us 
much about the sounds they are supposed to represent. After all, the tram and 
fart in Ulysses are clearly introduced and portrayed linguistically before the 
reader is able to understand the sequences as representing such sounds. At 
any rate, most of these sequences are indeed very imprecise. As Attridge 
points out, ‘only a few nonvocal sounds, in fact, can be imitated with any degree 
of closeness by the speech organs’,73 so that no collection of letters will sound 
like a tram since the human mouth, whose sounds alphabetic systems were 
designed to represent, cannot properly emulate the sound of a tram. Most 
importantly, the relative success with which flatulence is onomatopoeically 
represented derives from the fact that a fart is ‘unusually amenable to vocal 
imitation in being a sound produced by an orifice by the human body’.74 Both its 
articulatory and acoustic properties resemble that of speech. Attridge then 
concludes that ‘we might even say that the only fully successful onomatopoeia 
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occurs when the human voice is imitated, which is what written language, in a 
sense, does all the time’.75 
It is indeed a strange notion that phonetic alphabets consist in fact of 
onomatopoeia of normal speech sounds. However, this does point to the 
important realisation that aural onomatopoeia do not represent acoustic 
phenomena, but rather articulatory ones. In other words, they do not 
represent sounds in the world, but the sounds a human mouth might produce 
when attempting to imitate those sounds – rather than sound waves, they 
represent phonemes. I have discussed before Saussure’s definition of the 
phoneme as ultimately not material, and this has been a contentious point for 
other commentators, as can be seen in Of Grammatology. We saw that Derrida 
demonstrates the impossibility of a phoneme that is wholly material, since it 
depends on the work of iterability. But it is also undeniable that it was 
convenient for Saussure’s phonocentrism to eliminate the materiality of the 
phonic signifier so as to secure something analogous to Husserl’s ‘voice that 
keeps silent’. What Attridge’s analysis of onomatopoeia demonstrates is the 
muscular nature of speech as it is produced by a series of bodily surfaces with 
different textures and movements. Certainly, they have to be acted on by air 
from the lungs, but whereas this airy aspect of speech has been seized upon by 
various thinkers to emphasise the ‘spiritual’ character of speech and language, 
the embodied, physical – one might say, animal – aspects of it have been 
overlooked, since even this jet of air must, of course, be pumped by a muscle. 
                                                                
75 Ibid. 
306 | CHAPTER 5: HUGHES AND POETRY 
 
 
These realities of speech have been known literally since time 
immemorial, but somehow it takes an analysis of onomatopoeia to highlight 
that language cannot imitate any sound – unless it is produced by a body cavity, 
when they can be approximately emulated by graphemes and phonemes. This 
realisation will have an even more forceful import for Attridge’s analysis of 
lexical onomatopoeia and how it addresses the conundrum he sees in Jakobson. 
Lexical onomatopoeia, unlike its non-lexical counterpart, the sound and the 
sense are experienced as much more inseparable from each other: ‘context is 
present in the words themselves, and it is virtually impossible to hear a sound 
as a sound when it simultaneously informs us what sound it is supposed to 
represent.’76 Initially, then, lexical items which present us with some kind of 
onomatopoeic force that can be said to have their ‘material’ face (i.e. their 
‘sheer sound’) always already contaminated by the ideality and conceptuality 
of their signified sense. That concession to the represented concept on the part 
of lexical onomatopoeia explains the attraction of non-lexical ones in their 
apparent unwavering materiality. In short, Attridge ultimately states that the 
theoretical interest of onomatopoeia lies in the opportunity it offers for an 
account of the experience of heightened meaning, which is one way of defining 
Jakobson’s poetic function. Non-lexical onomatopoeia, besides giving the lie to 
the notion of onomatopoeia as a form of realism, is less interesting because it 
cannot offer these insights.77 
                                                                
76 Ibid., p. 149. 
77 Ibid., p. 150. 
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His privileged example of lexical onomatopoeia from Joyce is the phrase 
‘thick syrupy liquor for his lips’. The inclusion in the phrase of the mouth as a 
referent is extremely relevant for the importance of the physical realities of 
speech as we saw above. Attridge then locates the source of the pleasure 
produced by this onomatopoeic phrase as ‘the momentary and surprising 
reciprocal relationship established between phonetic and semantic properties, 
a mutual reinforcement that intensifies both aspects of language’, although this 
reinforcement does not derive from a relationship of simple resemblance, as 
per his list of all the ways in which onomatopoeic mimesis falls short.78 The 
impression of heightened meaning is an experience of ‘interdependence and 
indivisibility between semantic and phonetic properties’, so that  
the result is neither direct apprehension of the physical world nor a 
focus on the sounds of speech as sounds: rather, it might be called a 
heightened experience of language as language. By that I do not mean 
language as a mere sequence of sounds, or a series of physical 
articulations, or even as sounds given identity by a system of 
differences, but language in the act of producing meaning and thereby 
momentarily fusing the abstractness of langue and the concreteness of 
parole, the ahistoricity of the system and the historicity of this moment 
in time, the shared social convention upon which language depends and 
the individuality of my vocal activities as I speak these words.79 
Here Attridge circles what he argues to be the being-language of 
language: the articulation between the material and the ideal which constitutes 
the work of language. The importance of Attridge’s conclusion for my 
discussion cannot be overstated: the ‘solution’ he puts forward for the poetical 
dilemma concerning the corporeality of poetic language consists of specifying a 
                                                                
78 Ibid., p. 151. 
79 Ibid., p. 152. 
308 | CHAPTER 5: HUGHES AND POETRY 
 
 
site where the very distinction between corporeal phonemes and ideal 
systemic meaning is both irrelevant and secondary. In a gesture that could be 
described as deconstructive, Attridge posits an ‘originary’ element that in its 
turn will furnish the differences between the material and the ideal. It is, of 
course, highly relevant that he finds this element in an instance of language 
that puts focus on the vocal apparatus as an embodied reality. The individuality 
of the ‘vocal activities’ and the historicity of the utterance in question is 
brought to the foreground by the highlighting of tongue, lips, and palate as one 
pronounces/reads the utterance itself. After all, the experience of drinking the 
syrupy drink would stimulate and bring pleasure and attention to the same 
body parts that are now being used to describe this very experience. It is the 
materiality of the vocal apparatus that secures the utterance’s historicity and 
individuality that Attridge ascribes to parole.  
At the heart of material existence, however, there seems to lie a lack 
which must continuously be referred to and compensated for by means of the 
ideal system of language. In lexical onomatopoeias that describe the mouth, 
there is enacted the articulation between ideal and material that takes place 
when a subject fills the material void of the oral cavity with the ideal breath of 
language. In that moment the subject can not only use language but also 
experience what Kristeva and Attridge would describe as the truth of 
language. This human experience of language as language is analogous to 
Hughes’s description of poems as an articulation of living parts and spirits and 
thus points to a parallelism between animality and language itself. Finally, it 
serves as a methodological guide for Literary Animal Studies to find its true 
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object of study if it accepts the importance of finding both the animal and the 
literary in the process of animation. 
All that being said, it is very telling that Attridge, when describing the 
source of power and pleasure of lexical onomatopoeia, admits that this 
experience of language ‘seems to depend upon a semantic content [of the 
lexical onomatopoeia] that is relatable to some aspect of the physical 
characteristics of speech’.80 This is precisely the aspect of his point that I have 
been exploring, but it ultimately confines his conclusions to a very limited 
scope. Starting from a discussion regarding the true nature of the poetic 
function, Attridge weighs antagonistic theoretical and philosophical positions 
regarding the very functioning of language. In the end, his ‘answer’ to the 
problematic question lies in one type of language use (onomatopoeia) of a 
specific kind (lexical) that has a specific semantic content (the ‘physical 
characteristics of speech’). Even though I do not disagree with his conclusions 
and their relevance to the overall issue of linguistic representation, they are 
nevertheless too narrow in scope and application to be able to address the 
issue of poetic language and its relationship to animal ‘reality’. 
 
Three levels of poetic experience 
I propose to analyse how ‘The Thought-Fox’ responds – or attempts to respond 
– to this issue. From the start, the poem offers us the possibility to expand 
Attridge’s formulations by means of its use of visual onomatopoeia. As we saw, 
                                                                
80 Ibid., p. 151. 
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Derrida suggested that something in literature is tied to the substance of 
written expression, to the point that the emphasis laid by Russian formalists – 
such as Jakobson – on poetry as an inherently oral medium limited their 
exploration of the poetic function. 
The relationship, mentioned above, between internal poetic imagination 
and external (animal) reality is duplicated in the poem’s confusing set-up of 
interior and exterior. ‘Through the window I see no star:’ (l. 5) irresistibly draws 
attention to the outside world visible from the room where the speaker is, only 
to dismiss it as either inaccessible or uninteresting. Rather, ‘something more 
near’ (l. 6) is the topic of the poem, which is located ‘deeper within darkness’ (l. 
7). The image of depth seems to reinforce the notion of nearness and 
interiority, but this description is introduced with a ‘though’ – ‘Something more 
near | Though deeper within darkness’ (ll. 6-7) – suggesting that deeper does 
not mean nearer or more internal. There is a possibility that the deepening 
actually relates to the landscape outside the window, the dark starless 
midnight. In this way, the poem sets up the paradoxical positioning of this 
‘something’ which ‘enter[s] the loneliness’ (ll. 6, 8) and which seems to refer to 
the same ‘something’ which is also ‘alive’ (l. 2): it is nearer to the speaker than 
the starless night outside, but it still originates or is located ‘deeper’ within 
darkness – possibly deeper even than the dark night. It is, thus, simultaneously 
more intimate and further removed than ‘reality out there’. 
The ‘forest’ of this moment has blurry edges: inside and outside are not 
clearly delineated. Other than the ‘something else’ which is being described, 
two living things are said to inhabit this forest, ‘the clock’s loneliness’ and ‘this 
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blank page’ (ll. 3, 4). The relationship between these living things is confused by 
the first of a series of ambiguous lexical choices. We learn that ‘Something else 
is alive | Beside the clock’s loneliness’ (ll. 2-3), but it is not clear whether ‘beside’ 
here means ‘other than, besides’ or ‘next to, near’. If the latter, it could be 
argued that lines 2-4 are describing the desk in front of the speaker. The 
‘something else’ that is ‘more near though deeper within darkness’ inhabits the 
desk, next to the clock and the blank page, haunting what I call ‘the scene of 
writing’. 
This architectonics of the poetic space is also encoded by punctuation, 
in the way that colons are used to introduce the different levels of experience 
the poem describes. If we understand the colons as leading into a next, more 
internal level, which is then not left until a full stop is reached, the poem can be 
divided into three such levels, which I call ‘the window’, ‘the desk, and ‘the 
page’. Since my overarching aim is to discuss the visual aspects of the poem, its 
spacing and lineation are of utmost importance, but I believe rewriting the 
poem into paragraphs separated by colons or full stops may serve to facilitate 
the mapping of these levels. 
I imagine this midnight moment’s forest: 
Something else is alive beside the clock’s loneliness and this blank 
page where my fingers move.  
Through the window I see no star:  
Something more near though deeper within darkness is entering the 
loneliness:  
Cold, delicately as the dark snow, a fox’s nose touches twig, leaf; two 
eyes serve a movement, that now and again now, and now, and now sets 
neat prints into the snow between trees, and warily a lame shadow lags 
by stump and in hollow of a body that is bold to come across clearings, 
an eye, a widening deepening greenness, brilliantly, concentratedly, 
coming about its own business till, with a sudden sharp hot stink of fox it 
enters the dark hole of the head. 
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The window is starless still; the clock ticks, the page is printed. 
Interestingly, we can see that the third and fourth paragraphs above 
(lines 5 and 8 in the poem) both end in colons. That means that the reader does 
not return from the level introduced in the third paragraph or line 5, but is 
taken directly into a next one. This creates a nested structure in which one 
level is inserted into the previous one, and the poem takes us back and forth 
between them. Fig. 24 shows the levels or realms one goes through while 
following the normal order of reading: 
The first level adopts a matter-of-fact tone of objective description, 
with active, first-person verbs describing how the speaker relates to the world. 
We are in the realm of everyday existence, where each subject must 
experience the world according to their own abilities and limitations. However, 
the speaker here initially appears to be only mildly interested in the ‘real world’ 
outside. The two verbs contained in this level are ‘imagine’ and ‘see’: the former 
registering an abandonment of realistic observation and the latter its futility. 
The colons then take the reader into the next level, which is that of the 
poetic craft or of the artistic imagination. Lines 2-4 describe the characteristics 
of what the first level described as the fruit of imagination. Line 5 again takes 
place at the first level after the full stop of line 4. Again it describes the 
speaker’s ordinary experience of the world and the futile attempt to explore 
that experience. Lines 6-8 depict the moving away from the window after the 
dissatisfaction with the elements beyond it. In fact, line 5 would probably work 
equally well as the first line of the poem, describing the catalyst for the poet-
speaker’s imagining and retreat into writerly contemplation. 
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a. The window (the world) 
 
I imagine this midnight 
moment's forest: (1) 
 
b. The desk (the scene of writing) 
  
Something else is 
alive beside the 
clock's loneliness 
and this blank page 
where my fingers 
move. (2-4) 
Through the window I 
see no star: (5) 
 
 Something more near 
though deeper within 
darkness is entering the 
loneliness: (6-8) 
 
c. The page (the fox) 
 
  Cold, delicately as the dark snow a 
fox's nose touches twig, leaf; two eyes 
serve a movement, that now and again 
now, and now, and now sets neat 
prints into the snow between trees, 
and warily a lame shadow lags by 
stump and in hollow of a body that is 
bold to come across clearings, an eye, 
a widening deepening greenness, 
brilliantly, concentratedly, coming 
about its own business till, with a 
sudden sharp hot stink of fox, it enters 
the dark hole of the head. (9-22) 
  
The window is starless still; the clock 
ticks, the page is printed. (23-24) 
Fig. 24 Distribution of lines into three poetic levels 
Line 8 takes place at the second level and ends in a colon, therefore 
opening up the third level. Line 8’s colon frames the third level as a detailed 
description of that which the speaker is concentrating on instead of the 
invisible outer world. The second level thus functions as a threshold, describing 
the experience of entering in contact with the third level. The latter is entirely 
textual and takes place nowhere specific. It is not a description of poetic 
content, but is in itself set up as an example of the very stuff poetry is made of. 
Of course, the overall focus of the poem is to insist that the events of the third 
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level are carried back to the outer ones – the third level’s fox has the power of 
printing the second level’s page and of entering ‘the head’ (l. 22). 
Thus, the most striking aspect of the spatial arrangement of the poem 
comes at the end of the third level. Line 22 ends on a full stop, which should 
mean the closing of that level and the return to the previous one. However, we 
cannot be sure if lines 23 and 24 take place at the very next level above – the 
second – or whether the full stop takes the poem back to the first level of 
objective observation. The content of the last lines does in fact refer to 
elements which had been introduced both in the first level (the window) and in 
the second (the clock and the page). This unclear hop back to the outer levels – 
a hop whose landing straddles the border between them – works to blur the 
very distinction between first and second ones, undermining it retroactively 
from the very start of the poem. To be sure, the events in the third level, as we 
saw, do affect the elements outside it, but access to it is described as much 
more inscrutable, so that the border separating it from the others must be 
negotiated cautiously. On the other hand, the border between first and second 
levels is almost ignored by the imprecise hop back and the merging of 
previously disparate elements in the same sentence. 
The poem’s goal seems to have been all along to find a way of bridging 
the distance between the first and second levels. It tentatively steps back and 
forth between them, testing them out and experiencing the border. By entering 
a third level and making recourse to the fox’s powers, the poem can then come 
back and wield that power so as to dissolve the border. This is of course related 
to Hughes’s understanding of poetic art as a sort of shamanic practice that can 
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compensate for modern humans’ linguistically constituted estrangement from 
reality. For Alex Davis, ‘the overwhelmingly mimetic impulse of Hughes’s 
poetry is driven, at its roots, by a quest-romance to represent a pre- or non-
linguistic otherness’.81 For Hughes, language in general, langage itself, is ‘fully 
implicated in humanity’s alienation from the kind of unmediated relationship 
with the natural environment supposedly enjoyed by […] the animal kingdom 
and early hominids’.82 Therefore, poetry, rather than a perfunctory aesthetic 
practice, represents for Hughes the very useful possibility of helping humanity 
out of ‘the prison-house of language’. This is a shamanic role, ‘for the shaman’s 
function’, writes Laurence Coupe, is ‘to adventure in the spirit world – the 
dangerous flight of the imagination – to return with the healing gifts of stories 
and poems and songs, and thereby restore the balance between culture and 
nature’.83 
The second level of poetic craft strives not only to represent mimetically 
the world of the first level, but also to question the perception of that world as 
it is actually depicted in this level of everyday, human existence. Withdrawing 
into the second level may at times feel like solipsistic contemplation, but it is 
ultimately justified due to the limitations of first-level sensibility. The window 
of line 5 becomes itself the prison-house of language, and no amount of gazing 
at it will shatter its framing so as to give access to the spiritual truth of Nature. 
It is this realisation that then justifies the shamanic flight into the third level. 
                                                                
81 Davis, p. 31. 
82 Ibid., pp. 28-9. 
83 Laurence Coupe, ‘Hughes and Myth’, in Ted Hughes, ed. by Terry Gifford (London: Palgrave, 
2015), pp. 13-24 (pp. 22-3). 
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Rather than further isolation, the adventure in the third level proves to be 
essential to healing first-level perception. After all, what is summoned 
poetically in the lowest level is precisely the energies and the capabilities of the 
animal kingdom that connect it to those spiritual truths. As I argued, the poem 
announces itself victorious not only in having the fox print the page, but also in 
securing the role of poetic contemplation in the perception of reality. In the 
end, the window still reveals nothing and the stars are still not visible, implying 
that ordinary perception has not been transformed. Nevertheless, the ‘truth’ 
sought in the world is recorded on the page, arrived at by alternative means. 
Poetry cannot itself change the human condition once and for all, but is 
constantly needed to regularly bring, shaman-like, the animal truths of Nature. 
 
Shamanic zoopoetics 
The outdoor scene described in the third level seems to irresistibly take the 
place of the outside world occulted by the window in the first level. The scene 
is blanketed in ‘dark snow’ (l. 9), which reinforces its similarity with the 
nocturnal image of lines 1 and 5. In fact, we learn that not only the snow, but a 
‘fox’s nose’ (l. 10) is also dark – and ‘cold’ (l. 9). The similarities between the 
outdoor images of the first and third levels in a way explain the journey into the 
last level. We saw that the ‘something more near’ was also connected to the 
darkness outside, so that the recourse to the (thought-)fox is justified as simply 
another way of reaching outside reality. A different fashion of apprehending 
truth is available to us, and even though it actually comes from ‘more near’ – 
from an intimate, ancient communication with animality – it is nevertheless 
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rooted in the world. Comparing the nose of the fox to how the snow falls 
‘delicately’ (l. 9) on the landscape is how the poem introduces the third level. 
This reveals a fascination with the appropriateness with which the fox – and its 
nose – can perceive its surroundings. Not only does it apprehend reality 
delicately – respectfully, as it were – it is also in fact like reality: cold and dark 
as snow itself.84 It is perfectly attuned to Nature at the moment it perceives the 
natural environment and registers it. The movement that prints the snow is 
suffused with an urgency which is revealed in the way the poem seems to run 
alongside it, synchronically. The repetition of ‘now’ not only traces the fox’s 
pawprints as they are left on the snow, but also carefully records the careful 
observation to which the printing is being subjected.  
If the nose is clearly ascribed to the fox, the eyes on line 11 come across 
as rather disembodied. There is an ambiguity regarding to whom the eyes 
belong. Earlier, on line 4, the fingers were ‘my fingers’, and the nose was the 
fox’s, just as the forest was the moment’s (l. 1) and the loneliness seemed to 
belong to the clock (l. 3). In the third, poetic level, one is dispossessed of one’s 
one body and one’s eyes are simply ‘the eyes’. The eyes may very well belong to 
the fox, cautiously sounding out the ground before stepping forward, 
submitting vision to the urgency of the movement, which is ‘serve[d]’ by it (l. 
11). Alternatively, they could be the poet-speaker’s eyes, fascinated by the 
active fox now that the speaker has taken a passive, observant position. In this 
                                                                
84 The appropriateness suggested by the similarity between the fox’s nose and the snow recalls 
the notion of a poetic signifier which could, by the means of likeness, accurately represent 
reality. 
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possibility, the very passivity of the speaker is to the advantage of the vulpine 
message being scribbled on the snow-page, produced without any sort of 
human intervention or coaxing. It is, of course, telling that the body of the fox is 
not materialised, either, at least not yet. The poem so far offers only its nose 
and its movement ‘in hollow of’ (l. 15) its body. The speaker is clearly seeking 
out the fox and picking up its traces, this search being mirrored by the fox’s 
sniffing. But, if the fox not only smells but actually touches the objects around 
it, the speaker cannot smell, hear, or reach the fox – or at least not yet. The 
body of the fox must be fashioned poetically, formally, as if in compensation for 
the absence of its real body: Richard Webster argues that, in this passage, ‘both 
rhythmically and phonetically the verse mimes the nervous, unpredictable 
movement of the fox as it delicately steps forward, then stops suddenly to 
check the terrain before it runs on only to stop again.’85 I add that the poem 
also mimes the fox by copying its pawprints as its graphemes, as if elated for 
touching the fox. The elusiveness of the fox’s body leads the poem into lexical 
acrobatics to describe but still fail to describe what is only half there:86 ‘[…] 
warily a lame | Shadow lags by stump’ (ll. 14-5) is both vague and full of 
                                                                
85 Webster, p. 36. 
86 The elusiveness of the approaching fox whose body is announced but not revealed is 
reflected in the French expression à pas de loup as discussed by Derrida in The Beast and the 
Sovereign, Volume 1. Derrida explains that he privileges this expression (which translates 
literally as ‘by wolf steps’, meaning ‘stealthily, like a wolf’) in the seminar ‘because the wolf 
itself is there named in absentia, […] it is still absent, save for its name’, where ‘the absence of 
the wolf is also expressed […] in the silent operation of the pas, the word pas which implies, but 
without any noise, the savage intrusion of the adverb of negation (pas [step], pas de loup [step of 
wolf], Il n’y a pas de loup [there is no wolf])’. He explains that ‘where things are looming à pas de 
loup, the wolf is not there yet, no real wolf, no so-called natural wolf, no literal wolf. […] There is 
only a word’ (Jacques Derrida, The Beast and the Sovereign, Volume 1, ed. by Michel Lisse, Marie-
Louise Mallet, and Ginette Michaud, trans. by Geoffrey Bennington [Chicago and London: 
University of Chicago Press, 2009], p. 5.) 
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suggestion. ‘Stump’ is both a noun and an adjective. As a noun, the word 
suggests that the shadow hesitates next to a stump, meaning the bottom of a 
felled tree or perhaps gesturing towards the lame figure’s shortened limb. As 
an adjective meaning ‘worn down to a stump’ or ‘obtuse in outline’, the word 
may function quasi adverbially, describing how the shadow ‘lags by’, and that it 
is not clear-cut as the prints it sets on the snow. Webster sees this ‘lame 
shadow’ as a description of the fox ‘as it freezes alertly in its tracks, holding one 
front-paw in mid-air’.87 The poem seems to confess that it (carefully and 
vaguely) describes nothing but a shadow because it is what is available ‘in 
hollow of a body’, that is, instead or in the absence of a full body. Of course, the 
sylvan lexis of stump and trees adds to the confusion by pulling the word 
‘hollow’ into suggesting a hole in a tree: ‘in hollow of a body’ (in the sense of ‘in 
the absence of a body’) can easily transform into ‘in the hole of a tree trunk’, 
aligning the fox’s body, movement, and reality with the very significant ‘forest’ 
of line 1. 
The poem then states that this body is ‘bold to come | Across clearings’ 
(ll. 16-17), where ‘bold’ is another instance of lexical ambiguity. In an ordinary 
sense, the fox is described as bold for crossing the clearing since it was up to 
now wary and shy. But in a different sense recorded in the OED, ‘bold’ can 
mean ‘confident (in), certain, sure (of)’, so as to suggest that this body is bound 
to come across clearings. Of course, ‘bold’ also means ‘“standing out to the 
view; striking to the eye”; firmly marked, “pronounced”’88 and thus reveals the 
                                                                
87 Webster, p. 37. 
88 ‘bold, adj.’, OED Online (Oxford University Press, 2017), accessed 27 June 2017. 
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simple conclusion that the shy, concealed fox will come – is bound to come – 
into view when it crosses a clearing and is exposed out in the open, clearly 
outlined by the snowy background of the forest clearing. The typographical 
meaning of bold face is clearly not far off, given the interest the poem shows 
towards printing. Webster supports this notion by pointing out that ‘the gap 
between the stanzas [between lines 16 and 17] is itself the clearing, which the 
fox, after hesitating warily, suddenly shoots across’.89 This point makes the 
equation between snowy ground and the blank page still more forceful. Line 4 
informs that the page is blank, and after the ‘movement’ sets prints into the 
snow between trees (i.e. in the clearings), the page is printed. Against the clear, 
virgin, blank, writeable surface of the snow, both the fox’s body and its 
pawprints will be neatly visible, just as the materiality of poetic writing – or 
printing – is felt acutely in its relationship with line endings, stanza gaps, and 
most importantly the white space that usually surrounds poetry. 
In addition to the visual, spatial meanings of the poem, Webster also 
finds an aural echo of the snow-printing: ‘The first three words of this line [‘Sets 
neat prints into the snow’] are internal half-rhymes, as neat, as identical and as 
sharply outlined as the fox’s paw-marks, and these words press down gently 
but distinctly into the soft open vowel of “snow”’.90 The close vowels of the 
three stressed monosyllables, together with the plosives towards their ends, 
do contribute to the impression of a neat, soft pressure. The nasal consonant in 
‘neat’ could also be ascribed to that overall effect, differentiated from the same 
                                                                
89 Ibid. 
90 Ibid. 
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consonant in ‘snow’ due to the latter’s fricative softening. However, I would 
argue that the poem betrays an impatience with such representational 
techniques. This sort of mimesis has always been available, from the very 
beginning (i.e. the first level), and does not differ essentially from flawed 
perception.91 This realisation is precisely the conclusion of the effort in the 
second level: it struggles with creating a sensibility unique and powerful 
enough to contribute significantly and add to the first level. It cannot, since no 
tricks of poetic language can heal or help limitations which are themselves 
fruits of a linguistic existence. The futility of trying to revolutionise or 
overcome language with language is what leads the poem into the third level. In 
the end, the success of this venturing, if any, is reflected in the extent to which 
the poem demonstrates that it has euphorically touched the fox itself and 
registered its presence in the sequences of w’s. Or, more boldly, it is reflected 
in the very existence of the poem: if the page has been printed by means of the 
fox, the fact that a printed page lies before the reader is supposed to convince 
the latter that fox-writing has taken place and been captured. 
The strange lucid dream quality of the third level narrative is easily 
relatable to an actual dream that Hughes reports having had in Winter Pollen. 
Hughes writes that, while an English undergraduate student at Cambridge 
University, he started to feel an increasing frustration that affected his ability 
                                                                
91 The impatience to which I refer here is the same one Genette registers in many mimological 
thinkers when they admit that specific sounds do not really resemble in any meaningful way 
the things they are supposed to represent. Here, for example, it is clear that the fox is careful 
enough not to make any sound while walking on snow, so that the aural effect of the line is 
based on an indirect linguistic flight of fancy that has been rejected on the first level of the 
poem. 
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to write essays. After a stressful, unsuccessful attempt of essay writing, he fell 
into exhausted sleep only to have a cautionary dream or nightmare. In an 
uncanny resemblance to the Wolfman’s dream, Hughes dreamed he was still 
sitting at his desk, trying to write, in the same room where he was now 
sleeping, when an anthropomorphised, bipedal fox walked into the room:  
a figure that was at the same time a skinny man and a fox walking erect 
on its hind legs. It was a fox, but the size of a wolf. As it approached I saw 
that is body and limbs had just now stepped out of a furnace. Every inch 
was roasted, smouldering, black-charred, split and bleeding. […] It came 
up until it stood beside me. Then it spread its hand – a human hand as I 
now saw, but burned and bleeding like the rest of him – flat palm down 
on the blank space of my page. At the same time it said: ‘Stop this – you 
are destroying us.’ Then as it lifted its hand away I saw the blood-print, 
like a palmist’s specimen, with all the lines and creases, in wet, glistening 
blood on the page.92 
Hughes presents this story as an account of his change of studies from 
English Literature to Archaeology and Anthropology. The dream seemed to 
warn him that systematic study of literature was suffocating the true poetic 
vision and energies of which he was capable. Or rather, they were capable, as 
the Foxman accuses Hughes of ‘destroying us’. The ‘us’ to which the Foxman 
refers can mean the two sides of its own being – skinny man and fox-wolf – or it 
could of course also mean the Foxman and Hughes taken together. In a certain 
sense, Hughes himself as the dreamer ends up being the Foxman, as Pankejeff 
was the Wolfman. He always knew deep down that from his becoming-fox he 
could produce the poetry needed to speak the spiritual truths he felt were 
needed, and his academic study was paralysing his becoming. His own 
                                                                
92 Ted Hughes, ‘The Burnt Fox’, in Winter Pollen, ed. by William Scammell (London: Faber and 
Faber, 1994), pp. 8-9 (p. 9). 
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becoming-fox – himself as Foxman – comes to warn him of that, and leaves on 
the page – on which he was struggling to write – a mark of the importance of 
this becoming. It is entirely irrelevant whether Hughes actually did have this 
dream in his youth, which would then go on to haunt him for decades and 
influence his writing of a poem about a fox printing a page. In a certain sense, it 
is actually more interesting to read this short piece – written in 1993 and 
published in 1994 – as itself a reading of ‘The Thought-Fox’. With this account 
of the dream, Hughes sets up neatly the opposition I detect in the poem 
between ordinary, institutional poetry, on the one hand, and the kind of 
revealing energies unleashed by animals and the ancient truths he would be 
able to study in anthropology, on the other. As in the poem, the writer in the 
dream abandons the writerly space in order to succumb to a dream-like state in 
which an inexplicable hybrid being can complete the poetic work for him. In 
‘The Burnt Fox’, Hughes writes that ‘the impression of reality was so total, I got 
out of bed to look at the papers on my table, quite certain that I would see the 
blood-print there on the page’.93 As in the poem, the sojourn in the oneiric 
realm is expected to have a literal impact on reality, as if crossing the 
boundaries of the levels shown in my diagram above.  
 
The arche-animal in the forests of the night 
This dream diary entry that also works as literary criticism reinforces the idea 
that the journey into the third level of the poem, together with the fascination 
                                                                
93 Ibid. 
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with the material traces of the fox, reveals a suspicion directed towards 
‘ordinary’ poetic language. The imprecise language used in the poem to 
describe the fox, while rich with allusions, seems to point to the futility of 
trying to capture it linguistically. This connects to the heavy conceptual work 
being carried out by the forest and the trees in the poem. If the clearings 
between trees are the white gaps between stanzas – the page itself – it follows 
that the stanzas themselves are instances of trees, small clusters of forest. 
However, the privilege ascribed to the fox-writing that happens between trees 
downgrades the trees themselves and, consequently, of the stanzas as a form 
of poetic writing. This allows us to interpret that the forest in line 1 is also 
being indirectly referred to in line 5: the window is black because it is blocked 
by trees, whose denseness make a mockery of the transparency of the window 
pane. Surrounded by a confusing, dense linguistic forest, the human speaker-
poet craves the clarity afforded by a clearing from which one can see both the 
black-on-white prints against the snow below and the white-on-black of the 
stars against the night sky above – and, of course, the black-on-white of a 
printed poem on a page after the successful work of poetic mimesis. 
With this image of a poetic forest94 that must be shaped and 
manipulated, Hughes comes close to the literary meaning of the word ‘sylva’. 
Derived from the Latin silva for ‘woods’ or ‘forest’, the word ‘sylva’ is used in 
English to form adjectives such as ‘sylvan’ to refer to forests. The OED records 
                                                                
94 It is also entirely possible that the ‘midnight moment’s forest’ from line 1 is a reference to the 
‘forests of the night’ from William Blake’s poem ‘The Tyger’, a famous early example of an 
‘animal poem’. 
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that it also means a treatise on forest trees or the group of trees of a particular 
area. However, ‘sylva’ also has the literary meaning of ‘a title for a collection of 
pieces, esp. of poems’, inspired by Roman poet Statius’ (c. 45 – c. 96 
AD) collection the Silvae. The Silvae are a collection of occasional, impromptu 
poetry, which led Ephraim Chambers, in his 1728 Cyclopædia: or, An Universal 
Dictionary of Arts and Sciences, to define the literary term ‘sylva’ as ‘a poetical 
Piece; composed, as it were, at a Start; in a kind of Rapture or Transport’.95 This 
idea might have stemmed from the fact that, in Latin, silva can mean both 
‘forest’ and ‘material’, cognately to the Ancient Greek hȳlē (ὕλη) for ‘wood’ or 
‘timber’, but which also meant ‘matter’ or ‘substance’. In fact, the OED states 
that the etymologically incorrect English spelling ‘sylva’ (instead of ‘silva’) was 
adopted under influence of the Greek term. This suggests that impromptu 
poetry, composed ‘in a kind of rapture’, struggles with the materials of poetry 
still in their raw state and tentatively tries to fashion them into some kind of 
form. As discussed by Butler, ‘form’ as opposed to material hȳlē is an abstract 
forming principle, unlike the animalized form that poems take when they 
embody spiritual meaning, as described by Hughes. It is as if Hughes were 
rejecting the Ancient Greek duality of ideal form and material substance by 
disregarding the material trees, the poetic stanzas, as the stuff of poetry. The 
third level establishes that form is, as in modern poetics, the material aspect of 
the poem, and that this form is secured by means of the bodily materiality of 
the fox. In other words, the poem takes on a form by borrowing the material 
                                                                
95 ‘sylva | silva, n.’, OED Online (Oxford University Press, 2017), accessed 27 June 2017. 
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body of the animal. However, in a certain sense, it is clear that the fox is not – 
or at least it is not only – an object or being in the world that is then 
represented or mirrored in poetry. As we saw, it is the representation of the 
fox, the mimesis undertaken by the fox, that the poem wishes to borrow and 
register. That means that the fox is less the subject-matter of the poem than its 
actual subject. It is the fox who writes the poem, since it perceives the world 
better than the actual poet can and then writes it down as prints in the snow-
page, which are subsequently copied by the speaker-poet. 
This is a telling paradoxical reversal, for the fox is being asked to carry 
out two opposing tasks. It must, as a more ‘embodied’ being than a human, 
furnish the very form of the poem, its structure of ‘living parts’, which has a life 
of its own, etc. On the other hand, perhaps also because it is so connected to its 
own body, it is able to look ‘beyond the trees’ and find the clearing, tear the veil 
of language away from the window, touch the whole world with its nose, write 
about it on the snow, and thus produce the kind of ‘poetic message’ which a 
poet like Hughes feels poetry is tasked to convey. In short, any animal capable 
of writing cannot be reduced fully to its body or its consciousness – it is neither 
material nor conceptual – and thus must be read zoo-grammato-logically. 
Keith Sagar, both in the book The Art of Ted Hughes and the article ‘The 
Thought-Fox’ defends that the poem is purely metaphorical: ‘The poem is 
about writing a poem, about poetic inspiration, not about a fox at all.’96 ‘This is 
not, primarily, a poem about a fox, but a poem about writing a poem, about the 
                                                                
96 Keith Sagar, The Art of Ted Hughes (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1975), p. 19.  
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kind of thinking which produces poems.’97 For Webster, too, it is a self-
referential poem, in which  
the night is itself a metaphor for the deeper and more intimate darkness 
of the poet’s imagination in whose depths an idea is mysteriously 
stirring. At first the idea has no clear outlines; it is not seen but felt – 
frail and intensely vulnerable. The poet’s task is to coax it out of 
formlessness and into fuller consciousness by the sensitivity of his 
language. The remote stirrings of the poem are compared to the 
stirrings of an animal – a fox, whose body is invisible.98 
But, by the end of the poem, ‘the fox is no longer a formless stirring 
somewhere in the dark depths of the bodily imagination; it has been coaxed out 
of the darkness and into full consciousness.’99 Webster’s arguments point to 
the role that the fox’s body and form play in the poem’s own formation, so that 
it cannot be solely about writing a poem, since the poem can only take from by 
borrowing it from the fox. Of course, the arguments presented by the poem try 
to persuade us that not only is it indeed about a fox, but that its elusive body 
and writing have been recorded. Davis is doubtful, as he believes that the 
thought-fox is ultimately a ‘paper being’. He supports his argument by means of 
the thesis on the arbitrariness of the linguistic sign: 
[The] lack of identity between word and thing, sign and referent, leads 
Hughes elsewhere to lament language as cripplingly unable to 
communicate fully the immediacy of lived experience. From this 
perspective, the thought-fox’s ‘body’ is that of a verbal zombie, a kind of 
walking corpus.100 
The image of the zombie describes rather accurately the poem’s fox, 
which, as Hughes wrote, ‘is both a fox and not a fox’.101 However, Davis 
                                                                
97 Sagar, ‘The Thought-Fox’, p. 1. 
98 Webster, p. 36. 
99 Ibid., p. 37. 
100 Davis, p. 28. 
101 Hughes, ‘Capturing Animals’, p. 20. 
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overlooks the lengths to which the poem goes in the third level to bypass such 
limited language for some kind of visionary experience of touching and 
capturing the fox. The act of recording the outline of the pawprints in the shape 
of the w’s is itself a record of the attempt to signify the fox without using 
signification. The pawprint shape irresistibly seduces the poem itself with the 
promise of a linguistic code which seems to abandon systemic functioning to 
sensually touch animal embodiment itself. However, Davis is ultimately right: 
this visual onomatopoeia, too, works solely on the basis of the differential 
relationships between grapheme shapes. As is well known, Saussure’s thesis of 
differential value is supported by scriptural metaphors of the differential 
character of alphabet letters, which Derrida discusses in detail when 
describing arche-writing. 
In the end, the poem defends a sort of contamination or undecidability 
between materiality and ideality – which is, of course, the basis of the 
functioning of iterable graphemes or phonemes – so that the conclusions 
regarding the thought-fox’s ‘paper being’ or the differential value of the w’s 
seem to apply to real foxes in the real world. If the task of capturing the fox 
poetically results in marks that are, while not totally ‘ideal’ or ‘conceptual’ as 
systematic language is criticised for being, still not completely embodied or 
material, it must follow that foxes, too, are not exclusively corporeal. The 
bodies of animals are also caught in the play of the text, and this play is, in fact, 
the very hesitation gathered in their bodies. In ‘The Thought-Fox’, Hughes 
captures not the animal, but an arche-animal, and records not the tracks of a 
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fox, but its traces:102 not a presence – either simple or modified by temporality 
– but ‘a new structure of non-presence’.103 The traces of the fox are not 
present marks of a fox that was once fully present to print them, but are only 
traces of traces. That what we understand as animal being or embodiment is, as 
the arche-animal, a trace is what Hughes did not set out to discover but ends 
up revealing. The stakes of the poem are set up to accept either success or 
failure: either the fox will be captured in its reality or the poem will continue to 
suffocate in nothing but language. What actually happens would probably 
register as failure for Hughes, but escapes from the initial parameters of the 
poem: the fox cannot be grasped in a simple reality because it is not purely 
extra-textual. Likewise, the poem is also successful to the extent that the fox, 
not being extra-textual, can be and indeed is enacted by the textuality of the 
poem. 
So does ‘The Thought-Fox’ suppose that the specialness of poetic 
language relies on the material opacity of its form or on the transparency of 
signifiers which disappear before signified concepts? Does the poem’s version 
of the poetic function – which, for Jakobson, should foreground the ‘message’ – 
include meaning ‘as an inherent part of the sign’104 or does it depend on words 
functioning ‘independently of their referential function’?105 As Attridge has so 
aptly demonstrated, this question is an aporia, and either answer provides 
insurmountable problems both for literary theory and for (literary) Animal 
                                                                
102 As we saw in a previous section, Derrida’s problematisation of the Saussurean sign (i.e. the 
formulation of the trace) was carried out in terms of its non-simple materiality and ideality. 
103 Derrida, Of Grammatology, p. 91. 
104 Attridge, p. 129. 
105 Ibid., p. 134. 
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Studies. The first option collapses poetry into the ordinary functioning of 
language at the same time as it submits (animal) materiality to the primacy of 
conceptuality. The second option risks losing the very identity of the linguistic 
sign and the relevance of meaning to poetry, and it also threatens to posit 
animality as definable solely on material terms. We saw how the materialist 
account of animal being wrongly assumes that animals are wholly extra-textual 
and that formalism as a materialist form of literary analysis is untenable. 
‘The Thought-Fox’ plays with the impurity of graphemes and phonemes 
– neither wholly material nor ideal – in its attempt to circle animation and 
significance as the being of both poetry and animality. It attempts to capture 
meaning-making as signifiance itself – meaning that does not yet mean any 
thing. At the same time, it tries to imagine the animality of the fox as neither 
collapsible to its animal mind nor to its mere material body. By the end of the 
poem, both its body and its mind are in fact sublimated: the former lost to 
poetic form and the latter absorbed into the poet’s conceptual, imaginative 
agency when the fox enters ‘the dark hold of the head’ (l. 22). In a certain sense, 
the poem’s conclusion comes across as Hughes’s ‘filing away’ of the 
constituents of animal being: its body returned to its ‘origin’ in linguistic 
substance and its mind appropriately fused to the human mind as its model. In 
other words, Hughes’s attempt could never be more than an attempt and it 
leaves in the poem nothing but the scar of the striving towards the ideal-
material significance I discussed above.  
One could say that formally the poem could not but fail, but 
thematically, I would argue that it successfully describes the solution to the 
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problem. It sees in the transparent but obstructed window the figure of the 
transparent/opaque impasse of poetic language and finds in the alternative 
path of fox-writing a way out of the paralysing dichotomy. But if philosophically 
or theoretically the anima-ted fox breaks away from the metaphysical duality, 
its poetic enactment is as fleeting and limited as the mouth-related lexical 
onomatopoeia described by Attridge. Previously, I ‘rewrote’ Derrida by reading 
in Of Grammatology the suggestion that, ‘before being its object, [animality] is 
the condition of [mimesis]’.106 The poem recognises this and tries to enact it at 
the level of form. However, just as Derrida organises Of Grammatology as the 
failure of a science of writing called grammatology, ‘The Thought-Fox’ offers 
the failure of a poetic practice thoroughly guided by zoogrammatology. This 
responds to the conundrum hinted at by McHugh when she wrote her position 
papers regarding the field of Literary Animal Studies. If a critical scholarship 
should not privilege either mental interiority or extra-textual animality, we are 
left with the Derridean arche-animal as the horizon towards which we strive.
                                                                
106 Derrida, Of Grammatology, p. 29. 
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Conclusion 
I hope to have shown that the question of animality poses some very special 
issues and challenges to literary theory and criticism. As Susan McHugh 
rightfully points out, the approach that we as cultural or literary critics take 
towards ‘the animal’ is far from straight-forward and we in fact inherit a 
confusing network of significations attached to animality. One the one hand, 
we can conceptualise animals as radically different from humans due to their 
embodiment, but, on the other hand, we can take them to be only differently 
embodied subjectivities, not unlike the human’s as it is thought to be housed in 
the body. Both positions are fraught with problems and are, in fact, entangled 
with age-old questions about the relationship between materiality and ideality. 
 In fact, it is very telling that most of the language employed to celebrate 
embodiment and materiality is the same used by the philosophical tradition to 
dismiss writing, the sign, and representation as obstacles to truth. This 
connections are systematic and reveal the co-implication of the issues of 
writing and animality. On the other hand, simply accepting animals as 
“differently human” (effectively dismissing the very question of species 
difference itself) registers as a mere updating of Cartesianism, where now 
animals have graduated into having their own minds with which to master over 
their bodies. 
 As I have argued through the thesis, the equation of animality with 
writing (and thus with the signifier) comes undone when exposed to 
deconstruction. Insofar as Derrida reveals that the signifier is itself a product 
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of metaphysical formulations (set up in such a way to secure the self-presence 
of speech), it ceases being a productive concept for theorising animality. But if 
animality and writing have been intertwined for most of the Western 
philosophical tradition, a deconstruction of the vulgar meaning of writing 
cannot but also deconstruct the meaning of animality. It is to the vulgar 
concept of writing that the animal is related, which means that this animality is 
similarly produced alongside (and in the name of) a metaphysics of speech and 
human subjectivity. A different, new – but actually very old – meaning of 
animality corresponds to the arche-writing resulting from the deconstruction 
of the signifier. I name this paleonym arche-animality. 
 The consequences for literary and cultural analyses of animality are 
two-pronged. On the one hand, ‘the animal’, as a metaphysical figure born out 
of the repression of arche-animality, must be constantly underscored as part of 
the discourse of speciesism we more often than not attack, so that the very 
object of study in question in a way represents an obstacle to the study.1  
However, and this is the other prong, it must be kept in mind that the whole of 
the process of signification constantly produces the very concept of animality 
by the means of the articulation of signifier and signified.  
 To be sure, Derrida’s deconstructive readings attempt to locate the site 
where and the moment when a text reveals both that there is no outside-text 
and that its own conventional signifying practices – as supported by the 
                                                                
1 This is somewhat related to Saussure’s project in the Course. If he claims that his linguistics 
must in fact found the sign it goes on to study, Derrida’s grammatology must first destroy – or 
deconstruct – the writing it concerned with, just as zoogrammatology must deconstruct ‘the 
animal’. 
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difference between signifier and signified – are thwarted. One suspects that 
deconstruction reads a text for the the movement of the trace, past the 
workings of signifiers and signifieds. In that sense, deconstruction contributes 
to undoing the recurrent establishment of the human/animal distinction at 
work in any signifying process. Therefore, deconstruction will need to be an 
ally in the struggle to resist the vulgar concept of animality, but as 
deconstruction is never a done deal and always a work in progress, I argue that 
signifying processes require a careful vigilance. In the attempt to set up the 
human/animal distinction and utilise it to signify, texts will expose the 
repression of arche-animality, especially when invested in producing discourses 
about animals. 
In my analyses above, I have demonstrated how the movement of arche-
animality can be located in texts by means of undoing the repression it 
undergoes and looking beyond the ‘vulgar’ animal. I have intentionally selected 
texts from different genres and traditions so as to stress the ubiquity of the 
question of animality for textual procedures. Likewise, it is imperative that 
cultural and literary critics understand the instrumental role that animality can 
have in a variety of narratives and discursive practices, in such a way that 
attention to arche-animality can reveal the full extent and consequences of 
that role. 
 The sustained focus on Derrida is to some extent a response to the very 
deserved, if somewhat selective, fame he acquired within the Animal Studies 
field. Throughout the thesis, I have carefully shown how his early work always 
already contained extremely valuable contributions to the theorisation of 
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animality. I argue that his now famous late texts focused more specifically on 
animality can only be fully grasped in their importance when read as a product 
of these early writings. In a certain sense, his late work depends on this early 
framework. And this framework implies a suspicion of the neat dichotomy 
between materialism and idealism, so that animals will be not understood 
solely as either bodies or minds, and texts will be read for their deconstructive 
pull. Ultimately, deconstruction itself is anti-speciesist. 
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